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MIND THE GAP: RAILWAYS, LAND-USE PLANNING AND 
URBAN FORM: 1948-94
A thesis submitted for the award of PhD by Russell Haywood
Abstract
The aim of this thesis was to bridge a gap in the research literature with regard to 
commentary on and evaluation of the relationship between British land-use planning 
and the management and development of the railway network in the years between 
1948-94 when British railways were in public ownership. Although the research was 
focused on the nationalised main line system, it reviewed other rail systems where 
this was helpful to the analysis.
The research utilised a review of the relationship between the railway network and 
urban form in the years to 1947 to derive analytical criteria and to serve as a point of 
departure for the core of the thesis. The overall relationship between the two sectors 
post-1948 was explored, at a broad geographical scale, with regard to institutional 
relationships, policy, and outcomes with regard to the spatial relationships between 
the railway network and patterns of urban form. The results of this research were 
used to derive hypotheses about the relationships which were then tested in a case 
study of the Manchester conurbation.
The main conclusions are that there were few periods between 1948-94 when the 
ideological, institutional and policy frameworks necessary for a close and positive 
relationship between the planning and railway sectors were in place simultaneously. 
The contexts which were most favourable were with regard to: the location of new 
towns and town expansion projects in the South East in 1950s and 1960s; the 
improvement of railway networks in the PTE areas between 1968-79 along with the 
development of strategic policies for the restriction of major trip generators to CBDs; 
the period between 1985-94 when a surge in the property market was accompanied 
by BR Sectorisation, investment in other forms of fixed track transit, and the 
promotion of major development projects at and around stations, especially in CBDs.
The research concludes by identifying opportunities for further historical research and 
briefly reviewing the relevance of the findings to contemporary research.
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PART ONE
Introduction.
The core of this thesis is focused on research which described, analysed and 
evaluated the relationship between the management and development of the 
publicly owned national railway system and the operation of the land-use planning 
system between 1948-94.
Part One comprises chapters one and two. Chapter one is the introduction and 
explains the refinement of the research focus, the derivation of the research 
questions, and the evolution of the methodology and analytical framework. It 
concludes with a summary of the content of subsequent chapters.
Chapter two is a summary of the relationship between the railway network, patterns 
of urban form, and the development of planning ideology and practice in the years 
between 1830-1947. Chapter one explains why this research into the historical roots 
of the relationship between the two sectors was necessary before proceeding to the 
core of the thesis: to summarise, it enabled conclusions to be drawn which served 
as a point of departure for the subsequent research, and provided a set of criteria 
used in the analysis of the relationship between the two sectors between 1948-94.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
There has to be a starting point for a PhD thesis, a moment in time when the 
research idea first crackled into life. In this case the catalyst was a phrase in This 
Common Inheritance’, the seminal Government publication which was a turning 
point at the end of a decade of policy making which had undermined the basis of 
post-war land-use and transport planning. The phrase followed a discussion of the 
potential use of planning powers to guide new development to locations which would 
reduce the need for transport and/or permit use of more energy efficient public 
transport as an alternative to the motor car:
However, not enough is known about the relationship between choice of housing and 
employment location and transport mode to allow the Government to offer authoritative advice 
at this stage (Department of the Environment (DoE), 1990a, 87).
This marked a resurgence of political commitment to policies which would 
seek to bring about a planned relationship between land-use patterns and transport 
networks, rather than just bending to market forces and facilitating the development 
of urban form into patterns dominated by the locational demands of the dominant 
modes, the motor car and lorry. But the statement also seemed to deny decades of 
work by academics and practitioners to describe and understand relationships 
between land-use patterns and transport networks. As a result, I became inquisitive 
about the history of land-use and transport planning and relationships between 
them.
But why the focus on the relationship between the railway network and land- 
use planning? The reasons for this are to be found in the transport policy debate in 
the early 1990s; the prior economic boom had been accompanied by increased 
demand for travel in transportation networks that were unable to provide the 
necessary capacity. The result was congestion, particularly on the road network, 
which pushed transport issues further into public view. The road congestion issue 
was brought to a head by publication of revised National Road Traffic Forecasts 
(Department of Transport (DoT), 1989a), which projected increases in traffic over 
1988 levels of between 83 and 142% by the year 2025. The DoT responded to this, 
and the accompanying political pressure from the road lobby1, by announcing an 
expanded programme of trunk road building (DoT, 1989b). This typified the single-
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minded support for ‘the great car economy’ which had led the Government to relax 
its influence over public transport through bus deregulation and increased 
commercialisation of the railway network by forcing down the level of public subsidy.
The 1980s had also seen growing public concern at the environmental 
impacts of rising road traffic through exhaust pollution and loss of countryside from 
road building and associated development. These led to development of ‘the New 
Realism’ (Goodwin et al, 1991) in transport policy, whereby the view that ever rising 
volumes of traffic can be accommodated through road building was to be 
fundamentally challenged. It was the resultant political pressures from these 
transport related issues, and concern over other environmental issues such as acid 
rain and marine pollution, which led to the changes in Government attitudes towards 
the environment, transport and the planning system.
In the early 1980s planning had been seen by Government as a brake on 
enterprise and economic growth which; ‘imposes costs on the economy and 
constraints on enterprise that are not always justified by any real public benefit in the 
individual case ’(DoE, 1985,10). By 1986 an Enterprise and Deregulation Unit was 
operating within the DoE which was looking at reducing the ‘unnecessary burdens' 
of planning control through reducing its scope and developing a positive approach to 
development, ‘recognising that there is always a presumption in its favour, unless 
that development would cause demonstrable harm to interests of acknowledged 
importance’ (DoE, 1986, 21). However, the environmental debate placed limits on 
this deregulatory stance. Publication of ‘This Common Inheritance’ was a crucial part 
of the move away from it, towards seeing the planning system as playing a positive 
role as part of what became the ‘Strategy for Sustainable Development’ (DoE, 
1994a).
An important component of this change was a desire to lessen the growth 
and environmental impact of road traffic. In light of the claimed lack of a firm 
knowledge base for offering authoritative advice about relationships between 
transport demand and land use the DoE sponsored research (DoE, 1993) which 
informed the development of policies aimed at reducing demand for travel and 
facilitating travel by a variety of modes. These became a central part of the 
Government’s sustainable development strategy and reflected a major shift away 
from the deregulatory policies of the 1980s towards a more prescriptive regime. For
1 The British Road Federation pointed out that; ‘ the 1980-86 growth in car traffic was 8% higher than 
the most optimistic forecast’ ( 1987,7).
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example in order to reduce car dependency Planning Policy Guidance Note 13 
(PPG 13) stated:
...local authorities should adopt planning and land use policies to:
• promote development within urban areas, at locations highly accessible by 
means other than the private car;
• locate major generators of travel demand in existing centres which are 
highly accessible by means other than the private car; (DoE, DoT, 1994b,
3).
An important goal of these new policies was the development of urban form 
in ways which would increase the utility of the railway network: after years of being 
marginal to the concerns of land-use planning, there was to be an attempt to 
integrate the two. These policy changes were taking place shortly after a period of 
optimism with regard to the national railway network: the late 1980s boom was 
particularly strong in the South East and led to growth in ridership on both the British 
Rail (BR) network and London Underground. Outside the South East steady work by 
local authorities, passenger transport executives and BR had produced some 
remarkably positive results: new stations and the reopening of passenger services 
on lines which had lost them years previously. Town planners were centrally involved 
in these developments (Haywood, 1992). This optimism around rail, coupled to the 
policy shift towards better integration between land-use planning and transport 
planning, formed the rationale for the thesis:
future planning for maximum utilisation of the rail network needs to be 
informed by thorough evaluation of what has taken place in previous years.
Initial reviews of the literature revealed a great deal of material that dealt with 
the post-war history of the railway system, with Allen (1966) and Gourvish (1986) as 
outstanding examples, and land-use planning, with Cherry (1974) and Hall (1989) as 
outstanding examples. However, there were few publications which looked at 
relationships between transport, planning and land development in the post-1947 
period, with Tetlow and Goss (1965) as significant, and very few which looked 
specifically at the relationships between the railways and land development, as 
Kellett (1969) did with regard to the Victorian period (which, of course, predated the 
emergence of State land-use planning in Britain). Only Peter Hall had researched 
the latter consistently over the post-war period, and that had been as part of more 
broadly based research into strategic planning and decentralisation, largely focused 
on the South East (Hall, 1971; Hall et al, 1973a and b; Hall, 1988; Hall, 1989), with 
only one significant publication which looked at railways and land development in 
provincial cities (Hall and Hass-Klau,1985).
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There has been a fairly continuous stream of literature concerned with the 
economic impacts of urban transit systems. This is dominated by North American 
literature (as reviewed in Cervero and Landis, 1995, and Giuliano, 1995) and is not 
directly relevant to the UK situation. However, one strand of it was concerned with 
using land-use change as evidence of property impacts and for considering its 
impacts on transport behaviour. For example, Heenan’s (1968) findings highlighted 
the concentration of high-rise apartments and office developments within a five- 
minute walk of stations on Toronto’s Yonge Street subway. The importance of policy 
and institutional contexts was emphasised by Knight and Trygg, who pointed out 
that:
* the achievement of major land use ‘impacts’ around transit stations must require the
concerted action of other powerful forces in addition to transit-induced accessibility increases’ 
(1977, 233).
However, even British publications in this area, as reviewed in Grieco (1994), were 
not specifically focused on the role of town planning.
The absence of a strong thread in the literature reflected the fact that there 
existed a lacuna in British planning and in management of the nationalised railway 
with regard to the relationships between the two sectors. There existed not just a 
need for research and analysis, but also an opportunity to make a unique 
contribution to knowledge. The main thrust of the thesis came into view: 
an historical overview of the relationship between urban form and the railway 
network with a focus on evaluation of the impact on this of the planning 
system created by the 1947 Town and County Planning Act.
Initially the likely product of the research seemed self-evident: the railway 
system was at best a marginal influence on the land development process during 
this period, and land-use patterns developed in ways which largely ignored the 
potential utility of the railway network. This view arose from a consideration of official 
transport statistics. These show that relative patronage of the railway system for the 
carriage of passengers, and absolute patronage with regard to freight, declined from 
a position of dominance to a relatively marginal position when compared with the 
huge growth in road traffic ( see figure 1 for passenger data). In addition, whereas 
the road network had grown in length as well as in the volume of traffic it carried, the 
railway network was considerably smaller in 1994 than it was in 1948; it had been 
‘undeveloped’. As a result, popular consciousness about planning and transport was 
dominated by images of burgeoning suburbanisation characterised by road oriented 
patterns of development, typified by the ‘edge city’ (Sudjic, 1993) of the 1980s.
5
Figure 1: The growth of travel in Britain 1952-1995
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But more careful consideration of the interrelationship showed that it merited much 
closer study because:
• although rail transport had been overshadowed by road transport, it was still 
significant, and this significance was very variable spatially;
• although certain parts of the railway network had been undeveloped, other parts 
had received significant investment, new railways had been built, closed railways 
and stations had been opened, some lines had experienced real growth in traffic;
• although land development had been dominated by road based transport 
considerations, there were some notable exceptions wherein the transport 
properties of nodes on the operational railway system had been an important 
consideration and there had been a clear intention to integrate land development 
with rail access;
• land and buildings had been released into the development process as a result of 
the contraction of the railway industry and had presented significant opportunities 
for the planning process; evaluation of the way these were treated was a 
significant element of any overall evaluation of post-war planning, as well as being 
of special significance in considering the relationships between land-use planning 
and the railway network.
The relationship between the railway and land-use planning sectors in the 
post-war period was therefore not as clear-cut as it first seemed and further study 
was clearly justified. Also the contemporary commitment to bringing about a closer
6
relationship between urban form and the railway network through integrated 
planning, meant the product of this research held the promise of usefully informing 
current policy making.
The Research Methodology
The research subject matter lies at the interface between transport planning and 
land-use planning. A conventional research approach would be linear, to consider 
various theoretical positions as a basis from which to develop hypotheses to be 
tested by empirical work (Flick, 1998). Theoretical approaches to the relationship 
between transport and development (that is development in the broadest sense ie. 
economic development, not just urban development) are broadly based. Hoyle and 
Smith (1998) cite five essential ideas which underpin them: historical perspectives; 
nodes, networks and systems; modes, choices, intermodalism and flexibility; 
deregulation and privatisation; and holistic approaches. Specific theoretical 
approaches to transport, which have been developed into transport planning tools by 
public authorities and operate at the interface between transport and land use, 
include land-use trip generation and accessibility models which are underpinned by 
theoretical assumptions about transport behaviour (Pas, 1995). These could be 
used to explore specific relationships between patterns of land-use and the rail 
mode. However, they are usually used to measure an existing situation with a view 
to predicting a future situation whereas, from the outset, this thesis was concerned 
with a backward looking historical analysis of very broad inter-sectoral relationships.
Theoretical approaches to planning are equally varied, perhaps more so, as 
the nature of planning practice has changed as a result of the impact of other 
disciplines: as a leading planning theoretician says:
The planning tradition is a curious one, built up through a mixture of evangelism, formal 
institutional practice, scientific knowledge and, increasingly, academic development (Healey, 
1997, 7).
The approaches have included those based around architecture and urban 
design which have produced theoretical models of macro-scale patterns of urban 
development; geography and a focus on macro patterns of land use, models of city 
growth and urban form; sociology and the review of the impacts of planning on social 
space; and more recently the ‘argumentation’ approach based around a new 
paradigm for planning based around the processes of engagement with policy 
making in democratic societies (Healey, 1997).
In considering the contribution of ‘holistic approaches’ to transport and 
development, Hoyle and Smith state that:
It is important to emphasize that transport systems are dynamic wholes, and that their
evolution and operation should ultimately be perceived and analysed in this context. In order to
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understand how any system operates today, what its problems are and how it might be 
improved, it is usually helpful to know how it has originated, grown and developed (1998, 16).
In terms of the phraseology used above, ‘transport systems' can be interpreted for 
the purposes of developing the approach to this thesis as the relationship between 
the railway network and patterns of urban development, as influenced by planning 
policy and practice. As the literature review showed that there was not a robust 
thread of literature on the relationships between railways, planning and land 
development for the post-1947 period, the statement provides a robust justification 
for what is proposed. It is significant that they identified the relevance of ‘historical 
perspectives’ as well as ‘holistic’ ones.
Although it has been shown that theoretical approaches exist to certain 
aspects of the relationships between planning, railways and urban development, 
they were not appropriate to the sort of research being undertaken which essentially, 
was historical, focused around two sectors of State activity, and demanded the 
‘holistic approach’. The thesis was primarily aimed at filling a gap in the ‘historical’ 
and ‘holistic’ literature. It can be characterised as essentially ‘what’ and, to a lesser 
extent, ‘why’ research: after 1947, ‘what’ happened in the railway and planning 
sectors, what’ were their interrelationships like, and ‘why’ were they cast in that 
particular way? The research, therefore, essentially demanded a pragmatic 
approach and it was not appropriate to begin from some narrow, specific theoretical 
position. The methodology evolved on an iterative, step-by-step basis out of the 
process of engagement with the subject matter.
The research was concerned with the railway and planning sectors and it was 
clear from the outset that, before any analysis could take place, it was necessary to 
establish the basic facts and chain of events in each sector post-1947. As these 
were fundamentally bound up with public policy making, as opposed to the other 
sorts of subject matter which other kinds of transport research might be focused 
upon, it was clear that the research was policy oriented. The literature on research 
methodology showed that it would therefore be likely to focus on ‘actionable 
factors’, to be ‘multi-dimensional’ in order to obtain a well rounded and balanced 
picture, and to be ‘nationally representative’ (Hakim, 1997). It was also clear that the 
research would be primarily qualitative, concerned with describing, analysing and 
evaluating the institutional structures in which policy was developed, policy itself, and 
the product of the interaction between institutional structures and policy, the 
juxtaposition of development and the railway network. To a more limited degree, the 
research would be quantitative, as both transport networks and behaviour, and land-
use patterns are, to varying degrees, measurable. As the research was essentially 
historical, source material would be archival, primarily contemporary official 
documents containing qualitative and quantitative material. As the thesis aimed to 
explain the findings it was also necessary to review publications which offered 
commentary on and analysis of the subject matter, particularly contemporary 
publications, as it was important to differentiate between comment and criticism 
which was made at the time, and that which was made with the benefit of hindsight.
The first step was to fix the scope of the research with regard to space and 
time. Given that the vast majority of railway lines in the country, known as the ‘main 
line railways’, had been operated by the State owned industry since nationalisation 
under the 1947 Transport Act, then it was this network which was central to the 
thesis. However, where it has been fruitful with regard to understanding the subject 
matter and developing arguments to consider other railway systems, such as the 
London Underground, then these have been considered too. Given the fact that the 
nationalised railway operated in England, Wales and Scotland, then Great Britain 
was the geographical context for the study.
Under the respective legislation, the main line railways came into public 
ownership and the planning system came into operation in 1948: this fixed an initial 
point in time for the start of the study. The end point was easy to identify; the moves 
in the early 1990s to privatise British Rail had massive implications for the way in 
which it would be managed and would fundamentally change the organisational 
relationship between State land-use planning and management of the railway 
network. Under the 1993 Railway Act, April 1 st 1994 was the date on which the 
shadow structure for the privatised railway came into effect, so this marked the end 
point of the study.
After fixing these overall parameters the second step was to sketch out ‘key 
events’ with regard to development of the railway network and operation of the 
planning system between 1948-94 and to consider the possible interrelationships 
between them. In doing this it quickly became clear that, in order to begin to 
understand these interrelationships, it was necessary to consider the period before 
1948. This was because the railway network, patterns of urban form, the 
relationships between the two and, to a limited degree, the practice of town 
planning, had all existed for many years beforehand. Knowledge and understanding 
of these matters was an important precondition for studying the post-1948 era. 
Therefore the third step was the realisation that analysis of interrelationships before 
1948 became necessary to identify important visible and latent factors around
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which to develop the research methodology, and to produce a position statement of 
where things stood in 1947. The latter could act both as a point of departure for, 
and inform the analysis of, the period between 1948 and 1994.
The historical review showed that, in the period of its development between 
1830-1914 the relationships between the railway network and its operating contexts 
were generally positive, given that the network grew, the amount of traffic it carried 
increased, and most of this was commercially profitable. By 1914 the period of 
railway construction was largely over and the basic geography of the network 
showed little change thereafter. But the economy continued to change in the years 
to 1947 and in response to this, and to the rising importance of road transport, the 
country’s urban geography and the institutional arrangements with regard to 
transport began to change too. The unchanging railway network found itself 
increasingly out of step with the economic, geographical and institutional contexts 
within which it was operating. This thesis is an exploration of the factors affecting 
the spatial dimension to the readjustment which was necessary to reintegrate the 
railway network with its operating context, which itself would continue to change, in 
the aftermath of nationalisation in 1947.
The pre-1947 review explored the relationships between railway 
management and the management of urban growth, particularly with regard to the 
development of town planning ideology, the developing role of the State, the 
institutional manifestations of this, and the co-ordination it produced or failed to 
produce. In order to test the knowledge and understanding gained through this 
phase of the research, it was written up as an article focused on developments in 
London and successfully submitted for publication (Haywood, 1997a). A further 
article demonstrating one specific aspect of planning ideology’s pre-occupation with 
aesthetic matters at that time was also published (Haywood, 1997b). The pre-1947 
review led to the fourth step in the development of the methodology, the use of the 
concept of the interface between the railway system and the land-use planning 
system and a realisation that this needed to be defined in ways which enabled the 
formulation of a set of specific and interrelated research questions as shown in figure
2.
Because, post-1947, the management of the railway network and the land- 
use planning system were both carried out by agencies of the State, it was 
concluded that two important dimensions to the interface between them were 
concerned with institutional arrangements and public policy. In addition, the product 
of the two activities was the running of trains and land development, which are both
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discrete, physical entities with distinct geographical characteristics which are likely to 
exhibit varying degrees of spatial association. The analysis and evaluation of this 
physical outcome of the interrelationship was therefore adopted as a third dimension 
to the interface.
Figure 2: the research questions with regard to the three dimensions to the interface 
between the railway and land-use planning sectors.
1. What were the institutional structures for railway management and land-use planning and to 
what extent did these facilitate the development of positive relationships between the two 
sectors?
2. What were the main features of policy for the two sectors and to what extent was policy in 
each concerned with the relationship between them, as opposed to other matters, and was 
this concern likely to be positive or negative in its impacts on utilisation of the railway 
network?
3. What was the outcome of the interrelationships between institutional structures and policy 
for the two sectors as measured by: the geographical characteristics of the railway network 
and the intensity of the service on it; patterns of land use; and the degree of spatial 
association between patterns of land-use and the railway network?
The fifth step in development of the methodology was the utilisation of the 
product of the overview of the pre-1947 period to provide a position statement which 
acted as a point of departure for analysis of the post-1948 period. This contains:
• an analysis of the geographical characteristics of the railway network which was 
nationalised in 1947; it was particularly important to identify those aspects of the 
network geography which required attention in the post-1948 period in order to 
increase its utility and spatial association with patterns of urban form;
• an understanding of the interrelationships between the railway network and urban 
form during the period when the railway network was the most important transport 
influence on urban growth. It was particularly important to identify the positive and 
negative elements of this interrelationship as they stood in 1947 because, in the 
post-1948 era, synergy between land-use and transport planning would be 
expected to focus on the former and reduce the impact of the latter, if the two 
activities were to be working in harmony;
• an overview of the institutional framework under which the private railways were 
managed, including an analysis of the development of the role of the State with 
regard to the railway system and the control of land development, and the 
relationship between the two sectors;
• an analysis of the development of town planning ideology and railway 
management ideology with regard to the interface between the two sectors.
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The sixth step in the development of the methodology was to study in depth 
the 1948-94 period, using the benchmarking exercise as a point of departure, and 
seeking to answer the questions summarised in figure 2. With regard to institutional 
arrangements, this showed that, although the railway system was State owned and 
the planning system was State operated, these activities took place in quite 
separate organisational domains; the central State and the local State. Conventional 
wisdom about the management of BR characterised the industry as centralised, 
hierarchical, introverted, traditional in outlook and production oriented2. Although 
subject to political influence, this was very much at the national, as opposed to local, 
level and was direct from Government as opposed to any wider political process. The 
conclusion was that the industry was not sensitive to the changing characteristics of 
its spatial, economic and social contexts and that, as a nationalised industry subject 
to central political control, there was not an effective railway industry lobby seeking 
to defend the railway’s interests and maximise its integration into the land 
development process. However, given what has been said already about the 
continuing significance of the rail mode, the research sought to test this conventional 
view. In particular, the aim was to identify those situations where the institutional 
relationships were more favourable, or where similar relationships were used in 
different ways as a result of the interplay of different personalities and/or local 
contexts.
Although a function of the central State with certain nationally derived policy 
priorities, with periodic outbursts of activity at the regional scale, town planning has 
been predominantly associated with local government and, as such, has been open 
to political influence through pressure groups and political parties. It would be 
expected, therefore, that the two sectors were managed largely in isolation from 
each other. But a brief review of the institutional arrangements for the railways and 
local government showed that they were dynamic, raising the question as to how 
and why they changed, how the changes impacted on each other, and what the 
outcomes were for the relationship between the sectors. As both sectors were 
governed by statute, it was important also to identify what the statutory requirements 
were with regard to interrelationships between them and how these changed over 
time.
A further methodological step, the seventh, which developed from this initial 
analysis of institutional arrangements, was the realisation that, owing to the creation 
of passenger transport authorities/executives and other factors, 1968 was an
2 The term ‘operator-driven’ has been used to characterise British public transport generally.
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important benchmark in the 1948-94 period. As a result, it would be analytically 
beneficial, and more practical, to handle the analysis of the period in two parts: 1948- 
68 and 1969-94.
With regard to policy, the review of the 1830-1947 period threw up a list of 
items which would be expected to be on the policy agenda if railway and land-use 
planning were intended to operate harmoniously, and which could be used to 
evaluate policy in the 1948-94 period. The initial policy research showed that the 
agenda for the railways has been characterised by a tension between the internal 
priority for the industry - how best to run the railway, and that imposed by 
Government - how to run the railway at minimum cost to the Treasury. The policy 
agenda for planning was dominated by the pressures exerted by various lobby 
groups; for social housing, private housing, commercial property development, 
farming and countryside protection and, with regard to transport, the road lobby.
The fact that the railway lobby was neutralised through nationalisation meant that its 
cause was only taken up by proxy, by those on the periphery or outside the industry, 
typically when a route was threatened with closure or, later in the period under 
review, by the environmental movement. However, despite the generally negative 
implications of these factors, there were obvious examples of policies which had 
historical antecedents and which were aimed at producing synergy between the two 
sectors: the location of new towns along rail routes; the improvement of local rail 
services serving city centres; the resistance, until the 1980s, to out-of-town shopping 
centres; and the location of some major commercial redevelopment schemes at 
railway stations. The research aim was to put these into context and evaluate their 
weight, as compared with policies which were not focused on integration between 
the two sectors.
The final element of the initial approach to the research was concerned with 
the physical out-turn of the institutional and policy interfaces. The research focused 
on the location of development, the impact this had on the utility of the railway 
network and, in turn, the geography of the railway network and the impact this had 
on the nature and location of development. At the strategic level the research 
investigated the location with regard to the railway network of major blocks of new 
development such as new towns, town expansion schemes, over-spill schemes, 
major areas of suburban development, airport developments, and port 
developments, as well as the impacts of green belt policy. At the local level the 
research investigated the location and design of new development with regard to its 
precise interrelationships with the railway network, its stations and freight handling
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facilities. As, during much of the period under study the railway network was in 
decline, research with regard to the disposal of redundant railway land and its after­
use produced particularly important material from which to draw conclusions. This 
stage of the research reinforced ideas which had been developing about key 
themes which could be employed to analyse and explain the findings. This would 
make the thesis more than just an historical compilation, although that is of itself 
innovative and of value.
Three themes were selected: politics and political ideology; the influence of 
the professions and professional ideology; governance and management theory. 
This facilitated the eighth step in the development of the methodology, the creation 
of the overall analytical structure for the core of the thesis which is illustrated below 
in figure 3.
Figure 3: the analytical structure for the core of the thesis on the railway sector - 
planning sector interface: 1948-68 and 1969-94
Explanatory themes Institutional Policy Spatial outcomes 
arrangements
Politics and 
political ideology
Analysis of relationships at three spatial 
levels: 
national,
regional/sub-regional, 
and local
Professions and
professional
ideology
Governance and 
management
Step nine in the development of the methodology was the decision to utilise a 
refinement of figure 3 to summarise progress with the analysis at the end of each 
chapter. This is illustrated in figure 4 with regard to the first chapter of this analysis, 
chapter three, and demonstrates how this tool enabled progress to be summarised 
and, by reference back to figure 3, benchmarked with regard to the position in the 
overall methodology.
Figure 4: the analytical structure to be utilised to summarise the analysis in each 
chapter: example for chapter three- Institutional Arrangements 1948-68.
Explanatory themes Railway sector Interrelationships 
between the two 
sectors
Planning sector
Politics and 
political ideology
Professions and
professional
ideology
Governance and 
management
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The core of the thesis was very broad owing to it dealing with a long time 
span, two sectors, and ranging over the national theatre. It was recognised at this 
stage of the development of the methodology that it would reinforce the product of 
the research if the analytical tools developed could be employed in a single area to 
show what was actually happening on the ground, in one place, continuously 
throughout the period. Such a case study could serve to ‘ground’ the whole exercise 
and add to the analysis by exploring the relationship between the general themes 
and outcomes identified in the main analysis, and the particular and unique forces 
at work in a given locality, on the understanding that these forces can work in both 
top-down and bottom-up ways. The decision to carry out a case study was the tenth 
element in the evolution of the methodology.
Whereas the chronological approach seemed best for the general analysis of 
the post-1948 period, it was not necessarily the best way to handle the case study. A 
significant characteristic of the research subject matter was the hierarchy of spatial 
domains within which the three dimensions to the inter-sectoral interface were 
interacting: these were the national level, the regional/ sub-regional (conurbation) 
level, and the local level. For example, at the national level the research was 
concerned with the locus within Government of railway planning and land-use 
planning, and the organisational structure for the railways and its relationship to the 
national structure for the operation of the land-use planning system. It was also 
concerned with the major thrust of policy for each sector and the out-turn with regard 
to the general geography of the railway network and interregional patterns of land 
development. At the regional and conurbation level, the research was concerned 
with the degree to which there was scope for institutional co-operation between the 
two sectors, whether there was evidence that the geography of the railway network 
was managed in ways to maximise its utility in the plans for decentralisation and 
urban regeneration, and the physical out-turn in terms of the relationship between 
the changing nature of the railway network and patterns of urban form. At the local 
level, the research was concerned with institutional arrangements for each sector, 
the local policy framework and the outcome in terms of the detail development of 
specific sections of the railway network and areas of land, and the interrelationships 
between them. The issue of surplus railway land and how it had been used was 
particularly noteworthy in this respect. The spatial dimension to the research was 
therefore a unifying theme which reflected the geographical thread running through 
it. The eleventh step in the development of the methodology was therefore the
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decision to employ a spatially hierarchical, or ‘embedded’ (Nin, 1989, 50), approach 
to the case study.
The opening paragraph in this discussion of the research methodology stated 
that, because of the ‘gap’ in the literature, the research could not be approached 
with any preconceived hypotheses. However, as a result of the work undertaken in 
the previous eleven steps of the research, this gap had been narrowed significantly. 
The opportunity therefore arose to apply this knowledge and understanding drawn 
from the chronological analysis to the development of hypotheses which could be 
tested in the case study. This produced a crucial ‘hinge point’ in the overall thesis 
which was directly linked backwards through the chronological analysis to the 
research questions and, forwards, through the case study to the overall conclusions. 
As step eleven had produced the three spatial levels to the case study, step twelve 
was the decision to develop a hypothesis for each spatial level of the case study.
The thirteenth and final methodological step was selection of the Greater 
Manchester conurbation for the case study as it represented the ‘critical case’ (Nin,
1989, 47). Whereas London is the British city most influenced by railway 
development, it is a unique case. It will be shown in chapter two that the extent of 
railway development, and its impact on urban growth and decentralisation, varied 
significantly amongst the major provincial cities. Glasgow, for example, developed 
the most complex railway network which had a significant relationship with urban 
growth, whereas the network in Birmingham played a much lesser role than in any 
other major city, although its network exhibited features which, in the long term, 
became very advantageous. Liverpool was geographically a special case because 
of its coastal location which meant that it was only ‘half a city’ with its urban 
geography dominated by the riverfront. Manchester can be seen as a model 
conurbation in that it developed a complex railway network, but not as complex as 
Glasgow, and the city radiated out along it in all directions on the level plain of the 
Embayment. It will be shown that the network exhibited prototypical strengths and 
weaknesses and played a significant role in decentralisation. In the 1948-94 period 
there was a great deal of change to this network, of both a positive and negative 
kind; this took place in the context of extensive land-use planning activity which had 
identifiable impacts upon urban form. Manchester, therefore, presented all the right 
conditions for the case study.
The depth of the research in Manchester provided further opportunities to test the 
knowledge and understanding gained through submissions for publication: this was 
especially significant as Manchester was used in the submissions to exemplify the
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Figure 5: the thirteen steps in the evolution of the research methodology.
1. Fixing the scope of the core of the research with regard to space and time: the main line 
railway network, and other systems as appropriate, and land-use planning in Britain 
between 1948-94.
2. Sketching out of key events with regard to the railway system and the land-use planning 
system between 1948-94 to scope the research.
3. Recognition of the need for research of the period 1830-1947 to create a base line for the 
core research and develop analytical tools.
4. Development and definition of the concept of the interface between the railway system and 
the land-use planning system utilising three dimensions: institutional arrangements; policy; 
and spatial outcomes.
5. Utilisation of the 1830-1947 research to benchmark the position in 1948 as a point of 
departure for the core research.
6. Utilisation of the three dimensions to the interface between the railway and planning 
systems to carry out an in-depth study of the 1948-94 period.
7. Acting on the product of initial core research to make the decision to split the 1948-94 
period into two roughly equal parts, either side of the 1968 Transport Act.
8. Utilising the product of initial core research to generate three explanatory themes: politics 
and political ideology; the professions and professional ideology; governance and 
management.
9. Further refinement of the utilisation of the three explanatory themes to summarise and 
benchmark the analysis in each chapter.
10.The decision to carry out a case study to ground the research.
11 .The application of a spatially hierarchical approach to the case study.
12.The development of three hypotheses for testing in the case study.
13.Selection of Manchester conurbation for the case study.
specific impacts and implications of general trends and relationships. The 
submissions tested the general understanding and the robustness of Manchester 
as a case study: both were published (Haywood, 1996 and 1998).
Finally, since the research commenced, the contemporary railway network 
which has enjoyed unprecedented growth since privatisation in 1996, and the further 
development of land use and transport policy to seek even closer integration 
between the two sectors (DETR, 1998), means that this research has been taking 
place during a period which is as historically significant as the previous epochs of 
integrated planning in 1947 and 1968. Railway privatisation also means that there is 
an historical resonance with the period beforel 947. It is intended, therefore, thatthe 
output from the research should be of greater utility than just a backward looking 
analysis, however valid that may be. Just as the research has demonstrated that
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conclusions about the relationship between the railway network, planning and urban 
form in the 1830-1947 period were of great value in evaluating the relationship in the 
era after 1948, so the product of this research has thrown up a set of items which 
should be on the contemporary policy agenda if the intention is to reinvigorate the 
railways and reinforce their role in the development of urban form as the 
Government and the railway companies intend.
Conclusions.
The step-by-step approach to the development of the methodology eventually 
produced a thesis with nine chapters in addition to this introduction. Chapter two 
reviews the 1830-1947 period, documenting the development of the railway system 
and its interrelationships with patterns of urban geography. The analysis draws 
particular attention to the role of the State, and the development of planning 
ideology and railway management practice with regard to their stance towards 
these interrelationships. The chapter concludes with a review of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the geography of the railway system and the development of a set of 
analytical criteria for the following analysis. Chapter three reviews the development 
of the institutional arrangements for the railway system and the planning system for 
the period 1948-68. This is followed by chapter four which reviews sector policy for 
the same period, and chapter five which analyses the spatial outcomes with regard 
to the interrelationships between the railway network and patterns of urban form as 
they developed over the period. Chapters six, seven and eight repeat this process 
for the 1969-94 period, and in each case the summary diagrams are used to 
benchmark progress with the analysis. Chapter nine is the case study of the 
Manchester conurbation and analyses the specific impacts of the interplay of the 
factors reviewed in the previous chapters as they crystallise in this conurbation.
The spatially hierarchical approach leads, firstly, to an analysis of the impact 
of national railway system and land-use planning priorities on the broad geography 
of the Manchester railway system and its macro relationships with the growth 
patterns of the conurbation. Secondly the analysis moves on to consider how 
regional, and particularly sub-regional, considerations impact on the development of 
the railway network serving Manchester’s CBD and its relationship to the 
development of that CBD, especially with regard to patterns of development close to 
stations. The third element of the case study considers two local matters: the re-use 
of surplus railway land, and detail patterns of development in a high growth area on 
the outer fringe of the conurbation.
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Finally, chapter 10 draws out the main conclusions from the whole analysis, 
considers the opportunities for further research, and identifies the overall 
implications for contemporary policy towards the railway network and the planning 
system.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE RAILWAY NETWORK, URBAN FORM AND TOWN PLANNING : 1830 - 1947
The aim of this chapter is to develop a critical understanding of the 
geography of the railway network and its relationships with patterns of urban form, 
and to evaluate the degree of integration and/or dislocation between the two by
1947. The chapter will develop an explanation of these findings by reviewing: the 
development of political ideology concerning State intervention in management of 
the railways and the land development process; how professional ideologies with 
regard to railway management and town planning came to view the relationships 
between the two sectors. The chapter concludes with: consideration of how attitudes 
to governance and industrial management influenced the way in which the two 
sectors were structured at the start of the post-1948 period; a policy overview 
which will be used as a point of departure for the core of the thesis; and the 
production of a set of criteria to be utilised in the subsequent analysis.
The underlying rationale of the railway network.
Britain’s population increased from 10.5m to 37m between 1801-1901 
(Barlow, 1940), and this was mostly an urban phenomenon. The geography of 
industrialisation, so strongly associated with the coalfields and ports, was 
interwoven with that of the railway network. With the emergence of service 
industries after 1860 and the onset of urban decentralisation, the railway network 
became associated with central business districts (CBDs) and suburbs too. Country 
districts jostled for the attention of railway builders so that their products could get 
access to the burgeoning urban markets and, when travel for the working class 
became the norm, coastal resorts were tied into the network too (Simmons,1986). 
The network radiated out from London and was dense in the major urban and 
industrial areas, but its tentacles reached out to all but the remotest settlements. 
Network mileage and the volumes of goods and passengers it carried, grew steadily 
throughout the period as shown in table 1.
The railways were built when laissez-faire was the dominant ideology: the 
initiative was with private commercial interests. The administrative mechanism was 
the Parliamentary Bill (Biddle 1990, 27-57), which on becoming an Act gave the 
promoting company the right to compulsorily purchase the line of route from existing 
landowners. The conflict of interest between the industrialists, who were promoting 
the railways, and aristocratic landowners was a point of serious political conflict in 
the early years and the focus of much parliamentary activity:
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The power of horse and aristocrat was challenged by the railway but both learned to recognize 
an ally as well as a rival in its influence (Thompson, 1963, 1).
Table 1: growth in railway network and traffic (Great Britain): 1870 -1912
DATE Length of 
line open 
for traffic
Millions of 
passengers 
carried
Tons of
freight
carried
Gross
receipts
(£m)
Working
expense
s
(£m)
Net
receipts
(£m)
% of working 
expenditure 
to gross 
receipts
1870 13,565 a 322.2 166.5 b 42.9 20.6 22.3 48.1
1880 15,563 596.6 231.7 62.8 32.1 30.7 51.1
1890 17,281 796.3 298.8 76.8 41.4 35.4 53.9
1900 18,680 1114.6 419.8 101.0 62.5 38.5 61.9
1912 20,038 1265.2 513.6 124.0 78.4 45.6 63.2
a Mileage constructed; b -1871
Source: Railway Returns, reproduced in Aldcroft (1968)
It is worth recalling that the birth of the railways came towards the end of the 
period of Parliamentary Enclosure of the open fields (Hoskins, 1955; Shoard,1987), a 
process of ownership consolidation which was indicative of the power of the land 
owning classes. With regard to railway building, this was exercised to develop a 
complex statutory code which empowered the companies to acquire land, whilst 
protecting private property rights. In particular, railway companies could not retain 
land not required for operational purposes, known as ‘surplus lands’, and were 
thereby excluded from enjoyment of any betterment associated with its development. 
These matters were drawn together by the Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845 
(Frend and Hibbert Ware, 1866) and came to be of great significance in the 
relationship between the railway companies and the housing reform and town 
planning movements which, themselves, became much concerned with the land 
development process. A side-effect of the power of the landowners was that 
development of railways had to be driven through by strong minded individuals who 
imposed their will on their opponents, colleagues and employees. This was a 
significant factor in the development in the industry of a tradition of centralism, 
hierarchialism and introversion (Vaughan, 1997).
In 1844, in reaction to the growing influence of the railway companies, 
W.E.GIadstone, the President of the Board of Trade and the embodiment of Liberal 
opposition to unbridled laissez-faire, promoted a Railway Bill1. This attempted an 
extension of State intervention2 in the industry but was fiercely resisted. The most
1 During Gladstone’s time at the Board of Trade he used the Select Committee on Railways and a 
railway board, under the Chairmanship of Lord Dalhousie, to develop public interest principles for the 
consideration of railway bills: these represent the first articulation of State railway planning and are set 
out in appendices one and two.
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lasting feature of the subsequent Act was the provision for third class passengers 
to travel at a fixed rate of one penny a mile. This laid the foundation for the mass 
transit of the working classes which would eventually impact on the nature of urban 
development.
By 1845 the exploratory phase was over and trunk routes linking London with
Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, Bristol and Southampton
were in place: railways were established as profitable enterprises. The defeat of
Gladstone’s attempt to manage network development meant that subsequently:
The Road was clear for the chaos of the Mania, for future construction of blocking lines by rival 
companies, and of hundreds of uneconomic branches (Ellis, 1960a, 155).
When the speculative bubble which drove the Mania burst it took a while for 
investment to recover, but between 1850 and 1875 some 8,500 miles were added to 
the network, giving a total of nearly 15,000 route miles. Mileage expanded right 
through to 1914 to give an eventual total of 20,000 miles (Freeman and Aldcroft,
1985) (figure 6). Most of the later additions were rural branch lines, often known as 
“farmers lines’ as they were built with locally raised finance3: few were profitable. 
Other branch lines were those which intensified the suburban networks around 
major cities. Beginning in 1863, the development of the London underground as a 
largely segregated system was a very special case of this: for the most part new 
suburban lines were conventional, surface running routes of the main line 
companies. It was not unusual however for landowners to offer inducements of 
various kinds to the companies to build lines to access their holdings so that they 
could be developed for housing; the provision of land for a station was typical 
(Jackson, 1999 a and b).
In the closing decades of the nineteenth century the ‘water gaps’ in the main 
line network were closed by some remarkable feats of engineering. Brunei had set 
the standard in 1859 with his innovative Royal Albert Bridge at Saltash, and the 
Severn Tunnel and Forth Bridge were worthy successors. The extremities of the 
network were completed by the opening of lines to Kyle of Lochalsh in 1897,
2 This included provisions for nationalisation, although the preconditions were sufficiently complex for 
these never to be implemented.
3 By contrast local routes in France, known as ‘Chemins de fer d’lnteret Local’ were built using local 
and national sources of public funds, only strategic routes, known as ‘Chemins de fer d’lnteret 
National’ were privately funded, although even these were centrally planned.
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Figure 6: the railway network 1914
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Padstow in 1899 and Mallaig in 19014. The railway entered its Edwardian heyday 
and the emphasis changed to fine tuning with construction of ‘cut-offs’ (short cuts) 
typified by the last piece of main line railway built until the 1980s. This was the Great 
Western and Great Central Joint Line opened in 1906 between West London and 
Aynho Junction near Banbury, via High Wycombe (Edwards and Pigram, 1982), 
which shortened the Paddington-Birmingham route by 19 miles.
Laissez-faire meant that the mature railway network exhibited certain key 
characteristics. Route duplication was one: for example there were two between 
London and Exeter/Plymouth, two between London and Birmingham, and four 
between London and Manchester. Duplication extended to the lines between 
provincial cities: there were two between Manchester and Leeds, two between 
Manchester and Sheffield, and five between Manchester and Liverpool. There was 
route duplication at the local level too. On Clydeside, which developed the densest 
network outside London (Smith and Anderson, 1993), Barrhead had three stations 
and two routes to Glasgow, Renfrew had five stations and two routes, and Paisley 
had seven stations and three routes.
A second feature was that the focus on London meant that cross-country 
routes were usually engineered to a lesser standard only enabling journeys at 
slower speeds than on the main lines, with few through running trains5. The most 
notable exceptions included the York-Sheffield-Birmingham-Bristol route, Edinburgh- 
Glasgow, and the routes across the Pennines linking Liverpool and Manchester with 
Leeds, Sheffield and Hull.
Although the companies resisted State regulation, they did engage in 
planning to meet corporate goals. As the network developed, lines connected and 
companies developed common interests which led to the creation of the Railway 
Clearing House, in 1842 (Bagwell, 1968), which facilitated further co-operation. This 
produced horizontal integration: amalgamations to secure territorial supremacy, the 
maximisation of traffic and economies of scale, initiated by formation of the Midland 
Railway in 1844 with an empire stretching from York through Sheffield to 
Birmingham and Bristol. As parliamentary control over railway operation increased, 
amalgamations proliferated and, by 1870, 83 per cent of total railway revenue 
accrued to only fifteen companies (Freeman and Aldcroft, 1988, 33). The creation of
4 As an illustration of the growing involvement of the State in railway development in Britain, the lines 
from Strome Ferry to Kyle of Lochalsh and Fort William to Mallaig were financed by the Government 
for social/political reasons (Thomas, 1991, ppl09-123).
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large companies with ample resources led to a third characteristic of the network, 
duplication of facilities: if different companies had lines serving a particular city, each 
had separate passenger and goods facilities as increasing State regulation of prices 
restricted competition to quality of service. Duplication reduced network benefits and 
increased overheads.
Territoriality was associated with a fourth characteristic, gaps in the network 
at the interface between company territories: these typically occurred around city 
centres, where companies might approach from different directions. Because of the 
expense of making a connection across the city centre, probably by tunnelling, this 
was often never achieved: Manchester, Liverpool, Bradford and Glasgow were prime 
examples with London as a special case.
The railway system in the period 1914-39.
This period was a watershed for the railways as their dominance ended. 
Competition from tram and motorbus networks led to the reduction, or even 
complete withdrawal, of passenger services from some inner urban stations in most 
conurbations. Road haulage grew rapidly too and, as a deregulated industry it had 
the freedom to cherry pick the most profitable cargoes. In 1928 the railway 
companies were empowered to develop their own fleets of buses and lorries, which 
encouraged co-ordination between road and rail services, but the extent of this was 
limited. As road infrastructure developed and influenced urban form, the issue for the 
railway system was whether or not its operational role could be successfully adjusted 
to the new conditions, and whether its spatial integration with its markets would be 
successfully maintained.
During the Great War a Railway Executive Committee managed the railways 
as a unified system and significant economies were achieved (Aldcroft, 1968, 31). 
In 1919 the Ministry of Transport was established which suggested that railway 
nationalisation, was on the agenda. The companies fought against this and, 
instead, the 1921 Railways Act grouped them into the ‘Big Four’ in 1923: these 
had separate networks, giving them more or less geographical monopolies radiating 
out from London, and comprised the London Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS), 
the London North Eastern Railway (LNER), the Great Western Railway (GWR), and 
the Southern Railway (SR).
5 Bonavia (1995,105) refers to the Oxford-Cambridge route which had the potential to facilitate 
‘cultural exchanges’ between the two universities, whereas the reality was that these were usually 
effected via the waiting room at Bletchley.
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Competition from the roads and loss of traffic associated with the 
Depression, meant that the railway companies had their backs to the wall. These 
difficulties and structural problems arising from the Grouping, meant that 
managements were pre-occupied with internal matters. Between 1920-38 the 
number of rail passenger journeys fell by 40 per cent (table 2), although passenger 
mileage increased by a small amount: but this was totally eclipsed by the increase 
in bus and coach travel (table 3). Freight tonnage lifted fell by 16.8 per cent and 
freight tonne kilometres decreased by 13per cent. Also the financial performance of 
the railway companies failed to live up to expectations as, although they remained in 
profit, net receipts were below those for 1913 for every year between 1923 and 
1939. The decline of the railways, the growth of road traffic and the pursuit of 
integrated transport became the subject of both popular (The Times, 1932) and 
official (Hurcomb,1935) debate.
Table 2: British railways passenger and freight traffic: 1919-1938
Year Passenger Freight Tonnes Of Which Coal Freight Tonne -
Journeys (1) and Coke kilometres
Million Billion
Million Million
1919 2,064 310 183
1923 1,772 349 226 31.01928 1,250 331 190 29.01933 1,159 255 168 24.61938 1,237 270 176 26.6
(1) Figures include free-hauled (ie. departmental) traffic on revenue earning trains 
Source: DoT, Transport Statistics, London, HMSO, 1984
Table 3 Estimated number of passenger miles travelled by final consumers on public 
land transport in the U.K 1920-38 (m)
1920 1929 1938Railways 19,214 18,912 20,009Tramways and trolleys 8,058 9,494 8,148Buses and coaches 3,457 11,307 19,037Taxis and hire cars 1,624 929 587Horse drawn vehicles 216 63 13Total 32,569 40,705 47,794
Source: Stone R., and Rowe D.A., 1966, The Measurement of Consumers’ Expenditure and 
Behaviour in the UK, 1920-38, Vol. 2; reproduced in Aldcroft, 1968, 56.
Technologically the period saw refinement of steam locomotive design. 
Some suburban services were electrified, particularly on the Southern, and there 
was experimentation with the use of diesel power. But there was nothing like the 
development of main line diesel and electric traction as occurred in North America
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where, by 1940, they were used to operate the majority of express passenger 
services (Allen, 1941). During the economic recovery of the late thirties there was 
competition for public attention through the operation of special express services, 
typified by the ‘Silver Jubilee’ and ‘Cheltenham Flyer’. These earned the railways a 
place in the heart of the nation, but most services saw little improvement and most 
suburban services were typified by slow speeds and grimy carriages.
The handling of freight saw little change; even in 1939 it was based on 
wagonload traffic6 wherein wagons had to be shunted and re-shunted into different 
trains as they made their way from origin to destination, with goods getting damaged 
and delayed in the process. There was investment in automated marshalling yards at 
Toton, March and Feltham, and containerisation was introduced, but generally 
innovation in freight handling was limited. The traditional methods were very 
vulnerable to competition from road haulage and failed to build on the competitive 
advantage of railways: the ability to move large loads quickly over medium and long 
distances. The railways remained hamstrung by their common carrier obligation7 too; 
this was such a burden that the companies belatedly launched the ‘Square Deal’ 
campaign in 1938 to have it removed. The MoT was sympathetic but the outbreak of 
war prevented progress.
The Grouping improved efficiency; between 1928-38 the number of 
locomotives was reduced by 17 per cent, and the railway workforce was reduced 
from 735,870 in 1921 to 588,517 in 1939. Some companies, particularly the GWR, 
developed quite an extensive network of feeder bus and lorry services. But, 
generally, the heavy investment by the railway companies in bus companies8 did not 
lead to bus-rail integration, but to bus services complementing rail. One positive 
outcome was that companies9 became members of Joint Operating Committees 
with the local authorities who ran the municipal bus services, so that new bus 
services running into the towns could be properly co-ordinated with those running 
wholly within the towns. This was one of the few ways in which institutional
6 Wagonload traffic occurs where a train is made up of wagons having consignments with different 
origins and final destinations, so that marshalling is usually required at both ends of the trunk trip. 
Trainload traffic occurs where all wagons have the same origin and destination and no marshalling en 
route is required. The latter is clearly the most cost effective.
7 This was a duty laid on railway companies by parliament in return for the monopoly on freight 
transport which passage of a railway act bestowed on them: they had to accept for carriage any item 
submitted by a customer.
8 They had an interest in 47% of the 41,500 buses on British roads in 1931 (Aldcroft, 1968, 86).
9 This was a particular feature in the territory of the LMS
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relationships were developed to embrace the railway companies and local authorities 
(Hellewell, 1996).
But generally, there was no fundamental innovation to create a base on which the 
railways could compete with road technology (Joy, 1973; Hamilton and Potter, 1985). 
The relationships between the railways and urban form 1830-1914: the 
industrial districts.
Bulk freight haulage, particularly coal, was the underlying rationale of the 
network. In the coalfields the complexity and duplication of routes was remarkable: 
in the Welsh Valleys, for example, five companies with at least two or three routes in 
each valley served 72 collieries. The railways were also closely involved with 
development of the iron and steel industry, heavy engineering, town gas plants, 
breweries and the like. Industrial activity created demand for labour, leading to the 
development of industrial townships and demand for passenger services too10. As 
for the railway companies themselves, engineering complexes developed at Crewe, 
Doncaster, Swindon and their many counterparts. In the larger cities huge 
agglomerations of rail-served industries developed as around Stratford in the East 
End, or east Manchester and northern Glasgow (Kellett, 1979; Simmons, 1986). 
Large port complexes developed with their own internal railway systems: the largest 
was, of course, London, and all the major railway companies sought to gain access. 
In other areas specific ports were associated with particular companies, a notable 
example being the Great Central with Immingham.
So there was a close correlation between the location of industry and the 
geography of the railway network, although this is not to say that every factory was 
rail connected. Most were not and the short distance carting of raw materials and 
part-finished or finished goods was important in every industrial area.
The lack of control over urban development meant that industry was often 
associated with appalling environmental conditions. It was not uncommon for railway 
routes approaching city centres to be elevated on brick viaducts so as to avoid 
interference with street level traffic. Frequently these fixed the limits of city centres 
and, usually, they were associated with railway goods facilities, areas of noxious 
industry and sub-standard housing, as for example in Ancoats, Manchester (Kellett, 
1979, 338). Concern over these triggered calls for State intervention and, through 
association, led to railways being seen in a negative light by those concerned with 
public health, housing and town planning, a point of view which was to persist:
10 That around Denaby and Cadeby Collieries in South Yorkshire was typical (Booth, 1990).
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It was unfortunate that just at this period of lowest ebb in England’s control of urban growth 
and when the onrush of town building was commencing, the Railways should enter upon the 
transport scene. Hailed as the prime symbol of industrial success and so armed with despotic 
powers, they became a new tyrant dominating our cities with much less regard to the general 
convenience than the old aristocratic planner (Abercrombie, 1944a, 81-82).
The relationships between railways and urban form 1830-1914: the CBD.
There was a close relationship between the growth of CBDs and railway 
traffic: railway companies were directly associated with hotels, warehousing, retail 
and office developments and, by 1890, were owners of up to 9 per cent of city 
centre land in the five biggest cities, and directly influenced the function of up to 20 
per cent (Kellett, 1979, 318). The location of major railway stations became a factor 
of enduring significance because of the difficulties involved in altering their location, 
and the implications of this for their relationship with the CBD.
Competition between the railway companies for access to central London 
was particularly fierce: Parliament’s policy of restricting surface railway construction 
produced the now familiar pattern of termini around the ‘quadrilateral’, leading to the 
need for movement between them to make cross-London journeys, and for access 
into the City and West End. The solution was a local, underground system and the 
first line, built by cut and cover techniques, opened in 1863. After encouragement by 
Parliament (SC, 1863, 1-2), this became the Inner Circle, completed in 1884. In 
1890 came a new generation of electrically powered, deep ‘tube’ railways which 
traversed the quadrilateral rather than running around it. By 1907 they were linking 
new suburbs with the heart of the City and West End (Croome and Jackson, 1993) 
(see appendix 3 for chronology).
In the first decade of the twentieth century the street tramway networks, built 
under the 1870 Tramways Act, were being electrified so successfully that they 
took a slice out of London’s inner suburban railway traffic because of their 
convenience for shorter journeys (Barker and Robbins, 1974, 159). The response 
of the railway companies was to develop their outer suburban services, but also 
they began to electrify their inner suburban services (see appendices 4 and 5): so 
despite competition, rail traffic continued to grow.
London’s dominance of the urban hierarchy and the severity of its urban 
problems mean that it had paradigm status as a planning problem (Haywood, 1997). 
The railway network was a principal component of this: the debate about 
overcrowding, the need to provide land for commercial expansion, and the need to 
widen access to the suburbs, all hinged around the capacity of the network, with 
congestion throughout much of it indicating the stress it was experiencing. In the
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absence of any State directed co-ordination, trains, trams and buses competed with 
each other. However, the more astute managers of the various private 
undertakings began to realise that there were commercial benefits to be gained from 
amalgamation, as exemplified by the creation of the Underground Electric Railway 
Company (UERL) in 1902. The work of Frank Pick (Barman, 1979), typified this: he 
developed a poster and branding campaign to promote the Underground as a 
network and, after 1912, when the Underground took over the London General 
Omnibus Company he:
 began to develop feeder buses from the tube termini, on the model of Yerkes’ original
tramways plan. Within six months, with a new slogan “ where the Railway Ends the Motor 
Bus begins” he more than doubled the number of routes, and extended the service area five 
times (Hall, 1988,64).
There was not prolonged competition by railway companies to penetrate 
deeper into the heart of provincial CBDs; the traffic potential was not there to make 
such huge investments viable. For the most part railway termini remained where they 
had been located from the outset, or re-established soon afterwards, with a general 
absence of tunnelling, either for main line railways or ‘tube’ lines. Termini generally 
were peripheral, so journeys had to be completed by a walk, or tram or cab ride. 
Notable exceptions were Glasgow, where bridges were built to bring lines over the 
Clyde into the city centre, and Birmingham, where lines from north and south were 
linked by tunnel with a large excavation to create the centrally located New Street 
station. Glasgow was the only provincial city to see construction of a circular tube 
railway under the city centre, and it also had standard gauge tunnels running east 
to west which allowed suburban services to deliver passengers closer to their final 
destinations11. Liverpool also had an underground line linking the CBD with the 
Wirral.
The relationships between the railways and urban form 1830-1914 : suburban 
housing and town planning.
Even in London, where areas such as Richmond and Hounslow had lines by 
1850, the initial pace of suburban development was slow (Dyos, 1973). However, 
suburban traffic was actively promoted by the companies from the 1860s and was 
associated with rapid inter-censal population growth in Outer London. Railway 
companies to the south and east (Jackson, 1999a and b; Kay, 1996) of London 
were much more interested than those bringing long distance traffic into north and 
west London, as the latter had little spare capacity. This affected the scale and
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timing of suburban development and the nature of the railway networks. As the 
influence of the early town planning movement grew, the railways were associated 
with planned suburbs. Bedford Park was an example, with the most notable being 
the association between the arrival of the tube at Golders Green in 1907 and 
development of Hampstead Garden Suburb (Ikin, 1990).
Construction of lines to city centre termini usually involved demolition of much 
working class housing which was the cheapest to compulsorily purchase (Dyos, 
1955; Kellett, 1979). Few of the occupants were rehoused by the companies, the 
majority being displaced into adjacent areas leading to more overcrowding: these 
negative impacts were well understood by Parliament (RC, 1884, 20). Political 
concern over the housing question grew under Gladstone’s Liberals and Disraeli’s 
new Tories as the ideological pendulum swung towards collectivist and 
interventionist strategies (Black, 1969). This produced various statutes which are 
seen as part of the ancestry of modern town planning (Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning and Department of Health for Scotland, 1950; Ashworth, 1954; Cherry, 
1974,1988; Lawless and Brown, 1986).
Despite the legislation the housing problem remained (Cherry, 1988, 44), but 
reformers saw a solution in facilitating access to better housing on cheap suburban 
land through cheap rail fares. The first statutory provision was in 1861 (RC, 1884, 
49) but mass access to London’s railways did not arrive until the Cheap Trains Act 
of 1883; Ihe twopenny fare brought an entirely new travelling public on to the 
railways’ (Dyos and Aldcroft, 1971, 219) and the growth of working class suburbs 
accelerated, typified by those in the East End such as Walthamstow. By the turn of 
the century the debate around the housing problem intensified (Cherry, 1988, 49); 
Charles Booth led the movement which saw ‘improved means of locomotion’, 
particularly that provided by railways (Booth, 1901, 15-17) as the best way of 
increasing access to the suburbs. Some observers saw that if the railway companies 
were allowed to combine land and railway development a solution could be found to 
the housing problem and the associated need to expand railway services, by using 
development profits to subsidise rail travel (Perks, 1906).
The growing impact of the town planning movement was reflected in the 
promotion by Asquith’s Liberal government of the 1909 Housing and Town Planning 
Act. Although only enabling legislation, a number of schemes were prepared and 
submitted to the Local Government Board for approval before 1914. These included
11 Travel along the north-south axis continued to demand travel by road across the CBD between 
Central/St Enoch and Queen Street/Buchanan Street.
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several examples of railway suburbs, typified by those for the Ruislip-Northwood 
estate in north west London, alongside the Metropolitan Railway’s lines from Baker 
Street (Thompson, 1913,133 and 139).
Although undoubtedly railways did influence the patterns of suburban 
development in provincial cities, their smaller size meant that, generally, the impact 
was much weaker than in London and was very variable. For the majority of people, 
the main methods of getting around were walking, trams and omnibuses. 
Nevertheless, Glasgow saw development of a dedicated suburban railway, the 
Cathcart Circle, and the tunnels under the CBD built in the 1890s improved access 
to the industrial complexes down the Clyde, typified by the Singer works which had 
its own railway station. Services extended out well beyond the built-up area as far as 
Helensburgh, Balloch, Milngavie and Wemyss Bay. Manchester developed such 
classic commuter settlements as Hale, Altrincham, Wilmslow and Alderley Edge, 
(Hodson, 1971). In Birmingham the suburban developments in Sutton Coldfield 
were linked with the CBD by the ‘Cross City Line’(Boynton, 1993)12, but rail 
commuting was less important in Birmingham than in any other city of comparable 
size (Cherry, 1994, 70). Nevertheless, its network can be regarded as a model of 
good practice and will be revisited in the core of the thesis: two well located main 
stations with cross-city lines running in tunnel under the CBD, efficiently linking the 
outer suburbs and industrial towns with the regional centre13. Overall the most 
striking characteristic of railway development in provincial cities was its variability. 
This was well illustrated by Nottingham and Leicester; within 5 miles of central 
Nottingham there developed 35 stations, whereas within the same distance of 
central Leicester there was only 21 (Simmons, 1973, 289-299: Marshall, 1986).
The relationships between the railways and urban form 1919-39.
The inter-war years were marked by the development of the National Grid 
which freed industry from dependency on rail connections to supply coal. The growth 
of road haulage increased this locational shift away from the railways. However, new 
industries were developed which required rail haulage, such as iron and steel
12 The importance of the link between a railway suburb and its CBD was nicely demonstrated by the 
case of the Birkenhead to Hoylake railway opened in 1866. Initially this brought little growth to 
Hoylake but, in 1888, a connection was made with central Liverpool via the new tunnel under the 
Mersey. Hoylake grew from a population of 3,722 in 1881 to 14,009 in 1911.
13 The Cadbury’s model settlement of Boumville, with its own station and freight facilities (Hitches, 
1992), was on the West Suburban Line and planning schemes were prepared under the 1909 Act for 
Quinton, Harbome and Egbaston in association with the Harbome branch line (Sutcliffe, 1981, 84).
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manufacture at Corby. As a response to the structural decline of traditional 
industries, ‘trading estates’ were developed and were all rail connected. Examples 
included Park Royal, Slough Estates, Trafford Park, Treforest, the Team Valley and 
Hillingdon. So, despite the general erosion of rail’s association with industry, the 
outcome of change was not wholly negative.
Political unrest during the Great War led to Lloyd George initiating the 
‘Homes Fit for Heroes’ campaign (Swenarton, 1981), implemented by the 1919 
Housing and Town Planning Act. Perhaps the best known of the council housing 
schemes developed under this was that by the London County Council (LCC) at 
Becontree, in east London. Construction started in 1920 and; ‘By the end of the 
thirties, its population had reached about 116,000, accommodated in 25,769 
dwellings’ (Jackson,1991, 235). Despite the obvious need and potential for 
integrated land-use and transportation planning by building on such a scale, this took 
a long time to be realised, and only then by the Underground. This lack of railway 
connections to new council housing was not untypical; Manchester’s Wythenshawe 
and Liverpool’s Speke were similarly left off the railway network. It was significant 
that from around 1900, the municipalities developed their own tram and bus services 
and that the importance of linking council housing schemes to these had been 
emphasised by the Tudor Walters report.
Despite the intensity of local authority house construction, three quarters of 
the 4 million houses built between 1919 and 1939 were erected by private builders. 
Because of imbalances in regional economies, most were in the Midlands and South 
East, particularly around London. It was here that concerns increased over loss of 
farmland and the failure to produce balanced settlements with community facilities 
and employment. Improving motor bus services led to ‘ribbon development’ along 
arterial roads: this became the subject of particular criticism and statutory control 
under the 1935 Restriction of Ribbon Development Act.
There were some notable exceptions to the relatively declining role of the 
railways, particularly around London, where railway companies were centrally 
involved in suburban growth. The Metropolitan Railway Company had underground 
lines in central London and a surface extension out to Aylesbury, opened in 1892, 
and was unique in circumventing the general ruling that railway companies should 
not be involved with land development (Jackson, 1986). Electrification out to 
Uxbridge was complete by 1905 and, by 1914, development on surplus lands had 
commenced at Pinner. In 1919, in order to provide a more legally watertight basis for 
its development activities, the Metropolitan set up the Metropolitan Railway Country
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Estates Company (MRCE) and marketed its developments under the banner of 
‘Metroland’ (Edwards and Pigram, 1979, 1988; Jackson, 1991). This was a 
significant contribution to the massive population growth in Middlesex which 
experienced ‘five times the (percentage) increase for England and Wales, and the 
highest recorded for any county’ (Cherry, 1988, 95).
The MRCE encountered no serious opposition to its activities but other 
railway companies did not follow suit, despite the Metropolitan’s call for general 
legislation to enable them to do so (Selbie14,1921). Nevertheless, south of the 
Thames the Southern demonstrated that they had a common interest with 
developers and this acted as a spur to the improvement of services. Booth and his 
associates had recognised that:
Inner South and Outer South London are like two cisterns, the one brimming over and the 
other empty; a junction pipe is all that is needed to redress the level in one, and make the other 
serve a useful purpose (Browning Hall, 1902).
Electrification and construction of new routes were the answer, with the 
added bonus that removal of dirty steam trains made the system more attractive to 
passengers. Appendix four shows that, under the intelligent management of Herbert 
Walker (Klapper, 1973) the Southern electrified the routes out as far as Orpington, 
Sutton, Dorking, Guildford and Windsor by 193015. Subsequently electrification 
reached the South Coast allowing the introduction of that most famous commuter 
train, the Brighton Belle. The attendant suburban growth (Jackson, 1999) led to 
massive increases in the numbers of passengers carried (Haywood, 1997). Over a 
third of the new stations opened in the London area after 1919 were on the Southern 
and almost all of them enjoyed subsidy from developers (Bonavia, 1987; Jackson, 
1991: pressure from landowners was associated with new Southern branch lines too 
(Jackson, 1999b). The Southern actively promoted the usage of its trains to access 
the new suburbs and produced a free ‘Residential Guide’ from 1926 onwards 
(Jackson, 1999a and b).
After 1918 Pick began to pursue the sort of strategy for the Underground 
endorsed in professional journals;
The electric railways in the north of London are becoming congested and new direct railways 
from the north-west to the south-east and the north-east to south-west through central 
London, pivoting on Piccadilly Circus, are a necessity. These lines should be constructed on a 
high speed basis of average speeds of at least 25 m.p.h., with stops not more than one per
14 Selbie became general manager of the Metropolitan Railway in 1908 and promoted electrification 
and extension out to Harrow. He initiated the Metroland marketing campaign and formation of 
Metropolitan Railway Country Estates Ltd.
15 Bonavia (1987, 83) refers to the marketing slogans used by the Southern: ‘Live in Surrey, Free from 
Worry’ and ‘Live in Kent and Be Content’.
34
mile, with interchange facilities where they bisect the slower lines and with omnibus and tram 
services to feed the comparatively widely separated stations (Thompson, 1922,114).
New tunnels under central London were not financially viable so the 
Underground built surface extensions of existing lines out into green fields 
(appendix three) thereby spawning new suburbs, and rail catchment was maximised 
by integration with feeder bus services. When London’s public transport was taken 
into public ownership under the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) in 1933, 
the New Works Programme was launched with a budget of £40 million: this was 
facilitated by the Government underwriting the necessary loans as part of its anti­
unemployment strategy. Most of the work was completed before being curtailed by 
the War (appendix 3) and facilitated further suburban growth, public and private:
The Edgware, Cockfosters and Stanmore extensions, and the tube routes to Uxbridge and
Hounslow traversed areas that were quickly covered with private enterprise housing, and
of course the Edgware line also served the big LCC estate at Watling (Jackson, 1991, 190- 
192).
The LPTB was also notable for its success in co-ordination of the design of
stations, rolling stock and promotional literature. Pick, who had become the LPTB’s
Vice Chairman, was influential in this field and had long recognised the commercial
importance of the attractiveness of stations and a good public image of the system:
... if the cinemas were temples of entertainment, the Underground stations were the temples of 
travel. Frank Pick, Vice-Chairman of the Underground Group, had called his stations ‘inviting 
doorways in an architectural setting that cannot be missed by the casual passer-by*. To live 
near an Underground station was considered by many people to be the ‘acme of convenience’ 
(Edwards and Pigram, 1986,17).
Stations such as Arnos Grove on the Piccadilly Line extension to 
Cockfosters16, with their integrated bus facilities, were widely acclaimed as models 
of transport provision. As on the Southern, the stations were frequently part of a 
suburban node which comprised shopping parades and other local services too. The 
only improvements in provincial cities which approached this were electrification of 
the Manchester to Altrincham line and the Mersey Railway to West Kirkby on the 
Wirral. Even in London, one of the densest commuter flows, that through Liverpool 
Street, remained steam hauled.
Interventionism in the railways and town planning.
Despite the failure of Parliament to take strategic control over the 
development of the railway network, it was inexorably drawn into the industry’s 
affairs. The fact that, initially, railways were built to different gauges was an obvious
16 The Southern Railway too became widely recognised for excellence in the design of some of its new 
stations (and signal boxes) which employed the modernist ‘Southern Odeon’ style.
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shortcoming which would undermine network benefits. The major variations were 
Stephenson’s gauge and Brunei’s ‘broad gauge’: in 1846 the Gauge Act was 
enacted, despite Brunei’s vigorous opposition (Vaughan, 1991), whereby 
Stephenson’s ‘standard gauge’ was adopted for all future construction17.
The railways had powerful opponents amongst the traders who wanted 
goods carried at the lowest price and equitable treatment as compared with their 
competitors. Despite the common carrier obligation, ‘railway rates’ became the 
dominant transport issue. The traders wanted a transparent set of rates which all the 
companies would have to adhere to with no display of ‘undue preference’ between 
customers. This was eventually put in place by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 
1894 (Dyos and Aldcroft, 1971) and effectively ended competition on price between 
railway companies.
Parliament was also concerned with safety. The records of the Railway 
Inspection Department of the Board of Trade go back to 1840 (Rolt, 1998) when it 
was given the power to delay openings if the required standards were not met. As 
traffic became denser serious accidents occurred: debate around the causes 
focused on signalling, lack of brakes on rolling stock, and railwaymen’s excessive 
hours of work. The drift of public affairs meant that, by the 1900, legislation was 
enacted covering all these areas18 and the State was involved in enforcement 
(Bagwell, 1968; Dyos and Aldcroft, 1971). The growth of safety culture was another 
source of the introversion and hierarchical discipline which characterised the 
industry.
There was an external issue which the State was drawn into from a very 
early date which was directly related to the development of town planning: the 
impact of railway construction on public amenity. In the provinces extensive 
destruction of historic buildings occurred, such as the severance of Newcastle’s 
mediaeval castle. Intrusion did not always evade critical comment: in 1840 Ruskin 
bemoaned construction of the Midland Railway through the beautiful Wye Valley in 
Derbyshire:
every fool in Buxton can be at Bakewell in half-an-hour, and every fool in Bakewell at Buxton, 
which you think a lucrative process of exchange - you fools everywhere (Cook and 
Alexander, 1903-12, 86-87).
17 The gauge debate was focussed around the width between the rails and not the ‘loading gauge’, the 
vertical clearance under bridges and tunnels, which in Great Britain was very low by comparison with 
Continental railways: this came to be a problem after 1948.
18 Brakes capable of being operated by the engine driver at the front of the train were only made 
compulsory on passenger carriages, not freight wagons, a shortcoming which limited the speed of 
freight trains and was eventually to become a serious weakness vis-a-vis road haulage.
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In London, owing to the longstanding ‘Spirit of Improvement’ (Summerson, 
1962) the companies had a much more difficult time as a Royal Commission (RC) 
(RC, 1846) came down firmly against penetration of surface railways into the 
central ‘quadrilateral’. The matter was picked up in the 1860s by a Select 
Committee (SC) which encouraged the development of a diversionary orbital route, 
particularly in East London to serve the docks ( SC, 1863, 2). However, this was built 
on a piecemeal basis, the biggest omission being a link under the Thames to the 
east of Wapping19. The only exception to the restriction on railway construction 
across central London was the link between Blackfriars and Moorgate via Snow Hill 
tunnel, opened in 1866. This was the final thrust in a long battle between the 
companies serving south London to outflank each other in gaining access to the City 
and West End. This produced the series of termini along the Thames: Victoria, 
Charing Cross, Blackfriars (originally St Paul’s), Cannon Street, Waterloo and 
London Bridge. These were accessed by miles of brick arch viaducts which, along 
with bridges over the Thames, attracted contemporary criticism (Wilson, 1866; 
Haywood, 1997).
Elsewhere, in 1883 the successful campaign to prevent construction of the 
Ennerdale Railway, led by Canon Rawnsley, was instrumental in the formation of the 
National Trust and was the culmination of a long struggle to protect the Lake District 
by the group which included Wordsworth, Ruskin and Morris (Wheeler, 1995). 
Opposition to railway construction became increasingly sophisticated and, by 1914, 
the town planning movement was able to develop a detailed and successful 
environmental case against the proposed Northern Junction Railway, an orbital route 
in north west London. However, the North Circular Avenue which was proposed at 
the same time by the Traffic Department of the Board of Trade and would run 
roughly parallel to this railway, did not come in for similar criticism (Reade, 1913). 
This imbalance by planners in their attitude towards the environmental impact of 
roads and railways was something which came to characterise British planning.
By the 1890s Parliament had become so entwined with railway management 
that it became difficult to see where Government ended and private enterprise 
began. There was a growing lobby of those who wanted this to develop to its logical 
conclusion - nationalisation, which would allow operation as a unified network wholly
19 This outcome contrasted with the situation in France and Germany where, owing to military 
considerations, the State was centrally involved in the development of railway networks; construction of 
the orbital Ceinture around Paris was completed by 1867 with a similar line around Berlin completed 
by 1877.
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in the public interest. The Society for Railway Nationalisation was formed in 1895
and the case was fully articulated and written up by 1898 (Edwards, 1898). By 1912
the leading contemporary railway economist was of the view that:
The conclusion, therefore, that I most reluctantly arrive at is that we cannot go on as we are, 
that there is little hope for the establishment of an adequate and clearly thought out system of 
State control, and that, therefore, the only alternative - State ownership - is inevitable 
(Acworth, 1912, 9).
Popular concern about transport problems in London led, in 1903, to the 
appointment of the Royal Commission on London Traffic with a study area of up to 
15 miles from Charing Cross. Their report was a milestone with regard to its 
articulation of the relationship between the railway network and urban form, and the 
policy recommendations for its further development. Tables 4 and 5 reproduce 
evidence submitted by the Statistical Officer of the LCC which contained very useful 
summary measures of network characteristics. This is the sort of data which, in 
subsequent years, one would expect to find in land-use and transportation plans if 
the aim of State planning was to integrate land-use planning with the railway 
network.
The Royal Commission recognised a number of features of the network and 
its relationship with urban form as worthy of attention:
• the general geographical characteristics of urban railway networks including 
features such as route duplication and strategic gaps;
• the precise alignment of railways with regard to urban geography;
• the timing, frequency and cost of passenger services along the component parts 
of the network;
• the spacing and catchment of stations and the density of development around 
stations;
• the precise location of stations with regard to passengers’ destinations;
• the design of stations and their aesthetic relationship to other elements of the 
urban environment;
• the relationship between railway lines and the location of new development and 
the cost of railway services to such development;
• the relationship between railway services and other urban transport modes.
The report showed that laissez-faire had been replaced by recognition of the 
need for planning and effective institutional arrangements, recommending the 
creation of a Traffic Board’ (1905, 97), the precursor to the London Passenger 
Transport Board. The report also endorsed more interventionist mechanisms for the
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Table 4 : Number of stations in Greater London - according to sections.
Number of Stations Number of Stations per Number of Inhabitants per
Square Mile Station
Section In In ‘Extra In In In ‘Extra In In In ‘Extra In
Admin­ London’ ‘Greater Admin­ London’ ‘Greater Admin­ London’ ‘Greater
istrative London’ istrative London’ istrative London’
County County County
of of of
London London London
Western 53 60 113 3.14 .38 .64 15,603 7,001 11,036
Northern 70 55 125 3.52 .43 .84 16,332 7,582 12,482
Eastern 46 51 97 3.62 .34 .90 17,747 13,241 15,378
Total,
north of 169 166 335 3.42 .43 .77 16,489 9,111 12,833
the river
South­ 60 47 107 1.46 .45 .74 13,964 6,294 10,595
eastern
South­ 46 43 89 1.78 .48 .77 19,761 5,576 12,908
western
Total,
south of 106 90 196 1.59 .47 .76 16,480 5,951 11,645
the river
Grand 275 256 531 2.36 .44 .77 16,485 8,000 12,394
Total
Table 5 : Length of railways in Greater London - according to sections.
Length of Railway in Route Length per Square Mile Population per Route Mile
Miles
Section In In ‘Extra In In In ‘Extra In In Admin­ In ‘Extra In
Admin­ London’ ‘Greater Admin­ London’ ‘Greater istrative London’ ‘Greater
istrative London’ istrative London’ County of London’
County County London
of of
London London
Western 35.3 100.1 135.4 2.09 .63 .77 23,427 4,196 9210
Northern 43.7 67.3 111.0 2.20 .52 .74 26,161 6,196 14,056
Eastern 26.6 65.3 91.9 .99 .69 .85 30,691 11,524 16,231
total,
north of 105.6 232.7 338.3 2.11 .61 .78 26,388 6,692 12,707
the river
South­ 66.7 86.4 153.1 1.62 .84 1.06 12,582 3,424 7,404
eastern
South­ 49.3 58.9 108.2 1.91 .66 .94 18,438 4,071 16,617
western
Total,
south of 116.0 145.3 261.3 1.74 .75 1.01 15,059 3,686 8,735
the river
Grand 221.6 378.0 599.6 1.90 .66 .86 20,458 5,516 10,976
Total
Source: Mr Harper, Statistical Officer of the LCC, Royal Commission on London Traffic, Vol 
111, Appendix No 6,, p160, Table 31.
provision of cheap fares to ensure that the railways made a bigger contribution 
towards solving the housing problem; these included local authority subsidies and 
railway companies being allowed to engage in land development.
Despite these recommendations, action by Parliament was minimal and, with 
regard to town planning, only produced the permissive 1909 Act. It took the upheaval
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of the First World War to trigger more radical measures as has been outlined above. 
With regard to the railways this produced the Grouping which ‘....brought to a logical 
conclusion the trend towards concentration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries’ (Aldcroft, 1968, 41). The most complex part of the 1921 Act was that 
which dealt with rates and charges which, not withstanding the new competitive 
environment, continued the nineteenth century regulatory tradition, including the 
common carrier obligation. Rates were fixed at a level to yield an annual net 
revenue, known as the ‘standard revenue’, equivalent to that of 1913. However 
prices were still related to the value of the commodity being carried rather than costs, 
which meant that the railways still knew little about the real costs of carrying 
different kinds of traffic (Aldcroft, 1968, 45). However, their new competitors in the 
road haulage industry had a much clearer idea and used it to cherry pick the most 
profitable traffic.The Grouping deflected the attention of the MoT away from the 
railways, perhaps permanently (Council for the Protection of Rural England, 1992) 
and it focused on the growing bus and road haulage industries and development of 
the road network. The Ministry did respond to growing public concerns about road 
safety, pricing regimes and unfair competition for the railways, by regulating the bus 
and road haulage industries under the 1930 Road Traffic Act and the 1933 Road and 
Rail Traffic Act20. The latter gave the railway companies some rights to object to the 
granting of licenses to road haulage companies. A particularly significant 
development was the 1936 Trunk Roads Act which, for the first time, gave a central 
government ministry the duty to develop a strategic transport network.
With rising road traffic, London’s traffic problems worsened and the large, 
private transport companies were a focus of intense political debate over the 
conflicts between private profit and public interest. As the Labour Party gained 
political influence, some of its leading members developed the case for public 
ownership (Morrison, 1933). This came to pass in 1933 under the National 
Government which replaced McDonald’s first Labour Government, and the LPTB 
took over all London’s trams, buses, the Underground, the Metropolitan Railway and 
MRCE.
During the Second World War the railways were again placed under the 
control of the Railway Executive Committee (Aldcroft, 1968). There was a 
moratorium on investment and a huge increase in traffic carried. The railways
20 A Royal Commission on Transport was appointed in 1928 to consider issues surrounding the growth 
of unregulated bus and road haulage services and the Road Transport Act was passed as a result of its 
endeavours, even before their final report was published in 1931.
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suffered extensive bomb damage and were stretched to breaking point. The 
network emerged with a huge investment backlog(Pearson, 1967). The end of the 
war was marked by a rapid fall off in traffic and the availability of ex-army lorries and 
drivers meant that, despite a large increase in costs, the railways could not raise 
prices too much without fear of losing traffic.
Once the wartime emergency passed, the two main political parties renewed 
hostilities and a debate around nationalisation was firmly on the agenda. However, 
the rhetoric tended to mask the deeper issues with regard to the future of the 
railways: matters such as the appropriate balance between road and rail transport 
and how they could be best integrated; what form modernisation should take; and 
the relationship between the network and patterns of urban development. Once 
Attlee’s Labour Government was returned in 1945, nationalisation was inevitable.
Accelerated suburbanisation in the inter-war period, facilitated by new 
transport technologies, stimulated the debate about town planning. Although 928 
planning schemes had been drawn up by 1930 under previous planning legislation, 
these were limited spatially and were unable to effectively manage suburbanisation 
(Pepler, 1931). The 1932 Town and Country Planning Act consolidated all previous 
legislation and extended the powers of the local authorities to produce planning 
schemes for any land, although the powers were enabling rather than compulsory. 
Nevertheless, many local authorities drew up planning schemes which sought to limit 
suburban growth, but still these were ineffective as the right to develop remained 
with the landowner and, if a local authority sought to restrict this, it would be liable for 
compensation payments for loss of betterment. When faced with this councils 
backed down and development took place (Hall, 1990). The situation around London 
was so serious that the LCC promoted the Green Belt (London and Home Counties) 
Act in 1938 to facilitate the retention of open land for recreation.
The Blitz had a major impact on the planning debate as the destruction 
meant that the task of rebuilding was so great that only the State would be able to 
manage it. This provided the political stimulus for further intervention. In addition, the 
potential of planning to produce homes for all, typified by garden cities, created a 
wave of popular support for town planning. Thomas Sharp’s Town Planning was 
published in 1940 and sold 1/4 million copies (Cherry, 1974,130). This changed 
political context meant that consideration was given to the thorny problems of 
property rights, land values and betterment (Ministry of Works and Planning, 1942). 
The election of the Attlee Government in 1945 added a new dimension, as its 
commitment to the Welfare State meant that there would also be a need for sites for
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the new schools, colleges, hospitals and so on which would be its physical 
manifestation. The new government passed the New Towns Act in 1946, followed by 
the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act which became effective from July 1st
1948.
Planning ideology and the railway network.
Given the association between the social housing movement and ‘improved
locomotion’, it is hardly surprising that those who first articulated town planning
ideology should have had a perspective on the railway network. However it was the
overall design of the built environment which was central to planning ideology, not
its specific relationship with transportation systems: the infant profession was
dominated by architects. Howard (1898) saw the solution to the problems of the
big cities as out-migration to free-standing towns. As people would move by public
transport between the various settlements within the ‘social city’, there was a need
for a planned relationship between walking, electric trams and railways:
Those who have had experience of the difficulty of getting from one suburb of London to 
another will see in a moment what an enormous advantage those who dwell in such a group 
of cities as here shown would enjoy, because they would have a railway system and not a 
railway chaos to serve their ends (Howard, 1985,107-108).
It was no coincidence that Letchworth and Welwyn were located on a main 
line. However, despite this generally positive stance, Howard’s schema marked the 
beginning of the divergence between planning ideology and the interests of the 
railway system as there was an implicit assumption that demand for regular travel 
would reduce substantially. By 1913 he had developed a more explicit critique of the 
social costs of commuting (Howard, 1913).
Much of the debate about the advantages of garden city housing was carried
out at a fairly generalised level; but Unwin used his architectural skill to examine the
comparative costs of by-law and garden city housing. He was aware that an
argument against building at lower density was that it would lead to an unacceptable
increase in travel costs, but countered this by a simple argument:
... the fact that the area of a circle increases not in proportion to the distance from the centre 
to the circumference but in proportion to the squares of that distance, it follows that the 
increased radius required to give an area sufficient each year for a given increase to the 
population of a town is a rapidly diminishing one.....
It will be seen, therefore, that the total additional distance to be travelled as a result of
preventing overcrowding is a comparatively unimportant matter  ( Unwin in Creese,
1967,121 and 123).
Unwin’s arguments about the viability of lower densities were reinforced by 
those about allowing railway companies to become involved in suburban
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development in return for cheap fares. Unwin was critical too of the location and 
design of railway stations (1909, 173) and described how station approaches 
should be integrated with city centres21; his design for the town centre in Letchworth 
utilised the railway station as a focal point (figure 7).
Although after 1919 statutory planning was still focused on housing, a new 
form of planning emerged, regional planning, initiated by Patrick Geddes. Broad, 
geographical analysis enabled him to appreciate the extent of urban decentralisation 
and coalescence, and he coined the term ‘conurbation’ (Geddes, 1915) to describe 
it. His analysis led him to the view that environmental problems had to be tackled 
strategically; his ideas fell on fertile ground as the Depression produced widespread 
dereliction. Also, even before 1914, there was a realisation that the road system 
needed to be improved and that this could only be achieved by planning strategically 
(Pepler, 1931). Regional planning was potentially beneficial for the railway network 
which needed rationalising and its future utility depended upon its continuing 
integration with urban form. However, rail access was not a priority in contemporary 
regional planning ideology: the main issues were economic restructuring; land for 
housing; and the protection of agricultural land. The main transport issue was road 
planning. Regional planning schemes were produced through joint committees of 
local authorities and, generally, the railway companies were not involved 
(Abercrombie, 1923; Abercrombie and Johnson, 1923).
The regional problem and the furore over unrestrained suburban growth led 
to louder calls for State intervention. In 1937 this culminated in the appointment 
of the Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
Population, the Barlow Commission, which served as a focus for debate about the 
relationship between railway development and the growth of London. Pick gave 
extensive evidence which revealed that, despite being a supporter of town planning 
(Pick, 1927), his opinions were fundamentally different to those of the planners. He 
dissented from the Commission’s view that the growth of London was a ‘national 
menace’ and questioned their terms of reference which spoke only of its ‘strategic 
disadvantages’ (Barlow, 1940,1). Pick thought that London should continue growing 
to accommodate up to 12 million people inside its green belt, and that the efficiency 
of the transport network should govern its size, the key factors being the cost and
21 Although the railway companies had built many grand stations, typified by Paddington, St Pancras 
and Bristol Temple Meads, typically these were not integrated into grander set pieces of civic design. 
The North Staffordshire Railway’s Stoke on Trent station was unusual in this respect as it was part of a 
square, the other sides of which were made up by the railway company’s hotel and housing for railway 
workers, all built in a unified style (Biddle, 1986).
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Figure 7: Unwin and the station place.
Ufchworth Sfahcn
Source: Unwin, 1909.
time of travel:
The conclusion from these two approaches to the problem is broadly, so far at any rate as 
the centrifugal movement of the population is concerned, that London cannot become fully 
developed beyond a zone stretching roughly 12 to 15 miles from the centre (Pick, 
1938,358).
Frederic Osborn gave evidence on behalf of the Garden Cities and Town 
Planning Association and did not see Pick’s data on per capita growth in journeys as 
indicative of an improving quality of life:
Industrial techniques shorten hours, and this ought to mean more leisure. But in the great 
towns much of the released time gets used up in longer travelling - a fantastic way to waste 
the benefits of progress (Osborn, 1938, 742).
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He had no truck with the idea that land-use zoning should be manipulated to 
balance flows along public transport corridors and considered that city growth of the 
type envisaged by Pick led to increased waste of money, time and human energy. 
He favoured decentralisation to self-contained satellite towns where, with a 
population of 50,000 at 25 persons per acre, the average distance between home 
and work or countryside would be half a mile.
The Barlow Report’s watchwords were ‘redevelopment, decentralisation and 
dispersal’ (Barlow, 1940, 196). It was imbued with the view that ‘Railway
transport is one of the largest contracting industries’ (1940, 41) and had much
more to say about road traffic and its impact on urban form. It expressed concern at 
the increasing amount of travel and congestion in London which it saw as a product 
of railway-oriented suburbanisation. The final recommendations called for 
population dispersal to self-contained garden cities and satellite towns, where home 
and work would be in close proximity obviating the need for lengthy journeys. Such 
strategies were to be developed by a new ‘Central Authority, national in scope and 
character’ (1940, 201). Interestingly in an additional minority report by Abercrombie 
and two others, there was a recommendation that this new Ministry should also take 
over, ‘Some part of the planning functions of the Ministry of Transport’ (1940, 222).
Concerns over the threats to the countryside led, in 1941, to the Minister of 
Works and Planning, Lord Reith, appointing the Committee on Land Utilisation in 
Rural Areas, the Scott Committee. The Scott Report (Scott, 1943) showed a keen 
awareness of the effects of roads in facilitating development in the countryside 
which was seen as an undesirable aspect of ‘suburban drift’. The report bemoaned 
this and noted that new trading estates were rail connected. But it did not draw the 
conclusion that, by restricting industry to rail accessible sites, the rail option could be 
kept alive and there would be a rationale for resisting rural road building.22
The Honourable Mr Justice Uthwatt chaired the Expert Committee on 
Compensation and Betterment appointed, in 1941, to resolve the problems over 
development rights and land values. The Committee produced a fascinating report 
(Ministry of Works and Planning, 1942) which was crucial in developing the case for 
effective planning and the legal and financial means by which it could be achieved. 
It would be unreasonable to expect such a broad study to dwell at length on the 
particular matter of railways and land. But it is notable that, despite a complete 
historic review of the role of the State in constraining the rights of landowners, the
22 It is worth recording that in the index to the Scott Report there were four references to jam making, 
but only one to railways!
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issues concerning surplus lands and access to social housing were not mentioned, 
and neither was Howard’s model of local community ownership of betterment. It is 
notable that there were no planners on the Committee, only lawyers and valuers. In 
line with their terms of reference, the Committee’s report was wholly focused on how 
to secure effective State control of the use of land and had nothing to say about what 
betterment might be used for, other than to compensate landowners for loss of 
development rights. This failure to directly link development value with investment in 
physical or social infrastructure can, with hindsight, be seen to be a fundamental 
flaw within the post-war planning system.
The wartime plans for London
The County of London Plan focused on five major defects in London: traffic 
congestion; poor housing; poor open space provision; unsatisfactory mixing of land- 
uses; and outward sprawl. It was produced by Forshaw and Abercrombie: Forshaw 
was the County Architect, reflecting the continuing dominance of architectural 
concerns within planning ideology. As a result the stance towards the railway 
system was familiar:
To the planner the most obvious defects are the overhead lines carried on viaducts which 
impede redevelopment; the out-of-date character of some of the terminal stations, especially 
their faulty connection with main road planning and the large area of central land locked up in 
sidings (Forshaw and Abercrombie, 1943, 6).
Although the Plan recognised the need for modernisation and rationalisation 
of the network, the dispersal of population presaged a reduced role: the main 
physical works envisaged were aimed at removing the bridges across the Thames 
and their associated viaducts. The Plan recognised the difficulty of this and 
suggested that a specialist body be set up to consider its proposals. Despite the 
expected reduction in demand for rail services, the Plan embraced road building 
ideology and contained proposals for two orbital and nine arterial roads with flyovers 
and pedestrian footbridges and subways. This vision was developed from the 
Bressey plan (Bressey and Lutyens, 1937), but tried to relate this to the perception of 
London as a network of villages. Building on the work of Alker Tripp on the creation 
of traffic-free ‘precincts’ (Tripp, 1942), the plan proposed construction of American- 
style parkways allowing through traffic to be diverted away from the village cores 
through green backwaters. None of this was perceived as unacceptably intrusive.
The LCC Plan raised strategic issues of central concern to the Greater 
London Plan, also produced by Abercombie, (1944b) which covered an area up to 50
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miles from central London23. This also was critical of continued suburban growth
and was ambivalent in its attitude towards the LPTB which:
...now pioneer, now camp follower, plays a vigorous, if sometimes uncertain, role. It creates 
new suburbs and then finds itself unable to cope with the traffic: extensions in other 
directions aim at further spread of the population. On routes overcrowded beyond cure, it 
asks the straphanger to exercise patience beyond limit (Abercrombie, 1944b, 3).
The planned dispersal of over 1,000,000 people and their jobs to self- 
contained new towns was at the heart of the Plan, with a green belt to prevent further 
sprawl. This meant that:
Extensions of suburban lines and tubes, which may have been begun or for which 
parliamentary powers have been obtained, may no longer be required, and congested lines, it 
is hoped may be relieved (Abercrombie, 1944b, 10).
There were more proposals for new roads but the Plan was not totally
negative towards the railways and envisaged electrification of outer suburban lines
as far as places like Aylesbury, as well as better orbital routes, particularly around
the north eastern quadrant to the docks, and a rail link to the new airport at
Heathrow. Abercrombie saw the need to reduce freight costs by mechanisation,
larger wagons and containers; he was alert to the industry’s problems. But, again,
he called for the creation of a special railway industry body to consider the ideas.
The fact that, despite all his extensive research and consultations, Abercrombie fell
back on referral to a specialist body, is symptomatic of the failure to integrate the
private railway industry into the planning process. Bonavia recalled that:
Progress from the cloud-cuckoo land of planners trained as architects, lacking any transport 
experience, towards more realistic forms of planning, came in stages (1981, 188).
The Railway (London Plan) Committee was set up in 1944 and responded 
vigorously to the planners’ downbeat view of the prospects for the railways. They 
objected to the basic tenet that dispersal would lead to a reduction in demand for 
travel into central London:
...we do not believe that the expectation of a reduction from this cause is likely to be
realised we feel confident that a greater dispersion of population will mean a greater
volume of traffic (Ministry of War Transport, 1946,10).
Their investment proposals reflected operational requirements rather than the 
planners’ priorities of removing elevated railways on aesthetic grounds.
Wartime plans in provincial cities.
There were planning concerns similar to those in London in all the 
conurbations and the solutions of green belts and planned decentralisation were
23 The two plans comprised *.. two sides of a seamless web of cloth’ (Hall, 1995,230).
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common currency. As has been shown, in provincial cities trams and motor buses 
were the dominant influence on urban form: this and concerns over growing traffic 
congestion meant that road building was the dominant transport theme. Given the 
ideological gap between town planning and the railways which has been shown to 
exist in London, it would be reasonable to expect that few of the plans for the 
provincial cities would have much to say about integrating land-use with railways.
The general case, which will be illustrated later in the thesis in the 
Manchester case study, is that railway content was based on minimal expectations 
about development of the local network, but did embrace consideration of the 
location and character of main line stations and, in some cases, their rationalisation. 
The Abercrombie Plan for central Plymouth (Watson and Abercrombie, 1943) was 
unusual because the extent of bomb damage demanded almost complete rebuilding 
and had particular implications for the station. The central axis of the classically 
inspired plan linked the Hoe in the south with the main station on the city centre’s 
northern periphery, thereby tying it into the grand scheme of things in a way that 
would have pleased Unwin.
A major exception to the generally minimal attention given to railways was 
Glasgow: the City Engineer’s First Planning Report (Bruce, 1945) did contain 
extensive road building plans but, inspired by American practice, also envisaged 
construction of electric commuter railways along the central reservations of six 
radials, with two other roads already having parallel railways which would be 
electrified. Peripheral housing developments at locations such as Pollok, Castlemilk 
and Drumchapel were to be rail linked with the city centre too. In an echo of 
London, the plan also proposed the cutting back of the railways approaching the city 
from the south, to a new ‘South Station’ on the south side of the Clyde,.
The Bruce plan was only concerned with Glasgow and was based on 
decentralisation within the city boundaries. Abercrombie, in his Clyde Valley Regional 
Plan (Abercrombie and Mathew, 1946), took a much more strategic approach and 
proposed decentralisation to new towns which would be self-contained growth 
centres. The plan envisaged a new strategic road system but also electrification of 
the local railway network which included Glasgow suburban lines, lines from 
Glasgow to towns such as Paisley, Motherwell and Hamilton, and lines out to 
proposed new towns at East Kilbride and Cumbernauld. Abercrombie also identifed 
certain lines as being redundant, including the Subway. As in London, he called for 
the setting up of a special commission to consider his proposals. Although there was 
a conflict between the Bruce and Abercrombie decentralisation strategies, the fact
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that they both saw a significant role for the railways had a special influence on 
subsequent railway policy for the region.
Conclusions
Figure 8 summarises the findings of the chapter with regard to the thematic 
analysis of the railway-town planning interface. It has been demonstrated that, 
although laissez-faire was the dominant ideology there was, from the 1840s, an 
awareness that such an approach may well not produce a network best suited to the 
public interest. However, such doubts were initially held only by a minority and, as a 
result, State influence on development of the network was limited. The outcome 
was that its broad geography came to exhibit certain features which, eventually, 
were to handicap the railway system in its ability to compete with other modes.
These features were:
• duplication of routes at local and strategic levels;
• duplication of facilities, particularly stations and goods depots;
• poor location of stations with regard to town and city centres;
• failure to maximise network benefits, such as leaving strategic gaps and the 
poor development of cross-country routes;
• restricted vertical loading gauge.
This chapter has shown that there was an inexorable increase in State 
intervention, largely as a result of factors internal to the industry, and this was a part 
of a broader swing in political ideology towards intervention and collectivism which 
began in the late nineteenth century, and received two subsequent fillips as a result 
of the socio-political impacts of the First and Second World Wars. It is also important 
to note that, with the exception of the London Underground, intervention in the 
railway industry was through organs of the central State; the Board of Trade and the 
Ministry of Transport.
In parallel to the discourse around railways, there was a discourse around 
State influence over urban development. By 1900 the two were linked with regard to 
the working class housing question, as manifested by cheap trains, the debate 
around betterment and surplus lands, and the location and design of new suburbs, 
with the model settlements as a special case. The railways came to be seen as not 
only requiring control in the public interest in light of their role as the dominant 
transport mode, but that special control was required with regard to the housing 
question and other matters of interest to the town planning movement. It is 
significant, though, that town planning arose out of the public health and housing
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Figure 8: summary of thematic analysis of 1830-1947 period
Institutional structures Policy Outcomes
Political
ideology:
railway
sector
Market based development 
of oligopoly, accelerated by 
the State in 1921, followed 
by creation of nationalised 
industry. LPTB the 
exception with regard to 
urban rail systems.
No overall network plan: 
recognition of the need for 
planning came too late for 
most of it. Even post-1945 
the vision of integration 
restricted to transport 
sector.
Market forces led to 
railway being well 
integrated with C19 urban 
form, but increasing 
dislocation post-1919: by 
1948 network 
characterised by strategic 
weaknesses
Political
ideology:
land-use
planning
sector
Association with public 
health and housing led to 
planning becoming a 
function of the municipal 
domain under central 
government direction.
Planning seen as largely 
concerned with housing 
and countryside 
protection. Effective 
legislation only came 
about as a result of 
bombing and the drive for 
the Welfare State.
Despite a growing body of 
statutes, no commitment 
to effective planning 
control. No possibility 
therefore for use of 
planning powers to reduce 
the dislocation of the 
railway post-1919.
Professional
ideology:
railway
sector
Emphasis on infrastructure 
reflecting the dominant civil 
and mechanical engineers, 
and general business 
matters internal to the 
industry
Main concerns with 
matters internal to the 
industry: locomotives, 
signalling, mergers. Few 
personalities with the 
vision of Pick.
Little re-adjustment of the 
network post the 
Grouping, with notable 
exceptions in London. 
Railways perceived by 
other professionals as old 
fashioned and not 
essential to the ‘brave new 
world’ of post-war 
planning.
Professional
ideology:
land-use
planning
sector
Focus on public health, 
housing and land 
development led to focus 
on municipal sector. Strong 
association with architects 
and highway engineers.
Initial convergence of 
interest with railway 
network, but development 
of garden city ideology led 
to hostility towards 
/ignorance of railways, 
whilst embracing road 
ideology.
Initially garden 
suburbs/cities integrated 
with network, but post- 
1919 progressive 
disengagement of planned 
developments from the rail 
network.
Governance
and
management 
: railway 
sector
Emphasis on business 
efficiency in structures led 
to mergers between rail 
companies and 
diversification into other 
transport sectors. Lack of 
linkages between railway 
industry and local 
government - LPTB the 
exception.
Companies focused on 
internal matters and 
resistance to State 
intervention. Public 
interest focused on a 
balance between efficient 
units whilst restraining 
their power. Integration 
between modes came to 
be seen as demanding 
nationalisation.
Post-1923 emphasis on 
internal managerial 
problems and little 
rationalisation or 
improvement of the 
network. Activities of 
MRCE and LPTB unique, 
more limited association 
with land development by 
SR
Governance
and
management 
: land-use 
planning 
sector
Planning initially in 
voluntary sector, then 
became a function of 
local government, set 
within broad national 
guidelines
Planning in a policy locus 
associated with public 
health and housing, roads, 
buses and trams, not 
railways.
Local government 
agencies for planning, 
even at the strategic level, 
and even in London, 
excluded railway 
companies. Ideas referred 
to specialist rail industry 
bodies.
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movements which were essentially a function of local government, and that 
legislation placed town planning within the municipal domain. Intervention in the 
railways and land development were a function of quite different realms within the 
State.
Despite the development of a number of ideas and techniques to secure 
closer relationships between railways and the areas they served, they were not an 
essential component of British town planning ideology which crystallised around the 
notion of the garden city24. This was essentially an anti-urban or, at best, small town, 
vision which sought to disperse the city and thereby undermine the railways which 
had been central to its development. This divergence of interest increased during the 
inter-war period when the primacy of the railways came to be challenged by road 
transport and the demands of the road network began to exert a powerful influence 
on planning ideology. This was also a time when the calls for countryside protection 
and planned decentralisation became more influential in Government circles. 
Although planners did have views about the relationship between railways and cities, 
they were pre-occupied with their visual intrusiveness. They were, however, excited 
about how to create new urban environments to accommodate growing road traffic 
and the ideology of the small planning profession meshed with that of the much 
bigger architecture and civil engineering professions who were similarly pre­
occupied. Their shared vision was inspired by the Modernists, particularly Le 
Corbusier, who considered that cities would have to be completely rebuilt (Le 
Corbusier, 1929). He envisaged high rise blocks separated by a grid-iron network of 
local roads linked to American-style high capacity roads. But railways were a part of 
his vision too, with a complex, three tier underground network with all routes 
converging at a multi-level city centre station:
The only place for the station is in the centre of the city. It is the natural place for it, and there 
is no reason for putting it anywhere else. The railway station is the hub of the wheel (Le 
Corbusier,1929,166).
However, the British professionals overlooked these aspects of the Corbusian 
vision25 and generally, with profitable private railways which were seemingly central 
to the country’s survival, there was no awareness that road oriented planning 
contained the seeds of the geographical marginalisation of the railway network.
24 In the international arena there was a radical alternative model of the transport oriented linear city 
developed by Soria in Spain (Velez, 1982).
25 The exception was an unofficial plan produced by the Modem Architectural Research Group (Kom 
and Samuely, 1942: Gold, 1995)
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In 1945 deeper State involvement with the railways and land development 
was facilitated by a broader interventionist thrust by the new Labour Government. 
Nationalisation of the railways was a part of the socialist agenda of bringing the 
‘commanding heights’ of the economy under public control. The locus of professional 
and political debate about the railways was largely restricted to matters internal to 
the transport sector, ie. what form nationalisation should take and how to best 
manage the various transport modes in the public interest.
The reason why Pick’s ideas were so notable is that there were few other 
figures in the industry who shared them. Herbert Walker of the Southern was one 
who did, and another was Barman26 of the GWR (1947): he drew up a set of 
standards for new stations as shown in appendix seven, and was well aware of the 
importance of relating stations to the development around them. Somewhat over 
optimistically however he considered that:
To the town-planner, few buildings in a modern city are more important than the railway 
station. Its physical extent bulks large in the city plan (Barman, 1947, 69) 27.
Perhaps a more accurate reflection of the state of planning ideology came from 
another contemporary railwayman who, many years later, reflected that even with 
regard to the Southern Railway:
Overall, however, the close social inter-relation between transport and land use had scarcely 
been appreciated .... (Bonavia, 1987, 84)28.
However, this chapter has shown that by 1947, such was the state of 
knowledge and understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the national 
railway network, and its relationships with patterns of urban form29, that it would 
have been perfectly possible to draw up a policy agenda for development of the 
network and the reinforcement of its relationship with planned patterns of urban 
redevelopment and growth. Such an agenda is set out below and will form a 
template against which to evaluate policy and practice in the 1948-94 period.
26 Barman had rare qualities with regard to knowledge of the interface between planning, design and 
the railway network and awareness of the need for communication across the disciplines: he was an 
architect, who later worked as publicity officer at the LPTB under Pick (who died prematurely in 
1941), and then moved to the GWR. Payne (1947) is further demonstration of the unique role of the 
LPTB in producing such cross-cutting professionals.
27 This was a book about and sponsored by the GWR, presumably as part of Chairman Sir James 
Milne’s rear-guard campaign against nationalisation: it seems that Barman’s optimism about planners 
stemmed from Abercrombie’s plan for Plymouth and its rather unique focus on the company’s station 
there.
28 Bonavia began working for the LNER in 1945 and became a senior officer in the BTC and BR: he 
was one of the few employees to write extensively about the railways with official blessing.
29 These were nicely summarised by Beaver (1937).
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A pre-condition was the creation of institutional arrangements which would
have facilitated collaborative working between the land-use planning and railway
sectors at national, regional and local levels. With regard to the railway network, the
policy agenda would have included the following:
1. rationalisation of the network in order to remove duplicate routes and facilities, but 
with an eye on both contemporary diseconomies and the potential for future utility;
2. development of railway services to ensure that their pattern and quality would 
be competitive with that offered by road networks and road vehicles;
3. closing strategic gaps in the network, particularly with regard to CBD 
penetration and access across cities;
4. development of a programme of station enhancement to maximise their 
convenience and attractiveness to travellers, and station building so as to ensure 
that new urban areas would be located close to points of access to the network.
The town planning policy agenda would have included:
5. the general articulation of expectations about changing patterns of urban form in 
ways which would identify the implications for the potential utility of existing main 
line, suburban, cross country and rural railway routes, and the utility of new 
routes;
6. management of the redevelopment process in existing urban areas to maximise 
access to railway stations and rail freight facilities, with appropriate guidance for 
the location, layout, and density of development;
7. management of the location and character of greenfield site development so as 
to ensure accessibility to the railway network, with appropriate guidance for the 
location, layout, and density of development.
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PART ONE 
Conclusions
Chapter one has explained the derivation of the three research questions 
underpinning this thesis and carefully identified and explained the 13 steps in the 
development of the methodology. The crucial elements of the methodology are: 
the three dimensions to the interface between the railway and planning sectors -  
institutional structures, policy, and outcomes;
the development of three explanatory themes -  politics and political ideology, 
professions and professional ideology, and governance and management; 
the breaking up of the chronological analysis of the core of the thesis into two 
blocks: 1948-68 and 1969-94;
and the utilisation of the product of this analysis to develop three hypotheses to be 
tested in the Manchester case study.
Chapter two identified certain key characteristics of the national network, such 
as the emphasis on radial routes to London, and those aspects which would need 
attention post 1947 in order to reinforce rail’s attractiveness and efficiency as a 
transport mode in an increasingly competitive transport sector. In particular these 
included the duplication of routes and facilities, and the general failure of railways to 
penetrate into the heart of city centres. It has been shown that, by 1914, as the 
dominant transport mode the railway network was well integrated with patterns of 
urban development, but that the relationship was stronger in London than in the 
major provincial cities. Between 1919-39 this began to be undermined by the rising 
impact of road transport although, again in London, there were strong counter trends. 
There were important lessons to be learned from the Metroland, Southern Electric 
and New Works Programme experiences about the need for a very prescriptive 
stance to be taken towards railway investment and its relationship with developing 
patterns of urban form if these were to operate in ways which were advantageous for 
rail transport. As the market swung in favour of road transport the question, 
increasingly, was whether the State would intervene in this way.
To a certain extent such action by the State, which means action by 
politicians, would be influenced by the ideology of the professions and whether or not 
there was a consensus about the need for such intervention. Chapter two has shown 
that management culture within the railway sector was, with some notable 
exceptions, insular and focused on internal priorities centred around technological 
change and operating discipline. British planning ideology, although initially 
sympathetic to railways as a means to help solve the housing question, swung 
against railway interests once it crystallised around the notions of planned
54
decentralisation, self-containment and small town urban design. Even where 
Modernist concepts were developed for city redevelopment, the transport focus was 
around road systems not rail.
To the degree that the State became involved in each sector during the pre- 
1947 period, it was clear that each was tied to quite different loci within the State. 
Railways had always been a matter for central government -  the Board of Trade and 
then the Ministry of Transport. The work of the 1905 Royal Commission on London 
Traffic showed the need for a metropolitan level of planning to secure better 
integration between railways and land development and the LCC and, particularly, 
the LPTB, showed what could be achieved. At the time, though, there were no 
proposals for similar structures in provincial cities. Town planning became associated 
with local government and those departments associated with public health and 
housing. With regard to transport this reinforced the tendency for planning to be 
associated with road planning because of the links with municipal highway engineers. 
The calls for special bodies to be set up to consider the railway implications of the 
plans for London shows the difficulties in linking the two sectors at the strategic 
level, and that the positive experiences in London had done little to narrow the gap 
between railways and planning.
The foregoing suggests that it is helpful to the analysis to consider the 
relationship between the railway and planning sectors at three spatial levels: national, 
regional and local. This is because there are different, but interrelated, sets of railway 
network features which interact with different land development issues at each level. 
In addition, as the State begins to engage with these, there are different institutional 
arrangements at each level too. This theme will be further developed in subsequent 
parts of the thesis.
The shortcomings in the relationship between the railway and planning 
sectors meant that, despite railway nationalisation and the introduction of more 
effective land-use planning in 1947, these were not likely to produce favourable 
results for the interface between the sectors without more deep seated ideological 
changes. Chapter two concluded with the development of the seven criteria to be 
used in the subsequent analysis to measure the degree to which this took place.
This concludes part one of the thesis.
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PART TWO
Introduction.
Part two of this thesis is concerned with the review and analysis of the 
relationship between the railway and planning sectors in the 1948-68 period and 
comprises chapters three, four and five. These deal with, in turn: institutional 
arrangements, sector policy, and the outcomes of these interrelationships in terms of 
the geographical and operational characteristics of the railway network and their 
relationship with patterns of urban form.
Conclusions are drawn at the end of chapter three about the degree to which 
the institutional relationships facilitated the development of positive relationships 
between the sectors. The seven analytical criteria are used to analyse material in 
chapters four and five, and conclusions are drawn around them at the end of each 
chapter. The three explanatory themes are used to account for actions and changes 
as they occur in the dialogue, and their impacts are summarised at the end of each 
chapter.
Further observations will made at the end of part two about the relationships 
between the sectors at the three spatial levels, and the threads will be drawn 
together to form the bases of the hypotheses to be tested in the case study.
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CHAPTER THREE
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: 1948-68
Introduction.
The railway companies remained under the control of the Railway Executive 
Committee until nationalisation, which was announced as a policy goal by Herbert 
Morrison in 1945 and, despite opposition from the companies and the Conservative 
party, was enacted by the 1947 Transport Act. The railways passed into State 
hands and became British Railways (BR) on 1 st January 1948.
During the War serious consideration was given to how the legal obstacles 
to effective State control over land development could be overcome and what the 
goals of an effective planning system should be. Town planning was seen by Attlee’s 
administration as playing a central role in reconstruction, developing the Welfare 
State, and protecting the countryside. The new town, which embraced a vision of the 
good life previously unattainable to the working class, was particularly attractive in 
setting the tone of what the Brave New World might look like: the 1946 New Towns 
Act was Labour’s first piece of planning legislation. The Town and Country Planning 
Act followed in 1947 and provided the State with effective teeth to control patterns of 
development. In future, if land owners wanted to ‘develop’ land or buildings, they 
would have to apply to the State for ‘planning permission’. The State could refuse 
this, if to do so was in the public interest, and the land owner would have no grounds 
for compensation for loss of betterment.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the institutional structures which were 
created between 1947-68 for the management of the railways and for the operation 
of the land-use planning system, and to evaluate and account for the degree to 
which they were co-ordinated to secure the maximum utility of the railway network. 
The British Transport Commission.
The 1947 Transport Act nationalised the railways, the inland waterways, 
some of the larger private bus companies and the long distance (over 40 miles) road 
haulage industry (Quick Smith, 1949). Each mode was put under the management 
of an ‘Executive’ responsible to the British Transport Commission (BTC) which, in 
turn, was responsible to the Minister of Transport. The LPTB was wound up and 
placed under the control of the London Transport Executive. This creation of a 
separate body for London ensured the continued separation of management of the 
Underground and main line commuter railways. The BTC was charged with the duty 
to provide:
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 an efficient, adequate, economical and properly integrated system of public inland
transport and port facilities within Great Britain for passengers and goods with due regard to 
safety of operation.
Sir Cyril Hurcomb, former Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Transport, 
was installed as Chairman of the BTC, and Sir Eustace Missenden, former General 
Manager of the Southern, became Chairman of the Railway Executive. In the 
provinces the municipal bus, trolleybus and tram fleets remained under local 
authority control outside the BTC empire. Although the Labour Party was thoroughly 
imbued with the notion of building an integrated transport system, there was a 
tendency to think that nationalisation would deliver this automatically. There was 
awareness amongst the professionals though, that it would take time to work out 
what integration would mean in practice: *this is a period of transition towards “a 
properly integrated system of public inland transport5” (Lamb1, 1948, 5).
The task of managing BR as a single organisation was daunting enough:
The Railway Executive alone had inherited between 632,000 and 649,000 staff (no-one 
seemed quite sure of the exact figure), together with 20,000 steam locomotives, 1,223,000 
wagons (half of which had been inherited from private owners), 56,000 coaches, 19,414 miles 
of track and 7,000 horses (Henshaw, 1991, 41).
With each mode under the control of an Executive, it is difficult to see how 
Government expected the institutional structure to deliver integration. In addition, 
there was a clash of interest between the BTC and the Railway Executive over who 
should control strategy (Bonavia, 1971,1981; Gourvish, 1986)2. In theory, with State 
control over all sectors, integration was a matter of deciding which mode could best 
be used to transport a particular traffic and setting the rates accordingly. But, in 
practice, rates were controlled by a Transport Tribunal, not the BTC. So the BTC 
could only use quality to influence the choice between modes, a tool which 
historically had served the railways poorly. Competition continued despite 
nationalisation.
As the railways were nationalised so that they might be operated in the public 
interest, a mechanism was created whereby the public could influence the 
managers. In what for its time was a surprisingly enlightened initiative, the 
Transport Act created regional Transport Users5 Consultative Committees (TUCCs), 
the membership of which, though appointed by the Minister, was intended to be 
representative of users (Cameron, 1953). Although useful talking shops, the TUCCs
1 This was David Lamb’s Presidential address to the Chartered Institute of Transport.
2 By contrast, despite their failings, the Big Four had become regionally based multi-modal transport 
enterprises, owning railways, docks, hotels, shipping fleets, lorry fleets and bus companies under a 
single, unified management (Bonavia, 1971).
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had no powers and had to report through a Central Transport Consultative 
Committee (CTCC), partially staffed by the BTC. Access to the Railway Executive 
was therefore circuitous and open to BTC influence. The TUCCs and the CTCC 
became important bodies in the struggles against rail closures though, as they were 
one of the few avenues for lobbying in defence of rail transport, in an industry whose 
managers, as public servants, were gagged:
One of the difficulties that nationalisation has brought to the railways is the abolition of the 
directors who were also Members of Parliament and could speak in both Houses for the 
industry when required. Under nationalisation the railways have no one who can speak for 
them at all times (Pearson, 1953,121).
Although their numbers were to dwindle over the years, at the time of 
nationalisation the railway trade unions had thirty MPs (Morris, 1948), all within the 
Labour Party of course. However, this influence on Labour Governments was not 
necessarily within the long term interests of the competitiveness of the railway 
industry against an aggressive road transport industry and, of course, identification 
with Labour could become an added incentive to a Conservative Government to 
intervene in railway management.
The land-use planning system.
Prior to the 1946 New Towns Act, three types of institutional mechanism 
had been employed in the creation of new settlements. The first was the actions of 
industrial philanthropists, as in Bournville and Port Sunlight. The second was 
voluntary organisations with members ideologically committed to the garden city 
movement, as in Hampstead, Letchworth and Welwyn. The third was action by local 
authorities, as in the garden city satellites of Wythenshawe and Speke. However, the 
mechanism created under the New Towns Act was the ‘development corporation’, 
based on the Reithian model of the BBC. Membership of development corporations 
was to be by ministerial appointment and they were vested with powers to 
compulsorily purchase land, and produce and implement master plans, largely 
outside the influence of local authorities.
Under the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act the process of ‘development 
control’, whereby prospective developers have to apply for planning permission from 
the relevant local planning authority, became the most familiar face of the planning 
system to the general public. To help them make decisions which would be 
technically sound and which would have public confidence, planning authorities also 
had duties laid upon them to carry out surveys and consultations and to present 
their proposals as statutory development plans. These public documents, which 
would comprise maps and written statements, were also to be used to co-ordinate
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investment in publicly owned infrastructure with public and private development 
projects. Development plans, and other statutory instruments, circulars and policy 
documents from central government, were to be used as the basis upon which 
individual planning applications would be considered. These two arms of the 
planning system - forward planning and development control, were inextricably 
linked.
The important point for this thesis is that the Act gave local planning 
authorities powers to make decisions as to where land should be developed and 
what it should be developed for so that, if authorities so wished, a close spatial 
relationship could be achieved between land-use patterns and particular transport 
networks.
In light of what has been said in chapter two about the potential relationship 
between betterment and the development of infrastructure, it is worth saying more 
about these aspects of the Planning Act. The report of the Uthwatt Committee 
(Uthwatt, 1942) provided the intellectual point of departure: the argument was that 
just as the State should not be liable for a payment of compensation to a landowner 
refused planning permission, one who did receive permission should surrender the 
betterment through taxation. This became known as the ‘development charge’ and 
was levied in the Act at 100% of the betterment. But this money disappeared into the 
Treasury pot. As an application of the ideas mooted at the turn of the century by 
Perks, hypothecation could have included modernisation of rail services to serve new 
developments, but this was never proposed and the Treasury has always resisted 
hypothecation on principle3.
The planning system was to be overseen by the MTCP but detailed 
operation was to be in the hands of ‘local planning authorities’ which comprised the 
then existing upper tier of local government - the county councils in the shires and 
the county boroughs in the major urban areas. It is clear therefore that, from the 
outset, there would be difficulties in achieving co-operation between the bodies 
involved in railway management and land-use planning. They were the product of 
quite different models of public control. The railways were perceived as an industry, 
similar to the nationalised utilities, with a focus on production dominated by complex 
technologies and operational matters internal to the industry. On the other hand 
land-use planning, although steered by national government, was to be carried out 
by local councils and was seen as a service for local communities, closely related to 
other services.
3 Changing this principle has been a significant factor in the recent development of transport policy.
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Also there were relatively few town planners in the early years as 
membership of the Town Planning Institute was reported as 2,500 in 1950, some 
700 of whom were students. Many practitioners were in fact architects or surveyors, 
with little knowledge of transport and the focus on design still prevailed; ‘Emphasis is 
placed on design, because that must be the focus of knowledge’ (MTCP and 
Department of Health for Scotland, 1950, 34). Municipal engineers held a special 
place as ‘the majority of chief officers to local authorities responsible for planning are 
engineers’ (MTCP and Department of Health for Scotland, 1950, 25). Transport was 
therefore barely within the professional gaze and, where it was, the focus was on 
roads.
In addition statutory undertakers, such as BR, were given special status 
under the Planning Act whereby they could engage in ‘development’ associated with 
railway operation without the need to formally obtain planning permission. Where BR 
wished to engage in new railway building, or other major civil engineering works, 
then they continued to seek powers through the historic parliamentary bill process. 
These both reduced the need and opportunities for the growth of mutual 
understanding and co-operation between the two sectors.
The initial relationship.
Despite the barriers there was some evidence that the early post-war 
commitment to integration led to limited contact between the two sectors which was 
aimed at achieving co-ordination. For example, the annual reports of the BTC for 
1948-52 contained sections reporting on the activities of the London Transport 
Executive (LTE) entitled ‘Population, Planning and Future Developments’: these 
reviewed activity with regard to new towns, reported on the London Plan Committee, 
and referred to contemporary population projections. In the 1950 annual report the 
LTE section stated:
The Executive regularly review progress in the development of local authority housing estates, 
so that transport facilities may be provided as new traffic needs arise (BTC, 1950, 164).
However there were very few references to such matters in the annual
reports with regard to the main line network outside London, although the 1949 
report refers to an approach by the City of Glasgow with regard to the electrification 
of local services. This liaison continued over the years and did eventually bear fruit. 
The most heartfelt references to the impact of planning legislation in the annual 
reports were over the workload created for the estates section in submitting claims 
under the compensation provisions. Generally, despite the recommendations of 
Abercrombie within the Barlow Report, transport planning and land-use planning 
were in separate government departments and, specifically, no integrative
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mechanism was set up at national, regional or local levels with the explicit role of 
securing integration between urban development and the railway network. 
Conservative reaction to Labour’s initiatives.
The long, grey years of austerity made it very difficult for Attlee’s Government 
to deliver on its bold promises and, by 1950, the socialist dream was wearing thin. 
With regard to transport:
After six years of Labour Government, the Holy Grail of road/rail integration remained as
elusive as ever. The high hopes of the 1947 Act were never realised (Henshaw, 1991,
56).
In 1951 the Conservatives were returned to power and the post-war 
consensus (Smith, 1990) was tested: it did not extend to transport and the road 
haulage industry was promptly denationalised by the 1953 Transport Act. The 
railways remained in public ownership as there was no practical alternative and 
became the dominant concern of the BTC. Although road haulage was freed to 
pursue the most profitable traffic, the railways retained the common carrier burden, 
with some relaxation, and were prevented from operating road haulage services to 
railway depots. There had been widespread criticism of the two tier structure of 
Executives and the BTC (Pearson, 1953), so the former were abandoned and the 
railways came under the sole management of the BTC. Management of London 
Transport remained as a separate body under the BTC umbrella. With the retirement 
of Hurcomb, General Sir Brian Robertson was appointed as Chairman of the BTC, 
continuing the long association of the military with railway management.
As well as being supporters of a free enterprise road haulage industry which 
would expose the railways to competition, the Conservatives:
returned to power obsessed with euphoric recollections of life in the late 1930s. They sighed 
for the LMS, LNER, GWR and SR, and the supposed stimuli of old identities, liveries and 
rivalries (Allen, 1966, 15).
Under the 1953 Act the BTC was therefore required to develop a devolved, 
regional structure for the railways. This was introduced in 1954 (Ministry of 
Transport, 1954) and bore some striking similarities to the geography of the Big Four 
and facilitated the continuation of pre-nationalisation cultures. The regions were the 
Southern, Western, London Midland, Eastern, North Eastern and Scottish. These 
had been in existence for operating purposes since nationalisation, but now the six 
Area Boards became statutory bodies with full powers to manage the railway, with 
day-by-day operation through a General Manager. Although local authority 
associations were consulted as part of the preparation of the relevant White Paper, 
its content was wholly focused on railway matters and did not refer to any need for 
liaison between the Area Boards and local planning authorities. Robertson was
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concerned about the lack of control over the boards at the centre and created a 
‘General Staff’ and, below it, a ‘Central Staff’ at the BTC to counteract the power of 
the regional managers and co-ordinate their actions, producing a labyrinthine 
decision making structure (Bonavia, 1971, 1981) Other former army officers were 
drafted in reinforcing the militaristic and introverted culture of the organisation and 
its focus on production and ‘man management’4.
Operation of main line commuter services into London remained under the 
control of BR and were in fact in the hands of four regions: the Southern, Western, 
London Midland and Eastern. Despite increasing patronage on the commuter 
routes, some years later Hall highlighted the failure to bring about improvements 
and bemoaned the lack of integration between London Transport and British Rail 
services:
In 1955, after seven years of nationalisation during which integration should have taken place, 
the Committee of Inquiry into London Transport recommended strongly that facilities for 
interchange should be improved. Yet still nothing is done (1971, 141).
The totality of the 1947 Planning Act was also beyond the Conservative’s 
interpretation of consensus, particularly that element of it concerning taxation of 
betterment which was dismantled by Planning Acts in 1953,1954 and 1959 (Parker, 
1985). However, other actions by the Conservatives broadened the scope of 
planning, particularly the 1952 Town Development Act. Pressure for this came from 
local councils, especially in the South East, who looked jealously at the benefits 
enjoyed by localities arising from new town designation: the act empowered local 
councils to enter into agreements to accept large overspill populations from 
exporting authorities such as the LCC. As a result the Conservatives only designated 
one further new town during the 1950s. As further evidence of their desire to 
distance themselves from the Socialist connotations of planning, the Conservatives 
also wound up the MTCP and its functions were absorbed into the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government (MHLG), which would inevitably lead to some 
dilution of purpose.
In the previous chapter there was discussion of the emergence of the 
regional focus for town planning activity in the inter-war years. The deliberations of 
the Barlow Commission had reinforced this and, in the late 1940s, such was the 
scale of activity by local councils with regard to both housing and town planning 
activity, that the MTCP created a network of regional offices. However, there was no
4 The BTC headquarters were located in the former Great Central Hotel adjoining Marylebone Station 
and became known in the industry as ‘the Kremlin’: dining facilities were known as ‘messes’ and 
salaried staff continued to be known as ‘railway officers’, a situation which continued to the end of BR.
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creation of a more formal tier of elective government at this level and, in fact, very 
early in their term of office the Conservatives closed these regional offices. So, 
despite the development of a regional structure for BR, the institutional 
arrangements for regional co-ordination between the planning and railway sectors 
worsened.
Growth of the road lobby.
As the new structure for the railways bedded down, major changes 
developed in the balance of competition between transport modes. Mass car 
ownership sat comfortably with Conservative ideology and characterised ‘Super- 
Mac* and the ‘you’ve never had it so good’ years, in contrast to the austerity under 
Labour ( Sked and Cook, 1993). Road transport interest groups had existed since 
the turn of the century, typified by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders 
(SMMT) and the Royal Automobile Club (RAC). Many became members of the 
overtly lobbyist British Road Federation (BRF), founded in 1932, whose influence 
was reaching new heights in the 1950s (Council for the Protection of Rural England 
(CPRE), 1992; Hamer, 1987).
There was a direct link between local government and the road lobby as the 
County Surveyors’ Society had been developing plans for a national motorway 
network for years, and local authorities worked closely with the BRF. Sir James 
Drake, the County Surveyor of Lancashire, had been instrumental in securing 
passage of the Special Roads Act in 1949: it was no coincidence that Britain’s first 
stretch of motorway was the Preston by-pass, opened in 1958. The 1950s also 
marked a shift in power within the trade union movement as heavy industries 
declined and manufacturing expanded. The balance of power between the 
transport unions shifted away from those of railway workers, typified by ALSEF and 
the NUR (McKenna, 1980), towards the Transport and General Workers Union (T & 
GWU), to which lorry drivers and car workers belonged. This growing political 
influence of the road lobby was a significant factor which, along with problems within 
the railway industry itself, led the Government to pursue further major changes in 
the institutional arrangements for management of the railways.
In 1959 Ernest Marples, owner of Marples Ridgeway a road building 
company, became Minister of Transport. Government concern over British 
Railway’s finances was increasing at this time and, despite the fact that a 
Parliamentary Select Committee was investigating its activities, Marples set up his 
own committee of inquiry headed by Sir Ivan Stedeford, Managing Director of Tube 
Investments. The committee comprised private businessmen and two civil servants:
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its deliberations were shrouded in secrecy lending credence to the conspiracy theory 
of history (Henshaw, 1991, 122-129). But it significantly influenced the direction of 
subsequent events, such as the appointment of Dr Richard Beeching, a Committee 
member and former Technical Director of ICI, to the chairmanship of the BTC. The 
importation of personalities from private industry was a feature of the Marples- 
Beeching era. Beeching’s appointment caused a furore as his salary, at £24,000 
twice that of Robertson, was seen as a portent of difficult times ahead.
One significant innovation introduced by Beeching, though previously 
suggested by the BTC, was the creation of a subsidiary to develop railway property 
interests. Interestingly the name chosen was ‘Railway Sites Ltd.’, taken from a 
company created by the LNER in 1937 (Biddle, 1990). Though chaired by 
railwaymen, this company did include personalities from the world of property on its 
board, notably Harold Samuel of Land Securities Investment Trust,. There were no 
planners, but at least it symbolised a more pro-active stance towards the extensive 
land holdings.
In the early 1960s, when transport policy became dominated by road 
building, the MoT began to broach the idea of joint working on transportation studies 
to major local authorities in the conurbations. In the West Midlands for example, a 
‘West Midlands Conurbation Highways Committee’ already existed and, in 1963, the 
Ministry wrote to Birmingham City Council suggesting working together in 
‘formulating a programme of road improvements for the next 15-20 years’ 
(Birmingham City Council, 1963): this sort of initiative was in stark contrast to the 
institutional relationships which existed between the Ministry, BR and local 
government.
Creation of the British Railways Board.
The 1962 Transport Act disbanded the BTC and separated control of the
nationalised elements of road and rail transport. Control of the railways was
recentralised and given to the British Railways Board (BRB) with the following remit:
It shall be the duty of the Railways Board to provide railway services in Great Britain...and
to provide such other services and facilities as appear to the Board to be expedient, and to 
have due regard....to efficiency, economy and safety of operation.
The overall aim was to create a simpler and more accountable organisation, 
charged with the task of having all the businesses at the ‘break even’ point within five 
years. Theoretically the industry was finally freed from statutory restrictions on its 
ability to fix rates and fares although, in practice, political control increased. 
Although the other nationalised transport operations remained in public ownership, 
and a National Transport Advisory Council was set up whereby the successor
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Boards couid meet and develop policy, the 1962 Act was widely seen as destroying 
any potential co-ordination between the nationalised undertakings (Bonavia, 
1971,100). The Act gave the Minister many powers to intervene in the work of the 
BRB and, no doubt with a view to coming battles over closures, severely curtailed 
the powers of the TUCCs. In the future, where closures were mooted, they would 
only be able to oppose them on the specific grounds of ‘hardship’ to individuals 
affected by the closure proposal. Section 87 of the Act required the BRB to submit 
development proposals on surplus land to the MHLG and Railway Sites provided a 
convenient vehicle for this. To create an even more development oriented stance 
towards the estate, the offices of the Chief Estates Surveyor and Railway Sites Ltd 
were merged in 1965.
A renaissance for integrated land-use and transport planning.
The 1960s were years of major upheaval for the railway network. Public 
transport in general was in relative decline as a result of rising car ownership, and 
the whole notion of operating railways and bus services as commercially profitable 
enterprises was undermined: publicly owned transport as a whole needed to be 
thrown a lifeline. This came in the late 1960s as the product of a wider debate about 
urban problems and the need for new institutional structures. Like its 1945 
predecessor, the Labour Government elected in 1964 under the leadership of Harold 
Wilson, was much more interventionist than its Conservative predecessor: they were 
committed to accelerated slum clearance, rejuvenation of the new towns 
programme, and economic planning at the regional and national levels. However, 
with regard to transport, the new Government was still subject to the intense 
pressure of the road lobby, the general popular aspiration towards car ownership 
and, within the party, the growing influence of the Transport and General Workers 
Union, ably led by Jack Jones. There could be no turning around of the underlying 
growth of private road transport therefore but there was an attempt to look at the 
railway problem more strategically. The commitment to regional policy led to the 
creation of Regional Economic Planning Councils and, after April 1965, railway 
closure proposals were submitted to them for consideration: The climate was clearly 
more restrictive’ (Gourvish, 1986, 441).
With the commitment to planning which so typified this Government, and 
Labour’s long-standing commitment to social justice, perhaps a skilful politician could 
put publicly owned transport on to a firmer foundation. This turned out to be the first
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woman to play a significant governmental role in transport5, Barbara Castle, who 
‘was part of the intellectual left-wing of the Labour party, eager to fuse the reforming 
zeal of the 1940s with the central planning obsession of the 1960s’ (Gourvish, 1986, 
351). Castle produced a series of White Papers (MoT, 1966, 1967a, 1967b, 1967c) 
which drew some fundamental lessons from the experiences of the previous twenty 
years and introduced significant innovations in institutional arrangements. The 
learning went deep: it was understood that; The nature of urban transport systems 
must be based on our ideas of the kind of cities we want’ (MoT, 1967b, 1), and 
crucially; ‘We have neither the physical space nor the economic resources to rebuild 
our cities in such a form that all journeys can be made by private car...’(MoT, 1967b, 
2). The conclusion was that land-use and transport planning needed to be much 
more closely integrated, with the aim of reinforcing the potential to use public 
transport in cities, and that new interventionist bodies were required in the major 
conurbations to plan, co-ordinate and operate public transport. These were to be 
called ‘passenger transport authorities’ (PTAs) which would make policy, to be 
implemented by ‘passenger transport executives’ (PTEs). New legislation was 
proposed which would address this wide range of matters and this became the 1968 
Transport Act: in particular this revised the remit given to the BRB, and took the 
hard edge off the 1962 version, as it became:
...to secure that the combined revenues of the authority and of its subsidiaries taken together 
are not less than sufficient to meet their combined charges properly chargeable to revenue 
account, taking one year with another.
In response to the general thrust towards more sophisticated planning the 
BRB created a ‘Central Planning Department’ with the object of working on the 
internal corporate plan and co-ordinating other work such as the ‘conurbation 
studies’ and ‘planning such as that for the Channel Tunnel’ (BRB, 1967, 2).
At this time there was increasing concern too about the effectiveness of the 
structure of local government inherited from the nineteenth century. Regional 
geographers had a clear understanding of the implications for city governance of the 
decentralising trends which were so apparent in the city regions (Dickinson, 1972). 
The fit of the territories of existing institutional structures with the changing 
geography of the conurbations was increasingly unsatisfactory. In addition, a 
managerial revolution was taking place throughout the West in pursuit of the 
economies of scale achieved by large organisations, lubricated by application of
5 Although women had been employed by railway companies from the 1830s, their history has been 
disregarded by most historians and ‘is a history of exploitation as cheap labour, and of segregation in 
“women’s work’” (Simmons and Biddle, 1997,564-566)
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new computer technology, typified by such giant agencies as NASA and the 
American multi-nationals. Harold Wilson enthused over the ‘white heat of the 
technological revolution’, and there was a desire to bring these benefits into local 
government. Change had already taken place in London as, in 1963, the LCC had 
been replaced by a new strategic authority, the Greater London Council (GLC), with 
local services delivered by a lower tier of 32 boroughs and the City of London 
Corporation. So in 1966 the Government set up Royal Commissions on Local 
Government for England (under Sir John Redcliffe Maud) and Scotland (under Mr 
Justice Wheatley), and these reported in 1969. A common theme was recognition of 
the need for much bigger units of government, but there was debate over the 
advantages of a simple unitary structure, as opposed to the need for an upper tier 
of GLC type strategic bodies in the major conurbations. The majority of the English 
commissioners, seeing a need for simplicity, only accepted a need for an upper tier 
in the major conurbations, whereas the Scottish commissioners saw a need for one 
everywhere. These matters would not be finally resolved until the 1970s and will be 
reviewed in chapter six.
Castle was a pugnacious politician but, despite her commitment to the 
nationalised railway and her demonstration that she was the ‘man’ for the job (MoT, 
1970), nevertheless she was also subject to the political pressure of the road lobby. 
In response, in order to accelerate construction of the motorway network, one of her 
final initiatives was the creation in 1968 of the Regional Road Construction Units, 
which combined staff from the Ministry of Transport with those seconded from local 
government. This was another fusion which, if applied to the railways, would 
arguably have enabled the BR regions to develop closer liaison with local land-use 
planning policy making.
Conclusions.
This chapter has shown that, between 1947-68, although management of the 
railway network and operation of the planning system were both State activities, their 
institutional structures were quite different. They were associated with quite different 
parts of the governmental regime and there were minimal points of contact between 
the two (figure 9). Figure 10 summarises the explanation for this utilising the three 
core themes. In the immediate post-war period transport integration was the priority 
for the Labour Government and this produced the complex structure of the BTC and 
the various Executives. On denationalisation of the road haulage industry, the 
Railway Executive was removed from the structure by the Conservatives but, a 
backward look towards the Big Four, produced a statutory regional structure.
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Eventually the drive for a more commercially efficient organisation led to the abolition 
of the BTC and its replacement by the BRB, which was left intact by the subsequent 
Labour government. The professional cultures within the nationalised railway 
continued to be introverted, disciplined and hierarchical. Although, in the early 1960s, 
the Conservatives progressively sought to replace the public service ethos with a 
commercial one, this did not alter the view about the need for a centralised structure, 
rather it served to reinforce it.
Because of its involvement with reconstruction and the Welfare State, 
planning was seen as essentially a local service to be delivered through locally 
elected councils with a need to be sensitive to local demands. Although initially a 
flagship activity by the Attlee Government with its own Ministry to guide the local 
authorities, the Conservative’s lesser enthusiasm saw the absorption of this by the 
MHLG. Towards the end of the period the renewed enthusiasm for planning and the 
intention to reform the structure of local government, held the promise of a more 
distinct place for planning within local government. Planning ideology was 
comfortable with the institutional structure and planning’s links with local authority 
road builders and council house designers. In terms of the internal structure of local 
government, planning was usually subsumed within the local authority technical 
services sector, typically the engineer’s department, and this reinforced the 
professional synergies.
These poor institutional relationships meant that, even if policy makers in 
each sector were looking to co-ordinate their activities, delivery of this would not be 
easy. It was only towards the end of the period, and only in the major conurbations, 
and only with regard to passenger traffic, that the combination of a political 
opportunity with changing political and professional ideologies produced a 
consensus around the creation of intermediary bodies, the PTAs/PTEs. The 
segregation throughout most of the period between land-use planning and the 
railways can be contrasted with the much more widespread and closer relationship 
that existed between local government, particularly the highway authorities, and the 
private sector road lobby.
69
Figure 9: Institutional relationships between the railway and planning sectors in 
England 1948-68.
Geographic Level Railway Sector Town Planning - Town Planning 
______________________________________Railway Interface________ Sector
National Level
Regional
Level
Sub-Regional
Level
BR Regions
No statutory regional 
tier ofgovt.(2)
British Transport 
Commission/ British 
Rail
BR 
Districts (3)
Ministry of Transport 
(MoT)
Local
Level
No statutory 
regional tier of 
govt. (2)
County Boroughs
County Councils
Ministry of Housing 
and
Local Government
(MHLG)
1. The Ministry of Town and Country Planning was absorbed into the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in 
1953.
2 .The Conservative Government elected in 1951closed the regional offices of the MTCP. Serplan (Serplan, 1992) 
was created in the South East region in 1962 and the advisory Regional Economic Planning Councils were created 
in the mid-1960s. Scotland had its own locus of government throughout the period, whilst the Welsh Office was 
created in 1965.
3. Used for operating purposes only. Generally managerial decisions were made at regional headquarters, which in 
most cases were in London, or by the BTC/BRB.
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Figure 10: summary of thematic analysis of institutional structures 1948-68.
Explanatory themes Railway sector Interrelationships 
between the two 
sectors
Planning sector
Politics and 
political ideology
Initially seen as a 
public service: focus 
on integration with 
other transport 
modes. Separated 
out by Conservatives, 
eventually with a 
more commercially 
oriented business 
structure.
Generally weak and 
minimal, but 
realisation that a 
need for more 
integrative structure 
at the end of the 
period
A local service 
closely related to 
others, especially 
housing. Initially a 
flagship service, 
withdrawal from this 
by Conservatives. 
Search for more 
efficient structure by 
Labour by 1968.
Professions and
professional
ideology
Focus on internal 
functions, traditional 
introverted and 
hierarchical 
structures 
maintained. New 
influences were from 
private business, 
reinforced the 
isolated, national 
identity.
Few points of contact 
between professions 
in the two sectors 
which knew little of 
each other.
Planning was 
embedded in 
structures which 
were dominated by 
professionals 
concerned with road 
building, and 
planners looked 
towards these on 
transport.
Governance and 
management
Centralised, 
production oriented 
body under Labour. 
Rivalry between 
regional bodies 
created by 
Conservatives, 
followed by creation 
of BRB on private 
sector model
The two activities 
were seen as quite 
different; tied to 
different parts of the 
State structure with 
little need for contact; 
change of view with 
regard to passenger 
services in main 
conurbations by 1968
Initially a separate 
government 
department, then 
subsumed in a 
Ministry dealing with 
other centrally 
steered local 
services. But 
essentially a local 
service: awareness 
of need to update 
geography of local 
government by 1968
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CHAPTER FOUR
SECTOR POLICY: 1948-68
Introduction.
Commentators have seen the railways as experiencing net disinvestment 
since the late 1930s (Gourvish, 1986, 68): during the War the network suffered 
extensive damage and received minimal maintenance. In 1947 the operating ratio 
(the ratio of costs to income) stood at 103 per cent, so there was no internal source 
of capital accumulation. Britain was experiencing severe austerity and the economy 
was weak leading to Stafford Cripps devaluing the pound in the crisis of 1949. 
Railway investment was on the basis of make-do and mend.
The major tasks for the planning system were1: reconstruction of the war 
damaged cities; housing renewal; providing sites for development associated with 
the Welfare State; new towns; and protecting agricultural land from development. 
The overriding concerns of contemporary planning ideology with regard to 
transportation were remodelling cities to mitigate the effects of road traffic, and a 
reduction in daily commuting through dispersal of population to self-contained 
satellites. The prolonged period of austerity, including severe restrictions on the 
availability of building materials, meant that little progress was made with realising 
the ambitious agenda: the achievements were largely limited to designation of the 
first generation new towns with little actual development taking place and, in the 
cities, the erection of thousands of prefabricated houses to meet the immediate 
housing crisis.
When the economy improved in the 1950s the political context was such that 
transport and planning policy developed in ways which were markedly different: 
under the Conservatives, integrated transport and State directed decentralisation 
were abandoned. However, the re-election of a Labour Government in the mid-1960s 
led to a resurgence of commitment to both areas of policy and, significantly, the 
relationship between them. But this was in a context where the nature of transport 
infrastructure and society’s transport behaviour were markedly different from those 
of 1948. The aim of this chapter is to review how policy for the railways took account 
of planned changes in urban form, and the degree to which planning policy was 
influenced by considerations about access to the railway network.
1 These were extensively reviewed in the introduction to a White Paper in 1944: see appendix six.
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The railways: a difficult start.
One of the most urgent tasks facing the Railway Executive was 
modernisation of the motive power fleet: although Continental and American railways 
had been replacing steam with electric and diesel locomotives since the 1930s, 
Robert Riddles, the Railway Executive’s Chief Mechanical Engineer, ordered a new 
generation of steam locomotives and the last of them was not delivered until 1960. 
This decision was a source of tension between the BTC and the Railway Executive, 
illustrating the inability of the Commission to influence strategy (Bonavia, 1981, 45- 
55). It locked the railways into a form of traction which, although comparatively 
cheap to build, was labour intensive in operation, filthy, and thoroughly Victorian in 
image. The overall intention of the Railway Executive seemed to be to recreate the 
railway as it existed in 1939, and the average speeds of the express trains of that 
period were used as a benchmark against which to measure progress in 
reconstruction: the mind set was backward looking.
The Railway Executive was concerned about loss making rural branch lines, 
few having been closed since the Grouping (appendix nine): a Branchline
Committee was set up in 1949 to expedite closure and the annual reports of the BTC 
contained a section on ‘Closing Lines and Stations’. Securing closures was no easy 
matter, not at this time because of public opposition, but because of legal 
complexities over land ownership dating from the time of railway construction 
(Henshaw,1991, 49): but the important point is that the emphasis was on closures, 
not openings2.
Planned decentralisation and urban renewal.
The location of the new towns was fixed by central government and, in 
continuation of the locational characteristics of their antecedents, the sites 
designated around London were on the main line network. This was in fact a 
recommendation of the New Towns Committee:
It is better for a town to be on a through railway line than at the end of a branch; and in view of 
the importance of the rail traffic generated by a new town, or a group of such towns, the 
possibility of adding to and extending existing railways should not be ruled out (Ministry of 
Town and Country Planning, 1946,12).
However, location on a railway was, typically, the limit of the consideration 
given to planning around rail. For example, in the master plan for Harlow (Gibberd, 
1952), one of the most self-consciously design oriented plans, although the large 
area designated for the town centre abutted the station site the area closest to it
2 A small number of new routes were planned, but these were freight links to new collieries, such as at 
Calverton in Nottinghamshire.
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was zoned for a park and playing fields, with the commercial area being the most 
distant (figure 11 a and b3). This was not a plan based on maximising access to the 
station, despite Gibberd’s awareness that the railway was a contender for 
electrification, and was contrary to the advice given by the New Towns Committee 
wherein it had seemed that the tradition of Unwin lived on:
It (the station) should be an outstanding feature of the town The siting and approaches
will be part of the general scheme for the town, but the passenger station should be located as 
near as possible to the main shopping centre, and the railway and main bus station should be 
designed for easy interchange of traffic (New Towns Committee, 1946 ).
In other conurbations location on a railway line was also seen as desirable, 
but commitment to rail was minimal as, for example, at East Kilbride. This was a 
village of 3,000 population at the time of designation for Glasgow overspill, but had 
an initial target of 45,0004, more than enough to sustain a train service, especially as 
the density was to be 40 persons per acre. There was an operational station 
adjoining the historic village core, but the area designated for the new town centre 
was about half a mile away: the master plan noted that, notwithstanding the huge 
amount of road building proposed:
The form of the ground does not lend itself, without major cutting, to a realignment of the track 
to bring the passenger station nearer the centre of the town (East Kilbride Development 
Corporation, 1950,16).
Despite Labour’s commitment to planning, it was not until after the election 
of the Conservatives in 1951 that, because of economic growth, the pace of 
reconstruction accelerated. In 1954 building licenses were abolished and money 
became available for major projects. Local authorities embarked on massive slum 
clearance and redevelopment programmes and employed batteries of young, 
Modernist architects to design their new housing. Building high allowed for uses 
other than housing, whilst keeping densities relatively high and minimising the loss of 
agricultural land. But when the inner cities were redeveloped, despite high density 
construction, it was rarely possible to get more than half the number of people back 
onto a given area of land, because of the need to provide land for other uses.
Dispersal to new towns was, increasingly, not possible as they were 
expensive because of the need for infrastructure, and generating the growth of jobs 
at the same pace as the public sector could build houses was difficult too. So,
3 Fig 11a shows the semi-circular town plan which failed to maximise accessibility to the station, and 
the failure to include access to the station as a key component of the internal road circulation systems. 
Fig 1 lb shows the poor access from the station to the commercial core of the town centre.
4 This was later raised to 70,000.
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Figure 11a: Harlow new town plan and the railway.
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Figure 11b: Harlow new town: the station and the town centre.
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extensive as it was, the programme could not meet all the demands. The 
Conservatives had no intention that it should in any case as they preferred the other 
element of Abercombie’s strategy, the expansion of existing towns, to be facilitated 
by the Town Development Act of 1952s. So, many authorities had to use their own 
peripheral land or negotiate with other local authorities to acquire land and build 
overspill estates and town expansion schemes.
All cities had good public transport systems at the beginning of the period, 
often including extensive tram and trolleybus as well as bus and railway networks. 
But the upgrading of the tramways was not pursued, even though many of the 1930s 
peripheral estates had been served by extensions: closure programmes were drawn 
up and it was not unusual for local planning authorities to initiate these (Sheffield 
Transport Department, 1960, 27). This was because it was felt that trams were 
dangerous, owing to passengers boarding in the middle of the road, and a restriction 
on traffic circulation. But at least the inner districts had good bus services: their 
residents had never been regular users of the railways in provincial cities in any 
case.
The primary role of the first generation of development plans was to manage 
the land-use aspects of this housing renewal process: rezoning the redevelopment 
areas so as to separate housing from incompatible uses, and identifying green field 
sites for new estates. By and large, there was little consideration of the public 
transport needs arising from the location and density of development, despite the 
obvious potential which such compact housing forms had for association with railway 
systems. The mind set of BR meant that there was little attempt to engage with this 
process in any case. The political priority of the city councils was to build housing 
units, although because of the importance attached to road building and the fact that 
many development plans were produced within highways engineer’s departments, 
alignments for new roads were accommodated as they had been in the wartime 
plans which informed the planning process. The County of London Development 
Plan (LCC, 1951, 8) was typical in that its only reference to railways was to locate 
and zone operational railway land.
The Clyde Valley was a significant exception as the BTC produced a report 
(BTC, 1951) on the network and, as in London, the committee which produced this 
was chaired by Inglis and their terms of reference required them to be mindful of
5 This was facilitated by the fact that a bill was already under preparation by the previous 
administration (Hall and Ward, 1998,56). The Scottish equivalent, the Housing and Town 
Development (Scotland) Act 1957, was utilised for the decentralisation of Glasgow overspill 
population.
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Abercrombie’s plan. This was embraced enthusiastically and the report researched 
into experience on the network in the inter-war years and noted the increases in rail 
ridership at townships which experienced population growth, in a context where 
ridership generally had fallen; three new stations had in fact been opened to serve 
Glasgow City Council housing estates in 1949. The report, therefore, accepted the 
need to integrate railway and land-use planning by building new stations quickly to 
serve new developments, and by electrifying the local network to the north and south 
of the Clyde. In addition, it was recommended that municipal bus services and those 
operated by the BTC (Scottish Bus Group) should feed into rail hubs.
The reality of statutory planning in Glasgow was in stark contrast to the 
boldness of Abercrombie and Inglis: the draft City of Glasgow Development Plan 
was produced in 1951 and, like the Bruce plan, sought to solve the city’s housing 
problems within its boundaries through a combination of 29 comprehensive 
development areas (CDAs) and peripheral housing developments; the only 
transportation element of any significance was an extensive new road network. At 
the public inquiry Abercrombie expressed his bewilderment as to what the written 
statement was all about and considered that the city’s approach was ‘contrary to the 
spirit of the Act’ (MHLG, 1953, 728-729). This situation graphically illustrated the 
limitations placed upon the planning system by embedding it within local 
government: this prevented the development of more strategic approaches which 
might have more easily linked a land-use strategy with a rail network plan.
In the mid-1950s, despite plans for Government investment in the railways 
(see below), planning ideology with regard to rail transport remained unchanged. For 
example in the master plan for the one new town designated in the period, 
Cumbernauld, the designated area only had a railway line along its southern 
periphery. The town centre, despite being an innovative multi-level, high density 
structure, was remote from the station, as was most of the proposed settlement 
(Cumbernauld Development Corporation, 1958). Even in the South East, a plan by 
the LCC for a high density new town at Hook for 100, 000 people, also placed the 
station on the periphery of the town, remote from the proposed town centre (LCC, 
1961). However, the projected expansion at Basingstoke from 26,000 to 76,000 
which was substituted for the abortive Hook plan, was focused around the existing 
town centre with its centrally placed station. But this was more a product of Victorian 
inheritance than conscious rail-oriented planning (Butler, 1980). By the early 1960s 
the planning process managed the remarkable feat of designating a site for
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Skelmersdale in south Lancashire, with its complex network of railways, with no rail 
access at all (Skelmersdale Development Corporation, 1964).
Roads, cars and suburbs.
Not all public sector housing in the period was Modernist and the new towns, 
in particular, were a test bed for the development of Garden City ideology. As well 
as using traditional, two storey house designs, the concept of the neighbourhood unit 
had always been important to the Garden City movement and it was shown in 
chapter two that, historically, these had been associated with the development of 
railway suburbs. However, in the post-war era it was the needs of motor traffic which 
attracted the planners’ attention and the concept was appropriately updated (Tetlow 
and Goss, 1968). The neighbourhood unit:
 was an American idea developed in the 1920s by Clarence Stein and others who were
strongly influenced by the work of Unwin and Geddes. The elements of the neighbourhood 
unit, which were applied (though the scheme was not finished) at Radburn, NJ, as well as a 
few other places, were derived from Unwin’s cul-de-sac layout of house at Hampstead Garden 
Suburb and other early Garden-City type settlements. They were linked with modern road 
planning ideas to form the main components of the unit: ‘superblocks’ of houses encircled by 
distributor roads, on which the houses were turned inwards; the segregation of pedestrians 
and vehicles; and a network of pedestrian routes, including ‘green spines’ which linked the 
superblocks (Ravetz, 1980, 51-52).
Attlee’s Government envisaged the public sector taking the lead in
house construction, and this was the case until the late 1950s. But rising incomes
made home ownership more accessible and rising property values made it financially
attractive too. Private housing became increasingly important and construction
companies acquired land speculatively and then pressurised the planning system to
grant permission to build. The Garden City movement had wetted the public’s
appetite for low density houses with gardens and this had fuelled the suburbanisation
process in the 1930s, but private builders had jettisoned the carefully crafted
designs and created the sprawl which had fuelled the calls for effective planning.
The process began again, and despite planning control, the quality of the new
suburbia was heavily criticised by contemporary commentators:
  by the end of the century Great Britain will consist of isolated oases of preserved
monuments in a desert of wire, concrete roads, cosy plots and bungalows. There will be no
real distinction between town and country Upon this new Britain the Review bestows a
name in the hope that it will stick: SUBTOPIA (Nairn, 1955,365).
The builders favoured greenfield sites uncomplicated by ground problems. 
As the houses were built for sale, they were aimed at more affluent households who, 
increasingly, were car owners and this was becoming of increased locational 
significance:
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The other vital environmental factor (in addition to newness of housing and location RH) was 
how housing was connected physically to the rest of the city. In a period of declining public 
transport this meant, in effect, whether a household had only a house, or a house-plus-car 
(Ravetz, 1980, 152).
This need to make private housing attractive to car owners affected layout 
design. The speculative builders rarely used architects, relying on a small selection 
of standard house plans. As qualified planners were thin on the ground, it was often 
highway engineers who designed estate layouts and their primary consideration was 
vehicle circulation: the principles underlying this were developed into official 
guidelines by the mid-1960s (MoT, 1966a).
From the mid-1950s there was relentless pressure, from within local 
authorities and by private builders, for the release of greenfield sites. Although this 
demand had to be met, in part if not in full, what planning authorities could do was 
protect good quality farmland and prevent the ribbon and sporadic development 
which had characterised the inter-war years. One of the tools which they began to 
utilise was green belt, officially introduced by Duncan Sandys (MHLG,1955), 
wherein there would be a blanket presumption against development which would 
either have to locate between existing urban peripheries and inner green belt 
boundaries, or leapfrog over the green belts to sites outside them. In Greater 
London the latter typically included the new towns but, increasingly, housing came 
to be provided by the private sector in estates built on the edge of existing towns and 
villages.
Although it often took many years for green belts to be formally adopted 
within approved statutory development plans (Elson, 1986), they were employed 
around all the major conurbations as well as historic towns such as Oxford, 
Cambridge, York and Chester. They came to have significant impacts on transport, 
as will be shown.
Railway modernisation.
There was increasing awareness in the BTC of the competition from road 
transport and a realisation that diesel and electric power were an urgent necessity. 
With investment plans already in place for other nationalised industries, the 
Government looked to the BTC to produce one too. This was done within 6 months 
by a Planning Committee comprising headquarters staff and regional managers: 
there was no one from outside the BTC empire, not even customers. The 
Modernisation Plan, as it was popularly known, was approved in January 1955 (BTC 
1955) with a price tag of £1,240 million. It included proposals to replace steam 
locomotives, including electrification of the East and West Coast Main Lines (ECML,
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WCML), and certain suburban services in London and Clydeside: for the latter the 
Inglis Report was specifically referred to, the only reference to a previously published 
planning document in the whole Plan.
With regard to land requirements, the major impact was the programme for 
closure of 150 freight yards and construction and/or reconstruction of a network of 
55 large marshalling yards to expedite the handling of wagon load traffic. The new 
yards were planned to incorporate humps and speed retarders to allow automatic 
remarshalling of trains with minimum use of locomotives and manpower (Allen, 1966; 
Fiennes, 1967). There is no disputing the fact that there was a major problem of 
outworn infrastructure and archaic working practices (Rhodes, 1988, 10), but a 
freight strategy needed a much more incisive appraisal of future demand for rail 
freight, and this should have been clear at the time. Back in 1944 Abercrombie, 
hardly an expert on railway matters, had alluded to the importance of 
containerisation for example. Wagon load traffic was already being lost to road 
haulage with its door-to-door service and diminishing journey times, but there was no 
fundamental debate within the BTC as to whether there should be a more selective 
approach. Debate focused on whether the new yards should be within conurbations 
and close to traffic generators, or at major junctions on the trunk routes, such as 
Carlisle (Fiennes, 1967). Only weeks after the Plan was published, the MoT 
announced a four-year scheme of road improvements, including £212 million for 
motorways.
A similar situation developed with regard to investment in locomotives where 
the intention was to phase out steam in 15 years. The Regions were given their 
head6 and, just like the old days of the Big Four, each had its pet designs: so after 
the drought came the deluge with too many locomotive types, no standardisation, 
and many failed designs7. In one respect though there was evidence of awareness 
of the importance of the views of customers as Sir Brian Robertson set up a ‘Design 
Panel’ in 1956, *to advise on the best means of obtaining a high standard of 
appearance and amenity in the design of its equipment’.
As the introverted culture of the BTC and institutional arrangements did not 
provide good links with other agencies, such as local planning authorities, who were 
implementing their vision of the future (not well informed about the railway network), 
the BTC was poorly placed to develop a strategic vision for the railway system in the
6 Encouraged by the Government’s liking for historic continuity, the Western Region, for example, had 
already embarked on a programme of painting its carriages in GWR ‘chocolate and cream’.
7 The new traction fleet was to include electric and diesel-electric locomotives, and diesel and electric 
multiple units (DMUs and EMUs), with a small number of diesel-electric multiple units (DEMUs).
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context of rapid socio-economic and land-use change. The overall strategy was
driven by the aspirations of the engineers who maintained and operated the railway
and did not address the shortcomings of the geography of the network identified at
the end of chapter two. As a result the strategy was deeply flawed:
.. apart from the modest proposals for passenger withdrawals , and the closure of a
number of goods depots, the modernisation plan set out to rebuild the existing railway, 
whether there was a demand for its services or not (Joy, 1973, 44).
Or to put it in the rather plainer language of one of the few contemporary
railway managers to commit himself to print: ‘We had made the basic error of buying 
our tools before doing our homework on defining the job’ (Fiennes,1967, 77).8 In 
addition the financial impacts of key matters such as rising labour costs were 
overlooked (Joy, 1973, 48).
As the saga of the Modernisation Plan unfolded it did nothing to reassure an 
increasingly sceptical Government, and senior civil servants became distrustful of 
BR’s managerial capabilities. BR went into deficit in 1956, a position from which it 
never recovered. It was the concern over its finances that led the BTC to bring 
forward more lines for closure and these began to attract organised public 
opposition. The protracted closure of the East Grinstead to Lewes line between 1955 
and 1958 was a notable example: this was taken over by preservationists becoming 
‘the Bluebell Railway’. However, 1958 also saw the closure, with minimal opposition, 
of the longest route considered by the TUCCs up to this time, the former Midland 
and Great Northern Joint Line between Spalding and Great Yarmouth. Although the 
rate of closures increased, the public mood was still relatively passive compared with 
what was to come.
London Underground.
At this point it is necessary to make a brief diversion to consider the London 
Underground as certain issues arose which were of wider relevance. This emerged 
from the war in the same rundown state as the main line railways, although ridership 
in 1948 was above inter-war levels (Barker and Robbins, 1976, 339). From the start 
the BTC made it clear that its priority was the main line network and London’s needs 
would have to be funded from other sources. London Transport therefore had to 
develop investment cases sufficiently convincing to prise money out of central 
government. The Victoria Line saga serves to illustrate the sort of arguments used 
and the difficulties involved in raising funds on this basis. It had its roots in Route 8 
of the Inglis Committee report and first appeared as Route C in the London Working 
Party’s report of 1948. The proposal marked a significant change in Underground
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planning as, unlike the suburban extensions of the inter-war years, this was a new
route under the central area. Previous funding mechanisms had included straight
commercial profit and, between the wars, Keynesian inspired demand management
(the New Works Programme). In the post-war period railways could not be built as
straight commercial enterprises, and there was a labour shortage. Therefore the
wider benefits of railway investment which could not be captured through the fare
box would have to be taken into account if new investment was to be justified9. Cost
benefit analysis techniques were developed to inform the appraisal process for the
Victoria Line involving complex socio-economic analyses which were so innovatory
and wide ranging (Beesley and Foster, 1965) that they slowed the decision-making
process down considerably. The handling of the Victoria Line proposal therefore:
shows characteristic features of public handling of investment projects in mid-twentieth 
century Britain: general acceptance of the intention as desirable; delay for argument on 
constantly changing bases; final approval under temporary pressures which were largely 
irrelevant to the arguments (Barker and Robbins, 1976, 344).
What is significant with regard to the ideological context for planning, is that 
this project marks the first utilisation of welfare economics to underpin railway 
investment. This became very significant as events unfolded, and would be used to 
justify not just construction of new railways, but the operation of a significant part of 
the network. In addition, cost benefit analysis showed the significance to the viability 
of railways of securing property development around stations.
The railways in crisis.
Owing to the onset of recession in 1958 and growing competition from road 
transport, railway losses increased. The costs of the BTC’s most prestigious project, 
electrification of the WCML, were escalating from an estimated £75M to £165M and 
its completion was brought into doubt. Government began to ask difficult questions 
about the return on investment and other major projects, such as ECML 
electrification, were abandoned. The report on British Railways by the Select 
Committee on the Nationalised Industries (Select Committee, 1960) explored the 
principles10 which should underpin the management of the railway network and, in 
particular, recognised that certain services could be run on commercial principles, 
whilst others could not. The Committee advised that it may well be in the public 
interest to underpin the costs of the latter: the important point was to have clarity of
8 Fiennes was in fact sacked in 1967 after publication of his book which contained reflection on and 
informed criticism of railway policy.
9 The development of the motorway network ran into similar difficulties with regard to choosing which 
route to build from several alternatives: the problem with motorways was more fundamental as they 
were to be toll-free and would generate no direct income (Cobum, Beesley and Reynolds, 1960)
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purpose and transparency of accounting. This constituted the first articulation of a 
new approach to financing the railways and eventually, along with cost benefit 
analysis, became part of the ideological bedrock of a new funding regime.
The review process which Marples had set in motion reached its conclusion 
in 1963 with publication of Beeching’s The Reshaping of British Railways’, popularly, 
or perhaps unpopularly, known as the Beeching Report. There was an objective 
need for some incisive thinking, but transport policy under Marples had developed 
on the basis of ideological commitment to road transport and a reductionist stance 
towards the railways. Far from any desire to develop a balanced and integrated 
transport policy, there was a simple goal of cutting back the loss making railway 
system as far as public opinion would allow. However, notwithstanding the 
shortcomings of this ideological context, Beeching tried to apply a structured and 
analytical approach to the railway problem (figure 12).
Figure 12: Beeching’s approach to railway rationalisation__________________________
The logical approach to the problem of shaping, or reshaping a railway system is:-
a. to determine the basic characteristics which distinguish railways as a mode of transport;
b. to determine under what conditions these characteristics enable railways to be the best 
available form of transport;
c. to determine to which parts of the total national pattern of transport requirements these 
conditions apply;
d. to shape the railway route system and services so as to take advantage of favourable 
circumstances wherever they exist........
Railways are distinguished by the provision and maintenance of a specialised route system for 
their own exclusive use. This gives rise to high fixed costs. On the other hand, the benefits 
which can be derived from possession of this high cost route system are very great.
Firstly, it permits the running of high capacity trains, which themselves have very low 
movement costs per unit carried. Secondly, it permits dense flows of traffic and, provided the 
flows are dense, the fixed costs per unit moved are also low. Thirdly, it permits safe, reliable, 
scheduled movements at high speed.
In a national system of transport we should, therefore, expect to find railways concentrating 
upon those parts of the traffic pattern which enable them to derive sufficient benefit from these 
three advantages to offset their unavoidable burden of high system cost (Beeching, 1963,4).
The basis was to test, as quantitatively as possible, how far the operation of 
the railway departed from these conditions. The report analysed different traffics 
and routes to identify the costs and income of each. The results were very revealing 
showing that one third of route mileage carried only 1 per cent of passenger miles 
and 1per cent of freight tonnage. Roughly half the network could be seen as losing 
money, whereas the most heavily used part showed substantial returns. The lightly 
used part included most of the single track branch lines, of which there were 5,900 
miles. The Report also produced data showing that only express passenger services
10 The relevant extract from the Committee’s report is in appendix eight.
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and coal traffic were profitable. London suburban services approached profitability 
but local passenger services in other conurbations were major loss makers. 
Beeching identified the high costs and poor competitiveness of wagon load freight 
and highlighted the need to develop train load business ( siding to siding flows with 
no marshalling en route) and to develop new freight handling technologies such as 
containerisation.
Given that there was contemporary awareness of the failure of the 
Modernisation Plan to take into account the future impacts of changes in transport 
geography, it would have been reasonable to expect that Beeching would have 
considered their impact on potential demand for railway services. He only mentioned 
this briefly and it was soon dismissed:
No novel assumptions have been made about the future distribution of population and industry 
in the country as a whole.
 Therefore, in formulating proposals for line closure, all the Railway regions have taken
account of any developments which are sufficiently specific to be probable, but have not been 
influenced by quite unsupported suggestions that something might happen some day (1963, 
56).
Beeching’s brief was to consider then current levels of traffic in shaping his 
proposals and he, in fact, considered his closure proposals to be restrained. His 
recommendations were a mixture of good and bad news, but undoubtedly it is the 
bad which has entered national folklore. This included: the withdrawal of many 
passenger and freight services; the targeted closure of 2363 stations and freight 
depots and 5000 route miles; a tactical withdrawal from the seasonal holiday 
business; a dramatic reduction in the amount of rolling stock; and the possible 
withdrawal of provincial commuter services. However, the good news, which 
underpinned the development of more successful traffics, included: the selective 
improvement of inter-city passenger services; co-ordination of suburban train and 
bus services and charges, in collaboration with municipal authorities; the 
development of siding-to-siding ‘block’ trains and the development of a network of 
‘liner trains’ carrying intermodal containers between a limited number of mechanised 
terminals; the accelerated replacement of steam engines by modern locomotives. 
Criticisms of Beeching.
The major objections to the ‘Beeching Axe’ focused on the lack of regard for 
the social role of the railways:
The application of strict economic principles of pecuniary demand and cost (au Beeching) 
emphasises this anti-democratic influence (of the motor car RH) ... the purely monetary 
calculus of demand and supply has a definite bias against public transport (Dickinson, 1964, 
6).
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Also there were technical objections to some of the techniques and costings used to 
underpin the plan. The Railway Development Association (RDA)11 developed two 
main criticisms around the issues of contributory revenue and operating costs12. The 
RDA argued that with modern traction and concerted efforts to reduce operating and 
track costs, the case for retention of many lines could be greatly strengthened as 
compared with Beeching’s presentation of “the facts’. Criticism of Beeching’s 
methodology included the significance of only counting ticket sales at stations and 
not numbers of passengers arriving: this was felt to tip the scales against branch 
lines because these served seaside resorts and so on which were more likely to be 
destinations than origins. Similarly there was criticism of the timing of the collection 
of passenger figures, this being over a single week in April 1961, two weeks after the 
Easter holiday and hardly the peak of the tourist season. Critics felt that branch line 
operating costs tended to be overstated: Beeching was seen to take a dogmatic view 
of track costs as fixed and not susceptible to significant cost reductions. This was 
something that Fiennes (1967) pursued in rural East Anglia: the basic railway with 
single track, automatic level crossings, minimal signalling and unstaffed stations. 
However in later closure hearings Beeching’s estimated costs were sometimes 
quoted to try and demolish closure arguments put forward by overly zealous railway 
managers (Henshaw,1991,159).
If the social cost arguments can be seen as coming from the liberal, pro­
public transport social welfare lobby, and opposition to specific closures as coming 
from rail passengers, criticism of Beeching also came from a more unexpected 
source, conventional economists:
...vital years were lost while the management shunted round looking for excuses when it 
became obvious that the Beeching prescriptions were not even relieving the symptoms, let 
alone curing the disease. Straight talk and analysis in 1962 could have saved much wasted 
effort later, by directing scarce management resources into areas of really high pay-off, 
instead of scratching for negligible returns in trying to close rural branch lines. By this I mean 
areas such as:
1. Maximising the profits from the Inter-City passenger business ...
2. Obtaining continuous true improvements in labour productivity...
3. Demanding improved performance from the non-rail subsidiaries..
4. Commencing a fundamental analysis of the future of the freight business...
5. Getting the capital structure right (Joy,1973, 79)
11 The RDA had been formed in 1951 to argue the case for the development of modem lightweight 
diesel railbuses and multiple units to sustain retention of the branch lines.
12 Contributory revenue is the contribution to income on the trank routes made by traffic feeding from 
the branch lines: if the latter are closed then the trank services lose traffic.
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Despite the criticisms, Beeching had many supporters amongst railway managers
as, coming from industry, he had no particular axe to grind, and he introduced a
market oriented culture13 which promised a way out of the financial crisis:
How did we, the railwaymen, react?............Most of us shrugged and got on with the job for
we knew, although things would never be the same again, that Beeching was right (Hardy, 
1989, 83-84).
Town planning and road transport.
Contemporary publication of Buchanan’s Traffic in Towns’ (MoT, 1963) 
reflected the Government’s rising expectations with regard to the role of the private 
car. Marples had already increased the target for motorway construction from 800 to 
1000 miles by 1972. However, the environmental problems associated with road 
traffic were recognised in the wartime plans and had been more rigorously analysed 
subsequently (Smeed, 1961). It was accepted that some sort of balance had to be 
struck between accommodating road traffic and protecting the quality of urban life. 
Buchanan’s terms of reference were:
to study the long term development of roads and traffic in urban areas and their influence on 
the urban environment (MoT, 1963, 7).
It was clear that this was not to be a multi-modal view of the urban transport 
problem: the Buchanan and Beeching Reports were mutually exclusive. 
Nevertheless, there were a number of points about the former which make it worthy 
of discussion. The commissioning of the report resulted from recognition of the 
predominance of road traffic and the statistics which summarised that fixed the 
context of the contemporary policy debate:
...in 1959, road travel represented 81% of all inland passenger travel. Of all inland goods 
transport (during 1958), about 72% by tonnage or 45% by mileage, was by road (Buchanan, 
1963,12).
Buchanan demonstrated that car ownership would increase substantially over 
the following ten years and a significant increase in road space was necessary, even 
if only a part of the increased demand was to be catered for. He was well aware of 
the negative effects of motor traffic arising from congestion, accidents, noise, and 
atmospheric pollution. As Buchanan saw it, society had to decide what levels of 
external costs it was prepared to tolerate, and implement the balance of road 
building and vehicle restraint necessary to achieve those levels. The Buchanan 
Report represented the maturing and coalescence of professional ideologies which 
stretched back many years: the use of hierarchical road systems of the sort that the * 
traffic police (Tripp,1942), civil engineers (Bressey, 1937) and planners
13 The language used in the BRB annual reports characterised this and progressively through the mid 
and late 1960s embraced terms like ‘market research’, ‘product’, ‘product development’, ‘branding’ and 
‘market sectors’.
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(Abercrombie, 1944) had proposed; construction of limited access motorways in 
urban areas on the American model as advised by municipal engineers 
(Manzoni,1940); and reconstruction of city centres using multi-level structures as 
proposed by architects (Tatton Brown and Tatton Brown, 1941, 1942). There was 
nothing remotely like this sort of professional ideological convergence around 
planning for the railway network.
Stemming from his sensitivity to the negative aspects of motor traffic, 
Buchanan developed the concepts of the ‘environmental area’ and ‘environmental 
capacity’ which were defined as:
Environmental area - an area having no extraneous traffic, and within which considerations of 
environment (in the specialised sense, as defined) predominate over the use of vehicles.
Environmental capacity - the capacity of a street or an area to accommodate moving and 
stationary vehicles having regard to the need to maintain the environmental standards.
Overall Buchanan’s message was subtle: increased road traffic could be
accommodated, but there would be an environmental price to pay and society had to
decide what the limits should be. However, the problem with his environmental
concepts is that they were just that, concepts, which were not operationalised and
were thus vague and subjective.
Despite his brief, Buchanan made a number of significant references to
public transport, the need to integrate different transport modes, and to integrate
transport and land-use planning. He also suggested that development plans needed
to be supplemented by statutory transportation plans, concluding that:
In the long run the most potent factor in maintaining a “ceiling” on private car traffic in busy 
areas is likely to be the provision of good, cheap public transport, coupled with the public’s 
understanding of the position (MoT, 1963,193).
The report contained some interesting references to the use of railways and
street trams as part of integrated transport and planning strategies, particularly in
Germany and Sweden. Stockholm was noted as a city where the railway network
was being developed along with road building, in line with the plan from 1941:
It is very significant that a city of this size should have found it possible to finance the 
construction of an underground system, and to reach the bold conclusion that in the general 
public interest it should be a subsidised undertaking (MoT, 1963, 177).
But Buchanan’s message was too subtle given the political realities of the 
time: a huge development machine was rolling and it was not susceptible to the 
niceties of his arguments:
Behind Buchanan came the traffic engineers with their plans for urban motorways: hundreds 
of miles for London, similarly vast networks for every provincial city (Hall,1988, 316).
The report’s major impact was that the leadership of civil engineers in urban 
transport planning was reinforced and they utilised the new computer technologies to 
model14 traffic flows in a new generation of ‘land-use transportation plans’: the 
vacuum left by the failure of the integrated transport paradigm of the 1940s was filled 
by ‘predict and provide’ and accelerated road construction. The outcome was most 
typically characterised by events in Birmingham, where the plans developed by 
Manzoni dovetailed with the MoT’s plans for the national motorway network, to 
unleash an amazing burst of activity. At the time this had the support of politicians 
and most of the public.
Railway investment in the 1960s.
Publication of the Trunk Routes report, BRB (1965), was, as Beeching saw it, 
the logical and positive concomitant to the Reshaping Report. The problem with the 
7,500 miles of trunk route was the historic one of duplication: with declining traffic 
and the potential for increased capacity through modernisation, there was an 
obvious need to make choices. Beeching set out his usual methodical approach as 
shown in figure 13.
The report was notable for its 27 maps showing the relationship of the recommended 
core network of approximately 3,000 miles to major traffic sources such as power 
stations, oil refineries, steel works and coalfields, as well as the relative population 
densities of the conurbations. In keeping with the optimism of the time, there was an
Figure 13: Beeching’s approach to trunk route planning.___________________________
Examination of the present pattern of trunk transport of freight on rail, in relation to the 
national demand for freight transport between main centres, and of the present inter-city flows 
of passenger traffic.
Consideration of those changes in the national economy and in the disposition of population 
and industry which are likely to affect the future demand for public transport, and in particular, 
rail transport.
Assessment of the probable pattern of transport demand between main centres by 1984, and 
of the traffic flows favourable to trunk movement by rail.
Consideration of the potential capacity of rail trunk routes when developed technically and 
operated in the manner best suited to the types of traffic foreseen.
Selection from existing routes of those which can best be developed to provide the network 
and capacity required to handle the future trunk traffic demand (BRB, 1965,9).____________
14 In the 1960s the use of theoretical models such as the gravity model and quantitative techniques to 
represent transport networks and settlement patterns, caused a paradigm shift in human geography, a 
subject closely allied to planning (Haggett, 1965).
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assumption of an annual 4 per cent growth rate in the economy, and of a 15 per cent 
rise in population by 1984. Beeching was attentive to the work of the planning 
system and quoted from a contemporary study:
‘The South East Study 1961 - 81”, which deals with the growth and distribution of population 
and industry in the South Eastern Region, was issued last year by the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government. One significant feature of this report, and of the White Paper 
(Cmnd.2308) which accompanied it, is the evidence which it provides of the strong urge of the 
Government to damp down the main migrational movement which is apparent at the present 
time, namely the migration to the South East (BRB, 1965, 15).
From his consideration of these matters Beeching made two important 
assumptions which underpinned his strategy:
In relation to population it was assumed that the rate of growth would be comparatively even 
throughout the country and that no major redistribution would take place. In relation to 
industry, although some change was foreseen in the commodity pattern of production, the 
assumption was made that the geographical spread of general industrial activity would remain 
the same, and that growth would be uniform throughout the country (BRB, 1965,16).
Therefore an attempt was made to accommodate some of the factors 
influencing demand for railway transport in the long term, but one issue conspicuous 
by its absence was road traffic congestion: there was no connection with the 
Buchanan Report. Overall Beeching painted a rather pessimistic picture of the 
potential for rail passenger traffic and saw it as squeezed between competition from 
the airlines, for journeys over 200 miles, and from road transport over distances 
below 100 miles:
It is estimated that the total volume of demand for inter-city travel on rail will fall slightly from 
its present level.... (BRB, 1965, 32-33).
Beeching’s vision did not encompass development of high speed trains, 
despite contemporary development of the Japanese Shinkansen (Allen, 1965). He 
did countenance the possibility of a Channel Tunnel, but raised no specific 
expectations about its impact on traffic. The issue of the vertical loading gauge was 
not addressed although its constraining impacts on carriage of freight, particularly 
intermodal traffic, were recognised (Calvert, 1965, 41-47). The report was 
Beeching’s swan song as by mid-1965 he was back at ICI, four years after he left. 
He was succeeded by a career railwayman, Stanley Raymond15: the quantum 
change in railway policy was complete.
Regional planning in the London and the South East.
On its return to government in 1964, Labour had no coherent transport policy 
but was resistant to the Beeching closures. The new government was marked by a 
commitment to accelerate slum clearance which, along with the need to
15 Raymond’s salary at £12,500 was just over half of Beeching’s.
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accommodate economic and population growth, set the scene for a period of 
intensive strategic planning, typified by several plans for London and the South East 
as shown in figure 14.
Figure 14: Strategic plans for London and the South East._________________________
1 The South East Study”, (MHLG 1964), (obviously this had been under preparation by the 
previous Conservative Government);
2 The Conference Area in the Long-term”, by the Standing Conference on London and the 
South East Regional Planning, (Standing Conference on London and the South East 
Regional Planning, 1966); (the Standing Conference was a voluntary grouping of all the 
local planning authorities in the region, and became known as SERPLAN)
3 ‘A Strategy for the South East”, by the South East Economic Planning Council (South East 
Economic Planning Council, 1967); (this was one of a number of Regional Economic 
Planning Councils set up by the Labour Government reflecting the renewed commitment to 
economic and land-use planning: Peter Hall was a member)
4 ‘Strategic Plan for the South East”, (South East Joint Planning Team, 1970) produced by 
an independent study team set up by central government under the direction of the Chief 
Planner at the MHLG, Dr Wilfred Burns.
One of the major issues with which these wrestled was the location of major 
growth areas and their relationship to London. Experience showed that these would 
have to be larger and further from London than first generation new towns if they 
were to meet the needs of a growing population and achieve a higher degree of 
independence. With planning at this scale there were crucial interrelationships to 
consider between development and transport infrastructure, so there was obvious 
potential to interrelate railway and land-use planning.
The 1964 South East Study envisaged the development of fairly small market 
towns such as Newbury and Ashford, but also substantial expansion of existing 
county towns such as Northampton, Peterborough and Ipswich. In addition a 
completely new city, much larger than previous new towns, was envisaged to the 
north of Bletchley (Milton Keynes), as well as substantial growth in the Portsmouth- 
Southampton corridor. This notion of the ‘planned agglomeration”, as opposed to the 
development of free standing settlements, was an idea which developed rapidly. In 
the 1967 Strategy for the South East three such agglomerations were envisaged: 
one at about 70 miles to the south-west of London in South Hampshire; one between 
50 and 70 miles to the north-west of London based on Northampton-Milton Keynes; 
and a third area based on Colchester-lpswich and the growing ports of Felixstowe 
and Harwich.
With regard to the development of planning models, in addition to the 
‘planned agglomeration’ there was also the ‘transport corridor’ in the 1966 report:
Its authors argued that the concept of a self-contained town or community had broken down, 
to be replaced by the notion of different communities welded into an organised pattern of inter­
relationships. Therefore, they argued, a study of communications and of movement patterns 
was fundamental to preparation of a strategic plan. This pointed to the fact that any plan must 
be related, first to plans for major regional, inter-regional and international routes, so that non-
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local movements could be catered for efficiently; and secondly, to developing clusters of 
settlements closely related to transport routes. They concluded:
‘This may point to the advantages of establishing corridors (on regional or sub-regional 
scales) in which road and rail routes and services would be closely associated with axes of 
urban development (existing and new)” (Hall, 1971, 190).
The 1967 Strategy for the South East utilised the agglomeration and corridor 
ideas, although the word ‘sector’ was used to indicate breadth as well as length. 
Four major sectors were envisaged radiating from London towards planned 
‘counter magnets’ : in the direction of Southampton-Portsmouth, Northampton-Milton 
Keynes, Colchester-lpswich, and Canterbury. Each of these was to be paralleled by 
a minor sector also leading to counter magnets, which in this case would be free 
standing towns, not agglomerations. These radiated from London towards Swindon, 
Peterborough, Basildon-Southend, Ashford and Brighton. The underlying transport 
rationale was undoubtedly the development of the motorway network, but the sectors 
were well related to main railway lines radiating from London too.
All the sectors mentioned appeared in the map of routes selected for 
development in Beeching’s second report (BRB, 1965, map 21), apart from the 
London to Canterbury/Ashford, and London to Southend sectors, which were 
commuter routes and did not fall into Beeching’s classification as trunk routes. 
Although the sector idea was a good one for building a broad strategic relationship 
between patterns of land development and strategic transport routes, it is interesting 
to note that they were defined solely in terms of their relationship with London. Their 
relationships to each other were not mentioned and there was no discussion of new 
orbital rail routes in these plans and no serious examination of existing rail services 
between the centres mentioned: this failure to relate railway and planning policy was 
criticised at the time (Allen, 1966, 38).
The final plan in the series emerged from the MHLG in 1970 (South East 
Joint Planning Teams 1970a)16. Coming at the end of a period of intense strategic 
planning activity and being produced as a result of a joint commission by the 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Minister of Housing and Local 
Government and the Minister of Transport, as well as the Chairmen of the Standing 
Conference and the Economic Planning Council, it is obvious that this Plan was of 
much greater standing than any of its predecessors and can be seen to represent 
the most interventionist and prescriptive strategy that the planning system could 
then achieve. A number of specialist studies were produced and Volume 3 (South 
East Joint Planning Team,1970b) dealt with Transportation. Paragraph 1.4 of this
16 Although strictly outside the time period of this chapter this document is an integral part of the 
sequence of plans being reviewed here.
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stated: There has been no previous transport study of this kind, or on this scale, in 
the United Kingdom,.../.
The institutional context facilitated BR involvement in this study, which was a 
step forward, but the differing treatment given by central government to the road and 
rail networks was soon revealed:
Major road plans are already in hand for the period up to the late 1970’s  There was not
comparable long-term commitment to the allocation of resources to railway improvements...( 
para 1.7)
Section 2 was wholly concerned with the railway system and the limited 
horizons were clear:
The rail network is considerably less dense than the road system. Changes over the last few 
years have been in the form, on the one hand, of technical improvements to infrastructure, 
traction and rolling stock and, on the other hand, of closures of lightly used sections. This 
pattern is likely to continue, because the network already covers the main corridors of 
movement, and because high utilisation - and therefore major urban development in an area 
previously not served by rail - would be needed to make entirely new lines an economic 
proposition. For the purpose of this study the Team have therefore been concerned with 
changes in the loading and operation of the existing network, as opposed to changes in its 
form...(para2.23)
Paragraphs 2.24 and 2.25 went on to look at the organisational structure of 
British Rail noting that, for the most part, it followed the geography of the routes 
radiating from London apart from a small number of cross country services such as 
Southampton-Reading-Oxford-Birmingham, and Southampton-Severnside. Further 
comment was added about their quality:
In most cases the cross-country services offer a lower frequency of service than the radial 
routes, and in very few cases is it possible to make a cross-country journey of any length 
without changing trains.
So the historic problems associated with cross-country and orbital rail
services were recognised, but the conventional wisdom was that this situation was
not going to improve. Section 3 of the study looked at ‘New Developments in
Transport Systems’ and the involvement of BR staff is evidenced by comment on the
likely impact of improved signalling, automated control techniques and improvements
in passenger handling. But the overall conclusion was downbeat:
The Team consider that these changes could lead to considerable improvements but doubt 
whether their impact on interurban travel will be significant.
The recommended strategy was that development should be steered towards 
a number of major and minor growth points. The major growth points were
envisaged as eventually having a population of 1 million and included South 
Hampshire, Reading-Aldershot-Basingstoke, Crawley, Milton Keynes- 
Wellingborough-Northampton, and South Essex. The minor growth points were 
envisaged as eventually having populations of 0.25 to 0.5 million and included
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Bournemouth-Poole, Eastbourne-Hastings, Ashford, Maidstone-Medway, 
Chelmsford, Bishops Stortford-Harlow and Aylesbury. This strategy was accepted 
by government as the basis for regional planning in the South East and brought a 
decade of frenetic strategic planning activity in the region to a close.
Regional planning in the provinces.
Outside the South East the need for regional plans was perceived to be less 
because of lower rates of growth and the spheres of influence of provincial cities 
were smaller than London’s. Chapter two showed that, historically, the role of 
railways in the growth of provincial cities had been less too, so even where strategic 
planning did take place, there was comparatively little positive comment on the role 
of the railways. As an example of this, and because of subsequent events in the 
1980s which are reviewed in chapters 8 and 9, it is necessary to consider the 
Nottinghamshire-Derbyshire Study (Nottinghamshire County Council, 1969)17. This 
was concerned with the changing socio-economic characteristics of Nottingham and 
Derby and industrial decline in the Erewash Valley coalfield along the county border. 
It was the problems in the border area, and the presence of the M1 Motorway along 
it, which instigated the joint exercise. There were two trunk railways through the 
area: the ECML running between Newark and Doncaster, and the Midland main line 
running from Leicester to Loughborough, with branches to both Nottingham and 
Derby which conjoined near Chesterfield en route for Sheffield. The Nottingham arm 
ran through the Erewash Valley. There were a number of mineral lines throughout 
the two counties mainly serving collieries, but the Beeching closures had removed 
the local passenger network focused on Nottingham, as well as the Great Central 
main line from Leicester, through Nottingham to Sheffield. Mansfield lost its service 
to Nottingham in 1964 and entered national folklore as the largest town with no rail 
passenger service. There were few references to railways at all in the Study, 
although it did demonstrate awareness of the potential for concentrating 
development in rail corridors, but discounted this as a viable option (Nottinghamshire 
County Council, 1969,78). The absence of an inter-city service to Mansfield was 
remarked upon in a way which demonstrated awareness of the strategic importance 
of this, and the lack of direct involvement by BR in the Study:
Inter-regional links are essential to the prosperity of a major urban complex and should not be 
sacrificed because of relatively minor operational difficulties for British Rail.
Commuter links into Nottingham are not what is sought, but a stopping place for inter-city 
express services.................. British Rail have been asked to investigate these possibilities.
17 Although published just after the end of the period which this chapter reviews this study was carried 
out within it.
94
Planning ideology and the debate on urban form: the new towns.
With regard to broader ideological trends in planning, the car-based
decentralisation which so concerned Clark (1958) led, in America, to a radical 
conceptualisation of this new type of urban form, ‘the non-place urban realm’ 
(Webber, 1964). This developed from sociological criticism of the planners’ notion of 
the neighbourhood as a physical development form which had social significance: 
Young and Wilmott (1957) pointed out that people were members of many 
communities which could be based on family, workplace or leisure interest, as well 
as, perhaps, place. Webber developed this idea and said that, with developing 
communications technologies and the mobility offered by the car, the traditional city 
centre was losing its role as the central place where people needed to congregate 
for social interaction and access to goods and services. Technology offered the 
possibility for interaction without face-to-face contact, and the dispersal of activities 
throughout a motorway network would mean that there would be many sub-centres 
for such direct contact as would be required, all equally accessible to a dispersed but 
mobile population - the non-place urban realm.
Running contrary to this vision and, again coming from America, was a 
staunch defence of the traditional city and a fierce attack on what planners and 
architects had done to it. This was led by Jane Jacobs (1962) who celebrated the 
traditional, high density inner city suburb which was characterised by a complexity of 
human activity, characterised by walking and the use of public transport, typically a 
railway or subway system. The varied activity at street level - shops, cafes, 
restaurants, bars, workplaces and local service outlets - created a stimulating and 
singularly urban environment. There was no reason why such neighbourhoods 
should be seething slums as they had been portrayed.
In British planning circles, despite the commitment of central Government to 
road building, debate raged as to these visions of the future and their implications for 
design of the built environment, including the transport systems which serve it 
(Tetlow and Goss, 1965). As so often happened it was in the new towns that the 
ideas came to be developed and applied in their purest form. The Cumbernauld 
master plan was dominated by roads, but the designers drew from the experience 
with Radburn-inspired layouts in the first generation new towns and planned for a 
very high degree of pedestrian-vehicular segregation: the town centre design was 
the sort of structure endorsed by Buchanan. The new towns, including Cumbernauld 
and those designated later, were dominated by car-oriented transport planning 
during a period when resources for road building were abundant. As one of the 
engineers involved stated subsequently:
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In the early years of their existence the Mark lls and Mark Ills18 laid down what are arguably 
the best, and certainly the most comprehensive, urban highway structures to be found in 
Britain (Dupree, 1987, 33).
It fell to the designers of Runcorn to produce a plan (Ling, 1966) which, by 
utilising a ‘double circuit linear’ form, structured development around a dedicated 
public transport corridor, albeit a busway. This was because the designers19 
recognised that even with rising car ownership, there would always be a significant 
part of the population which would be dependent on public transport, so it made 
sense to embrace it as a core element of the design. The layout of residential 
neighbourhoods was focused around the need to provide easy pedestrian access to 
the centrally located bus stop. Runcorn’s new town centre was to be a similar 
structure to that at Cumbernauld, with the addition of access by the busway.
Initial plans for Milton Keynes were for a high density monorail city but these 
were dropped in 1968 (Bendixson and Platt, 1992) and replaced by the, now 
familiar, system of grid roads with a dispersed pattern of land uses and limited 
density development so as to maximise vehicular mobility, whilst minimising traffic 
generation and the potential for congestion (Milton Keynes Development 
Corporation, 1970). It was recognised that the provision of public transport services 
would be difficult, but it was felt that technology would come to the rescue with a 
‘dial-a-ride’ system. The plan came to be warmly endorsed by garden city 
traditionalists as a return to the original concepts of spaciousness, good landscaping 
and plenty of open space (Osborn and Whittick, 1977): the failure to plan around 
public transport was traditional too.
Planning ideology and the debate on urban form: city centre redevelopment.
Owing to post-war austerity there was little scope for planning authorities to 
act on the advice of the New Towns Committee (1946) or the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning (1947) with regard to station design but, by the mid-1950s, the 
economy improved and town centre redevelopment became a significant focus of 
planning activity. There were many forces driving this: the need to make-good war 
damage; demand for new retail floorspace and the need for better access for 
delivery lorries; demand for private car access and parking; the need to resolve the 
increasing conflicts in city streets between through traffic, local traffic, buses, cars, 
delivery vehicles and pedestrians; and demand for new office buildings to house the
18 New towns designated between 1955 and 1970, those before 1955 are known as Mark Is.
19 The design team included Roy Cresswell, one of the few town planners of the period to specialise in 
the relationship between land-use and public transport networks: I  was taught by Roy at the University 
of Nottingham between 1970-72. See Ling (1967) for a fuller discussion of Runcorn and the rationale 
behind the target of 50/50 public/private transport modal split.
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growing service sector. Architecturally, this process was dominated by Modernism 
and, as so many of the issues had to do with traffic, highway engineers played a 
central role too: the Buchanan Report reinforced this engineering-led approach. 
Councillor T. Dan Smith was a member of the Buchanan Steering Group and his role 
in the dramatic redevelopment of central Newcastle which incorporated major road 
building plans, illustrated the close relationship between local government and the 
road lobby.
The case of Birmingham was particularly notable: chapter 2 showed that,
although it was a major railway hub with a model network, rail commuting had not
played a very significant role in its growth. Nevertheless, the potential was there.
However, the post-war planning of Birmingham was masterminded by one of the
country’s leading civil engineers, Sir Herbert Manzoni, who considered that:
Unfortunately, the layout of the railway system is very meagre, and its use has probably 
tended to diminish rather than increase with the improving facilities for trams and omnibuses 
(Manzoni, 1940,112).
Although he was well aware of the spatial demands of rising car traffic, 
Manzoni’s thinking was totally road-oriented. But he was tremendously far-sighted 
and effective: under his auspices the City Council promoted a city centre 
compulsory purchase order (CPO) in 1946 beginning the long process of road 
building through acquisition, demolition, and reconstruction. The city’s statutory 
development plan (City of Birmingham, 1960) was much concerned with problems 
of ‘communication’20, but the solutions embraced policies for the building of inner, 
intermediate and outer ring roads, link roads, by-pass roads and multi-storey car 
parks, with no mention of public transport. The only railway item of any significance 
was appendix 4 which listed ‘Major Developments by Statutory Undertakers’ and 
included rather cryptically: ‘British Transport Commission - London Midland Region - 
New Street - Reconstruction’.
The CDA, one of the tools of the 1947 Act, was increasingly used to plan and 
implement large scale change which often involved the use of CPO powers to bring 
land into public ownership. This was deemed necessary so that local road networks 
could be remodelled and large retail and office buildings could be developed in an 
integrated way, along with multi-storey car parks. With such thoroughgoing change 
occurring there was plenty of scope to alter structural relationships between land-use 
and transport systems and, even within the context of improving vehicular access, 
rail access could have been improved too. Croydon is a good example of how the 
central area of a traditional market town grew rapidly as a result of massive planning-
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led investment but, despite the excellence of its railway services, the design of the 
central area was overwhelmingly dominated by road-oriented ideology.
Ravetz (1980, 48) commented that two primary concepts which underpinned 
urban planning ideology at this time were concentricity and segregation. 
Concentricity went back to Howard’s Social City and was an important element of 
Abercrombie’s Greater London Plan, closely related to road proposals. The Ministry 
of Town and Country Planning had produced policy guidance (MTCP, 1947) for town 
centre redevelopment which was dominated by concern to improve traffic circulation 
by building ring roads. It was clear that this could have negative implications for 
access to railway stations by placing them on the outer side of such roads which 
would separate them from the town centre (figure 15).
Concentricity lent itself to the idea that different planning treatment should be 
given to different sectors and zones of cities, and that land uses should be 
segregated accordingly. For example, the design guide mentioned above found that 
of thirteen possible uses only four or five were permissible in town centres. Ravetz 
demonstrated how well fitted to each other were these planning concepts and the 
aspirations of architects and highway engineers:
The imperatives of traffic engineering were thoroughly compatible with architectural thought, 
which regarded obsolete street plans as the “root evil” of modern city planning (1980, 50).
Thus the planning approach to urban restructuring came to be founded on 
the concentricity of the road network. The segregation of land uses, particularly 
residential from workplaces, increased the need to travel, but the road-oriented 
ideology meant the process was likely to produce reliance on the private car and to 
reduce the convenience of rail transport. The only significant counter trend resulted 
from the activities of Railway Sites: the potential for securing development around 
main line stations, especially in London, was recognised and pursued vigorously, 
although the main aim was to secure cash income to offset the losses in the core 
business.
The social railway.
Despite their stated opposition to the Beeching closures, the trunk network 
was not secure from closures under Labour: in 1967 Castle produced the ‘Network 
for Development’ plan (MoT, BRB, 1967) which stated that the railway network, 
standing at 13,200 miles would be ‘stabilised’ at 11,000 miles, of which just 8,000 
miles would be open to passenger traffic. This network comprised the profit making
20 The written statement listed 17 ‘problems’ with nos. 13-17 all concerned with communications.
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Fig 15: Ministry of Town and Country Planning 1947: model plan for town centre 
redevelopment
SKETCH PLAN FOR TH E CENTRAL AREA
v.7.7.7.'m
CENTRAL AREA proposed density of building
ES J up to .8 
8 up to 1.2
1.2 up to 1.6 
1.6 up to 2.0
Source: Ministry of Town and Country Planning, 1947.
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trunk routes and the socially necessary commuter lines, along with a handful of rural 
routes. But:
The real shock came with the list of lines that fitted neither of the above categories  It
appeared that many supposedly “safe” secondary lines were to be swept away, as were the 
majority of the marginal branch lines (Henshaw, 1991, 189).
Political opposition to closures reinforced the use of rail’s social benefits to 
justify public investment in infrastructure and the underpinning of operating costs. By 
the mid-1960s concern for *the environment’ was an emergent issue too (Galbraith, 
1958: Carson, 1962) with the development of an economic critique of road traffic 
growth (Mishan, 1967). White Papers confirmed Government recognition of the 
continuing importance of the railway network and the need to put it on a sound 
financial footing. It was seen as essential to identify and secure financing of those 
lines which could not operate profitably but which should be retained in the public 
interest. In 1967 a special Economic Unit was set up in the MoT to do this: cost 
benefit analysis was now employed as a core policy making tool. Castle’s new broom 
led to casualties in the BR hierarchy and Stanley Raymond was forced out in late 
1967. She wanted new blood to take the industry forward and her preferred 
Chairman was Peter Parker. However salary terms could not be agreed and, 
ironically, Castle ended up with a 62 year old career railwayman, Henry Johnson: 
Castle herself moved on in April 1968.
The emergence of ‘structure plans’.
In parallel with the paradigm shift which was taking place with regard to public 
transport policy in the mid-1960s, tremors were passing through the planning 
system and there was increasing debate about its successes and failures. It was 
clear that, under the Conservatives, the system had not been used as previously 
intended. One of the key points at issue was the relationship between forward 
planning and development control. There had been rapid economic growth from the 
mid-1950s with the ensuing property boom exerting tremendous pressure on the 
development control system. Development plans were supposed to set the context 
for this but often, owing to political and bureaucratic delays, they were not available 
as formally adopted plans. The finished product was often unsatisfactory too 
because their central feature was a zoning plan superimposed over an Ordnance 
Survey map. This detail, coupled with the impacts of planning decisions on property 
values21, meant that the focus of debate was at site level. The broad strategic 
issues were largely obscured.
21 Which had risen markedly during the period giving rise to a generation of property tycoons (Marriott, 
1967).
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A Planning Advisory Group (PAG) was set up in 1964 to review the situation. 
Membership was drawn largely from local government and was dominated by chief 
clerks and planners: although it included the Director of Highways and 
Transportation of the GLC there was no one from British Rail or the bus industry. 
The report (PAG, 1965) recommended that two types of plans should be produced: 
structure plans for quite large areas concentrating on strategic matters such as 
economic development, transportation, social welfare and demand for land. 
Location policy would not be site specific. These strategic plans would be 
supplemented by local plans which would be site specific, but could only propose 
patterns of development which were compatible with the structure plan. Significantly 
this report made no mention of railways. As a step towards implementation of the 
PAG report the Government produced a White Paper (MHLG, 1967): this drew 
attention to how the context for planning had changed since 1947 when expectations 
about population and road traffic growth had been modest. These changes to the 
planning system were introduced by the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act and 
will be reviewed in chapter seven.
Conclusions.
Although integrated transport was an important goal of Attlee’s Government, 
it was poorly conceptualised and limited to matters internal to transport. Public 
ownership of an integrated transport system was not part of the post-war consensus 
and the Conservatives acted quickly to denationalise the road haulage industry. 
Once car ownership began to increase they were quick to see the implications and to 
make political capital out of road building plans.
Policy towards the railway network itself initially marked time, owing to 
austerity and the need for the organisational implications of nationalisation to be 
worked through. When investment plans came in the mid-1950s they were poorly 
conceived and backward looking, with no deep understanding of how the 
competitive position of the railways was changing, or how the network needed to be 
developed to accommodate socio-economic change. The rise of the road lobby and 
the escalating costs of railway modernisation combined to trigger Conservative plans 
for the undevelopment of the network. This was accompanied by development of a 
vision, albeit a limited one, for the core network: there was no aspiration for a 
Japanese-style high speed network, and no plans to improve the penetration of city 
centres by tunnelling or building urban metro systems. Although in opposition Labour 
had opposed the Beeching cuts, once in power they found it hard to stop the 
momentum of the closure process and, in any case, were supportive of the roads
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programme. The critique of Beeching developed by his opponents tended to focus 
on matters internal to the industry, rather than any potential to reinvigorate lines 
mooted for closure through manipulating patterns of land-use change.
Chapter two demonstrated that, historically, there was an absence of 
railway-oriented thinking in British planning. This did not change in the 1947-68 
period, although planning ideology did change dramatically. The public sector 
oriented ideology of planned decentralisation and self-containment of the early 
period was overridden by management of private sector suburban growth and town 
centre redevelopment, facilitated by road building. However, planning ideology was 
not completely devoid of concern for the railway network: in London and the South 
East, and to a much lesser extent on Clydeside; the geography of the network did 
influence strategic planning, particularly the location of new towns and growth poles.
The development of strategic planning in the 1960s strengthened the case to 
invest in the core network of radial routes serving London. But these 
interrelationships between the planning and railway sectors were fairly minimal and 
were not tied to any proposals for major extensions to the core network and did not 
prevent the development of proposals to close strategic routes. Outside the South 
East there was more limited strategic planning activity. With weaker historical 
associations between urban form and railway networks and with so many closures 
taking place, the scope for developing interrelationships between developing 
patterns of urban form and the railway system was limited.
The findings with regard to the thematic analysis are summarised in figure 16 
and the following summarises the outcomes with regard to the points on the policy 
agenda developed at the end of chapter two. With regard to railway policy:
1. plans were drawn up to rationalise the network but they went beyond removing 
duplicate routes and facilities and were based on the goal of minimising the cost 
to Government of running the railway, and on the basis of a vision of the railway 
playing a minimal role within the future transport network;
2. plans were drawn up to modernise the core, main line network radiating from 
London and linking it with other major cities, although only one trunk route was 
prioritised for electrification; no qualitative leaps were planned such as the 
introduction of high speed trains or the raising of the vertical loading gauge to 
facilitate the movement of significantly larger rolling stock; plans were made to 
upgrade those commuter services in London and other conurbations, and rural 
services, which were not scheduled for closure;
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3. no plans were made with regard to new railways to close strategic gaps in the 
network, and only one new Underground railway line was planned for London;
4. there was a programme of station enhancement, but many stations were 
scheduled for closure and there were very few plans for new stations;
With regard to the town planning agenda:
5. planning policy generally was not articulated in ways which identified the 
implications for the railway network, with the exception of some strategic plans in 
the South East and even these concentrated only on radial routes to London;
6. planning policy and ideology with regard to the redevelopment process in existing 
urban areas was dominated by the needs of motor vehicles, with generally 
negative implications for access to railway stations and rail freight facilities, and 
the guiding principles for redevelopment were built around the needs of road 
traffic movement;
7. the policy with regard to greenfield areas was to prevent their development as 
far as possible, but where development was planned the prime transport 
consideration was to provide for access by road vehicles: with the exception of 
most of the new towns, there was no general attempt to ensure accessibility to 
the railway network;
Despite, or perhaps because of, the dominance of road building in transport 
policy, there was an identifiable shift by 1968 with development of the social case 
for the railway and recognition that all the expected growth in road traffic could not 
be accommodated. Creation of the PAG group showed recognition of the need to 
reinvigorate strategic planning, which was potentially beneficial with regard to 
managing the development process in ways to facilitate rail travel. But it was still 
clear that British planning ideology had little understanding of how to do that.
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Figure 16: Summary of thematic analysis of sector policy 1948-68.
Explanatory themes Railway sector Interrelationships 
between the two 
sectors
Planning sector
Politics and 
political ideology
Public service role of 
the 1940s replaced in 
the 1960s by a 
commercial remit and 
dominance of the 
reductionist Treasury 
view. Development 
of the political case 
for the social railway 
by 1968
Labour’s vision of 
integrated transport 
did not embrace land 
use, and Tories were 
against integration 
per se. There was 
political consensus 
around planning for 
the road network. 
Support for strategic 
planning and 
recognition of the 
case for the social 
railway offered better 
prospects for the 
future.
Priorities linked to 
housing, town centre 
redevelopment and 
countryside 
protection. Transport 
elements dominated 
by road lobby. Public 
sector hegemony 
replaced by private 
sector.
Professions and
professional
ideology
Introverted culture 
focused on technical 
disciplines - 
engineering and 
operating. New blood 
came from private 
sector whose 
business culture was 
hostile to the public 
service mentality and 
emphasised 
importance of core 
businesses.
Very limited interface 
between the 
professions: their 
ideological gaze was 
away from each 
other. Main contact 
restricted to location 
of new towns and 
some other major 
developments. More 
contact in London 
and the South East 
than elsewhere.
Continued
dominance of design 
oriented ideology: 
convergence with 
other professions 
around road 
planning/urban 
redevelopment. 
Minimal planning for 
access by public 
transport - Runcorn 
exceptional.
Governance and 
management
Railways seen as a 
nationalised industry 
to be managed first 
as a public service 
but, post-Beeching, 
as a public 
corporation. Spatially, 
policy focused 
around a core, 
modernised main 
line network. 
Awareness by 1968 
that a need for 
change for local 
services in the 
conurbations.
Little awareness, or 
concern, for most of 
the period that 
institutional 
structures and their 
internal cultures 
were inimical to 
linking the two 
sectors. There was 
an intention to 
change this by 1968, 
particularly in the 
major conurbations.
Major focus of activity 
related to other areas 
of local government: 
integration with road 
planning the 
dominant transport 
theme. Re- 
emergence of 
regional planning in 
the 1960s largely 
focused around land- 
supply and economic 
issues, but limited 
attempt to plan in co­
operation with BR in 
the South East.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OUTCOMES: 1948-68
Introduction.
The aim of this chapter is to review the outcomes of the interplay between the 
institutional structures and policies of the railway and land-use planning sectors, to draw 
conclusions as to whether these were largely positive or negative with regard to the role 
and utilisation of the railway network, and to offer some explanations for these 
outcomes.
The overriding outcome was the huge increase in society’s transport activity, 
passenger and freight, and the overshadowing of all public transport modes and rail 
freight by the huge growth in car and lorry traffic. Total passenger movement increased 
from 219 to 389 billion kilometres between 19521 - 68, with that by car and light van 
increasing from 58 to 279 billion kilometres. The proportion of households without a car 
declined from 86 per cent in 1951 to 51 per cent in 1968. Total passenger movement by 
rail (BR plus all other networks) declined from 40.4 to 34 billion kilometres between 1948 
and 1968 (a 16 per cent decline), having reached a peak of 41 billion kilometres in 
1958-59. Bus and coach travel declined from 92 to 64 billion kilometres over the period 
(a 30 per cent decline) showing that, by comparison, rail was reasonably successful. 
With regard to freight, the total of goods lifted by all modes increased from 1202 million 
tonnes in 1952 to 2009 million tonnes in 1968, a 67 per cent increase. The total lifted by 
rail declined by 27 per cent from 289 to 211 million tonnes. Reflecting the changes in the 
geography of manufacturing and distribution which became more transport dependent, 
there was an increase in goods carried by all modes from 88 to 129 billion tonne 
kilometres, a 47 per cent increase. Goods moved by rail fell from 37 to 23 billion tonne 
kilometres, a 38 per cent decline, so by both measures, there was a significant absolute 
decline in rail freight.
The railway network was cut-back by approximately one third, the number of 
freight depots, marshalling yards and private rail sidings was massively reduced, and 
the number of passenger stations was more than halved (appendix nine). Extensive 
parts of rural Britain in Cornwall, Devon, Central Wales, East Anglia, the Pennines, the
1 DoT statistics for total passenger travel only run from 1952.
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Southern Uplands and Highlands of Scotland were removed from the railway map, 
along with many urban branch lines. Superficially therefore, it would seem that there 
was limited scope for planning to link developing land-use patterns with the contracting 
railway network. However there was another side to the outcome, as indicated by the 
fact that the decline in bus and coach ridership was much steeper than for rail. The 
main line network received considerable investment: for example the Kent Coast 
electrification was completed by 1962, that of the WCML between London and 
Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool by 1966, and high speed diesel-electric 
locomotives were introduced on to the ECML. Journey times were cut by up to a third 
and the WCML electrification produced spectacular returns:
An upsurge of 50 per cent in passenger receipts and 65 per cent in passenger journeys, some of 
which were recaptured from air (BRB, 1966, 3)
Retained local railway networks were improved with DMUs and EMUs replacing steam 
services. All this meant that there were plenty of opportunities for planning policy to 
concentrate activity around modernised railway corridors and nodes.
There were two major dimensions to planning practice in the period. In one the 
planning system was used proactively to manage major schemes such as new towns, 
expanded towns and overspill estates: the geography of the railway network was a 
significant strategic consideration in some of this. In the other dimension, which 
became dominant, the planning system was largely reactive, responding to pressure 
from the private sector for the development of green field sites for private housing and 
major town centre schemes for commercial redevelopment. Planning in this case was 
typified by the development of green belt policy, a fairly blunt instrument with which to 
manage decentralisation and, in town centres, the use of planning powers to assemble 
publicly owned sites and develop master plans in partnership with private developers. 
Access to the road network was the overriding transport consideration in this, but there 
were examples of favourable outcomes for rail.
Planned decentralisation.
London’s paradigm status as a planning problem was inherited by the whole of 
the South East region. Between 1951-61 redevelopment of inner areas at lower 
densities led to population decline in Greater London (the built-up area within about 
fifteen miles of Charing Cross). On the other hand the outer ring, between fifteen and 
forty-five miles, increased its population by 964,000 in the same period (Hall, 1971, 19-
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20). This growth was strongly, but by no means exclusively, associated with the planned 
dispersal of population and employment from inner London.
Of the areas designated for London’s new towns all, except Basildon2, had a 
station at designation, although even Basildon lay on a radial route to London (see 
appendix ten). In Harlow a new ‘town centre’ station3 was opened in 1960, whose poor 
relationship with the town centre has already been noted. The low priority given to rail in 
new town planning by both the MHLG and BR was revealed in a contemporary 
publication:
Train services are not a great problem because, apart from a few commuters, nobody needs them
to get to work Most towns have reserved land for a new station; but getting the new
stations built is a long job (Schaffer4, 1970, 141).
Clearly, despite rising car ownership and personal mobility, even in 1970 
Schaffer’s views about the needs of new towns residents for transport were still quite 
contrary to those of the authors of the 1946 Inglis Report. Outside the South East the 
association between the railway network and new towns was more patchy: Washington 
station was closed in 1963 at the same time as its designation, and Corby closed in 
1966 (Daniels and Dench, 1980); there was no station on designation at Newton 
Aycliffe, and Peteriee, Skelmersdale and Glenrothes were not on the railway network 
at all.
Town expansion under the 1952 Act was a more random process than new 
town designation as it depended upon reception areas volunteering to enter into 
agreement with the exporting authority. Appendix eleven shows that, although the towns 
which entered into agreements with London were all on the network and had a station at 
the time of making their agreement, three towns in East Anglia, (Braintree and Brooking, 
Haverhill, and Mildenhall), lost their stations in the 1960s. Bodmin, an unlikely overspill 
for London perhaps, retained only Bodmin Road. In the provinces two of 
Wolverhampton’s partners and eight of Glasgow’s did not have a station at the time of 
making their agreement. As a result of pre and post-Beeching closures, stations were 
closed at three of Birmingham’s partners, both of Walsall’s, three of Wolverhampton’s, 
Burnley lost two local stations but kept its main one, three of Bristol’s partners lost their
2 referred to at the time as one of the ‘notorious examples’ of the BRB vetoing new station projects (Allen, 
1966,210)
3 Now a listed building
4 Schaffer was a senior civil servant and for seven years was in charge of the New Towns Division of the 
MHLG.
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stations, one of Newcastle’s and eleven of Glasgow’s. Despite the exhortations of the 
New Towns Committee, there were no extensions of railways to serve new settlements.
It is important to recall that the aim of planned decentralisation was to reduce 
demand for travel into London through self-containment. Although the Inglis Committee 
had cast doubts on the likelihood of this outcome, research (Hall, 1971, 338- 346) 
showed that the new towns stood out in terms of their relatively low levels of out- 
commuting. The problem with this apparent success was its relative insignificance: 
‘Overall, just under 4 per cent of the total housing effort had gone into the planned 
communities’ (Hall, 1971, 358-359). Notwithstanding the decentralisation of employers 
from London, employment there increased by about 150,000 (Hall, 1971, 23) as a result 
of service sector growth. Public transport, particularly rail, was important in providing 
access to the jobs:
...of 1,238,000 people entering central London on an average day in 1962, less than 10 per cent 
(123,000) used private transport (Hall, 1971,131).
This increase was accommodated by improvement to commuter services into 
London which included electrification of routes into Essex. This was initially to 
Shenfield5, then Chingford, Enfield, Hertford and Bishop’s Stortford by 1960, and all the 
way to Southend and Clacton by 19636 (see appendix 5 for details of electrification 
schemes). The investment in the Bishop’s Stortford line included the opening of new 
stations at Southbury, Turkey Street and Theobalds Grove, a rare event during this 
period7. Another belated completion, in 1947, of a pre-war project were the extensions 
of London Underground’s Central Line: eastwards from Liverpool Street, surfacing at 
Newbury Park to connect up with the former Great Eastern country branch lines to the 
growing suburbs of Woodford, Loughton and Hainault8; and westwards to West Ruislip 
(Bruce and Croome, 1996). The route from King’s Cross to the new and expanded 
towns of Letchworth, Welwyn, Stevenage and Hitchin was widened to allow a more 
frequent service but, although earmarked for electrification in the Modernisation Plan,
5 a scheme begun by the LNER but delayed by the outbreak of war in 1939 and completed in 1949.
6 this electrification of Eastern Region routes out of Liverpool Street was a product of the Modernisation 
Plan
7 These were in fact re-openings of stations closed in 1919 when services were withdrawn on the 
Churchbury Loop between Lower Edmonton and Cheshunt owing to competition from street trams.
8 As evidence of London Transport’s continuing ability to deliver integrated transport, the route surfaced 
at Stratford to provide cross-platform interchange with BR Essex commuter trains, and three of the new 
stations - Wanstead, Redbridge and Gants H ill - were on the Eastern Avenue with good bus connections.
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this did not take place until the 1970s. The commuter routes to Kent were improved by 
extensive work at Charing Cross in 1954 to accommodate 10 car commuter trains9 
(Morgan, 1994) and then, between 1959-61, the Southern Railway electrification was 
extended by the Kent Coast scheme to Canterbury, Ashford, Ramsgate, Dover and 
Folkestone (appendix four). These schemes brought dramatic improvements in services 
with reductions in journey times (28 minutes off the Liverpool Street-Clacton schedule), 
and more frequent services (those to the Kent Coast were almost doubled).
Despite the strength of the central London office market, decentralisation of 
offices accelerated and in the four years to the end of 1961, planning permission was 
given for a greater volume of office development outside central London ie, the City and 
West End, than within it (Marriott, 1967, 181). The single most notable feature of this 
was the development of Croydon which was Ihe only centre worthy of the name’ 
(Marriott, 1967, 185). Central Croydon grew from more or less zero floorspace to nearly 
300 000 square metres (three million square feet) built by 1964. There was a rational 
pattern behind the spread of decentralised offices and the locational relationship with 
transport networks was crucial:
Access to transport and to pockets of white collar workers were the two decisive
factors Ideally, there had to be inter-suburban links to ferry office workers to and fro by public
transport, and links of road and underground train with the West End or the City, or both 
(Marriott, 1967,180-181).
Whereas Croydon was not on the Underground, its growth as a surburb had long
been associated with the excellence of its rail connections to central London. It was 
therefore an ideal location to draw in rail commuters from its own hinterland and to 
provide the rapid access to central London necessary for business purposes. However, 
despite the its prime location on the south London network, the detail development of 
Croydon was highway oriented. This comprised the archetypal townscape of high rise 
office blocks built alongside a new dual carriageway, Wellesley Road, which had 
elevated and underground sections, along with multi-storey car parks and a purpose- 
built shopping mall, the Whitgift Centre. Although the Council played a leading role in 
promoting this investment, implemented through the development plan, no special 
measures were taken to promote access to and from the railway station, which received
9 Because of the low vertical loading gauge, extra capacity on the British network could only be achieved by 
running longer trains which necessitated platform extensions at stations: two experimental, and rather 
compact, double-deck trains were built by the Southern Region in the 1950s, but were deemed to be 
unsuccessful. Double deckers were considered again in the 1960s, but the idea did not get off the drawing 
board (Allen, 1966,219-21).
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no investment either, and the road schemes rendered pedestrian access from the 
station more difficult.
Another impact of the decentralisation process was that it tended to lead to the 
replacement of inner suburban journeys by long distance commuting, thereby 
exacerbating network capacity problems:
...in the present minimally planned environment, commercial migration from London tends to
boomerang on BR................ Between 1962 and 1964, for example, season-ticket travellers from
Basingstoke10 to London, 48 miles out, rose by 83 per cent in number, whereas those from the 
commercially developing suburb of Kingston-on-Thames, 12 miles out, dropped by 13 per cent 
(Allen11, 1966,227).
Although in a general sense decentralisation in the South East was good for 
BR’s business, it tended to increase the problem of Ihe peak’ and made it difficult to 
reduce overcrowding, despite increases in network capacity. The opportunities to secure 
mutually beneficial development through the disposal of surplus land were missed too. 
In 1964 the MHLG requested that the BRB co-operate with the LCC, and then the GLC, 
in making surplus land12 available for housing and giving the local authorities first 
refusal: this became a general requirement under MHLG Circular 57/66. The tensions 
between BRB and the planning system over the slow progress in securing financial 
yields from this were made clear when an annual report referred to these arrangements 
as ‘a distinct drawback to the Board’ (BRB, 1968, 56).
The limitations of strategic planning.
The limited commitment in the South East to integration between strategic 
development and the railway network meant that there were no plans for cross-London 
rail routes of the sort discussed during the War, and orbital routes were closed. Whilst 
major growth was promoted in locations like Milton Keynes, Northampton and 
Peterborough, as well as the already well established centres of Oxford, Cambridge and 
Swindon, railways between them were put forward for closure. A service existed 
between Oxford and Cambridge, and steam had been replaced by DMUs. En route 
between the two towns this service offered connections with four major trunk routes: the 
Great Western at Oxford, the WCML at Bletchley (with easy access to Milton Keynes 
and Northampton), the Midland main line at Bedford, and the ECML at Sandy (for
10 Basingstoke experienced rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s under the Town Development Act
11 Geoffrey Freeman Allen was editor of Modem Railways and this book was widely regarded within the 
industry as a seminal publication.
12 The 1964 BRB annual report referred to 800 acres of land in Greater London being the subject of 
discussions (BRB, 1964, 67)
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access to Peterborough). With these strategic links and the expected growth at key 
nodes along the route, there was obvious potential in this line, but Barbara Castle 
agreed to closure in 1965 and services were withdrawn as of January 1, 1968 (Allen, 
1966, 39). The absence of investment in new railways, even in London, meant that 
Heathrow was not linked to the network, although this had been suggested by 
Abercrombie in 1944. Two early BTC initiatives, which really were completions of former 
Southern Railway projects, exemplified the backward looking culture. In 1948 a new 
terminal for BOAC flying boat services was opened at Southampton followed in 1950 by 
a new Ocean Terminal for trans-Atlantic liners, and both of these were linked to London 
by rail services. The flying boat terminal was redundant by 1950 and the Ocean 
Terminal by 1960, both eclipsed, of course, by the development of Heathrow. However, 
as evidence that there was not total failure to integrate rail with air transport, in 1958 a 
new station on the London-Brighton main line was provided at Gatwick which was 
developed as London’s second airport: there had been a long established station at 
Gatwick for the racecourse, so this was really a well chosen rebuilding exercise by the 
BTC.
The Ashford-Hastings line is another example of an orbital route which 
connected two growth areas and, even at this time, Ashford was envisaged as important 
with regard to Channel Tunnel plans. This route was slated for closure by Beeching, but 
survived as a result of local opposition (Moody, 1979, 207), although it was one of the 
few Southern Region routes not electrified and was served by DEMUs. The fact that 
such gaps were left in the electrified network was indicative of the tight Treasury 
constraints on investment. Another area earmarked for growth which suffered large 
scale closures was Bournemouth-Poole: these included lines which linked them with 
another area of rapid growth, Bath-Bristol. This route was closed in 1966 with a rail 
journey between the two conurbations subsequently necessitating a circuitous journey 
via either Dorchester or Southampton with a change of trains en route, always a 
disincentive to users. The route between Brockenhurst and Poole via Ringwood, and 
the direct line from Poole to Salisbury had already been closed in 1964, so the 
opportunity was lost to guide the growth of Bournemouth-Poole along rail axes, as well 
as to facilitate direct rail access to Bath-Bristol and the intervening Mendips area of 
outstanding natural beauty (Adley, 1988, 79-103).
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One notable exception to the general case of the run down of suburban services 
in the provinces was the Welsh Valleys lines. In the pre-grouping era five companies 
had run services to Cardiff and these all passed to the GWR in 1923, and were then 
handed on with minor changes to British Railways in 1947, so rationalisation was long 
overdue. The service was recast in 1953 to give regular interval services, and then 
steam was replaced by DMUs: these improvements seemed to reflect the self- 
contained nature of the Valleys where the absence of long distance main lines allowed 
management to be focused around local services. Despite colliery closures and 
rationalisation post-Beeching (Davies and Clark, 1996, 6), the services survived 
remarkably well, given the fact that they served a sparsely populated hinterland and 
linked it with a city of only medium size. In subsequent years, with further rundown of 
the coalfield, these links with service sector employment in Cardiff were to become more 
important as will be shown in chapters 7 and 8.
Transport impacts of housing location and design.
With regard to the impacts of planning ideology on the design of residential 
areas, the outcomes were complex and were the product of three ideological models. 
The first was in the new towns and town expansion schemes where the garden city 
tradition lived on, but varying degrees of pedestrian-vehicular segregation were 
employed to bring the traditional neighbourhood concept into the era of mass car 
ownership. Although most new towns were located on railway lines and either had a 
station at designation or were provided with one, or in some cases an additional one, 
this was about as far as planning around the railway network went. Despite the prior 
practice of Unwin and official advice, stations were not always accessible, as 
exemplified by Harlow. Although Runcorn’s new town centre was well located with 
regard to the busway, it was inaccessible from the railway station. A better solution was 
provided at Redditch, which was also notable for bus-oriented planning, as the new town 
centre was to be an expansion of the original which had an existing railway station. 
Redditch was designed by consultants Wilson and Womersley who were well aware of 
the growing importance of public transport to Government policy in the mid-1960s, 
noting that BR’s proposed closure of rail services to Redditch had been refused (Wilson 
and Womersley, 1966, 59). They also produced a bus-oriented linear design for Irvine 
where, again, the new town centre was located at the historic town centre which had a 
station (Irvine Development Corporation, 1971).
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In the second model the large urban local authorities, encouraged by central 
government (both Labour and Conservative), had their massive redevelopment 
programmes which were typically inspired by Modernism. However, post-Beeching, local 
rail services were often withdrawn. As the street tramways were scrapped too, the 
residents became dependent on bus services. Where new developments were located 
on the urban fringes this lack of rapid rail connections with the mother city placed the 
residents at a considerable disadvantage with regard to their access to jobs, services, 
families and friends13.
Increasingly it was the third model which became dominant wherein private, 
speculative builders developed large estates of detached and semi-detached houses 
and bungalows, with little direct input from the urban design professions and with 
minimal planning control. Here the vision was a scaled down version of contemporary 
American, consumerist suburbia built around car ownership, domestic appliances and 
relaxation in private gardens. The role of the planning system was largely confined to 
fixing the location: typically this was either on the edge of a large town or city; or in small 
towns and villages in the rural hinterland of major cities, out beyond the green belt. In a 
contemporary study of the Hertfordshire green belt Pahl (1970) showed that the new 
residents of the expanding villages were more affluent and, being car owners, more 
mobile, than the original working class residents. Their presence tended to lead to 
reductions in local services and the planners’ vision of the future tended to be through 
the eyes of car users, leading to a development pattern which depended on use of a car 
to gain access to necessary services:
Planners and builder-developers may be forgiven for thinking primarily of job opportunities and 
communications to take the chief earner to work when making decisions in the outer metropolitan
region However, it is the chief earner’s wife who actually lives in the outer metropolitan region
day in and day out, and most of these women are certainly not mobile (Pahl, 1970, 120)14.
The developers were well aware that the likely purchasers of their houses would
be car owners and provision for their needs was an important design consideration: 
there had to be space to park cars and adequate access to the main road network. For 
the most part proximity to a railway station was not a factor. Generally, the peripheral
13 Research by Wilmott and Young ( 1957) showed the strength of family and kinship networks in the East 
End and the relative isolation which could be experienced in overspill developments, particularly by 
women if they were not working.
14 This was a far cry from the middle class, country lifestyle portrayed in Noel Coward’s ‘Brief Encounter’ 
produced in 1945, wherein Celia Johnson used the train for her weekly trips to Milford to change her library 
books at Boots, have coffee at the Kardomah, and illicit encounters with Trevor Howard.
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location maximised the distance between the new housing estates and the nearest 
station, which was typically in the town centre. As large numbers of smaller railway 
stations were closed, the tendency was for an increasing average distance between the 
location of new housing and the nearest station, although there is no available data for 
this period.
Whatever ideology influenced the location and layout of housing, the one
common factor which came to affect the residents’ lives was car ownership. In a
thorough contemporary evaluation of planning policy there was a clear conclusion as to
how road building and land-use policy had combined to benefit car users:
Increasing car ownership’s most significant effect has thus been substantially to increase the 
proportion of the population able to make cross-country journeys between places too small or too
distant from each other to support a reasonably convenient public transport system The
type of person who has benefited most from the mobility explosion has been the car owner living 
in a small town or rural area. And containment policies have operated to place a substantial part 
of the population growth, during the 1950s and 1960s, in just such areas - thus encouraging the 
use of the car (Hall, 1973, 418).
The generally poor location of housing developments with regard to the railway
system, and the decline in railway services in most city regions, meant that rail was not 
an option even for these longer radial journeys which historically had been a 
characteristic feature of the railway’s role.
Rail served housing: the exceptions.
Amidst this generally poor integration between housing developments and the 
railway system, there were some positive outcomes. The line from Birmingham to 
Sutton Coldfield was built in 1862 to serve this growing suburb and was extended 
northwards to Litchfield in 1884. In 1948 BR inherited a frequent commuter service 
between Sutton and Birmingham, but this had changed little and was archaic by 
comparison with the pre-war Southern Electric model. In 1951 the population of Sutton 
Coldfield stood at 47,000, more than double the 1931 figure, and commuters were a 
significant part of the population. Local BR managers were aware of the need to 
improve what was the busiest commuter line into Birmingham and an hourly, regular 
interval, steam-hauled service was introduced in 1954 carrying about 2,390 passengers 
per day (Boynton, 1993, 77-78). In 1956 the service went over to DMUs and the 
frequency was increased. Soon after an exceptional event took place:
The “Railway Magazine” reported in November (1957):-
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“A temporary station, Butlers Lane, which has been experimentally installed by the LMR to 
meet the needs of a housing estate under development, was opened on September 30th
n
The opening of a new station was an earth shattering event in the 1950s. There were new 
stations built in that decade, but most appeared on declining rural lines as last ditch attempts to 
attract extra traffic. They have all now vanished. Butlers Lane is the second oldest station built 
since the formation of British Railways in 1948 which remains today (Boynton, 1993, 83).
However, despite this early success and the continued growth of population in 
Birmingham’s outer suburbs facilitated by the development plan process, even this 
railway service went into decline. This was because of increasingly tight investment 
constraints which led to lowered maintenance standards, reductions in service and no 
electrification. In the meantime the commuters bought cars.
The Sutton Coldfield branch line was unusual: outside Greater London any 
improvements to local railway services usually only came about as a result of main line 
investment which allowed simultaneous improvement of local services on the same 
route. The best examples were those associated with the WCML modernisation which 
facilitated electrification of local services between Rugby-Coventry-Birmingham- 
Wolverhampton-Stafford, Birmingham-Walsall, Manchester-Crewe/Stoke, and Crewe- 
Liverpool Lime Street. A notable exception was Clydeside, resulting from the 
Abercrombie and Inglis reports, and the lobbying by Glasgow city council. The 
Helensburgh-Queen Street Low Level-Aidrie cross city service was electrified in 1960: 
new stations were opened at Garscadden and Hyndland. This was followed by 
electrification from Glasgow Central to Cathcart, Neilston, Kirkhill and Hamilton in 1962, 
and to Paisley, Greenock and Gourock/Wemyss Bay in 196715. Tables 6 and 7 show 
that the introduction of DEMUs and EMUs stimulated ridership, but that the superior 
service given by electric trains resulted in the biggest increases, the ‘sparks effect’ 
which the Southern had discovered forty years previously. To illustrate the limited 
horizons of rail investment even in Glasgow, the Rutherglen-Dumbarton cross-city line 
utilising the tunnel under the CBD via Central Low Level, was closed in 1964 and,
15 This latter route was the most heavily populated of all and arguably should have been electrified soonest: 
Allen (1966,144) considered that the reason for the delay was a deal struck between BR and Glasgow 
Corporation to protect Corporation bus services from competition, a nice example of how public ownership 
was no guarantee of providing the best service for the public. This was a difficult time for the Corporation 
Transport Department as the street tramway network was closed between 1959-62 and replaced by bus 
services, which were themselves experiencing competition from rising car ownership.
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despite Abercrombie and Inglis, neither the route to East Kilbride nor Cumbernauld was
electrified, but at least they avoided closure.
Table 6: Impact of service improvements on ridership on 
Birmingham suburban services 1966-69.
Route Time Increase
period in
ridership
Birmingham-Walsall* 1966-69 +51%
Stafford-Wolverhampton-Birmingham- 1966-69 +112%
Coventry-Rugby
Birmingham-Lichfield (DMU) 1966-69 +22%
Birmingham-Kidderminster (DMU) 1966-69 +18%
* electrified services unless indicated otherwise eg. (DMU).
Table 7: Impact of service improvements on ridership on Glasgow suburban 
services 1960-73 (1960 base line=100)
Glasgow North Neilston Branch Gourock/Wemyss Lanarkshire
(Airdrie- Bay Circle (DMU)
Helensburgh)
1960 100 100 100 100
1961 electrified electrified
1966 Electrified
1973 358 285 217 220
Source: both tables Greater Glasgow Transportation Study, 1974
It is disappointing to note that, despite the Corporation’s support for 
electrification, the location of peripheral housing estates took little note of the geography 
of the network (Smith and Wannop,1985, 155). Despite electrification, there was no 
extension of the network to better serve the estates, this was impossible given the 
Government’s stance and the overall mindset of the BTC/BRB. As in Birmingham, the 
city development plan was restricted to zoning existing railway land as ‘operational 
railway land’. On the other hand the 29 CDA’s promoted for housing renewal, were also 
utilised to assemble land for motorway construction and extensive land allocations were 
included in the development plan for this (Corporation of the City of Glasgow, 1960).
City centre redevelopment.
The product of road-oriented redevelopment for town centres was disastrous for 
the environment and for access to the railway network. Birmingham was typical, with its 
multi-level Bull Ring development opened in 1963, followed by the inner ring road 
around the whole city centre (Cherry, 1994) which served to create a barrier and had a 
blighting effect. In Newcastle and Bristol, new dual carriageway roads were associated
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with large scale office developments with barren, first floor pedestrian decks (Aldous, 
1975).
It has been demonstrated in chapter two that planning for rail was not a 
significant component in British planning ideology. The lack of appreciation of Victorian 
station design was reflected in the fact that the grand plans produced in the 1940s often 
included proposals for station redevelopment: even those of the quality of York were 
earmarked for this. Whether or not such plans came to fruition depended upon BR’s 
investment plans and local property markets, but local planning authorities were usually 
enthusiastic when the opportunity arose. The most notorious episode was the rebuilding 
of Euston as part of the WCML electrification, which triggered demolition of Hardwick’s 
Doric Arch and the Grand Hall. Euston was London’s first terminus so the Arch dated 
from the dawn of the railway age and its demolition served as a spark to ignite the 
popular, conservationist backlash against the developers and the Modernist ideology of 
the architects and planners. Euston was also a case where the BRB proposed an 
airspace office development as part of the rebuilding but:
Almost incredibly, the London County Council refused British Rail permission to develop office
accommodation over the rebuilt Euston Station as it would increase street congestion   while
granting permission for office blocks along Euston Road remote from any station (White and 
Senior, 1983,114).
Space was left between the new station and Euston Road to take advantage of 
any change in planning policy but, despite the Labour Government’s pro-public 
transport stance, strategic policy worked against this as it was stymied by the 
restrictions on office development introduced in 1963 on an informal basis, and then 
formally under the Control of Office Employment Act of 1965. These difficulties with the 
planning system were referred to in the BRB annual reports with a growing sense of 
frustration:
Although belatedly it became generally accepted that the most suitable places for major office 
developments in London are over the main-line stations, efforts to progress worthwhile schemes 
of this kind are frustrated by Government restrictions (BRB, 1968, 56) .
With regard to the location and general ambience of stations, the changes in city 
centres tended to not only promote the use of cars, but also to actively work against the 
use of the railway network. It will be recalled from chapter two that one of the historical 
weaknesses of the railway system was the peripheral location of stations with regard to
16 This went on to refer explicitly to the illogicality of granting permission for the Euston Centre referred to 
above whilst refusing air space development over the redeveloped Euston station.
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city centres. There was no strategy to invest in realignments, by tunnelling for example, 
and some existing tunnels were closed. What happened instead was that ‘concentricity’ 
led to construction of inner ring roads which, because of the peripheral location of 
stations, often lay between them and the commercial core. This reduced the 
accessibility of stations by introducing another barrier and, typically, crossing the road 
necessitated use of pedestrian subways or over-bridges which came to be regarded as 
amongst the most unattractive features of city centres. This re-arranging of the road 
network and its relationship with stations was facilitated by statutory town maps and 
CDA plans. Examples included Bristol, Hull, Gloucester, Sheffield and Plymouth.
In some cases, far from increasing the rail penetration of town centres, lines 
were cut back with new stations being built in more peripheral locations. Sometimes the 
driving force behind such rationalisation was the BRB, in pursuit of cost reduction. In 
other cases it was the local council, acting through its planning and/or highways 
committee, as the land was required for redevelopment, sometimes for road building, 
with the changes being incorporated into statutory plans. Closures of well located 
stations included Blackpool Central and Nottingham Victoria: the latter, built in a huge 
cutting and more conveniently located than the retained Midland Station, was completely 
demolished and a shopping mall, the Victoria Centre, was developed on the site. 
Despite the good location and access via tunnels under the city centre, the new 
development was granted planning permission in 1965 with a design that precluded the 
later restoration of a rail service. The acquiescence of the BRB and the planning 
authority in this failure to retain an option for rail reinstatement was typical of the era.
An important by-product of the changing position of the railways in the transport 
market was the closure of freight facilities on the periphery of city centres. In chapter 
two it was noted that these had been provided on a massive scale, typically with 
duplication. During the 1960s the wagonload and general merchandise traffic collapsed 
and there were widespread closures: The result was a sudden and massive increase in 
redundant land’ (Biddle, 1990, 203). Although close to city centres, often this was not 
close enough to make it attractive for commercial development. This meant that the 
most financially rewarding use was to lay the areas out as a ‘temporary’ car parks for 
the growing numbers of commuters who either could not, or would not, use the railway. 
Thus redundant railway infrastructure was used to facilitate competition from the car. 
More generally the BRB recognised that disposal of redundant land could provide a
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significant income to offset its losses: in 1965, Railway Sites was wound up and the 
Estate Department given a more specific brief to dispose of land rather than seek its 
development.
City centre redevelopment: the exceptions.
There were situations where integrated planning produced a more positive 
outcome: in London the main stem of the Victoria line between Walthamstow and 
Victoria opened in 1969, giving access to King’s Cross/St Pancras and Euston, as well 
as the prime retail area of Oxford Circus. Arguably the only development where anything 
like the sort of high quality, multi-level scheme envisaged by Buchanan came to fruition 
(although not completed until the early 1970s) was the Barbican, which was also readily 
accessible by Underground on the Corbusian model. But even this had a downside: 
‘London Wall - a motorway dividing the city. A completely anti-pedestrian environment 
despite the upper level walkway’ (Ward, 1986, 43). Despite the planning difficulties 
referred to previously, by 1968 significant commercial developments were secured at 
Holborn Viaduct and Waterloo, with a large airspace development at Wembley Central 
in the suburbs.
Outside London positive outcomes were most likely where complete 
modernisation of railway infrastructure was taking place, such as on the Coventry- 
Birmingham-Wolverhampton axis. Lord (1991) reported that in 1963, as a result of post- 
Beeching streamlining, the Western and London Midland Regions were merged and the 
new organisation took a more focused approach to securing development opportunities. 
New Street had always been unusual because of its central location and this provided a 
good opportunity to carry out the sort of development which should have been more 
widespread: the building of large retail and office developments at major stations 
(Marriot, 1967). Henry Johnson, the Chairman and General Manager of the London 
Midland Region, said that the intention at New Street was to emulate recent 
developments at Cologne and Munich to create ‘an attractive social centre in addition to 
a modern environment for railway business’ (Modern Railways, 1964)17.
The tragedy for New Street was the architectural form which this took: the tracks 
were ‘decked’ over by a 7.5 acre slab and the inspiring ambience of the glazed train 
shed was replaced by a gloomy, subterranean world at platform level. Commercial 
buildings designed in the ‘Brutalist’ style, were erected above, with little recognition in
17 The development was linked to the adjoining Bull Ring scheme which contained a bus and coach station.
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the interior layout that the shopping centre was the prime means of gaining access to 
the station below. The City’s development plan had nothing to say about this project 
other than to allocate the whole site as ‘operational railway land’. The ‘modernisation’ of 
all stations during the 1960s was dominated by this no frills approach of the ‘Modernists’ 
which influenced the BRB Design Panel18 in the same way that it influenced local 
planning authorities19. Because of the decayed state of many old stations, 
redevelopment in this style was welcomed at the time:
Elegant new show pieces of modern architecture with model passenger facilities were put up at 
Tamworth and on a much grander scale at Coventry. Between Crewe and the Manchester- 
Liverpool terminals a good many local stations had their old buildings replaced by neat pre­
fabricated structures of modern outline, to complete the image of a thoroughly up-to-date service 
when the electric multiple-units began to run (Allen, 1966,139-40).
In 1965 the Design Panel created the ‘double arrow’ totem to signpost the 
location of stations and this piece of functionalism has certainly stood the test of time. 
Overall however, despite the fact that the Victorians had understood the commercial 
benefits to be gained from grand stations, and the urban design principles underpinning 
station location and design had been developed by Unwin, they were ignored in the 
early post-war decades. The statutory planning system played its part in this, albeit a 
limited one because, in many cases, utilising its rights as a statutory undertaker and/or 
gaining powers by parliamentary Act, BR could rebuild stations without the need to 
obtain formal planning permission. But even where planning permission was required, 
owing to the involvement of commercial development with station rebuilding, planning 
authorities were ill-equipped ideologically to secure a better outcome. Oxford was an 
extreme example where BR wished to rebuild the station utilising funds generated by 
development of adjoining vacant railway lands: the city council refused permission as 
the vacant lands were required for a road scheme (Modern Railways, 1969)20. The 
overall result was that passenger access to the network tended to become more difficult. 
Industrial development.
18 In what was an example of the positive impact of the post-Beeching market-oriented approach, this 
design work involved the creation of a women’s panel to advise on the design of passenger rolling stock; 
however there is no evidence that this extended to consultation about issues such as station design and 
access (Allen, 1966,55)
19 Upsurge in demand for school and other community buildings led to local authorities developing the 
CLASP system of prefabricated construction: the 1966 BRB annual report noted that this system of 
providing very utilitarian structures had provided new stations at Fleet and Sunbury-on-Thames.
20 Improvements at Oxford were finally in place by 1999.
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In the early post-war decades, in just the same way that the old Victorian 
housing areas needed to be redeveloped, so the industrial areas needed attention too. 
However, this was a lengthy process. Although through the 1945 Distribution of Industry 
Act central government did get involved in industrial development, steering industries to 
new towns or the depressed regions, by and large the State, at either central or local 
level, played a more passive role in the redevelopment of industrial areas compared 
with housing areas or city centres. During the early BTC period when the road haulage 
industry was being nationalised, the 1951 annual report showed that the BTC was 
mindful of the need to locate new road haulage depots in locations which would promote 
road/rail co-ordination, but such initiatives were stillborn. Owing to improvements in 
heavy goods vehicle technology and the development of the road network, more and 
more industrialists changed over to road transport: sidings were closed and internal 
railway networks fell into disuse.
From the 1930s, the sorts of buildings which modern industry required were 
large, single storey structures with a much larger footprint than the multi-storey 
structures of old. Post-war planning authorities were aware that more land needed to be 
allocated for industry but, despite the experience of the 1930s trading estates, there 
was little pressure from industrialists to include access to the railway network as a 
locational requirement in development plans. So, as in the housing areas and city 
centres, authorities focused on the need to improve road access and a rail link was not 
seen as a standard locational requirement with regard to access for freight or the 
workforce.
The major land development activity by BR, the construction of the marshalling 
yards, did not require formal planning permission as they were built using parliamentary 
powers. They had a huge land take requiring sites up to three miles long and half a mile 
wide: the biggest was Carlisle Kingmoor which covered 2.75 square miles of greenfield 
land. The overall construction programme lasted over ten years as shown in table 8, and 
the last, Tinsley, was not opened until 1965. But this programme did not bring planning 
authorities and the railway industry together in jointly utilising the planning process. 
Liaison was only consultative and the industry worked to its own agenda. There was no 
development of the mutual understanding or information sharing which was necessary 
to develop a pro-rail culture within planning authorities, or an understanding of how land- 
use could be manipulated to serve the railway within the railway industry. The collapse
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of the wagon load traffic which inspired construction of the yards was so severe that, by 
late 1965, closure of Ripple Lane was in hand, seven years after it opened, and a 
number of major projects were quietly aborted at the planning stage.
Table 8: The Modernisation Plan marshalling yards.
Yard Year Yard Year
opened opened
Bescot (Walsall) 1966a Ripple Lane (London) 1958
Crewe 1961b Severn Tunnel 1960/62
Dringhouses (York) 1962 Tees (Thornaby)
a
1963
Healey Mills (Wakefield) 1963 Temple Mills (London) 1958a
Kingmoor (Carlisle) 1963 Thornton (Fife) 1956
Margam (Port Talbot) 1960 Tinsley (Sheffield) 1965
Millerhill (Edinburgh) 1963 Tyne (Gateshead) 1963
Perth 1962
a reconstruction of existing yard(s)
b Basford Hall yard at Crewe opened in 1901 but was electrified as part of the WCML project 
Pre-existing major yards which received no significant investment under the Modernisation Plan 
are not listed: examples included Whitemoor, Feltham, Toton, Wath, Willesden, Cricklewood and 
Mossend.
Source: Rhodes, 1989.
By the mid-1960s structural economic change was leading to closure of rail 
connected industrial complexes too: the railway industry itself was not immune as 
exemplified by closure of private plants such as Beyer Peacock’s in Manchester and 
North British in Glasgow. Electrification of the station at Singers in Glasgow was 
illustrative of the way in which the whole of the old railway was expensively electrified, 
rather than proactive policy with regard to use of the modernised railway for industrial 
workers: factory and station were closed in 1969.
The statutory planning process had little influence on the development of 
strategic transport policy and, as has been shown, by 1963 the die was cast in favour of 
road transport. Planners were pressured by their highway engineering colleagues21 to 
prevent roads in industrial areas from becoming blocked with parked vehicles and 
causing difficulties for lorry access, by ensuring adequate on-site parking. Local 
planning authorities thereby required planning applications for the new industrial estates 
to include land for ample off-street car and lorry parking. The lower density 
development which this produced, wholly dependent on road access, was a further
21 Typically, until the mid-1960s, this was the same department and often the planning was done by 
engineers or surveyors in any case, owing to the small number of qualified town planners, and, as has been 
shown, City Engineers were in the forefront of the replanning of the cities in the early post-war period.
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element of the incremental process of adapting the built environment to facilitate access 
by cars and lorries.
Post-Beeching, the BRB seemed content to let much of its freight traffic fall 
away anyway, as it focused on trainload haulage of bulk products centred on a relatively 
small number of major industrial complexes such as quarries, collieries, power stations, 
steel works, oil refineries and ports. The character of contemporary rail freight was 
epitomised by the introduction of semi-automated ‘merry-go-round’ coal trains, linking 
new or modernised collieries with new coal-fired power stations developed by the 
Central Electricity Generating Board, such as those along the Trent and Aire Valleys22. 
One of the major locational constraints was the need to place power stations at points 
where railways ran close to rivers which were used as a source of cooling water (Allen, 
1966; Fiennes, 1967; White, 1979). This facilitated retention of the coal traffic which 
continued to be the core of the freight business and it was typical of the era that this 
involved three nationalised industries and did not require formal planning consent. BR 
did develop rail links into private sector oil refineries though, largely developed since 
1945 in estuarine locations such as Fawley, Milford Haven, Thameshaven, Stanlow, 
Immingham and Grangemouth. Between 1963 and 1968 rail increased its haulage of 
heavy petroleum products from 4.8m to 15.0m tonnes, using the Beeching approach of 
high bulk wagons and block trains (White and Senior, 1983, 96).
As the focus of industrial production moved towards light industry and consumer
products, the rail freight business found it increasingly difficult to carry goods at
competitive prices in the quantities generated, from origins and to destinations which,
increasingly, were not rail connected. The liner train concept, branded as Freightliner,
was a bold and initially successful attempt to compete and a network of 50 terminals
nationwide was planned. The potential was recognised by some planners:
In the early new towns much stress was placed on the need for rail communication but, although 
access was provided to rail sidings, little use is made of them at present. Circumstances may 
change in the future, as the rail service to industry is improved by liner trains and other means 
(Schaffer, 1970, 25).
As a result of Labour’s reinvigoration of regional economic policy in the 1960s,
several large industrial projects were implemented where rail played a role. These 
included the development by Ford of the Halewood plant on Merseyside and the British 
Leyland development at Bathgate where rail was used to move components and
22 This was a massive programme involving transport of coal to over a dozen new power stations: although 
most were close to the coal fields some, such as Didcot, involved lengthy hauls (Modem Railways, 1964).
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finished vehicles. However this work to reduce the costs of the automotive industry was 
something of a mixed blessing with regard to the future prospects for the rail passenger 
business.
Conclusions
The major issues for management of the post-war railway system were 
rationalisation and modernisation. But the introverted culture of the industry, and the 
failure to link it institutionally with external bodies which were more deeply involved in 
planning for change, meant that the industry found it difficult to develop a vision for its 
role in a rapidly changing society. Instead, a start was made on rebuilding the whole of 
the inherited system as though it would continue to be central to society’s needs. When 
things rapidly began to go wrong, changes in transport politics produced an abrupt, 
politically directed U-turn, and an attempt to reduce the industry down to a profitable, 
modernised core with minimal call on the Exchequer. The public service paradigm was 
replaced by minimising cost to the Treasury. Although contraction was painful, the 
overall view within the industry about Beeching was positive:
His outstanding achievements are to have jolted a hidebound industry out of morbid introspection 
into an aggressive confrontation of its competitors, to have trimmed it down to ideal fighting 
weight, and to have bludgeoned the public conscience into awareness of the crucial issues facing 
public transport in a motor age, even if the public has not yet had the courage to tackle all of them 
(Allen, 1966, viii).
However, despite the retrenchment and concentration of investment in the core 
business, BR remained in deficit with little prospect of breaking even: profitability was a 
goal which turned out to be a chimera.
At the local level it was obvious that, owing to their inherent advantages over the 
rail mode, growing use of the car and lorry would have profound implications for urban 
planning. It does not follow, however, that: provision for road traffic should have been 
such an overriding concern; that the railway network should have been pruned back as 
far as it was; or that patterns of development should have been encouraged which were 
so obviously at odds with use and development of the railway network. The case of 
Runcorn new town shows that there was an understanding amongst some planners of 
how development could be manipulated to favour public transport, albeit a busway. 
Similarly, the experiences in places as disparate as the Valleys, Birmingham and 
Glasgow shows that improvement of local rail services was perfectly feasible outside the 
South East. Also there were cases of railway managers who fought against branch line
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closures, even in rural areas, arguing, counter to Beeching, that both operating and 
track costs could be reduced. Supportive town and country planning frameworks could 
have been linked to the modernised main lines and low cost rural operations, but the 
institutional arrangements and planning ideology were not conducive to such co­
operation. The failure to secure more major development around main line stations 
characterises the relationship: the positive outcomes were notable because they were 
exceptional.
The findings with regard to the thematic analysis are summarised in figure 17 and 
the following summarises the outcomes with regard to the points on the policy agenda 
developed at the end of chapter two. With regard to railway system:
1. rationalisation went well beyond removing duplicated routes with the goal of cutting 
back to a commercially viable core network, rather than with an eye to maximising 
the network’s future scope and utility;
2. services and fixed infrastructure on the main line network radiating from London 
were modernised, although only one trunk route was electrified; outside greater 
London those commuter and rural services which were not withdrawn were 
modernised by the introduction of some EMUs but mainly DMUs although, where 
travellers had a choice, the quality was unlikely to persuade then to prioritise the 
train over the car; those rail freight services which were retained, were significantly 
improved but the marshalling yard programme was not a success;
3. no significant sections of new railway were built and in fact some cross CBD tunnels 
or well located stations were closed, and only one new Underground railway line was 
built in London;
4. many stations were rebuilt, occasionally as part of a larger commercial 
developments, but hundreds were closed and there were very few new stations;
With regard to the town planning agenda:
5. planning policy produced patterns of development which were generally poorly 
related to the railway network, with the exception of some strategic developments 
such as the new towns and some major industrial complexes, the most significant of
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Figure 17: Summary of thematic analysis of outcomes 1948-68.
Explanatory themes Railway sector Interrelationships 
between the two 
sectors
Planning sector
Politics and 
political ideology
Public service 
paradigm led to start 
of rebuilding of most 
of the historic railway. 
Cost of this and the 
rise of the road lobby 
led to a U-turn 
towards the Treasury 
led approach and un­
development of a 
third of the network.
No political champion 
for rail-planning 
integration and little 
evidence of the two 
systems working in 
harmony. Planning 
policy had no effect 
on Beeching 
closures. Change in 
the offing at the end 
of the period.
The political priorities 
never included 
integration between 
land-use and the 
railway network: 
examples of this 
were exceptional. 
Muted response from 
planning system to 
rail closures.
Professions and
professional
ideology
Dominance of the 
technical professions 
produced backward 
looking
modernisation, 
followed by fatalism 
about the Beeching 
closures. The 
infusion of private 
sector businessmen 
produced greater 
awareness of market 
segmentation, but 
their vision was 
constrained.
There was minimal 
contact between 
professionals in the 
two sectors and no 
development of a 
culture of planning for 
rail, as developed 
around road 
planning.
The goal of self­
containment was 
readily abandoned in 
the face of growing 
car ownership, and 
planners were pulled 
along with the road 
oriented ideology of 
the engineers and 
architects.
Governance and 
management
The complex public 
service monolith of 
the early period was 
replaced by a 
streamlined, action 
oriented Board on the 
private sector model. 
This was used 
though to secure 
rapid contraction of 
the industry and least 
cost modernisation.
The two systems 
were managed within 
different parts of the 
public sector realm, 
with little or no 
political or
professional pressure 
to alter that. Activity 
in each sector took 
little note of the other. 
Firm proposals for 
change in the major 
conurbations were in 
place by the end of 
the period.
The development 
corporations secured 
positive locational 
outcomes for the new 
towns, and the non- 
statutory strategic 
plans for the South 
East embraced rail 
planning, on a limited 
basis. Elsewhere 
planning was largely 
focused around 
providing for road 
traffic.
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which were the power stations which were permitted development;
6. the redevelopment process in existing urban areas generally served to undermine 
access to railway stations, and the location, layout and density of development 
generally took little note of station location;
7. with the exception of most of the new towns, the development of greenfield areas 
generally produced settlements which were not focused around rail corridors, and 
the location, layout and density of development generally took little note of station 
location, even in the new towns.
Politically, by the end of the period, the road lobby was dominant, characterised 
by the ‘Motorway Box’ plan for London. However, there was rising concern over the 
growing impact of urban road traffic and the continuing decline of public transport and 
these were so great as to provoke action: the ‘do nothing’ alternative looked too 
unpalatable. But, as explained in the previous chapter, despite the development of a 
new policy thrust by Barbara Castle, Labour found it difficult to halt the momentum of 
the closure programme and some duplicate main lines, as opposed to branch lines, 
were closed as shown in figure 18.
Figure 18: Railway closures under Labour 1966-69 (date of closure in brackets)
the former Somerset and Dorset line between Bath and Bournemouth via Templecombe (1966);
the former Great Central main line north of Aylesbury to Sheffield (1966-69)23;
the former Manchester-Derby Midland Railway main line through the Peak District between 
Matlock and Chinley (1968);
the former London and South Western Railway Exeter-Plymouth main line between Meldon 
Quarry (Okehampton) and Bere Alston (1968).
But on the other hand, the future looked hopeful with a new deal for public 
transport in the major provincial conurbations to be brought about by the 1968 Transport 
Act, and a greater emphasis on strategic planning which it was hoped would result from
23 Having been built 50 years after all the other main lines to London, the Great Central was the best 
engineered with a generous vertical loading gauge, having been conceived as part of Watkin’s Liverpool- 
Paris vision: despite the Channel Tunnel being a live issue in the 1960s, these attributes were not sufficient 
to prevent closure. Re-opening of the line as a dedicated Channel Tunnel freight route is currently being 
pursued by a private company, Central Railway, although the trackbed has not been protected by the 
statutory planning system other than on a piecemeal basis.
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the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act, all to be set within a modernised local 
government structure. It was clear that the railway industry had a much better 
understanding of the need for liaison with the planning system:
Co-operation between state, local authorities and public transport to plan population and 
commercial resettlement around transport routes that need more use economically and can 
practically absorb it is a sine qua non for the resolution of coming problems (Allen, 1966, 226).
What would be critical with regard to future outcomes would be the goals which 
would be set for the new arrangements with regard to the role of the railways and their 
relationship to land development, and the adequacy of the resources which would be 
brought to bear in their attainment. Would these continue to be minimal and largely 
focused on main lines, or was passage of the 1968 Transport Act symptomatic of a sea 
change in attitudes and action towards urban public transport and land-use planning?
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PART TWO
Conclusions.
Chapter three has shown that, although the railway and planning sectors 
were both State activities, they took place within quite separate realms within the 
State structure and the institutional linkages between them were poor. There was 
change over the period driven, on the one hand, by an ideological shift towards a 
more commercially managed railway and, on the other, by a recognition that 
overcoming problems of personal mobility and urban road congestion called for new 
transport planning bodies in the conurbations. Potentially, the latter could work more 
effectively at the inter-sectoral interface. There was change in the planning system 
too with, by the mid-1960s, renewed emphasis on strategic planning, with changes in 
local government structure in the offing to facilitate this. Given the fact that the 
strategic dimension to the inter-sectoral interface was, arguably, the most important, 
these changes were potentially positive. However the very different nature of the 
drivers behind these various trends presaged difficulties for the future.
Chapter four showed that, when measured against the seven analytical 
criteria, the development of policy for the relationship between the sectors was 
inadequate and, in some cases, the reverse of what was required. Although railway 
nationalisation took place because of a political goal of integrating transport systems 
in the public interest, this vision did not extend to the adoption of the sorts of 
prescriptive land-use planning policies which would have been necessary to mould 
urban form around the network. The political and ideological priorities for planning 
were housing, urban renewal and countryside protection. Subsequently, the 
combination of the impacts of the poorly conceived Modernisation Plan and the rise 
of the road lobby produced the Beeching rationalisation which was based on very 
narrowly prescribed goals. For example, whereas the strategy did address the issue 
of duplication of routes and facilities, this was not done from a perspective which 
perceived a growing role for the railway network as part of a broader transport 
strategy. Nor did the vision for the core network embrace the issue of improving rail 
penetration of CBDs by, for example, tunnelling. This meant that planning ideology, 
which from the outset was poorly developed with regard to the railway network, was 
even less likely to develop in ways which would reinforce the utility of the much 
reduced network which the Beeching strategy had as its goal.
Chapter five showed that this was indeed the outcome and that the major 
transport product of socio-economic change over the period was the massive 
increase in road transport, with the road network becoming the dominant transport
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factor influencing, or transforming, patterns of urban form. However, the limited 
evidence of positive outcomes, such as new town location and airspace 
development at stations in London or on trunk routes to London, reinforced the value 
of considering the three spatial levels at which the sectors interacted. It also allowed 
some tentative conclusions to be drawn about the underlying nature of the 
relationship at each level to form the bases of the hypotheses to be tested in the 
Manchester case study, after further development in part three. This was done by 
considering the following specific issues:
the impacts of national policy on the broad geographical interrelationships between 
the railway network and patterns of urban form;
the particular issue of rail access to regional CBDs and the extent to which planning 
concentrated activity generators in rail accessible locations; 
and local railway-land use planning interaction.
The interim hypotheses for each level derived from the analysis in part two
are:
at the national level, the focus for route modernisation was typically trunk routes to 
London, and local services were much more likely to be improved significantly if they 
were on such routes. These factors did influence planning policy and outcomes in a 
very general way with regard to matters such as new town location and the location 
of commercial development at or close to certain stations, as these tended to be on 
trunk routes serving London;
at the regional level, the gap in railway planning and management with regard to 
local services in conurbations outside London was identified and the PTA/PTE 
structure was intended to close it and reverse the rundown of those networks. Land- 
use planning outcomes had shown that the planning system was effective in 
controlling patterns of urban decentralisation and in promoting city centre 
redevelopment, but this had been largely focused on producing developments based 
on road access;
at the local level, planning and urban design had failed to take advantage of the 
potential offered by national policy outcomes, as exemplified by the detail of the 
relationship between stations and land development in the new towns, and urban 
design was dominated by planning for road traffic.
With regard to the explanatory themes, the dominant characteristic in part two 
was the remarkable convergence of political, professional, managerial and
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governmental ideologies around facilitating the growth of motorised road transport. 
Even in the heyday of the railways there was no comparable convergence. By 
comparison with the road transport sector, the railways were politically and 
ideologically marginalised between 1948-68. Although the resurgence in 1968 of 
support for strategic planning and public transport was encouraging, it was clear, 
just as it was in 1947, that much deeper political and ideological change would be 
necessary to alter the direction of land-use and transport policy and practice if the 
opportunities presented by the changes of 1968 were to be realised.
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PART THREE
Introduction.
Part three of this thesis is concerned with the review and analysis of the 
relationship between the railway and planning sectors in the 1969-94 period and 
comprises chapters six, seven and eight. As in part two these deal with, in turn: 
institutional arrangements, policy, and outcomes with regard to the geographical 
and operational characteristics of the railway network and their relationship with 
patterns of urban form.
Conclusions are drawn at the end of chapter six about the degree to which 
the institutional relationships facilitated the development of positive relationships 
between the sectors. In chapters seven and eight conclusions are drawn around the 
seven analytical criteria at the end of each chapter. The three explanatory themes 
are used to account for actions and changes as they occur in the dialogue, and their 
impacts are also summarised at the end of each chapter.
Further observations will made at the end of part three about the relationships 
between the sectors at the three spatial levels, and the threads will be drawn 
together, along with the material from the end of part two, to form the hypotheses to 
be tested in the case study.
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CHAPTER SIX
INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS: 1969-94
Introduction.
By 1968, concern over the social and environmental impacts of the growth of 
car traffic and the decline of public transport led to a refinement and reassertion of 
the policies of the 1940s which, in the following decade, cascaded through the 
railway and planning sectors and produced a new set of spatial outcomes. But at the 
end of the 1970s, apart from some very notable achievements in a few of the major 
conurbations, the vision of integrated land-use and transportation planning allied to 
successful development of modern public transport systems, was still a long way 
from being realised. In 1968 it was possible to be optimistic about the prospects for 
railway-land use integration, but in 1979 the prospects became markedly pessimistic. 
Margaret Thatcher’s ‘New Right’ government set its face against the post-war 
consensus and sought to re-affirm the primacy of market forces and roll back the 
frontiers of the State. This bitter economic medicine was intended to shake out 
inefficiency and encourage managements to break union power so as to raise 
productivity and profitability. It was sweetened politically with a brand of populism 
not previously seen in British politics which, for transport, meant the assertion of the 
right of the motorist to go where he or she chose, when he or she chose. Margaret 
Thatcher made a point of not travelling by train and she drew attention to the benefits 
of ‘the great car economy’.
This generally bode ill for strategic planning, for publicly owned public 
transport, and for a nationalised monolith like BR. However, it will be shown that 
surprisingly, despite Thatcherism, the development of institutional arrangements for 
management of BR and for strategic land-use planning, produced the most 
supportive structure of the whole post-war period.
Creation of the Passenger Transport Authorities and Executives.
The 1968 Transport Act restructured BR’s finances in the face of continuing 
deficits and attempted to put the industry on a secure footing. The creation of the 
PTA/PTE structure in the major conurbations was crucial in developing the interface 
between town planning and local railway networks. The model for this had a long 
pedigree going back to the 1905 Royal Commission on London Traffic and the 
Pick/Ashfield era at the LPTB had demonstrated what could be achieved. The PTAs 
comprised elected councillors and became responsible for policy making; the PTEs
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were their officer level counterpart responsible for implementation. The PTEs were 
given powers under the Act (section 20) to finance the socially necessary services 
which BR could not run commercially. They were also given powers (section 56) to 
invest in public transport infrastructure, which could include railway rolling stock and 
fixed infrastructure: 75 per cent of the cost would come from Central Government. In 
addition, section 39 of the Act gave the Minister powers to pay BR grant for other 
unremunerative services outside the PTE areas, which is where the lion’s share was; 
for example the Southern Region’s commuter services which were treated as a 
single ‘block’. Freight services were expected to be profitable without subsidy.
The 1968 Act also substantially changed the pattern of ownership of the bus 
industry. Various publicly owned coach and bus services outside the major 
conurbations were vested in a new public undertaking, the National Bus Company 
(NBC). These services were to be operated in competition with BR’s Intercity 
services. In areas where PTEs were created, municipal bus companies were wound 
up and their fleets vested in the PTEs. This meant that, for the first time outside 
London, there was a body in the major conurbations with a focus on local rail 
services which could organise local bus services to feed into rail hubs. In 1969 the 
first four PTA/PTEs were established in the West Midlands, Merseyside, South East 
Lancashire North East Cheshire (SELNEC), and Tyneside. These were followed by 
Greater Glasgow in 1973, and South and West Yorkshire in 1974.
The structure of BR.
In line with the developing corporate culture within BR, the 1968 Act
abolished the statutory regional boards and the BRB produced its first ‘Corporate
Plan’ in 1968. The development of a more outward looking planning culture with
participation in the ‘conurbation studies’ was seen as very beneficial:
By these means, it became possible to see more clearly the significant contribution that the 
Board’s services can make to the passenger transport needs of urban communities in the 
decades to come (BRB, 1969,19).
The 1968 Act also required the BRB to report back within a year with a replacement 
scheme of organisation. There had been concern in the 1960s about Government 
interference with railway management for political purposes1, ie. deferring increases 
in fares and charges, and that the Board was too concerned with running the railway 
rather than with developing a vision for its future and promoting it externally(Bonavia,
1 There were particularly scathing remarks in the 1967 annual report (BRB, 1967,6) which welcomed 
the recognition by Government of the need to create statutory mechanisms for the support of socially 
necessary services which, it was hoped, would allow the Board greater freedom of action with regard to 
the commercial railway.
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1971). Any change in the former was unlikely and outside BRB’s control, but they 
lost no time in appointing McKinsey and Company to draw up a management plan.
This was entitled ‘Organising for the 1970s’ and was adopted by Government 
in amended form in 1969 (BRB, 1969). The main principles were a clearly defined 
management structure and a systematic planning and control process based on the 
setting of objectives. The Board was to take on a non-executive role, with day-to-day 
management of the railway (‘staff’ as well as ‘line’ responsibilities) being handled by 
a Chief Executive, with the Chairman acting as principal spokesman and head of 
liaison with the Minister and outside bodies. The implications for reinforcing the role 
of the railway within society as a whole were positive and signalled a further move 
away from the former introverted culture. The report also proposed replacement of 
the six operating regions by eight ‘territories’; Bonavia (1985) referred to this as an 
example of the disease to which BR became increasingly prone - continuous 
structural change as a response to crisis resulting from being given conflicting and 
unachievable goals by politicians. BR embarked on this change but it quickly ran 
into the sands of union opposition and was abandoned after three years; the regional 
structure remained intact, although non-statutory and without the prior degree of 
devolved decision making.
A new structure for rail freight.
The 1968 Act had specific implications for institutional arrangements concerning 
freight: quantity regulation of the road haulage industry was abandoned and replaced 
by quality control, which only regulated the safety standards of goods vehicles and 
their operators. The Act set up the National Freight Corporation (NFC) which 
comprised the rump of the nationalised road haulage industry (British Road 
Services), the former BR sundries business, National Carriers, and Freightliner with 
its road haulage fleet. The principle underlying this was that the NFC would be 
responsible for rail traffic where its origin was road collection, whereas BR would 
retain control of freight traffic which originated from rail-connected sources. This was 
a determined effort to try and create an organisation which was competitive in the 
market for general merchandise and parcels traffic. However, placing rail based 
services in the hands of a road transport organisation, rather than encouraging BR 
to develop intermodal expertise, was seen by BRB as disadvantageous to the long 
term interests of the rail freight business.
Creation of the Property Board.
One very significant change which came out of the McKinsey report was the creation 
of the British Rail Property Board with the following remit:
135
to control all property matters for the whole of the Railway Board’s undertakings, with 
particular regard to the commercial development of its property, including the air space over 
stations (BRB, 1969,52).
The Property Board assumed responsibility for the sale or management of
non-operational property and maximisation of revenue from operational property.
The need to handle the large amounts of property which were becoming redundant
and the need for BR to reduce its deficits, were the rationale for this renewed attempt
at creating an effective property operation. These factors also meant that BR had a
very specific need to engage with local planning authorities which, if influenced by
the right sort of policies, had the potential to stimulate ridership by locating major
activity generators at, or near to, stations. That the significance of this new era of
management of the railway estate was not lost on the BRB was illustrated in 1974
when Robert Lawrence, former general manager of the London Midland Region and
an operator and not a property manager, became chairman of the Property Board
and remained so until his premature death in 1984. Lawrence’s experience helped
him prise the maximum volume of property from the operating departments. Also in
1974 the property regions were increased from five to seven:
this put the regional estate surveyors into smaller administrative areas that gave closer 
contact with local business and municipal communities (Biddle, 1990, 207).
Local government re-organisation: the English metropolitan counties, the 
Scottish regions and the GLC.
In the local government arena, underpinning the deliberations of the Redcliffe 
Maud and Wheatley Commissions was an assumption:
that something loosely called the city region - that is, the city or conurbation plus its sphere of 
influence - would be the right basis for local government reform (Hall, 1989,176).
This concept sat comfortably with the PTA/PTE structure, but the 
commissioners found difficulties in applying the concept because of tensions 
between the design of administratively efficient institutional structures and the 
public’s politico-geographical consciousness. The former concern drove the English 
commissioners towards the unitary concept, whereas their Scottish colleagues opted 
for a two tier structure throughout. Senior was alone amongst the English 
commissioners in his support for a comprehensive two tier structure, but the rest of 
his colleagues were sufficiently persuaded by his arguments to support a two tier 
structure for the conurbations, with a unitary structure elsewhere. In the event it was 
left to Edward Heath’s Conservative Government, elected in 1970, to make the final 
decision. But the important point to note is that the need for strategic planning at a 
broad geographical scale, as recommended by the PAG group, was recognised, in
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parallel to the case for planning public transport at this level and subsidising it in the 
wider public interest. The phoenix of integrated land-use and public transport 
planning, at the level of the city region, was rising out of the ashes of the 
experiences of the early post-war decades. Further evidence of ideological shift after 
a decade or more of growing environmental awareness, was the creation of the 
Department of the Environment in 1970 out of the former MHLG, and its absorption 
of the Ministry of Transport.
The first significant step in the direction of combining responsibility for 
strategic land-use and transport planning in a single, directly elected body, came in 
1970 when the GLC took over London Transport (Garbutt, 1985) under the 1969 
Transport (London) Act. However, it was significant that the area administered by the 
GLC, at 600 square miles (roughly the area contained within the metropolitan green 
belt), was considerably smaller than the 2,000 square miles previously administered 
by the LPTB. Given the extending influence of London and the fact that main line 
commuter services remained with BR, this was to become a significant disadvantage 
for strategic planning2.
Heath’s 1972 Local Government Act produced a different structure for 
England from that envisaged by Redcliffe Maud: a two-tier system of counties and 
districts was created throughout England and Wales. In terms of town planning the 
upper tier of county councils was to be responsible for producing structure plans, 
whereas the lower tier district authorities would produce most of the local plans. In 
the six major English conurbations new geographical entities, metropolitan counties, 
were created which became responsible for strategic land-use planning and 
highway planning. As in London, they took over responsibility for public transport by 
absorbing the PTA/PTE structure too: unlike the GLC though, the 1968 Act gave 
them powers to develop and finance local BR services.
The absorption by the PTEs of municipal bus fleets saw the ending of the 
system of Joint Operating Committees set up in the 1930s. This involvement by BR 
in local bus services, was replaced by the PTEs having a much more interventionist 
role in the planning and financing of local rail services. The bringing together of 
responsibility for all local transport planning under the umbrella of the metropolitan 
counties was a significant move towards a more integrated structure. But an 
important facet of it was the fact that the PTEs were legally separate organisations
2 The former LT Country Bus and Coach Department which operated services out towards the periphery 
of the old London Transport area, was absorbed by the NBC, which undermined the potential for 
integration with rail services.
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from their parent county councils, and often physically separate too, each being ‘a 
body corporate with a Common Seal’ (Hellewell, 1996, 14). This meant that there 
was a significant division of labour between the PTEs who were responsible for 
public transport, and the county highways departments who continued to have 
responsibility for road planning. Therefore the institutional structure continued to 
provide a quite separate locus for road-oriented planning. County planning 
departments were usually in the same building as highways, and there was likely to 
be very regular contact between staff in the two departments3 concerning matters 
ranging from consultations over planning applications to the drawing up of 
comprehensive redevelopment plans. It was clear that the structure was not as 
supportive of public transport oriented land-use planning as it might have looked at 
first glance. Also trunk road planning continued to be the responsibility of the MoT, 
(albeit that this had notionally been amalgamated with the DoE), and proposals were 
developed in a quite separate planning framework and had to be automatically 
incorporated into statutory land-use plans. This was further illustration of the 
limitations of the new structure.
The inability of the GLC (London Transport) to directly influence London 
commuter rail services was an issue picked up by the 1977 transport White Paper 
(DoT, 1977, 30). However the Government felt that commuter services were too 
closely integrated with the rest of the railway network to be extracted and handed 
over to the GLC. But the GLC and the DoT set up a London Rail Advisory 
Committee to look into the improved co-ordination of rail services. In common with 
the GLC, and despite the city region concept, the boundaries of the new metropolitan 
counties were drawn relatively tightly and, by and large, they were contained within 
green belt boundaries. Given what was said in the previous chapter about the 
development of transport behaviour patterns which involved regular journeys across 
green belts, these tight boundaries created significant institutional barriers to 
strategic planning. This problem did not occur to the same degree in Scotland where 
a two tier structure, with an upper tier of elected regional bodies, was created: 
Strathclyde region took over the PTA/PTE and as such administered an area which 
embraced the whole of Greater Glasgow and beyond. However the actual PTE area 
comprised only about an eighth of the region although, to confuse matters, the PTE 
acted as the region’s agent on public transport matters throughout the region.
3 A significant development in the 1960s was the creation of separate planning departments, whereas 
previously planning had often been a function of surveyor’s departments.
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The new structure was in place by April 1974. It was striking that it reflected 
past trends of urbanisation in that PTAs were created in the older, industrial 
conurbations: other more complex urban systems such as the Leicester-Derby- 
Nottingham triangle, or emergent conurbations such as Portsmouth-Southampton, 
Bournemouth-Poole, or Bristol-Bath were not included. Even such an historic, 
industrially based system as Cardiff and the Valleys was excluded, despite its 
retention of a good local passenger network which was favoured by the area’s 
physical geography4.
Although creation of the metropolitan counties and the PTA/PTE structure 
was positive with regard to the development of strategic land-use and transportation 
policy, it was more problematical with regard to local planning. Lower tier district 
councils were much more concerned with traditional planning issues such as the 
provision of housing land and urban renewal, along with developing new expertise in 
housing improvement area planning, derelict land reclamation and conservation. 
They were generally remote from the policy interface with BR and this meant that the 
development of a rail oriented culture at local planning level was unlikely. It was also 
significant that the districts had their own borough surveyor’s departments which 
acted as agents on local highways matters for the county councils. This reinforced 
the highway oriented linkages between land-use planning and road-oriented 
transport planning, in contrast to the relatively remote linkages with rail oriented 
planning by the PTEs.
The 'shire’ counties and the railway network.
As will be shown in the following chapter, the mood of political optimism which 
marked the late 1960s changed markedly in the mid-1970s in the face of severe 
economic difficulties. The economy was plagued by high inflation resulting from 
global and domestic sources and this led to political turmoil (Sked and Cook,1993, 
pp 253-291) as Heath’s Government tried to cope and the unions fought back to 
protect real earnings and jobs. A statutory prices and incomes policy was developed 
which led to confrontation with the unions, and problems with oil supplies associated 
with the OPEC crisis were exacerbated by coal shortages caused by domestic 
industrial unrest. Heath introduced the three day week in the autumn of 1973, 
followed by other energy saving initiatives including a blanket 50 mph speed limit on 
the roads. In February 1974 he called a general election on the ‘who rules the 
country?’ issue: the National Union of Miners responded by calling a national strike. 
Labour was returned to Government without an overall majority, although this was
4 Its case was recognised in the 1977 Transport White Paper, but no action was taken.
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secured in a further general election in October 1974, but the economic problems 
persisted.
As a reflection of this more pessimistic mood, the MoT was separated from 
the DoE again in 1976 which arguably served to make trunk road planning even 
more remote from local transport planning. However, things were not altogether 
bleak: with the PTEs having been operating for a number of years there was a 
growing awareness that their administrative areas were relatively constrained and 
many provincial rail services served cities outside them as well as extensive rural 
hinterlands. The importance of the public transport work of ‘shire’ county councils 
was recognised by the 1978 Transport Act which required them to produce a five 
year public transport plan. This meant that, although county councils had been 
involved in bidding for finance from central government for road construction since 
the Ministry was created, it was only in 1978 that mechanisms were fully in place to 
empower them to plan and bid for funds for public transport developments. But, 
given the then current state of public finances, this was unlikely to amount to much 
investment in the railways in the short term.
Thatcherism and the underming of local planning authorities.
Heath’s new institutional structures were only fully in place by 1974, by which time 
Labour was back in power. They were relatively short-lived as, following further 
economic difficulties leading to conflict with the unions and the ‘Winter of Discontent’ 
(Healey, 1990; Sked and Cook, 1993), Margaret Thatcher’s ‘New Right’ 
Conservative government was elected in 1979 with a large majority in the House of 
Commons. The new Government was committed to a break with the post-war 
consensus which it viewed as characterised by the mixed economy, interventionism 
and, since 1974, corporatism. They were wedded to the view that it was the private 
sector which was the source of wealth and it had to be freed from the dead hand of 
State regulation. Local authorities were viewed with suspicion as, at best, a 
necessary evil and, at worst, profligate and subversive of the national interest. With 
regard to town planning and public transport therefore, the 1980s and early 1990s 
were marked by a more or less continuous process of unwinding most of the 
institutional relationships which had been painstakingly built up over the previous 
three decades.
Town planning and urban regeneration came under the Thatcherite 
spotlight from the outset (Ambrose, 1986; Thornley, 1992). The 1980 Local 
Government Planning and Land Act abolished the regional economic planning 
councils which survived from the 1960s and introduced ‘Urban Development Areas’
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(UDAs). Here development control was to be taken away from local councils and, 
along with land ownership, investment and other interventionist powers, was vested 
in Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), central government appointed bodies 
on the new town model (O’Toole, 1996). The Government acted quickly and created 
UDCs in the redundant dockland areas of London and Merseyside in 1981.
Another feature of the Local Government Planning and Land Act was the 
power it gave to Government for the creation of Enterprise Zones (EZs) in areas 
needing economic regeneration. These were mushrooming all over the country as a 
result of severe economic recession especially, but not exclusively, in the midlands 
and the north. Although the creation of an EZ brought a bundle of advantages to an 
investor, such as tax incentives and freedom from payment of local property taxes, 
they also created a relaxed planning regime where specified developments could 
take place without the need for formal planning consent. This was a further 
undermining of the power of local planning authorities to control patterns of land use: 
eleven EZs were created in 1981 with a further fourteen in 1983-84.
BR and sectorisation.
The Government’s view of the importance of markets reflected the diagnosis 
of BR’s ills made by Bob Reid, who became Chairman in 1982. His view was that the 
corporate railway had lost touch with its customers and he re-organised to create five 
‘business sectors’, as a move towards becoming a more ‘business-led’ organisation. 
At this time there is little doubt that the primary aim was cost cutting ie. not running 
trains for which there was no identified market. The passenger sectors were 
InterCity, London and South East (L&SE), and Provincial; Freight and Parcels 
(including Royal Mail and newspapers) were the other two. Bonavia (1985, 39) 
identified three main methods of devolution in large organisations; by function, by 
territory, and by product. In the early years of nationalisation devolution was focused 
around function and territory; post-Beeching it focused around territory and product; 
creation of the sectors reinforced this trend towards product.
In order to avoid the sort of staff backlash which the post-McKinsey attempt 
at re-organisation had provoked, an evolutionary approach was adopted whereby 
the sector structure was laid over the regional structure. The regions were still 
responsible for running trains and maintaining the permanent way whilst the Sectors 
were their ‘customers’. This undoubtedly led to confusion: the Sector Directors drove 
the marketing function and were responsible for financial results which were 
produced via various internal accounting mechanisms, the first time this 
responsibility had been devolved below board level since the creation of BR in 1962.
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But the artificiality of the financial results came in for criticism and the whole sector 
idea was seen by some as a product of ‘the desire to re-organise, to be seen to be 
doing something' (Bonavia, 1985, 38). But the creation of one organisation to 
oversee London’s commuter services was something that critics had long argued for. 
In the provinces the creation of the Provincial sector, widely perceived as the 
Cinderella of the passenger businesses, potentially brought land-use planning and 
the railway closer together by creating a focus that had a vested interest in medium 
and short distance journeys in urban and rural areas.
Abolition of the metropolitan counties.
Given their commitment to market forces and rolling back the State, the Government 
had little enthusiasm for the sort of strategic intervention represented by structure 
planning and other activities of the upper tier authorities, particularly those in the 
conurbations. The latter were all Labour controlled and were a source of effective 
political opposition characterised by the GLC regime led by Ken Livingstone, once 
Labour returned to power in 1981. Transport, particularly London Transport fares, 
became the focus for intense conflict (Garbutt, 1985, pp 67-76). Fundamental 
changes were mooted in 1983 and the GLC and the metropolitan counties were 
abolished in 1986 by the 1985 Local Government Act: this retrenchment did not 
extend to the ‘shire’ counties which were less directly associated with Labour. 
Abolition of the GLC and the metropolitan counties meant that responsibility for local 
transport planning fell to the highways departments of the remaining lower tier district 
councils which had previously been acting as agents for the counties. This served to 
further erode the scope for integration between land-use planning in the districts and 
PTE driven railway planning, as any linkages usually had to be developed through, or 
at least in conjunction with, the highways department whose priority was the local 
road network.
Public transport and market forces.
1986 was a seminal year as it marked the end of the attempt, begun in 1968, 
to integrate strategic land-use planning with the development of publicly owned 
public transport. From the start it was clear that the latter would be a target for 
Thatcherism: it was ideologically unacceptable and was viewed as being, in practice, 
associated with trade unions and cosy relationships with Labour controlled public 
bodies. This threat was reinforced when one of Thatcherisms leading ideologues, 
Nicholas Ridley, became Secretary of State for Transport in 1983. However, with 
regard to the railways there was a strong political folk memory of opposition to the 
Beeching closures and an awareness of the political significance to the Government
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of the South East commuter electorate. The Government therefore took a more 
gradualist approach to ‘reform’ of BR than it did with regard to its relaxation of local 
authority planning control or policy towards the provincial bus industry. This involved 
increased pressure to make BR more market oriented and to reduce its dependence 
on public subsidy, rather than statutory restructuring or privatisation. These 
pressures did indeed produce significant policy shifts within BR with regard to the 
ways in which the organisation was structured and run and, in terms of international 
comparisons, made it into a notably efficient performer amongst state owned 
railways. Ironically their ideological commitment to market forces made the 
Conservatives rather good managers of publicly owned enterprises, although this 
was usually to make them ‘leaner and fitter’ in readiness for privatisation.
The first statutory step with regard to public transport was the 1980 Transport 
Act which deregulated the inter-city coach industry. As even under the NBC coaches 
had competed with Intercity (on price), the implications of this were not particularly 
profound for BR, but were a shift away from transport integration nevertheless. The 
perceived success of this encouraged the Government to extend deregulation to all 
stage bus services. After trials in Hereford and Worcester and Devon which the 
Government saw as successful (DoT, 1985) the 1985 Transport Act deregulated 
stage bus services and forced the various publicly owned undertakings to create 
‘arms length’ operating companies which could run as straight commercial entities. 
Those services operated by the NBC were earmarked for privatisation at this stage. 
In April 1986 the metropolitan counties and the GLC were abolished and in October 
stage bus services were deregulated: Thatcherism was clearly making its mark in 
unravelling the work of 1968-72, although there was an element of caution in the 
strategy as bus deregulation did not extend to London.
Implications for the railways.
London Transport had already been replaced in 1984 by a new body, London 
Regional Transport, which was under the direct control of the Secretary of State for 
Transport. To some extent, this did improve matters for London’s railways as both 
BR and London Underground services were then under the direct influence of the 
Secretary of State and he had signalled his intention to achieve better co-ordination 
and interchange between the two railways. With regard to fares, this was illustrated 
by introduction of the Capitalcard in 1985 which allowed travel by British Rail, 
Underground or bus on a zonal basis: this was a backhanded complement to the 
policies of Ken Livingstone.
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As far as the railway network outside London was concerned, the impact of 
bus deregulation fell particularly in the urban areas where buses would be free to run 
in competition with local rail services, and the operation of regulated, feeder services 
ended. However, the PTA/PTE structure survived abolition of the metropolitan 
counties5, the reason for this seems to be pragmatism, certainly not ideological 
commitment to integrated public transport. Much of the bus industry remained in 
PTE ownership and there was a need for continued administration of the funding of 
discounted travel for OAPs, children and other groups, along with the operation of a 
system for funding non-commercially viable bus services (tendered services).
Outside the conurbations the upper tier of ‘shire’ counties remained6. Since 
1978 they had been preparing public transport plans and, although they did not have 
a statutory duty to invest in local rail services, a significant number of them did so 
with significant results as will be shown. A positive element of the 1985 Transport 
Act for the railways was Section 63, which empowered the shires to contribute 
revenue support to local rail services. However, the internal structure of the DoT 
continued to have a heavy roads bias: Bonavia (1985, 113) reported that of sixteen 
under-secretaries two dealt with railways and seven with roads, and of forty-five 
assistant secretaries four dealt with railways and thirteen with roads. The DoT was 
poorly structured to respond to pressure from local government for investment in rail. 
Further erosion of the planning system.
The erosion of the powers and influence of local planning authorities 
continued relentlessly in the second half of the 1980s and, during the tenure of 
Nicholas Ridley as Secretary of State for the Environment (1986-88), reached its 
zenith. The 1986 Housing and Town Planning Act introduced Simplified Planning 
Zones (SPZs) which would enjoy the relaxed planning regimes of the EZs without the 
financial benefits. The first SPZ was declared in Derby in 1988 by which time there 
were twenty-three EZs. Also by that time UDCs had been created in Sheffield, the 
Black Country, Trafford Park, Tyne and Wear (Newcastle and Sunderland), Teeside 
and Cardiff, with ‘mini’ UDCs in Central Manchester, Leeds and Bristol. Taken 
together, the creation of EZs and particularly the UDAs, was a severe erosion of the 
influence of local planning authorities on urban regeneration which had arguably 
become the most significant problem facing the major urban areas. In 1988 the 
influence of local authorities was further eroded by the replacement of grant regimes 
which funnelled public money through them to developers in non-UDA areas, by City
5 The elected members coming in future from the remaining district tier of local government
6 The balance between unitary and two tier arrangements now being the obverse of what Redcliff Maud 
had recommended.
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Grant, which flowed directly from the DoE. By 1989 the involvement of local 
authorities in regeneration was so marginal that the Government was criticised by its 
own watchdog, the Audit Commission (1989): The totality of government effort in the 
inner cities is less than the sum of its parts’. It is ironic that the concept of the 
development corporation which, when used under the 1946 New Towns Act was 
seen as an indication of positive attitudes towards planning, should have come to be 
seen in the late 1980s as indicative of the contemporary Government’s hostility to it. 
The rider to this was the winding up of the new towns programme and the disposal of 
their assets to the private sector.
In the late 1980s, abolition of the GLC and the metropolitan counties left a 
vacuum at the strategic level and the Government had no intention of filling it: The 
fact is this: in 1988 we start with a blank hole where strategic local government used 
to be’ (Hall, 1989,170). However it was recognised that London, at any rate, was so 
large and complex that some sort of co-ordination between boroughs was required: 
to fill this gap, the 1985 Local Government Act created the statutory London 
Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC). In the provincial conurbations there was to be 
no such statutory body and it was left to the metropolitan districts to co-ordinate their 
planning activities to the extent that they saw fit. This meant that a range of post­
abolition structures developed, ranging from very informal arrangements with 
minimal contact between authorities, to more formal structures with joint bodies at 
elected member and various officer levels.
These changes had implications for plan making as the bodies which had 
produced structure plans were no longer extant. As a result a new kind of plan, the 
unitary development plan (UDP), was introduced which would be produced by all the 
remaining lower tier authorities in London and the former metropolitan counties. 
UDPs would have a strategic element (part one), and would also comprise a 
borough wide local plan (part two). Given the absence of an upper tier strategic body 
to fix the context for these activities, the DoE issued Regional Planning Guidance for 
London and each of the former metropolitan counties, but the content was brief and 
bland. Collectively these changes severely curtailed the potential for planning 
authorities to co-ordinate patterns of development with the railway network as this is 
dependent upon a strategic and prescriptive approach. Although the UDCs were very 
interventionist, the following chapter will show that, for the most part, they were not 
ideologically given to planning around public transport networks.
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The resurgence of strategic planning.
In the property boom of the second half of the 1980s the initiative for new 
house construction lay almost totally with the private sector. As will be seen later, this 
led to conflict between developers and residents in the hinterlands of the city 
regions, especially in the South East. As this conflict was typically through the 
planning appeals system, it inevitably drew in the Secretary of State as arbiter, 
particularly where major developments were proposed such as new settlements. 
Nicholas Ridley was ideologically biased towards the developers who were 
responding to market forces, but the opponents were frequently staunch Tories, so 
the conflicts were politically unfortunate for Ridley to say the least. His effigy was 
frequently burnt at protest rallies and his ratings reached a nadir when he was 
famously caught out objecting to a new development in his own ‘back yard’ in the 
Cotswolds.
These tensions resulted in his replacement in 1989 by Chris Patten who 
developed a significant change in the Government’s ideological stance towards 
planning, and their view of the relationship between land-use and demand for 
transport. Patten also saw the need to rejuvenate the regional planning process and 
reinforce the role of bodies such as Serplan. This was partly, perhaps, because he 
recognised the intellectual case for this. But also Patten saw that the voluntary 
involvement of local planning authorities in developing regional planning guidance 
meant that they would develop ownership of the policies which would reduce the risk 
of the Secretary of State getting mired in the sort of conflicts which had beset his 
predecessor.
In light of such conflicts debate developed about the lack of a statutory layer 
of government capable of strategic planning. With regard to greater London, Hall 
commented that:
....underneath the surface, the problems that brought the GLC into being have not gone away. 
On the contrary they are endemic, and if anything they have been intensified in the intervening
thirty years We can be sure before long - perhaps by 1995, almost certainly by the year
2000 - the spectre of London government will once again rear its head (1989,174).
He was unduly pessimistic as debate had commenced by the early 1990s and 
support for some sort of strategic body to co-ordinate land development with 
transport infrastructure was coming from unexpected quarters - the property 
industry. Suggestions for a new body ranged from re-establishing a democratically 
elected body with an executive figurehead comparable to the mayor of Paris, to a 
Government appointed commission which would include transport and commercial 
interests as well as local government representatives (Falk, 1990). However, moving
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the clock back in this way proved too much for the Conservatives and the existing 
structures remained unchanged, although reinvigorated.
The balkanisation of local government came under increasing criticism in the 
early 1990s, particularly with regard to urban policy. The result was an attempt by 
Government to pull together various disparate elements into more coherent policy 
bundles, such as the Single Regeneration Budget, and the regional organisation of 
Central Government departments was restructured as part of this initiative. This 
produced regional Government Offices (GOs) in 1994 which provided a more 
focused approach to liaison with regional planning conferences and BR sector 
managers.
Reinforcing the sectors.
It was the development boom of the late-1980s which caused the resurgence 
of interest in strategic planning and the boom also led to increased railway ridership 
and stimulated bulk freight traffic, particularly that associated with the construction 
industry. This generally positive economic climate reinforced the drive towards 
following through the sectorisation process which had started in the early 1980s. 
Economic growth was focused in the South East and its railway network had always 
been the most important part of the national network: this is why London and South 
East had been created as a separate sector. In 1986 this process moved a stage 
further and all London’s commuter services, which had previously been operated as 
separate entities by the four regions with their financial results pooled for 
presentational purposes, were amalgamated into Network South East (NSE). Chris 
Green was brought in from the Scottish Region as general manager. This created a 
single champion for London’s commuter services: NSE was a sizeable business in 
its own right with a turnover in excess of £1 billion pa and focused management of 
this augured well for service development (Green, 1989). The prior creation of 
LPAC and encouragement of Serplan meant that, surprisingly, given the 
Government’s ideological character, a very positive framework had been constructed 
for strategic integration between land-use planning and the development of rail 
services in London and the South East.
Outside London a similar improvement in institutional relationships 
developed. The increasing role of the ‘shire’ counties in rail investment has already 
been mentioned. The creation of the Provincial sector had produced a champion for 
what were third priority services, coming after Intercity and London and South East. 
These were a mixed bunch and included: long distance routes between major cities, 
such as Liverpool-Newcastle; local services in the PTE areas and around major
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cities; and rural services. Since 1982 the Provincial sector had developed five 
regional sub-sectors; Scotland, North West, North East, Central, and South Wales 
and West, each with its own management based in Glasgow, Manchester, York, 
Birmingham and Swindon respectively. In addition, the Government’s strict financial 
control over BR, and BR’s growing experience with extracting money from local 
authorities, meant that there was growing within the industry a culture of developing 
and nurturing links with local government. Taken together, this meant that the 
institutional structures and cultures for integration between local railway planning and 
local authority transport and land-use planning were stronger than at any time since 
1947.
The railway side of this relationship was further strengthened when, in 1990, 
the Provincial sector became Regional Railways and, like NSE, took over ownership 
of trains and management of operating staff from the Regions. As the Government’s 
support grew for regional planning in other regions on the Serplan model, 
opportunities developed for closer working on policy development between the 
Provincial sub-sectors, regional planning conferences, and representatives from the 
GOs.
In 1988 sectorisation was also applied to the freight business, the bulk of 
which post-Beeching was based on trainload traffic. The overall branding was 
Trainload and the sectors were Coal, Metals, Construction and Petroleum: 
Freightliner was combined with the remaining UK and international7 wagonload 
businesses to form the Railfreight Distribution sector, with the Royal Mail and parcels 
businesses comprising the final sector.
The success of sectorisation in allowing the various railway businesses to 
develop their markets, encouraged BR to reinforce their role further. This process 
started internally in 1989 and by mid-1990 proposals had been accepted by the 
Board for implementation over the next few years. As in the early 1980s there was to 
be progressive change on an evolutionary basis with a target completion date of 
1993. The strategy was labelled ‘Organising for Quality’ (Ford, 1991) and the aim 
was to make the Sectors into vertically integrated railway businesses having total 
ownership of infrastructure and rolling stock and to abolish the Regions. Each 
Sector was to be further broken down into ‘profit centres’ based on routes, a 
structure which closely resembled the Line Management approach which the Eastern 
region had developed in the 1950s (Bonavia, 1971, 88-89). The BR Board would be 
responsible for setting targets, special projects such as the Channel Tunnel would be
7 This was quite a substantial business based on train ferries serving Harwich and Dover
148
progressed by dedicated task forces, and a central services facility would remain to 
oversee technical work.
Just as the creation of the Sectors had been potentially beneficial to the 
relationship with the local planning system, their reinforcement was likely to further 
improve the scope for fruitful liaison. For example, the Sectors would now have 
‘ownership’ of stations and would have a direct interest in securing passenger 
generating activities in and around them. NSE was quick off the mark in beginning 
the process of implementation of Organising for Quality and publicised (Gough, 
1991, 6) its development of a tight/loose management philosophy. This involved 
having a tightly-knit central management team with responsibility for strategic 
planning and external liaison with bodies such as Serplan and London Transport, but 
would also delegate operational matters and local liaison down to each of the nine 
operating divisions based on specific rail corridors. This structure and management 
philosophy was very supportive of the development of relationships with strategic 
and local planning bodies and augured well for the future if the other two passenger 
sectors were to develop along similar lines.
Railway privatisation.
In the general election of 1992 the Conservatives, under John Major’s 
leadership, were re-elected, somewhat surprisingly in the opinion of most 
commentators. Eager to show that the Government had lost none of the radical zeal 
of the Thatcher period, his ebullient Secretary of State for Transport, John 
MacGregor, lost no time and in July of that year published a White Paper setting 
out the Government’s intention to privatise the railways (DoT, 1992). For those who 
thought that BR’s biggest problems stemmed from intervention and manipulation by 
politicians for their own ends, this was the final proof of their thesis: the outcome was 
that just as BR completed the Organising for Quality initiative in April 1993 and 
placed all the infrastructure in the ownership of the Sectors, the Board was 
instructed to take it all away from them and place it with a new track authority, 
Railtrack, by April 1994. As a backhanded complement to how close the Sector 
structure was focused around various rail markets, the structure of the passenger 
rail franchises which were eventually offered to the private sector closely followed the 
sub-sector structure of Intercity, NSE and Regional Railways (Harris and Godward, 
1997).
Conclusions.
This chapter has shown that between 1968-94 there were substantial 
changes in the institutional structures for the railway network and the planning
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system: figure 19 summarises the institutional structure where it was strongest in 
the provincial conurbations, and figure 20 summaries the thematic analysis.
The period began with bringing London Transport under the control of the 
GLC, the creation of the PTA/PTE structure, and the re-organisation of local 
government. In the major provincial conurbations, this created a structure which, 
although it had its weaknesses, made it easier to relate railway development to 
strategic land-use planning. Outside the conurbations the ‘shire’ counties were also 
eventually empowered to become financially involved in the development of railway 
services. However, this was a period when BR was characterised by a centralised or 
‘corporatist’ approach to its management, although service delivery was still 
dominated by engineers and operators in the Regions. Outside the PTE areas 
therefore, the overall interface with local government was poor.
Although the election of the Conservatives in 1979 led, initially, to a blunting 
and erosion of the institutional structures for land-use planning, and looked 
threatening to the prospects for BR, this was not how things eventually worked out. 
The Bob Reid era produced very significant changes in the internal management 
structure of BR which sought to place it much closer to its markets and change its 
culture towards that of a private sector service provider, dependent on maximising 
sales. By the mid-1980s this structure began to engage very favourably with local 
authorities who became recognised and valued as both customer and partner. By 
the late 1980s the sectors were engaging with the revived structure for regional 
land- use planning in the Patten era. Overall this produced what was arguably the 
most favourable institutional structure for the relationship between the railway and 
land-use planning sectors of the whole post-war era.
Once the Government signalled its intention to restructure BR in readiness 
for privatisation, then the organisation entered a period where it returned to focus 
almost entirely on internal matters: relationships with local government quickly 
began to break down.
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Figure 19: Institutional relationships between the railway and planning sectors in 
England (outside London) 1969-94.
Geographic Railway Sector Town Planning - Town Planning
Level Railway Sector
Interface
National
Level
Regional
Level
Sub­
regional
Level
Local
Level
British Rail Board
Ministry of 
Transport (1)
BR
Regions/Sectors
Department of the 
Environment
10 Metropolitan 
District Councils
PTA/PTE
No statutory 
regional tier of 
govt- (3)
BR
Districts
No statutory 
regional tier of 
govt. (3)
Metropolitan 
County Councils 
(1974-1986)
’Shire’ county 
councils (4)
1. Between 1970 and 1976 the Ministry of Transport was part of the Department of the Environment
2. The responsibility for management of the infrastructure remained with the Regions until the Organising for Quality 
linitiative in 1992 when infrastructure was divided between the business sectors. From 1982 onwards the sectors 
provided an additional interface at the regional level.
3. Regional Offices of the MoT(later DoT) and the DoE were re-opened in the 1970s. Serplan was reinvigorated in 
the 1980s, and similar regional planning conferences were created in the other English regions.
4. The ’shires’ began to develop relationships with the sectors in the early 1980s and these strengthened up to 1994.
5 .The metropolitan district councils were responsible for local planning from 1974-86, and for local and strategic 
planning after 1986. PTAs were made up of councillors from these authorities post-1986.
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Figure 20: Summary of thematic analysis of institutional structures 1969-94.
Explanatory
themes
Railway sector Interrelationships 
between the two 
sectors
Planning sector
Politics and 
political ideology
Initially a centralised 
corporate structure, but 
expected to develop a close 
relationship with PTA/PTEs 
through the regional 
structure. Hostility by 
Conservatives post-1979 
produced a segmented, 
market oriented organisation 
and culture, which sought 
linkages with the whole of 
local government.
Initially close in London 
and the PTA/PTE 
areas. Undermined by 
Conservatives in the 
early 1980s, but a 
strong resurgence in 
the late 1980s early 
1990s which 
particularly embraced 
the shires and regional 
bodies, as well as the 
PTA/PTEs.
Initially seen as a local 
public service, but with a 
local and strategic role. 
Hostile stance by 
Conservatives post-1979 
saw powers transferred to 
other organisations or 
undermined. Strategic role 
re-emphasised in the 
1990s within a culture 
which increasingly 
favoured ‘partnership’.
Professions and
professional
ideology
Initially continuance of 
traditional introverted and 
hierarchical structures. Post- 
1979 development of market 
oriented culture which sought 
partnership with property 
interests and local 
government.
Initially few points of 
contact between 
professions in the two 
sectors, other than in 
London and the 
PTA/PTE areas. By 
late 1980s much more 
contact across a broad 
front, including shires 
and non-metropolitan 
districts. Presence of 
BR Property Board 
provided opportunities 
for project based co­
operation.
Planning continued to be 
embedded in same 
structures which were 
concerned with road 
building, and continued to 
look towards these 
primarily. Links were 
developed with the 
PTA/PTEs in the metro 
counties. Ideological crisis 
for planning in early 1980s 
which emphasised links 
with property market, but 
by late 1980s planners 
developing links with rail 
sector across a broad 
front.
Governance and 
management
Seen as a centralised, 
production oriented corporate 
body in the 1970s. 
Sectorisation produced a 
complex, devolved structure 
focused on market 
segments, leading to valuing 
of links with local 
government.
Throughout the 1970s 
there was an 
aspiration towards 
linking the planning 
and railway sectors, 
especially in London 
and the PTA/PTE 
areas. Despite 
changes the linkages 
remained in London in 
the 1980s but were 
weakened elsewhere, 
only to be re­
invigorated across a 
broad front in the late 
1980s/early 1990s.
Local government re­
organisation produced a 
two tier structure focused 
on strategic/local 
planning.PTA/PTEs 
provided a linking 
mechanism. This was 
undermined in the 1980s, 
although the stimulus to 
regional planning in the 
1990s created bodies 
which were able to re­
assert the linkages in a 
climate where 
partnerships were valued.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SECTOR POLICY : 1969 - 94
Introduction.
This chapter will show that major investment plans for main line and local 
railway services were developed in the 1970s, but that the response by the planning 
system was limited: the main thrust was towards restricting the location of major trip 
generators to town and city centres which, by and large, were well served by rail. 
However, because of the lengthy statutory planning process, by the time these 
policies were formally adopted Mrs Thatcher’s Government was in power and had no 
intention of constraining the property market in this way.
There followed a difficult period for the railway and planning sectors as the 
Government embraced the market and its locational pull towards the road network. 
But from 1990, owing to the growth of popular concern about the environmental 
impacts of road-oriented decentralisation, there began a progressive policy U-turn. 
Unexpectedly, this produced the most thoroughly articulated, pro-rail land-use 
planning policies of the whole post-war era, and a railway management which 
understood the importance of this and sought to build on it.
Owing to the break in the policy thread this chapter is split into two parts, 
broadly before and after 1979. It begins by reviewing policy at the national level to 
1979, then drops down to look at London and a sample of provincial conurbations, 
and finally considers the rest of the country. This pattern is repeated for the 1980s, 
before returning to review national policy changes in the early 1990s.
Main line railways to 1979.
Government concerns over the high cost of WCML electrification were finally 
overcome in 1970 with the decision to complete the work through to Glasgow. BR’s 
thinking on inter-city services extended beyond conventional rail technology: 
building new routes was politically unacceptable so a ‘tilting’ train was proposed to 
facilitate higher speeds over the sinuous main line network: the Advanced
Passenger Train (APT). It was recognised that its development would be difficult so 
another train, utilising conventional technologies, was also developed: the High 
Speed Train (HST) which was to run at up to 125 mph. Prototypes of each began 
running in 19721.
The higher priority given to rail-oriented planning was reflected in the debate 
around the choice of location for London’s third airport: all the options included a
1 The same year that SNCF unveiled its prototype ‘Train a Grand Vitesse’ (TGV).
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rail link to London (see appendix twelve). Buchanan, in his Note of Dissent, favoured 
Foulness and he expected a new railway would be built to it (Roskill, 1971, fig. 10.9): 
this was the most ambitious project to be countenanced since the war and was 
indicative of the new mood. Also BR convinced Heath’s Government of the viability 
of a cross-Channel rail tunnel: a White Paper was issued in 1973, followed by a BR 
consultation document in 1975; completion was envisaged by 1980. The 
Government accepted that the full benefits could only be realised if there was 
simultaneous construction of new high speed rail links to it.
Despite this buoyancy with regard to the main lines, the Treasury driven 
search for rationalisation continued: BR’s overall mindset continued to focus around 
capacity reduction. Lines continued to be brought forward for closure, albeit at a 
reduced rate, but there was also a remorseless generation of rationalisation plans: 
singling of double track, removal of passing loops and sidings, closure of spurs into 
industrial complexes, and removal of staff from stations.
The concept of the ‘railhead’, a station on the rationalised system to which 
customers would drive, clearly ran the risk of inducing them to remain in their cars 
for the whole of their journey. However it was used positively to justify new stations, 
a significant innovation: Bristol Parkway, opened in 1972, was located on Bristol’s 
periphery, close to the intersection of the M4 and M5. The concept was also used, 
less convincingly, to make a virtue out of necessity when, in 1973, Alfreton station 
was renamed ‘Alfreton and Mansfield Parkway’2: Mansfield is 8 miles from Alfreton 
and it was rather fanciful to see the renamed station as an adequate replacement. 
Nevertheless the concept showed BR’s willingness to promote the network and was 
indicative of an optimistic side to the corporate persona.
Government was willing to invest in London’s commuter network and the 
politically important Southern Region received £220m in 1970, and further 
commitments to electrification followed: £35m in 1971 for the lines out of Moorgate 
and King’s Cross to Royston via Welwyn and Hertford. However, as evidence of the 
restricted vision, not even London’s routes were safe from closure. Despite his 
experience of rail-oriented strategic planning, Hall fell under the influence of the 
Railway Conversion League (1970) and noted:
In some cases the motorways may use main-line railway tracks which are superfluous and no 
longer remunerative: the line out of Marylebone is an obvious example (1971,149).
The Public Service Obligation and rail freight grants.
2 The station was in fact renamed ‘Alfreton’ in the 1990s, when Mansfield regained its train service.
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By the early 1970s it was clear that more support was needed for loss 
making passenger services than was being provided through the Section 393 
mechanism of the 1968 Act. The economy was racked by inflation and Heath’s 
government was using control over nationalised industries to limit rises in prices and 
incomes: in 1974 the BRB noted that costs rose by 33 per cent but they were 
permitted to raise prices by only 16 per cent. The financial deficit continued a 
decade on from Beeching. A ‘Rail Policy Review’ was conducted by BR and the MoT 
and, although its conclusions were not published at the time, they were subsequently 
and were of great significance in setting out the principles underpinning railway 
policy:
a) the railway existed primarily for the purposes of the passenger system;
b) the standards and, therefore, the costs of track and signalling were determined primarily by 
the requirements of the passenger system;
c) in the light of a) and b), where freight shared facilities with the passenger business, it should 
pay only its avoidable costs;
d) on that basis, the freight business was capable (after a short transitional period) of 
achieving financial break-even without the aid of grant;
e) the passenger business as a whole, at anything like its then size, was incapable of breaking 
even;
f) the cost of the passenger system could not be reduced without service closures on a scale 
disproportionate to the expected savings;
g) grant should be paid for the passenger system and not on a service by service basis (DoT, 
1983, 8).
The 1974 Railway Act wrote-off a further £298m (1974 prices) of debt and 
empowered the Government to pay future subsidy as a block grant. As by then the 
UK was a member of the European Community, the method of providing support had 
to conform to EEC law and took the form of a Direction imposing a ‘Public Service 
Obligation’ (PSO) which provided that:
The British Railways Board shall, from 1 January 1975, operate their railway passenger 
system so as to provide a public service which is generally comparable with that provided at 
present....(appendix B in DoT, 1983)
Whereas the above shows that rail freight was not a political priority, there 
was debate over the relative track costs of road and rail: Government was 
sympathetic to the argument that rail was at a disadvantage and concerned about 
the environmental implications of growing lorry traffic. As a result, section 8 of the 
1974 Act introduced ‘freight facilities grants’, which would be available for the 
development of rail infrastructure where it would transfer a measurable flow of lorry 
traffic to rail. An important feature of this mechanism was that it depended upon 
modal shift: in cases where a freight generating activity was granted planning 
permission and a condition was imposed limiting such movement to rail, then a grant
3 This was on a short term, line by line basis.
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would not be available because no modal shift could take place. This discouraged 
the explicit use of planning powers to facilitate modal shift.
Transport White Paper.
A transport White Paper was published in 1977 (DoT, 1977) reflecting 
Government concerns about the rising cost of oil, erosion of the quality of life 
through road traffic, and the needs of non-car users. The Government restated their 
commitment to rail 4and identified the main line network’s tasks (figure 21), but 
stated that it was not their role to be prescriptive about how different modes should 
be used.
Figure 21:1977 White Paper: main tasks for the railways.
a) to continue as the major public transport carrier of long-distance passenger travel on a 
network of services connecting all the major centres of population;
b) to continue and develop their function, which is essential to the industrial strategy, in 
carrying large flows of freight from siding to siding, especially heavy flows of bulk traffic such 
as coal and ores;
c) to continue as a major carrier of people to and from work within London’s vast area of work 
places and dormitories;
d) to continue to provide under the Public Service Obligation and, where they are judged 
locally to be the right way to meet local needs, local stopping services in many parts of the 
country; and to provide also those services which are required under agreements with the 
Passenger Transport Executives within systems of public transport in the conurbations they
serve. (DoT, 1977, 46).___________________________________________________
Whereas it was expected that inter-city passenger and all freight services would be
commercially viable, subsidy would be available for commuter and rural services.
The most negative implications concerned freight:
Rail can undoubtedly offer a highly competitive service on longer hauls and for movement 
direct from siding to siding. But it offers no real alternative for most of the goods that now go
by road A substantial diversion of freight traffic from road to rail is not therefore
immediately possible. Nor is it a sensible long-term aim (DoT, 1977, 39).
In order to reduce the reliance on transport it was recognised that the basis of land 
development decisions would have to change:
...housing and employment have become increasingly separated. Larger hospitals, schools, 
offices and shops to serve wider areas have meant longer and often more difficult journeys 
(1977,7).
But this was not reinforced by commitment to more prescriptive land-use planning 
or by encouraging BR to capture new markets: the separation of the DoT and the 
DoE made this unlikely in any case. By contrast, despite the intention to reduce 
expenditure on road building, there was an intention to more closely integrate road
4 It was significant that this was still seen to be necessary.
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planning with land-use and economic planning, and special mention was made of 
how institutional arrangements could facilitate this:
The planning of road schemes must fit the wider economic and land-use plans in the regions, 
and it is the job of the joint Regional Offices of the Departments of Transport and the 
Environment to secure, with the local authorities and the Economic Planning Councils, that it 
does (DoT, 1977, 56).
The White Paper identified geographical priorities for road building which contrasted 
significantly with the stance taken towards the railway network which was focused 
on underpinning existing services through subsidy, rather than improvement. The 
most significant references to the network were concerned with new procedures for 
closures which, in what appeared to be buck passing, would more closely involve 
local transport authorities (DoT, 1977,21 -23).
At this time there was also a wide ranging inquiry into lorries and their 
environmental impacts (Armitage, 1980) which noted the effects of land-use 
change on demand for lorry transport:
New industrial areas have developed with no rail access of any kind. Indeed modern industrial
estates are often not linked to the railway. There has been a bandwagon effect
(Armitage, 1980,15).
The report considered a wide range of measures to ameliorate the growth of lorry 
traffic, one being using the planning system to influence the location of traffic 
generators. But there was little enthusiasm for this:
Land use planning is a weak instrument for controlling the effects of lorries for reasons 
inherent in our planning system (Armitage, 1980, 89).
Armitage did conclude though that structure plans and local plans5 should consider 
freight transport issues, although there was no specific recommendation that this 
include maximising the opportunities for modal shift to rail. His recommendations 
with regard to rail were restricted to suggestions for widening the criteria for giving 
Section 8 grants.
DoE planning guidance.
Heath’s Government published a Manual on Development Plans (MHLG, 
1970) which emphasised that:
In particular, the new system provides a means for the full integration of land use and 
transport planning throughout the process (MHLG, 1970, 4).
The appendix contained indicative policies including suggestions on planning for rail: 
‘emphasis on rail’, ‘concentration of growth along rapid transit corridor’, ‘district
5 Armitage noted that of the 1,600 or so local plans proposed by local planning authorities, work was in 
hand on only 350.
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shopping centre at suburban railway station’, and ‘facilities for modal interchange’ 
(MHLG, 1970, 71). Although this support was not reinforced by any further 
Government publications, the importance of designing to minimise walking 
distances to bus stops6 was emphasised and a quarter mile (400m) identified as a 
general guideline (DoE, 1973). The only other significant publication with regard to 
neighbourhood design was a reaction against the car oriented layouts of the 1960s, 
but this focused on traffic calming rather than pedestrian access to public transport 
(DoE, DoT, 1977)7.
Planning and the BR Property Board.
During the early years of the new Property Board, planning policy was more 
supportive of the railway network than it had ever been, so how did the Property 
Board respond? The approach was termed:
‘Optimum Management’, a professionally based, prudent policy that combined sale, where it 
was seen to be in the best interests of the railway, with retention and development where long­
term income and capital appreciation indicated a better return (Biddle, 1990, 208).
Although this demonstrated strategic thinking, the underlying rationale was 
maximising income, not utilising the estate to promote ridership: where this 
happened, such as with regard to air space developments, the outcome was 
fortuitous. On these terms the Property Board was regarded as a success and, in 
1975, became a self-accounting unit within the management structure, having 
yielded about £20 million a year. Lawrence realised that, without maintaining the 
supply of surplus land, it would be difficult to sustain this and he used his experience 
of the operating departments to persuade them to release property. The Board’s 
confidence led them to launch what would eventually become their most successful 
project, the redevelopment of Liverpool Street station (Modern Railways, 1975, 334- 
336)8.
A new focus for planning policy.
The economic crisis led to abandonment of the Channel Tunnel project in 
early 1975. In 1976, Dennis Healey made deep cuts in public spending in order to 
reduce the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, and requested loans from the
6 With hindsight it seems anomalous that this document did not embrace access to railway stations.
7 The other dominant planning concern in housing design at this time was poor elevational treatment by 
private builders and a loss of local identity: the Essex Design Guide was the precursor of many similar 
attempts to rectify this weakness (Essex County Council County Planning Department, 1973).
8 It was hoped to make a start on this 25 acre mixed use scheme in 1978, although the onset of 
recession delayed this for nearly a decade.
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International Monetary Fund9. After years of expansion this introduced a new 
paradigm for the public sector; cash limits and budget cuts.
The crisis had important ramifications for planning policy which had been
predicated on growth. Although urban poverty had been rediscovered in the 1960s
(Coates and Silburn, 1970), the overriding mood had been optimistic. This changed
as the economy turned down, population growth levelled off, and the shutters were
brought down on public expenditure10. The policy focus turned towards the ‘inner city
problem’ and what came to be known as ‘urban regeneration’. Given the fact that
inner city residents had typically been bus users, it was not to be expected that rail
would feature strongly in any policy statement about the inner cities, except perhaps
in London. What is more surprising is that ‘Policy for the Inner Cities’ (Secretary of
State for the Environment, et al, 1977) contained very few references at all to
transport and, in the brief reference it did make, concluded that:
The main practical requirement is likely to be for better and improved local roads and in some 
cases for better access to the primary road network (1977, 32).
This concerned the needs of industry rather than residents11.
The limits to road building: London’s ringways.
Buchanan inspired visions for cities began to encounter opposition once the 
public came to appreciate the scale of destruction necessary to accommodate the 
new roads and the intrusiveness of the finished product. The backlash came first in 
London as the draft Greater London Development Plan (GLDP) went to public 
inquiry in 1970/71, chaired by Frank Layfield. As the implications of the four 
proposed ‘ringways’, which formed the core of the transport policies, became better 
understood, the protests grew stronger: it was estimated that 20,000 houses would 
have to be demolished and the total cost was put at £2 billion at 1972 prices. The 
opening of Westway in 1970 drew attention to the impacts: 22,000 objections to 
the GLDP were registered, most of them against the roads. Plowden (1972) 
articulated the case against ‘predict and provide’, pointing out that facilitating public 
transport had implications for land-use policy: central London was the area of 
maximum accessibility and activity generators should be located there, as opposed 
to the GLC’s strategy for the development of ‘strategic centres’ on the ringways. The
9 Needlessly so he said later, with the benefit of hindsight (Healey, 1990,432-33).
10 This was initiated by Peter Shore’s ‘The party is over’ speech in Manchester town hall (Shore,
1976)
11 This failure to understand the importance of access to jobs and services for deprived communities, 
and the failure to consider the mobility provided by public transport as a prerequisite of regeneration, 
came to be seen as a major policy weakness (Lawless and Gore, 1999).
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furore meant that urban transport policy moved into the glare of the political arena12 
wherein the policies of elected politicians were driven by campaigning community 
groups: by the 1973 GLC elections both Labour and Liberal parties were standing 
on an ‘anti-ringway’ ticket and, with a Labour victory, they were scrapped13.
This had positive implications for rail as the Government set up a London 
Rail Study which involved the DoT, the GLC, London Transport (now under GLC 
control), and BR. The results, published in 1975, put forward three options for 
capital investment ranging from £2000 million to £2400 million, with a figure of £1400 
million being the minimum for renewals. The Victoria Line had been completed 
through to Brixton in 1971, when work started on the proposed Fleet Line (later 
renamed the Jubilee Line) from Baker Street to Charing Cross, and on extension of 
the Piccadilly line to Heathrow14. The London Rail Study recommended that the Fleet 
Line be extended eastwards through Docklands to Thamesmead: Docklands was 
already in decline and the need to improve its accessibility from central London was 
understood. However, these aspirations were quickly forgotten in the crisis of the 
mid-1970s.
The planning response.
The research underpinning the GLDP (GLC, 1971) included a sophisticated 
analysis of London’s railway network. This showed that: railways covered 3 per cent 
of Greater London’s area; there was on average one route mile for every square 
mile; there were 566 stations on the BR and LT networks; and that less than 6 per 
cent of London’s population lived more than a mile from a station. Maps of rail 
accessibility were produced along with those showing passenger interchanges and 
freight facilities: there was a good understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the network and of the importance of manipulating density in both residential and 
employment areas. The amended GLDP utilised this to develop rail-oriented 
policies: as a point of departure it considered that a feature of the new structure for 
London:
 will be that a larger part of total activity, and a high proportion of all new activity, should be
located in close relation to transportation facilities, particularly the underground and railway 
networks (GLC, 1976,11).
12 Transport 2000 was formed in 1973 as a nationally oriented anti-road building lobby group.
13 Hall (1982,56-86) commented on how the ringways saga characterised a fundamental shift in 
transport planning for London, away from the Abercrombie-Buchanan infrastructure based grand plan, 
towards a more complex, community driven approach: public transport and walking became more 
important.
14 It should be noted that this was not an extension to the main line system as previously envisaged by 
Abercrombie and British Railways.
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The Plan identified ‘preferred locations’ to which office and industrial developments 
would be steered, with rail access a significant part of their rationale. 28 strategic 
town centres were identified for retail development, 25 of which were also preferred 
office locations, and all except two were rail connected, the majority having been 
previously identified as rail passenger interchanges (table 9). The Plan recognised 
the effectiveness of plot ratio as a ‘standard control’ over development with 
particular relevance for transport, as well as the need to restrict private non- 
residential parking in major employment centres (table 10). It also contained general 
policies with regard to improving rail services. Surprisingly one proposal from the 
ringway era survived and, unfortunately, its success came to serve as a model for 
others to follow:
In addition to the Strategic Centres, Brent Cross is planned to be a large shopping centre for 
people who wish to use their cars for shopping (GLC, 1976, 81).
Production of statutory local plans was limited nationally and, in London, only six 
were formally adopted by 1980 (Simmie, 1994, 119): subsequently progress was 
swifter. With rail carrying the majority of the City’s 300,000 daytime population, it is 
hardly surprising that the City of London Local Plan (Corporation of London, 1986) 
should have been supportive of rail projects and developments at rail interchanges, 
along with using plot ratio to manipulate density patterns. More surprising is the fact 
that Croydon utilised plot ratio too, accepted higher values ‘in the vicinity of east 
Croydon station and West Croydon bus and railway stations’ (London Borough of 
Croydon, 1982, 12), and adopted the GLC’s recommended parking standards for 
shops and offices in Central Croydon. One of the most thoroughly developed rail- 
oriented local plans was Hammersmith and Fulham’s (London Borough of 
Hammersmith and Fulham, 1988): this sought to improve existing and create new 
services and stations, and there was a rail freight section which sought to maximise 
the opportunities to retain/develop terminals. The plan contained an interchange 
strategy and used measures of public transport accessibility to underpin its land-use 
strategy. Together these plans showed that, despite the Thatcher Government’s 
ideology, the reality in London was that road traffic growth could not be 
accommodated and rail access had to be developed as an alternative.
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Table 9: Greater London Development Plan: rail accessibility and interchange 
facilities at preferred office locations and strategic centres.
Strategic centre (1) Rail services(2) Strategic centre Rail services
Barking* BR,U, BUS Kingsland* BR
Bexleyheath* BR Kingston* BR, BUS
Brixton* BR.BUS (3) Lewisham* BR, BUS
Bromley* BR,BUS Peckham* BR, BUS
Clapham Junction* BR, BUS Richmond* BR, U, BUS
Croydon* BR, BUS Romford* BR, BUS
Ealing Broadway* BR, U, BUS Stratford* BR, U
/West Ealing
Enfield* BR, BUS, CARP Sutton* BR, BUS
Hammersmith* U, BUS Uxbridge* BR, BUS, CARP
Harrow* BR, U, BUS, CARP Walthamstow* BR, BUS(3)
Holloway BUS Wembley BR, U, BUS
Hounslow* BR, U, BUS Wimbledon* BR, U, BUS, CARP
Ilford* BR, BUS Wood Green* U, BUS
Kilburn BUS Woolwich* BR, BUS
1. Source - Greater London Plan 1976
2. Source - where more than one mode is cited the information on interchanges is from Greater London 
Development Plan: Report of Studies 1971
3. Brixton and Walthamstow became the termini of the Victoria line completed in 1971 
* Preferred office location
Table 10: Greater London Development Plan: car parking standards for office and shop 
developments
Area Standard
Central area of London 1 space per 12,000 sq ft of floor space
Inner Ring 1 space per 8,000 sq ft of floor space
More important suburban centres 1 space per 5,000 sq ft of floor space
remainder of outer London 1 space per 2,000 sq ft of floor space
Source: Greater London Development Plan, 1976, table 4 
The provincial conurbations.
The anti-roads backlash was replicated in other conurbations, albeit more 
slowly, and many felt public involvement in transport policy was not welcomed by the 
DoT: this stimulated the birth of the ‘direct action’ movement (Tyme, 1978). 
Opposition to road building provided a receptive context within which to develop the 
case for rail: the creation of the PTA/PTEs and the new strategic authorities provided 
the means through which a closer relationship between land-use and railway 
planning could be promoted. The result was that the road-oriented land-
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use/transportation planning techniques of the 1960s, were developed to include the 
option of investment in local railway networks.
The more structured approach to local government financial planning which 
had developed in the late 1960s15 led to the introduction, through the 1972 Local 
Government Act, of annual submissions by county councils of Transport Policies 
and Programmes (TPPs) (DoE, 1973). These were bidding documents specifying 
transport planning objectives and priorities against which central government made a 
financial settlement, largely through the Transport Supplementary Grant. However, 
because they were prepared by highway authorities, TPPs tended to reinforce the 
relationship between local authorities and road building, so the new structures did 
not guarantee pro-rail strategies.
Nevertheless, there developed several distinctive relationships between the 
PTA/PTEs and the railway system which can be summarised using three models. 
The first, where there was the most extensive use of the new powers, was in Tyne 
and Wear. In one of its first policy statements the PTE demonstrated its awareness 
of the importance of land-use planning to the ability of public transport to provide for 
various trip requirements:
Town Planning
The ability of public transport to cater economically and attractively for journeys for all or any 
of these purposes depends upon:
a) How the various centres of activity are grouped in relation to one another.
b)The ease with which it can move directly and quickly between them.
c)The accessibility of stopping places to either end of the journey (Tyneside PTE, 1970, 
para.7.17).
A subsequent report noted the various failings of existing rail services, 
particularly the fact they were run-down16 and served central Newcastle poorly 
(Voorhees and Buchanan, 1973). Under the 1973 Tyneside Metropolitan Railway 
Act, the PTE proposed a light metro system linking the former north and south 
Tyneside networks by tunnels under Newcastle city centre. The strategy was 
founded on clearly identified objectives and the PTE took over ownership of the local 
lines from BR. Overall it was Ihe first truly comprehensive approach to transport 
provision in any major British city’ (Hamilton and Potter, 1985).
In the second model the PTEs relied on a co-operative relationship with BR to 
develop ambitious improvement plans for the BR network. In Strathclyde, before the 
PTA/PTE was created, reports of the Greater Glasgow Transportation Study 
(GGTS)( 1968,1971) had recommended that a priority should be the re-opening of
15 Utilising American ‘Planning-Programme-Budgeting Systems’ (PPBS) developed by Robert 
McNamara’s Department of Defence for running the Vietnam war.
16 Instead of re-investing, BR had de-electrified the local routes in the 1960s.
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the Glasgow Central Low Level route (the Argyle Line closed in 1964): the protracted 
development of investment cases to submit to Government for the re-opening of 
lines closed during the Beeching era was something that came to characterise the 
period. The GGTS noted that there had been a levelling off in rail ridership, despite 
the success of electrification, but that:
Greater use might be made of some existing electrified rail services, and those yet to be 
electrified, by the policies involving changes in land uses and location of planning projects 
being more integrated with the detailed usage of the rail network (GGTS, 1974, iv).
However the GGTS also favoured extensive motorway building and the Study 
(1968) recommended completion of inner, middle and outer ring roads around 
Glasgow and seven radials. The Greater Glasgow PTE, the shortlived forerunner of 
Strathclyde PTE, submitted a Clyderail proposal to the Scottish Office: this included 
the Argyle Line and another scheme (the St John’s Link) to connect the line from 
Paisley over the Clyde into Queen Street Low Level. The investment case was 
broadly based being built on tackling multiple deprivation, improving central area 
accessibility, encouraging regeneration, and aiding the control of road traffic growth 
(GGPTE, 1974, section 4.1).
The continuing support for rail services by Strathclyde PTE was not reflected 
to any great extent in planning policy. Although background work (Colin Buchanan 
and Partners, 1974) noted that between 1965-72 £36M had been invested in the 
Clydeside network and ridership had increased by 5 per cent, it did not specifically 
address the question of how development might be managed to utilise the railway 
network and no special mention of Glasgow city centre was made with regard to any 
of its assets, let alone its accessibility by rail. The subsequent Strathclyde Structure 
Plan (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1979) focused on economic regeneration, 
rehabilitation of inner areas and peripheral estates, and the supply of land for 
housing and industry. Whilst the role of rail in providing access to central Glasgow 
was recognised (p47), certain lines were earmarked for improvement and/or re­
opening (Schedule 2B), and a list of urban centres was produced to which public 
transport access would be improved, there was no development of a more 
sophisticated land-use/transportation strategy of the sort used in the GLDP. The 
railway schemes listed in the Plan were substantially overshadowed by the plans for 
road construction.
Another example of the second model was Merseyside: the Merseyside Area 
Land Use/Transportation Study (MALTS) (City of Liverpool et al, 1969) produced by
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a broad grouping of interested parties17, recommended construction of a new road 
hierarchy over a 25 year period. However, it was accepted that this would not cater 
for all traffic needs and it was also necessary to improve public transport. MALTS 
recommended investment in the ‘Loop and Link’ tunnelling project under central 
Liverpool and had quite a lot to say about integration between land-use and public 
transport services, as shown in table 11. This was one of the most fully articulated 
policy statements of the period and could have formed the basis of a sophisticated 
planning agenda, applicable in Liverpool and elsewhere.
Table 11: Merseyside Area Land Use/Transportation Study: the layout of communities.
In the layout of communities serious study should be given to:
a) The inter-relationship of buildings and roads so that as many places of residence and work 
as possible lie within five to seven minutes walk - about five to six hundred yards- of roads 
suitable for the through movement of buses.
b) The layout of through roads in a way which will not detract from the overall operating speed 
of buses.
c) The need to permit as much medium and high income residential development as practical 
within reasonable walking distance of suburban railway stations.
d) The importance of permitting the greatest practical concentration of employment around 
railway stations in areas to which it is economical to carry public transport passengers by rail.
e) The need for entrances to railway stations to be located in a way which will place as many 
people as possible within convenient walking distance. In practice this could mean introducing 
entrances at both ends of the station.
f) The need to make it possible for people to reach main through roads as quickly as possible; 
this could mean introducing “short cuts” to save time consuming walks to the end of 
residential streets (City of Liverpool et al, 1969,34)________________________________
The West Midlands was an example of the third model where, initially, there
were only very limited plans for the network. The transport study initiated in 1963 
concluded that the cost of building roads to accommodate projected traffic levels 
would be too high and a more balanced approach was necessary (Freeman, Fox, 
Wilbur Smith and Associates, 1968). By 1972 the West Midlands PTE (WMPTE) had 
identified local rail services to be retained and developed, and had a strategy for 
improvements to station accessibility (WMPTE, 1972). Analysis of traffic potential 
noted developments in rail corridors: in particular that the city council’s housing
17 Showing the unwieldy institutional structure of local government before the 1972 Local Government 
Act came into force these included: the City of Liverpool and the County Boroughs of Birkenhead, 
Bootle, and Wallasey; Cheshire and Lancashire County Councils; Bebington and Crosby Borough 
Councils; Huyon-with-Roby, Kirkby and Litherland Urban District Councils; Whiston Rural District 
Council; the Mersey Tunnel Joint Committee; the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board; the Ministry of 
Transport; the Ministry of Housing and Local Government; the British Railways Board; Crossville 
Motor Services Ltd. and Ribble Motor Services Ltd.
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developments at Chelmsley Wood and Kingshurst, which housed 60,000 people, 
were not rail accessible, but that the site proposed for the National Exhibition Centre 
had rail potential, as did the route to Redditch new town. This illustrated how the 
PTEs were committed to their local network and were able to consider, in detail, how 
it could be integrated with patterns of land development. By 1972 Birmingham Snow 
Hill station was already closed and, although this plan contained no specific 
reference to it, it did vaguely propose new tunnels under the city centre and 
electrification of much of the local network, although these did not emerge as 
serious proposals at this time.
In the West Midlands three alternative structure plan strategies were 
developed, ranging from one which was decentralised and market oriented, to one 
which sought to concentrate all activity into the inner city (West Midlands County 
Planning Department, 1978).
There was a lot of internal debate about transport policies and the wisdom of relying on the 
private car at a time of energy shortage, despite the controlling party’s commitment to cutting 
public transport subsidies (Struthers and Brindell, 1983, 79).
Perhaps inevitably, the adopted strategy (West Midlands County Council, 1982) 
embraced something from both extremes, a commitment to public sector investment 
in the inner city, along with provision of suburban sites for private sector housing and 
employment. Significantly there was concern that: ‘Many participants (at the 
examination in public in 1981) considered the plan to be biased towards roads rather 
than public transport, particularly the railways’ (Struthers and Brindell, 1983, 80 and 
85). Whatever its shortcomings, this plan was notable for its very specific policies 
for re-opening railways and safeguarding disused trackbeds18 as set out in table 12. 
This was a significant issue in many areas given the growing evidence that closures 
had gone too far.
These strategic policies were followed through by the Birmingham Central Area 
Local Plan (City of Birmingham Council, et al, 1984) as shown in table 13, and this 
also referred to the use of development briefs for detail planning, something which 
Birmingham and other authorities used very successfully, as will be shown in the 
next chapter. Together these policies made up a very coherent policy framework, but 
it is very significant that this was project based and primarily concerned with 
reopening a closed system, rather than furthering the utility of an existing one 
through a more far reaching land-use strategy.
18 The former 11 constituent strategic planning authorities of the West Midlands County had produced 
structure plans prior to 1974 and these disused trackbeds had been protected by them.
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Table 12: West Midlands County Structure Plan 1982: rail policies
Policy Tp 3: The restoration of the Birmingham to Stourbridge passenger services via Snow 
Hill will be commenced before 1991, and services now running to Moor Street station will be 
linked through the Snow Hill Tunnel to the Stourbidge services.
Policy Tp 4: Safeguarding of Railway Routes.
The railway formation of the former Wolverhampton low Level line between Wolverhampton 
and Handsworth junction will be safeguarded for the possible re-introduction of passenger 
services beyond the plan period (to 1991)
Policy Tp 6: Public Transport and Development.
The design and layout of re-development or new development will ensure the maximum 
accessibility of homes, workplaces and shopping to public transport.
Policy H 8: Housing Densities.
New housing, including higher density development (between 35 and 45 dwellings per hectare 
in most cases), will in general be encouraged in appropriate locations, particularly in and close 
to city and town centres and close to railway stations.______________________________
Table 13: Birmingham Central Area Local Plan 1984: rail policies 
Proposal 4: Development of the Snow Hill Station Site.
a) The City Council wish to see the Snow Hill Station site developed in the following manner:
I) On the Colmore Row frontage: offices.
ii) Within the site: offices, multi-storey car parking, leisure facilities, hotel, housing and 
ancillary community facilities.
iii) Underneath the above elements: a railway station.
iv) To the Snow Hill-Queensway frontage, bus loading and unloading facilities.
b) The above elements will be defined in more detail together with the arrangements for 
vehicular and pedestrian access in a development brief to be prepared by the City Council in 
conjunction with the West Midlands County Council and the West Midlands Passenger 
Transport Executive.
Proposal TR 2: Passenger rail services to the city centre will be improved by:
a) the conversion of Moor Street to a through station;
b) the re-opening of the underground rail link between Moor street and Snow Hill;
c) construction of a new station at Snow Hill;
d) re-opening of the rail link between Snow Hill and Smethwick West.
Railway policy under Thatcher.
An important component of what came to be called Thatcherism’ (Thornley, 
1993) was populism, which was expressed as support for the personal freedom 
offered by private motoring. An early indication of the new politics was the reference 
in 198019 of BR’s London and South East commuter services to the Monopolies and
19 The Government’s monetarist approach to economic management triggered a severe depression 
which, of course, led to a rapid decline in demand for railway transport for passengers and freight. The
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Mergers Commission20. The BRB, under the chairmanship of Sir Peter Parker (1976- 
82), had been prescient as they produced The Commuter's Charter' (BRB, 1981): 
this marked their recognition that BR had to relate directly to its customers for 
political support rather than relying on Ministers. The document highlighted the 
relatively low levels of subsidy enjoyed by BR and London Transport as compared 
with other countries and the fact that, if commuter services were to be improved 
significantly, the costs would lead to unacceptably high fare levels. The community 
benefits from a well used railway were cleverly described as ‘invisible earnings’ 
(BRB, 1981, 1) and were used to justify bridging the funding gap by subsidy. 
Several ways in which this could be done were highlighted: taxes on businesses, 
including Parisian style payroll taxes; sales taxes; tourist taxes; road user taxes; and 
local authority contributions. The document did not refer to taxation on betterment 
from property development21 or to more focused exploitation of BR’s property 
portfolio.
BR had some friends in Parliament: in 1981 the ‘Speller amendment’ to the 
1962 Transport Act allowed BR to introduce service improvements on an 
experimental basis; if they subsequently failed to become viable they could be 
withdrawn without invoking the statutory closure procedures. This removed a 
significant disincentive to service and station development.
The ‘Review of Main Line Electrification’ (DoT, BR, 1981) considered a range 
of options from a base case of ongoing schemes, through to one which included 
most of the network. Analysis showed that all, except the smallest, gave a rate of 
return of at least 11 per cent. The report concluded that:
 it would take an unlikely combination of adverse factors to undermine entirely the prospect
that a programme of main line electrification would be financially worthwhile; ie earn a return 
of at least 7% (DoT, BRB, 1981, 2)
This was picked up and applied by the DoT as a template against all subsequent 
investment: this came to be seen by critics as one of the major sources of bias
overall mood was sombre and Peter Parker’s opening comments in the 1980 annual report were: ‘1980 
was a grim demanding year for British Rail’ (BRB, 1980,7)
20 In welcoming the findings of the inquiry in the 1980 annual report, Peter Parker stated that: ‘We seek 
closer co-operation with our operating partners in London Transport and the GLC and twelve county 
authorities in the area’ (BRB, 1980,9). This was evidence of the growing awareness of the need for 
close working with local government which had positive implications for the railway-planning interface.
21 Advisedly so as one of the first legislative actions of Mrs Thatcher’s Government was to rescind the 
1975 Community Land Act which had been the previous Labour Government’s abortive attempt at 
giving local authorities a lead role in the development process through land acquisition and access to 
betterment.
168
against railway investment, given the use of social cost-benefit analysis to justify 
investment in road schemes.
The benefits of electrification were defined as lower maintenance costs and 
increased ridership, but the Review referred to a submission from Transport 2000 as 
to the possible implications for the locational decisions of the railway’s customers, 
and that changes producing increases in rateable values could be seen as an 
external benefit which should be considered. However the Review’s authors 
considered that:
There is insufficient evidence of the relationship between a programme of main line 
electrification and future land use or settlement patterns to enable a view to be taken (DoT, 
BRB, 1981,77).
What is striking about this is that the question was not raised as to whether land-use 
planning should be used to deliver these. The discussion was couched in terms of 
the response of businesses to electrification, as though this occurred in a vacuum 
which public policy was unable to influence: here was evidence of the Government’s 
market led approach.
BR was affected by privatisation and the hotels and Sealink passed quickly 
into the private sector22. But, for wholesale privatisation, the Government’s priorities 
were the highly profitable utilities. However, in a remarkably prescient comment, 
Bonavia noted that:
...in 1983 the railway achieved a surplus of £64 millions before interest charges, etc, after 
grants totalling £934 millions from central Government and local authorities, and £24 millions 
grants for special purposes. If - and it is a big ‘if’ - there was a guarantee that grants at this 
level would continue, might not a purchaser be interested in taking over the railway? (1985, 
130).
The Serpell Report.
Although privatisation was not favoured, the continued dominance of the 
Treasury view was illustrated in 1982 when David Howell, Secretary of State for 
Transport, set up a committee with the following terms of reference:
To examine the finances of the railway and associated operations, in the light of all relevant 
considerations, and to report on options for alternative policies, and their related objectives, 
designed to secure improved financial results in an efficiently run railway in Great Britain over 
the next 20 years (DoT, 1983, 1).
Initially the BRB welcomed this review as they expected to benefit from it, but this 
mood changed when the Chair was named as Sir David Serpell, a rail hawk who 
had served under Marples. Given the totemic status of public expenditure to the New 
Conservatives, Serpell’s investigations looked very threatening. He considered that
22 As did the National Freight Corporation, the road transport company formed under the 1968 Act 
(McLachlan, 1983).
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there was a reasonable prospect that the freight business could break even by the 
mid-1980s, but advised that the Board should be ready to withdraw promptly from 
unprofitable traffics (DoT, 1983, 24). Serpell showed the rising dependence of 
passenger services on grant and the growing disparity between expected 
performance, as set out in BR plans, and outcomes. In particular the low load factor 
of the Provincial services was noted, 20 per cent, and reference made to the 
potential to make savings by bus substitution. Serpell set out what he saw as general 
weaknesses in the Board’s financial planning (DoT, 1983, 57) and considered the 
options for the future, illustrated by maps of reduced networks. Predictably his major 
conclusion was:
that reductions in the size of the network will be required if the level of financial support for the 
railway is to be lowered substantially.... (1983, 85).
The shrewdness of BR’s management strategy under Robert Reid (1982-90) 
was reflected in the fact that Serpell was quickly forgotten: a significant factor was 
the maps which, like Beeching’s, produced a political backlash. The Government 
stated that it was not seeking major route closures, but accelerated the rate at which 
the PSO grant was to be reduced23, and asked the Board for its views on 
replacement bus services. A further fillip was given by the announcement in 1984 of 
electrification of the ECML24. In the same year further approvals included extensions 
of existing electrified routes to Hastings, Cambridge and Norwich.
The continuing drive for rationalisation of the railway network.
The continuing strength of the anti-rail culture within Government was 
reflected in publication of a report looking into the potential for conversion into roads 
of some of London’s rail routes (Foster, Posner and Sherman, 1984). This 
considered orbital routes such as the North London Line, and the Marylebone- 
Aylesbury radial route. The report noted the narrowness of rail alignments compared 
to roads and the only route subject to further consideration was the Marylebone line, 
as a route for National Express coaches. BR went as far as bringing Marylebone 
forward for closure, but the idea ran into problems over headroom limitations. The 
fact that such ideas received official encouragement, rather than the lines being 
improved as railways, highlighted the Government’s stance.
There was further evidence of this with regard to rural lines: bus-substitution 
was pursued by BR in response to Government pressure and various lines were put
23 When Nicholas Ridley became Secretary of State for Transport he brought forward the reduction of 
PSO from £700m to £635m from 1988 to 1986: the targets for BR implied retention of roughly the 
same size of railway with a 25% cut in central Government funding (BRB, 1983).
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forward as candidates. Closures continued to be brought forward too, the most 
notable being the Settle-Carlisle line, one of the remaining duplicate trunk routes. 
This saga which began in 1981, provided volumes of evidence for conspiracy 
theorists who, since the days of Beeching, saw BR’s senior managers as too willing 
to close lines to please their political masters. However, the case also showed the 
changed political context of rail policy making and the potential to use the 
institutional structure to influence BR and Government (Towler, 1990). Closure was 
formerly proposed in 1983 and eventually withdrawn in 1989.
The final irony was that Ron Cotton, the manager briefed to run the line 
down, worked with local authorities, businesses, communities and pressure groups 
to double ridership. As part of the campaign the local authorities formed a Joint 
Steering Group to develop the case for retention and practical policies to reinforce 
the role of the railway in its hinterland. The whole of the alignment was declared a 
conservation area, so that even if the line was closed the trackbed and structures25 
would be retained.
The Channel Tunnel.
The renewal of interest in the Channel Tunnel was a surprising development.
President Mitterand and Mrs Thatcher developed a very co-operative relationship
and the outcome was the 1987 Channel Tunnel Act: the political compromise was
that the tunnel would only be funded by private sector finance. The political
differences between Mitterand and Thatcher were reflected in their respective
approaches to the rail networks which would serve the Tunnel. In France there was
a rapid follow through with State commitment to build TGV-Nord from Paris to
Calais, with a major interchange and associated commercial development at
EuroLille. Such investment was not on the agenda in the UK: despite the potential
boost to passenger services which would result from the link with European high
speed systems, the Government’s ideological straitjacket constrained BR’s scope to
develop a ‘vision’ for the Tunnel. Harman (1989, 647) criticised the industry for this
and Serplan was generally critical of the Government’s failure to introduce effective
regional planning for the South East and to incorporate rail planning within this:
This opportunity must be seized: at the time this report is being prepared, there is no evidence 
that the Government or British Rail are showing the required foresight (Serplan, 1989).
24 The £306m investment was to be funded internally, so all BR had secured was permission to spend its 
own funds, which was indicative of how politically hamstrung it was
25 The elevated and rugged country through which the route passes means that it is characterised by 
having many tunnels, embankments and viaducts, typified by Ribblehead Viaduct which was adopted 
as a campaign logo.
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Nevertheless, section 40 of the Act which instructed BR to consult with 
regional bodies about Tunnel rail services, acted as a stimulus to the growing 
interest in rail amongst local planning authorities, as well as private sector interests. 
Contemporary research showed that, with regard to freight traffic, these local 
interest groups were particularly concerned that:
the requirement for a minimum 8%26 per annum return will severely limit the implementation
of regional recommendations for investment will lessen rail’s market share, and could
have an adverse effect on regional economies (Farrington et al, 1990,143)
The limitations of the UK’s vertical loading gauge were becoming more 
apparent at this time as maritime containers were increasing in size, and the 
proposed link with Continental railways served to bring the issue into sharper focus. 
But no action was proposed as the Government had made it clear that support for 
the Tunnel project would not translate into plans for public investment in the 
domestic railway network.
Deregulation of planning and its limits: the green belt battle.
The Conservative’s laissez-faire approach to planning was reinforced by the 
fact that 43 per cent of their MP’s had links with property interests (Healey et al, 
1988). As well as initiating UDAs and EZs, the 1980 Local Government Planning 
and Land Act introduced Land Registers, lists of publicly owned vacant sites, and 
forced public bodies to place this land on the market. This bolstered attempts by the 
Property Board to dispose of land quickly and was a significant push towards 
utilising it for development which would yield immediate financial returns, rather than 
securing uses which would utilise the railway network27. This was followed by the 
creation of EZs, eleven in 1981 with a further fourteen in 1983-84.
But it was not all plain sailing for the Government: in 1983 they signalled their 
intention to relax green belt controls which provoked opposition from a united front of 
environmental groups and Labour and Tory controlled local government bodies. In 
Parliament the Government was opposed by over sixty Tory MPs28 and the pressure 
forced them to back down and issue a revised circular re-affirming commitment to 
green belts, using this to demonstrate their green credentials. This was a pity as
26 This was 1 per cent above the 7 per cent minimum rate of return cited in the main line electrification 
report, showing a further tightening of the Treasury constraints.
27 The Government did not take any more radical steps to create a freer market in land as suggested by 
Chisholm and Kivell (1987), presumably because their suggestions would impact negatively on private 
sector interests.
28 The total area of green belts had increased significantly since the mid-1970s as articulate residents 
realised it could be used to protect their environment and maintain property values: most such residents 
had Tory MPs (Elson, 1986).
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there were good planning reasons to reconsider green belt policy, not the least of 
which was the effect of stimulating demand for commuting by car. Green belts also 
sterilised land along railway lines, particularly around stations, which could have 
been developed for rail served settlements: all too often the stations had already 
been closed.
Despite this setback, the Government pressed on with their deregulatory 
agenda which was embodied in the titles used for subsequent White Papers: ‘Lifting 
the Burden’ and ‘Building Businesses Not Barriers’ (DoE, 1985,1986). The 
implications were that developers should only be refused planning permission where 
development ‘would cause demonstrable harm to interests of acknowledged 
importance’ (DoE, 1986, 21): the policies to focus major commercial developments 
in town and city centres built into the first generation of structure plans were being 
ignored.
As the economy boomed growth was concentrated in the broader South East 
region, especially along motorway corridors such as the M1, M4 and the M11: 
‘Sunbelt Britain’ (Breheny et al, 1989). This phenomenon was ascribed to four 
factors, one of which was:
.... a major concentration of producer services activity largely as a result of the 
decentralisation of activity from central London to free-standing towns and cities within a 
radius of about 150km of the metropolitan area (Mason et al in Breheny et al, 1989, 57).
This suggested to the Government that the markets for light industrial and office 
buildings were converging with firms requiring a new type of flexible, high quality 
building (Henneberry, 1988). Debate focused on the impact of the Use Classes 
Order (DoE, 1972) in requiring planning permission to change the use of such 
buildings and this produced the overarching B1 Business class (DoE, 1987, 3), 
which formally freed large, speculative, office developments from restrictive 
locational policies (Haywood, 1996). In the buoyant market of the late 1980s, this 
meant that the tremendous pressures in all the major conurbations for out-of-centre 
office developments were irresistible. The locational advantage to developers was 
the use of cheap land for high value development, with easy access to the major 
road network and abundant on-site parking as the marketing attractions. 
Contemporary research in the USA showed the likely outcomes (Cervero, 1984): the 
implications for the railway network were very negative.
London: the Docklands debacle and the emergence of Network South East.
The promotion of major urban rail projects had ended with the mid-1970s 
crisis, and the cost overrun by the Tyne and Wear Metro reminded Government of 
the financial risks. It was surprising therefore that they should have supported the
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introduction of a new form of rail transport into London, namely light rail. Promotion 
of Docklands regeneration meant that, because its inaccessibility was seen as a 
barrier to private investment (LDDC, 1983), it was necessary to invest in some sort 
of public transport system and a segregated rail system was the only practical 
alternative. The Government would only fund a low cost solution so, in 1982, they 
agreed to provide £77 million for the Docklands Light Railway (DLR), a low capacity 
system capable of carrying 8000 passengers per hour, which would run between 
Tower Bridge and the Isle of Dogs, with a link to Stratford where there would be 
interchange with BR’s Essex commuter services and the Central Line.
There was no overall land-use/transportation strategy for Docklands and the 
Government had no reservations about encouraging the step change in the scale of 
development presented by the Canary Wharf scheme, which became associated 
with Olympia and York. This envisaged 1 million square metres of development on 
about 30 hectares of land and led to the estimated number of jobs on the Isle of 
Dogs increasing from 25,000 to 65,000, generating a commuter flow which could not 
be serviced by DLR. What followed was a gradual shift in Government policy in 
response to the transport problems the new developments were creating. Further 
investment in the DLR was committed, in partnership with Olympia and York, to 
increase the capacity to 15,000 passengers per hour and to link it to the City by 
tunnelling to Bank. Eventually, in 1993, the Government approved construction of the 
Jubilee Line extension which could carry 24,000 passengers per hour in each 
direction (Willis, 1997). The disregard in Docklands for integration between land 
development and transport was widely criticised as the most striking example of the 
failure of the Government’s laissez-faire approach (Brownhill,1990; Church, 1990; 
Simmie, 1994).
Rail traffic volumes closely follow the economic cycle and the late 1980s 
boom coincided with the development of favourable institutional arrangements as set 
out in chapter 6. In addition, there was growing concern over road traffic congestion 
and pollution. The costs of congestion were used by the road lobby to justify further 
development of the trunk road network (British Roads Federation, 1987) and concern 
was deepened by publication of revised National Road Traffic Forecasts (DoT, 
1989a) which projected increases in traffic over 1988 levels of between 83 and 142 
per cent by 2025. The Government responded by announcing a greatly expanded 
road building programme (DoT, 1989b). Despite this, the concerns over road traffic 
provided an opportunity to argue the case for rail and there was widespread
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development of schemes to improve passenger services, which were usually 
incorporated within the land-use planning process.
London was a prime example: despite decentralisation, Central London’s 
economy grew rapidly and this had profound transport impacts. Green29 (1989) 
demonstrated that although commuting into Central London increased by 7 per cent 
between 1985-88, the numbers travelling by road actually decreased, whilst those 
travelling by Network South East and the Underground increased by 16.7 per cent 
and 12.9 per cent respectively. For 14 years from 1970 rail commuting into London 
had declined, but the 1988 total was the highest ever recorded. The Central London 
Rail Study (DoT et al,1989) was jointly produced by Network South East, London 
Regional Transport, London Underground and the DoT and contained a range of 
proposals for massive investment. These included East-West and North-South 
Cross Rail, and improvements to the recently introduced Thameslink system (see 
chapter eight)30. Green used estimates of employment growth to argue for massive 
investment which included a new generation of EMUs and DMUs, to be branded as 
‘Networkers’, and investment in neglected routes such as those serving 
Marylebone31 and the London Tilbury and Southend line. He also proposed 
development of services to Stansted and Heathrow airports, and major projects such 
as the Cross Rail projects and use of the proposed Channel Tunnel Main Line from 
King’s Cross for express commuter services.
The provincial conurbations.
In Glasgow, implementation of the Argyle line project, followed by upgrading 
of the underground system, the Subway, produced an escalation in costs for 
Strathclyde PTE, exacerbated by falling ridership associated with the recession. The 
PTE reported that revenue as a percentage of costs had fallen from 62 per cent in 
1977 to 43 per cent in 1983 (Strathclyde Transport and BR Scottish Region, 1983). 
So, even this pro-rail PTE had to introduce a cost cutting strategy which included 
driver-only operation, the ‘Basic Modern Station’ concept which replaced staff by 
ticket machines, closure of the Paisley Canal line, and thinning of the timetable 
elsewhere. The Section 20 network was in crisis and there was a need for 
investment and reduced operating costs: the alternative was a steady run down on
29 The transfer of Chris Green from ScotRail to become the head of Network South East put in place a 
politically astute manager who was alert to the impacts of property development. Like Gerald Fiennes, 
Green was one of the few BR managers to emerge from the anonymity of public service.
30 These schemes picked up on the themes of the wartime plans as they would enable passengers on the 
main line railways to reach destinations in Central London without changing to the Underground, as 
well as offering rapid journeys across London.
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all but the most highly used lines. As a symbol of its commitment to rail, even during 
this difficult period the PTE managed to maintain its capital programme with the 
proposed electrification of the route out from Paisley to Ayr. This was approved by 
Scottish Secretary George Younger in 1982, one of the conditions being that the 
PTE should obtain European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) funding, showing 
the widening of the funding net for the social railway and the need to demonstrate 
socio-economic benefits. A working group was set up in 1983, comprising members 
and officers, BR managers32, and trade union representatives33, which produced an 
investment plan coupled to reductions in manning levels: funding was to be from a 
combination of the PTE, the Scottish Office and the ERDF.
Approval of the original DLR investment served to stimulate interest in light 
rail as a tool to reduce road traffic congestion in other cities and to link this to urban 
regeneration. Plans usually employed a combination of street running and 
segregated track utilising former BR lines, and the Provincial Sector was positive in 
its attitude to these (Williams, 1992)34. The first proposal to crystallise as a fully 
costed project was in Manchester in 1985 (Knowles, 1996), and this will be 
considered in chapter nine. What was significant to the role of land-use planning in 
these proposals was that they were to be funded under section 56 of the 1968 
Transport Act. Changes to the procedures governing this mechanism (DoT, 1989c) 
meant that funding would be predicated on the expectation that schemes would 
provide benefits for the wider community, or ‘non-users, and this could provide the 
basis for public subsidy. Although it was expected that the major area of non-user 
benefit would be reduced traffic congestion for road users, there was an expectation 
of regenerative effects too, including the impact on land development. The second 
project to come to fruition was in Sheffield where Parliamentary powers were in place 
by 1989. Government funding was committed by Michael Portillo in 1990. Line 1 
was to be largely street running whereas Line 2, which was to run through the Lower 
Don Valley regeneration area to the proposed Meadowhall shopping centre, used a 
route released by BR (Lawless and Dabinett, 1995). The North American literature 
showed that a very interventionist approach was needed to ensure that property 
investment took place around stations on new rail systems (Heenan, 1968; Knight
31 After years of closure threats, the Chiltem line was subject to a ‘total route modernisation’ plan 
which included new trains, new signalling and station improvements.
32 This included Chris Green before his move to NSE .
33 The inclusion of the unions to oversee acceptance of job cuts, showed their continuing influence as a 
constraint on BR management, despite the onset of Thatcherism.
34 The surge of interest in light rail saw 40 schemes mooted nation wide (Taylor, 1993), and was 
likened to the Railway Mania of 1844.
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and Trygg, 1977; Cervero 1984). Similarly, research by Hall and Hass-Klau into the 
impact of rail investment on city centres in the UK and Continental Europe had 
concluded that:
Transport improvements by themselves can never achieve anything; they merely facilitate 
urban change. They have not had an obvious or marked effect on the structure and 
organisation of the city, even in Germany - though that may well happen in time. It will only 
happen, however, if other urban policies make it do so (1985, 170).
Given the Government’s relaxed stance towards road-oriented 
decentralisation, their support for light rail projects based on assumptions about 
property development along their routes was surprising. By the time that these 
schemes were entering the construction phase local planning authorities were 
producing their unitary development plans (UDPs) so, theoretically, there was an 
opportunity to produce planning strategies to steer development to nodes on the 
networks. However, the Government had no enthusiasm for such an interventionist 
approach35 and, in any case, the areas of most intensive redevelopment in 
Manchester and Sheffield were being managed by UDCs, so the prospects for rail 
oriented planning were poor to say the least. Even in Newcastle, where the locally 
owned Metro was already in operation, the city planning authority’s first thoughts 
about the content of its UDP were a depressing reflection of the hostility of this 
ideological context. In a document running to 169 pages, transport and its 
implications for planning merited only one and a half pages of vague intentions 
(Newcastle City Planning Department, 1986, 83-84).
The 'shire’ counties and Provincial.
The creation of the Provincial Sector facilitated development of the 
investment case to replace ageing Modernisation Plan rolling stock (Cornell, 1993). 
This led to ‘Sprinterisation’: a second generation of mainly two-car DMUs which 
were faster and more efficient than their predecessors. These were to be used as 
part of a more fundamental change of operating practices whereby the running of 
infrequent but high capacity trains would be replaced by frequent, faster, lower 
capacity Sprinter trains. The Sprinters would contain denser seating arrangements 
than their predecessors as the Government would only authorise a ‘two for three’ 
replacement programme, which promised further cuts in operating costs36. By 1990
35 The Strategic Guidance for Greater Manchester (DoE, 1989), for example, made very little mention 
of office development ( a major trip generator), made no mention of Salford Quays (see chapter 9), and 
the only mention of Manchester Airport was to state that: ‘Manchester Airport will grow apace during 
the period of this Guidance’ (para. 5).
36 Although this would eventually provoke a debate about space standards and passenger comfort, and 
the difficulties of carrying luggage and cycles in these ‘cost effective’ trains which have no guard’s van.
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the situation for Provincial was very positive and there were no extant proposals for 
line closures or bus-substitution (Whitehouse, 1990).
The most notable location for development of railway services through
integration with ‘shire’ county council policies was in the Valleys, where there was a
long standing culture of support within BR and the community. However, by the
early 1980s, even the Valley Lines were in decline: ridership fell by 25 per cent
between 1980-83 as local unemployment and fares rose. Within the ‘nationalised
monolith’ such local systems were regarded as ‘hopeless cases’, with continual cost
cutting as the only strategy, with inevitable consequences. However, from 1983 the
Valley Lines enjoyed a remarkable renaissance (Clark, 1993; Davies and Clark,
1996) as a devolved structure gave local managers their head: they developed a
growth strategy which produced fares reductions, increased service frequency,
plans for 20 new stations, and re-opening lines. South and especially Mid Glamorgan
County Councils played a significant role by developing pro-rail policies in their
respective structure plans and providing capital from their transportation budgets:
Perhaps the most fruitful relationship ever to exist between non-metropolitan councils and a 
railway company in Britain was that between BR and Mid and South Glamorgan county 
councils in the 1980s (Davies and Clark, 1996, 95).
Although the experience in the Valleys was arguably the most fruitful 
involvement of the shires in railway development, it was not unique: by the late 
1980s Durham, North Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and Lancashire were investing heavily 
(Sully, 1989). Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Leicestershire began to develop 
plans on the scale of the Valleys and to incorporate rail strategies into their statutory 
development plans. The most notable of these was the ‘Robin Hood Line’ scheme to 
reintroduce rail services between Nottingham, Mansfield and Worksop, these having 
been withdrawn in 1964 and part of the route closed and disposed of37. The project 
used compulsory purchase to return this to public ownership: further evidence of the 
over zealous closure and disposal strategy and the failure of the planning system to 
safeguard the alignment. The policy goals behind the project were concerned with 
reducing traffic congestion in greater Nottingham, and with increasing personal 
mobility for people in the declining Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire coalfield. 
Nottinghamshire County Council was the driving force, supported by Derbyshire and 
the districts: together they formed a ‘Robin Hood Line Steering Group’, with the 
Provincial sector as a member. The degree of local authority commitment necessary
37 This was in the Leen Valley where in the C19 three companies had each built a line for the coal 
traffic, one of the classic examples of route duplication, but all were closed and disposed of post- 
Beeching.
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to progress this project was reflected in the fact that, because it stood outside the 
PSO mechanism, they would have to supply all the capital and be prepared to 
underwrite any operating deficit.
The local authority planning functions lent support through strategic policy 
development as expressed in: structure plans; case making to secure funding; and in 
the detail of station location and development which was tied into local plans 
(Haywood, 1992). However it is indicative of the overall state of contemporary policy 
development that Nottinghamshire’s replacement structure plan of 1991 still did not 
contain prescriptive rail corridor policies. However, Leicestershire developed more 
innovative policies to underpin its commitment to the reintroduction of rail passenger 
services over two routes (Haywood, 1992), which were related to a land development 
strategy based on ‘transport choice corridors’ which:
..are based on the railway lines in the County, along which new local railway services are 
proposed, and along the A6 between Leicester and Loughborough. This is the only bus route 
in the County which has the potential to offer, in the foreseeable future, a realistic choice of 
transport. Ideally, development land should be allocated in locations within walking distance of 
a station or proposed station or the A6 bus route. Walking distance is usually about 1 
kilometre (half a mile) (Leicestershire County Council, 1991, para 2.37)
National policy in the 1990s: land-use/transport integration again.
Public concern over traffic pollution, congestion, and loss of countryside led 
to the emergence of the ‘New Realism’ (Goodwin et al, 1991) with regard to the 
transportation debate: ‘predict and provide’ was being fundamentally challenged. The 
political pressures led to significant policy shifts: the fallout saw replacement of 
Nicholas Ridley by Chris Patten as Secretary of State for the Environment, and he 
introduced a more interventionist approach. This began with publication of ‘This 
Common Inheritance’ (DoE, 1990): whereas this discussed the role that managing 
land-use and transport could have in reducing impacts on the environment, it failed 
to draw any conclusions:
... not enough is known about the relationship between choice of housing and employment 
location and transport mode to allow the Government to offer authoritative advice at this stage 
(HMSO, 1990, 87).
Given the literature which this thesis has reviewed, it is clear that the reason 
for this was political rather than technical: a U-turn from laissez-faire to a more 
prescriptive regime would need to be gradual and carefully presented. Whatever its 
shortcomings though, the White Paper was a crucial part of the move towards 
seeing the relationships between land-use and demand for transport as something 
which the planning system should address as part of what became the ‘Strategy for 
Sustainable Development’ (DoE, 1994a). Encouraged by the evidence of policy 
shift, lobby groups pressurised the Government with a series of reports on the
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transport crisis and the need for radical change (Owens, 1991; Joseph, 1991; 
Sinclair, 1992; Roberts et al 1992)
In order to develop a firm basis for policy the DoE sponsored research (DoE, 
DoT, 1993) which showed that, in order to promote the use of public transport, trip 
generating uses should be located in corridors well served by public transport, and 
also identified possible areas of policy tension:
• the preservation of green belt and possible, selective urban expansion within 
transport corridors; and
• the safeguarding of well-accessed locations for uses ‘needing’ such locations and 
local economic or environmental considerations (1993, 65).
This was followed by research by Breheny, Gent and Lock (1993) into private 
sector new settlement proposals, there having been 184 of these between 1980-92. 
This evaluated five alternative development models but, although transport 
implications were considered in the broadest sense, particularly with regard to 
energy consumption and ease of providing public transport, explicit relationships with 
the railway network were not explored. However, the overall conclusion was 
significant:
If the desire for sustainability is given great weight, then, taking all considerations in the 
round, new settlements of a scale approaching 10,000 dwellings (25-30,000 population) -with 
supporting employment and other facilities and amenities - would be the most desirable form 
of urban development other than urban infill (Breheny et al, 1993, 81).
Settlements of this size could be expected to support a railway service. Significantly, 
the report went on to draw attention to the fact that this size was comparable to that 
of Letchworth and Welwyn, but did not note their location on the same railway 
corridor or the prominent role that the station played as the focal point of their 
layout. This omission showed the limitations of contemporary planning ideology.
This movement on land-use policy was paralleled by changes in transport 
policy, stimulated by the impact of the ‘eco-warriors’. The confrontations38 produced 
a political alliance between the young idealists and, much more threatening to the 
Government, the respectable middle class. It was this which ended ‘predict and 
provide’, rather than research by consultants and academics, although this provided 
the intellectual justification. There was in fact a surge in contemporary publication 
which explored the concept of ‘sustainable development’ and its ‘deep green’ 
ramifications (Jacobs, 1991; Douthwaite, 1992): planning ideology became 
concerned with how development patterns could be manipulated to facilitate use of
38 Battles took place at the site of the Bath Eastern By-pass, the M l 1 extension and the M3 extension 
through Twyford Down.
public transport, especially railways. This produced the concepts of the ‘sustainable 
city’ and the ‘compact city’(Breheny, 1992; Breheny and Rookwood, 1993; Haughton 
and Hunter, 1994): although the language was new, this was clearly a return to the 
ideological strands developed in the late 1960s and 1970s, which had been largely 
ignored since the early 1980s39.
The new mood produced a significant change in the TPP process: by the 
1980s this had become part of the ‘predict and provide’ mechanism. It was 
recognised that transport policy needed to be co-ordinated across local authority 
boundaries, ie. that transport planning has a strategic dimension, and that the TPP 
process needed to encourage use of transport modes other than cars40. This led to 
introduction of the ‘package approach’ whereby authorities were encouraged to 
develop joint strategies, which would explicitly be in step with those in UDPs, to 
secure modal shift from the car. But there was no explicit steer towards promoting 
use of local railway networks other than to point out that:
Public transport proposals for which the Government is able to consider resource allocations 
include new railway and bus stations, heavy and light rail schemes in urban areas, bus priority 
measures and guided busways (DoT, 1993, 10).
Encouraged by the ideological swing, local transport authorities began to
develop more ambitious strategies. Strathclyde pointed out the importance of the
Government acting to manage decentralisation more effectively:
Resisting these pressures will require a continuation of the past strong co-operation between 
strategic and local planning authorities. It will also require the Government to support the 
planning authorities through decisions on development plans and planning inquiries and to 
implement the principles of sustainable development set out in ‘This Common Inheritance’ by 
containing unnecessary decentralisation (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1991, 52).
Authorities in the West Midlands carried out a series of Integrated Transport Studies 
followed by publication of a twenty year public transport strategy (WMPTE, 1992): 
this envisaged a further cross-city rail link, electrification of local railways, 
improvements to the overloaded New Street station, new stations, and a light rail 
system, the first phase of which would utilise the safeguarded trackbed between 
Snow Hill and Wolverhampton.
The process of change was given added momentum by the arrival in 1992 of 
John Gummer as Secretary of State for the Environment, as he seemed to undergo 
a quite genuine change of outlook as a result of exposure to the sustainability
39 The resurgence was international too, with ‘transit planning’ being a part of the American ‘New 
Urbanism’ movement (Calthorpe, 1993; Katz, 1994).
40 There was little consideration of freight transport issues by local authorities, other than with regard to 
road maintenance and bridge strengthening for heavier lorries.
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debate. With regard to transport and land use, this produced the revised version of 
PPG13 which, in order to reduce car dependency, stated:
...local authorities should adopt planning and land use policies to:
* promote development within urban areas, at locations highly accessible by means other than 
the private car;
* locate major generators of travel demand in existing centres which are highly accessible by 
means other than the private car (DoE, 1994b, 3).
It is important to note the generality of the language with which the support 
for public transport oriented planning was expressed: there were no quantitative 
targets for the density of development around stations, or utilisation of accessibility 
measures to specify the distance from stations within which major trip generators 
should be located. Neither were planning authorities required to produce per capita 
data on railway route miles or station provision of the sort produced for the GLDP. 
This was despite the fact that, particularly in London, planning and transport 
authorities had utilised public transport accessibility measures for many years, and 
the growing computer based technology of geographical information systems made 
their application easier (Kerrigan and Bull, 1992).
The new PPG also endorsed the need for modal shift to rail for freight and 
recommended that planning authorities should designate distribution sites next to 
railways and safeguard rail connected, or rail connectable, sites for freight 
generating development. Support for rail freight had been present in minerals policy 
guidance for several years, but MPG 10 was particularly notable in that it was the 
only piece of planning policy guidance this research has identified which contained 
data about rail freight (DoE, 1991 )41: stronger support for rail would have led to much 
wider utilisation of such data with target setting.
The scale of the policy change was reflected in the chosen alignment for the 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL), which the Government had reluctantly conceded 
had to be built. After pressurising BR to find the cheapest and most operationally 
efficient route, the Government, under the influence of Michael Heseltine, opted for 
an alignment from St Pancras to Stratford, and thence through the Thames riverside 
area of Essex to north Kent. This high cost option with its miles of tunnel, was 
justified on strategic grounds because of its regenerative impacts (DoE, 1993), a 
strategy eventually branded as the Thames Gateway’ (Thames Gateway Task 
Force, 1994). Support for this project and the many other proposed rail links for 
London which had their roots in the Central London Rail Study, was followed
41 It noted that the percentage of finished cement products moved by rail from production sites ranged 
from 61 per cent at the Hope Valley plant in Derbyshire to 0 per cent at several others, with only 7 of 
the 19 sites listed having rail carrying more than 10 per cent
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through in LPAC’s Strategic Planning Guidance for London (LPAC, 1994). This 
contained a locational strategy which used Dutch ‘A-B-C’ policy (Sturt, 1992) to 
develop the sorts of policies which the GLDP had contained, as shown in table 14. 
Table 14: Sustainability, Transport and Development Interaction: Locational Framework
Category A. Development proposals which generate a large number of person trips, because 
of the size, nature and intensity of their activities, should be located where there is high public 
transport accessibility and where the current or proposed public transport network has the 
capacity to cope with the additional trips. Parking provision would only provide for essential car 
trips.
Category B. development proposals which generate a more modest number of person trips 
could be acceptable where public transport accessibility, though still good, is complemented 
by the highway network which could cater for some non-essential car trips. The proportion of 
total person trips provided for by car could be determined by the factors identified in LPAC’s 
Parking Advice to set parking standards for A2/B1 land uses. This approach could be 
extended to other land uses.
Category C. Development proposals which generate relatively few person trips could be 
acceptable in areas of more limited public transport accessibility, provided that the capacity of 
the highway network could cater for car-based trips. LPAC’s Parking Advice suggests the 
means by which an appropriate level of parking provision could be provided. Uses within this 
category which would generate a large number of goods trips would be subject to other 
planning requirements, such as appropriate access to the Strategic Road Network and 
environmental considerations.
Source: LPAC, 1994, 66.______  ____  _____
Conclusions.
This chapter has shown that, following abandonment of urban motorway 
plans in the 1970s, policy swung in favour of integrating land-use policy with public 
transport planning, particularly in the conurbations. Professional ideologies began to 
change and to focus on relationships between the two sectors. This took place under 
Heath’s Conservative government and continued under Labour, so there was a 
degree of consensus. However, because the implementation of these strategies 
depended upon sizeable investments to overcome the historic shortcomings of the 
railway network, the onset of recession brought this initial period of policy making to 
an end. Subsequently, urban land-use planning became focused around 
regeneration and public transport considerations slipped down the agenda, although 
they did comprise a clearly identifiable thread within the first round of adopted 
structure plans. Outside the conurbations, although the development of railway 
closure proposals declined, the financial losses continued. Government policy 
towards BR continued to be dominated by the Treasury view and any major 
investments had to be pursued doggedly. By the end of the 1970s, there was little 
likelihood of any major projects being brought forward.
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After 1979 there was a rapid collapse of the supportive land-use planning 
policy framework, with the New Right’s laissez-faire approach to development which 
favoured road transport. The ideological stance to planning, local government and 
nationalised industries was very hostile and, in response, professional ideologies 
moved away from integration. It is not an over-exaggeration to say that town 
planning was fighting to retain some sort of coherent ideological identity during this 
period (Reade, 1987). However, the change in political, ideological and economic 
circumstances produced an unexpected combination which amounted to what 
became the most supportive planning policy context for rail in the whole of the post­
war era.
Figure 22 summarises the thematic analysis of policy. With regard to the points 
developed at the end of chapter two, the railway policy agenda can be summarised 
as follows:
1. there was a continued search for rationalisation of the network led by concerns to 
limit public expenditure and this produced closure plans and general reductions 
in line capacity; throughout the period there was a counter thrust towards re­
opening closed lines, and building new light rail systems, which was becoming 
stronger towards the end of the period;
2. a new generation of intercity trains was planned, but restrictions on BR’s ability 
to invest severely limited the number of schemes for improvement of the main 
line network to be brought forward and there was no policy to develop French 
style high speed trains; in the 1980s plans were developed for second 
generation EMUs and DMUs
3. before the crisis of 1976 several schemes were developed for new/improved 
railways to close strategic gaps in the network, one new London Underground 
railway line was planned, and plans for the Channel Tunnel were eventually 
developed through to implementation; towards the end of the period light rail 
schemes were developed as a cheaper way of providing more accessible rail 
projects and plans were developed for re-opening more closed cross-city routes 
where these had been safeguarded;
4. plans for the improvement of existing stations and the opening of new ones 
became widespread, although they were particularly associated with the PTEs; 
this included their proposed integration with associated development and 
redevelopment schemes.
With regard to town planning policy the outcome was:
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5. before 1979 planning policy in the major conurbations in particular was 
supportive of rail access, although not as prescriptive as it could have been; this 
was followed by a marked disregard for the overall transport impacts of 
development policy through the 1980s which, in turn, was replaced by the 
return to a more supportive regime in the conurbations and many shires in the 
early 1990s;
6. the redevelopment process was managed in ways which were predominantly 
concerned with road access, although in the PTE areas policies were developed 
to retrofit early peripheral developments through station building strategies and 
major developments were promoted at railway stations in many major towns and 
cities; planning policy generally disregarded freight except for certain bulk 
traffics; supportive national policy guidance was produced in 1970 and especially 
in 1994;
7. policy with regard to greenfield areas continued to be to prevent their 
development as far as possible and, where development was proposed, the 
prime transport consideration was to provide access by motor vehicles: the 
exceptions to this trend continued to be in the new towns.
From the above it can be concluded that the overall policy context for the 
relationship between the railway network and land-use patterns was strong at the 
beginning of the period, weak during the 1980s, but with a vigorous resurgence in 
the early 1990s which led to what was the most mature relationship of the whole 
post-war period. Ironically, this came at the same time that the Government 
committed themselves to rail privatisation. It seemed that the Conservatives’ new 
leader, John Major, wished to demonstrate that he was continuing the radical policies 
towards State-owned enterprises of his predecessor42 and just as open to the advice 
of the Adam Smith Institute (Irvine, 1988). The late Robert Adley MP who was a 
Conservative friend of the railways, a frequent critique of Government policy and 
Chair of the Select Committee on Transport, referred to railway privatisation as a 
‘poll tax on wheels’. His death was untimely as his influence was such that 
subsequent events may have unfolded differently. Privatisation would certainly 
destroy the relationship between BR and local authorities and make it far more 
difficult to co-ordinate the public interest goals of State land-use and transport
42 Mrs Thatcher had favoured the creation of a track authority with companies competing to run trains 
on it and had sponsored research into rail privatisation, but this did not come to fruition before she left 
office.
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planning policy with the commercial goals of a balkanised, privately owned and 
operated railway.
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Figure 22: summary of thematic analysis of sector policy 1969-94.
Explanatory themes Railway sector Interrelationships 
between the two 
sectors
Planning sector
Politics and 
political ideology
Initially a balance 
between the 
commercial and the 
social railway. 
Replaced after 1979 
by a hard commercial 
stance: also support 
for rail projects if 
regenerative impacts 
and/or partnership 
basis. Dominance of 
Treasury view 
throughout.
Labour’s vision of 
integrated transport 
embraced land use 
policy, but political 
priorities forced this 
down and then off the 
agenda. There was a 
strong resurgence 
under the
Conservatives in the 
1990s, as long as 
this could be 
delivered through the 
market and/or 
partnerships.
Priorities continued 
to be housing and 
countryside 
protection, with 
regeneration added 
post-1976. Some 
initial regard for rail in 
locational policy, but 
undermined post- 
1979, with a 
resurgence in late 
1980s/1990s. 
Emphasis on re­
opening projects.
Professions and
professional
ideology
Continuance of 
introverted culture 
focused on technical 
disciplines, although 
regional managers 
developed joint 
policies with PTEs. 
BR Chairmen 
generally more adept 
at PR. Post-1979 a 
market oriented 
culture which sought 
to develop joint 
projects/policies with 
local authorities and 
property developers
Limited interface 
between the 
professions in 
London and the 
PTA/PTE areas, but 
a decline 1976-86. 
Strong recovery 
associated with 
property boom and 
the development of 
the ‘New Realism’ 
and sustainability 
agendas in the late 
1980s/1990s.
Design oriented 
ideology overridden 
by socio-economic 
concerns. Limited 
development of 
ideology around 
planning for access 
by public transport 
mainly through 
structure plans. This 
was eroded post- 
1979, but re- 
emerged strongly 
around regeneration 
and sustainability in 
late 1980s/1990s.
Governance and 
management
Priority to manage 
BR as a public 
corporation on 
business lines, 
minimising 
dependence on 
public funds. 1968 
and 1974 Acts 
produced more 
financial
transparency: rural 
lines at risk 
throughout. Post- 
1979 Conservatives 
pushed for more 
market oriented 
culture, which was 
responsive. 
to/encouraged local 
authority/property 
market initiatives.
Value of the 
PTA/PTE structure 
as a link facilitating 
joint railway/land-use 
planning policy was 
demonstrated 
throughout. Post- 
1979 the combination 
of UDCs and 
planning deregulation 
produced hostile 
policies, but the 
partnership era was 
supportive. The 
Property Board 
played a positive role 
in triggering 
supportive policies 
and projects around 
stations.
Planning linked to the 
new policy agendas: 
the environment and 
then regeneration, 
but main transport 
considerations 
throughout continued 
to be around roads. 
Planning authorities 
marginalised post- 
1979; UDCs not rail 
oriented. Resurgence 
of planning in the 
1990s as part of the 
sustainability debate, 
in a context where 
public/private 
partnership and 
regionalism was 
encouraged.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
OUTCOMES : 1969-94
Introduction.
The overriding feature of the period was the continuing increase in society’s 
dependence on transport and the absolute dominance of the car and truck. Total 
passenger movement increased from 395 to 689 billion kilometres1, with that by car 
and light van increasing from 286 to 596 billion kilometres. The total by rail (BR plus 
all other networks) was 35 billion kilometres in 1969 and exactly the same in 1994, 
having reached a nadir of 31 billion kilometres in 1982 and peaked at 41 billion 
kilometres in 1988. Bus and coach travel declined by 32 per cent over the period, 
from 63 to 43 billion kilometres, which shows that rail continued to be relatively more 
successful. Goods lifted by all modes increased from 1964 to 2051 million tonnes, 
only a 4.4 per cent increase. The total lifted by rail declined by 54 per cent, from 211 
to 97 million tonnes. The picture with regard to goods moved was very different, as 
this reflected the fundamental changes in the geography of manufacturing and 
distribution which, along with the introduction of just-in-time delivery schedules, 
became much more transport dependent: there was a large increase of 66 per cent, 
from 133 to 221 billion tonne kilometres2. Haulage by rail fell 35 per cent, from 20 to 
13 billion tonne kilometres: so, by both freight measures, there was a very 
significant absolute decline in rail freight.
The relative resilience of rail passenger traffic suggests that, although the 
continued growth in road traffic exerted an overwhelming influence on patterns of 
land development, nevertheless certain things went in rail’s favour. For example, it 
was significant that, despite accelerated urban decentralisation, over the 1975-94 
period the percentage of households3 living within a seven minute walking distance 
of a railway station only declined from 9 per cent to 8 per cent, and the percentage 
living within a 7-13 minute walk remained the same at 13 per cent. This chapter will 
show that, towards the end of the period, the interaction between the ‘tail’ of the 
interventionist policies of the 1970s and the Conservative’s market-led approach 
was complex and, unexpectedly, produced positive outcomes. And this despite the 
dominance of the Treasury view throughout, although this was the ultimate factor in 
deciding the fate of the network.
1 all statistics in this paragraph are from DoT Transport Statistics 1995 edition.
2 the totals for goods lifted and goods moved are quite different to those for the 1948-68 period where 
the biggest change was in goods lifted.
3 this data on accessibility of stations is from National Travel Surveys as quoted in Potter (1997).
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The aim of this chapter is to review the outcomes of the interplay between the 
institutional structures, ideologies and policies of the railway and planning sectors in 
the 1969-94 period. Conclusions are drawn as to whether these were largely positive 
or negative with regard to the utilisation of the railway network. As in chapter seven, 
this chapter is split into two halves around 1979, and the dialogue broadly follows the 
same pattern of reviewing national outcomes, and then dropping down to review 
those in London, the provincial conurbations, and the areas outside.
The national network and main line services to 1979.
Completion of WCML electrification in 1974 led to the 401 mile Euston- 
Glasgow journey time being reduced by 55 minutes, to just over five hours. The 
introduction of HSTs in 1975 was of even wider significance as they could run on 
any main line, not just the WCML. They knocked 23 minutes off the London-Cardiff 
journey time: the railway could compete effectively with the M4 motorway. London- 
Newcastle came down to just over 3 hours which was better than could be achieved 
on the M1/A1 and, in 1978, the London-Edinburgh journey came down to 5 hours. 
The introduction of faster trains was accompanied by steady work to improve track 
quality to facilitate the higher speeds: £190 million on the ECML between 1967 and 
1980 for example (Semmens, 1990, 191). Even on lines where speeds were 
restricted, as on the Midland main line between Sheffield and St Pancras where 
HSTs were introduced in 1982, there was ridership growth because of their positive 
image with the public. These improvements in Intercity services served to reinforce 
the traditional importance of CBDs as rail nodes.
Notwithstanding these improvements, the tendency towards retrenchment 
continued, but not as strongly as in the 1960s. Total route mileage fell by about 3550 
kilometres4 overall, from 20,080 in 1968 to 16,528 in 1994, but with less than 1000 
kilometres lost post-1981. The length of route open to passenger traffic fell from 
15,242 kilometres in 1968 to a low of 14,291 in 1992, but then actually increased to 
14,357 in 1994. Although the number of passenger journeys on BR declined, 
passenger kilometres rose from 29.6 billion in 1969 to a peak of 34.3 billion in 
1988/89, but then fell back in the 1990s recession to 30.4 billion in 1993/94, still 
above the 1968 level. Similarly ridership on London Underground fell from 655 
million journeys in 1968 to 498 million in 1982, but then grew to 815 million in 
1988/89 before falling back to 728 million by 1992/93, with a slight recovery to 735 
million in 1993/94. Passenger kilometres on London Underground showed a similar 
pattern.
4 all statistics in this paragraph are from DoT Transport Statistics 1994 edition
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Despite the improvements there were some significant closures: even the 
Southern Region was not immune, with the Uckfield-Lewes line in 1969 being the 
most notable5. Also in 1969 the Carlisle-Hawick-Edinburgh ‘Waverley’ route was 
closed, despite being 98 miles long and serving an isolated population of 100,000 
in the Central Borders6 area. By 1972 Scotland had lost 4,000 miles of the 7391 it 
possessed at nationalisation and other strategic lines serving remote rural areas, 
such as Inverness to Kyle of Lochalsh, were under threat. However, as an 
illustration of the growth of the pro-rail lobby, there was a successful fightback 
against the latter, which involved MP’s, local authorities and the Highlands and 
Islands Development Board, as well as the wider public (Thomas,1990). A central 
feature of the Waverley closure case was the much lower cost of alternative bus 
services, but opponents questioned whether, in such a remote area, these could 
offer anything like a comparable service. The ‘bustitution’ issue grew in significance 
and, by the 1980s, was shown to be unsuccessful (Hillman and Whalley, 1980) and 
was challenged with increasing success by campaigning groups (Railway 
Development Society, 1988). The Waverley closure was followed in 1970 by 
withdrawal of passenger services between Sheffield and Manchester on the 
electrified Woodhead line and their concentration on the Hope Valley route: Sheffield 
Victoria was closed. With further loss of freight traffic associated with decline in coal 
consumption, the Woodhead route was closed completely in 1981, despite a spirited 
anti-closure campaign.
Closures continued at the rural extremities of the network: Kings Lynn- 
Hunstanton in 1969, Barnstaple-llfracombe in 1970 and Exeter-Okehampton in 1972. 
The latter was not even in the Beeching report and was galling for those who had 
opposed closure of the branch lines in north Devon and Cornwall as they had been 
led to believe that Okehampton would remain as a railhead. This closure, along with 
others such as the Waverley route, Grosmont-Pickering, Penrith-Keswick, Matlock- 
Chinley and Barnstaple-llfracombe, meant that rail access into national parks was 
severely eroded (see fig. 23 for a map of the network in 1985).
Whereas other secondary main lines remained open, often they were 
reduced to single line working, as with the Salisbury-Exeter line, and the ‘Cotswold’ 
line between Oxford-Worcester. Main line services over the former Great Western- 
Great Central Joint Line through High Wycombe were withdrawn by 1973, leaving 
only local passenger services on the line working out of Maryiebone: the link through
5 This left no alternative route to Brighton should the main line be temporarily closed.
6 This was despite the presence of some of Glasgow’s town expansion partners being located along the 
route as shown in appendix ten.
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Figure 23 The Railway Network 1985
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to Banbury remained but only as single track north of Princes Risborough. Singling 
reduced costs but had significant effects on quality of service: a late running train 
would delay trains running in the opposite direction. Singling raised the threat of 
further reduced ridership leading to full closure and reflected the reductionist outlook 
within BR7. Even a strategic route such as the ‘North and West’ along the Welsh 
Marches between Newport-Hereford-Shrewsbury was considered for closure, 
although this would have meant that all services from South Wales to the north 
would have had to run via Birmingham.
Given that closure decisions came from central Government, it might have 
been expected that there would have been a national strategy for the protection of 
closed alignments as rights of way, for alternative forms of motorised transport or 
for walking and cycling. But this was not the case and it was left to local authorities 
to acquire disused trackbeds if they perceived a use for them, and to safeguard them 
through planning policies. This occurred on an ad hoc basis, although a more 
coherent approach was developed in some counties, such as Derbyshire. Here 
trackbeds were acquired for recreational use and there were policies which 
countenanced a potential return to rail: examples were Matlock-Chinley and the 
Woodhead route which were protected in the county structure plan. One of the most 
striking failures to protect a strategic alignment was that of the former Great Central 
main line between Sheffield and London8.
Rail freight.
Even before the introduction of Section 8 grants in 1974, the Beeching 
innovations were bearing fruit and bulk traffics such as coal, steel, aggregates and 
petroleum products were being retained. These presented few issues for the 
planning system as, typically, they were associated with extant industrial complexes 
or those, such as power stations, which enjoyed exemption from planning control. 
Freightliner was having some success too and was carrying more than 5,000 
containers a week by 1968. When the Swansea terminal opened in 1969 it was the 
twenty first: others were already to be found at Stratford, Willesden and King’s Cross 
in London, in major conurbations such as Manchester, Glasgow, Leeds, Sheffield,
7 In its response to a Government consultation prior to the 1977 White Paper, the BRB bemoaned the 
continuing disregard for the railway’s wider role: ‘...the social and environmental objectives have never 
yet been defined in such a way that they could be injected into the network studies. This deficiency is 
still not made good...’ (BRB, 1976,10)
8 It should be recalled that this route was built 50 years after the other trunk routes and was constructed 
to a high specification as part of Watkin’s aspiration for a Liverpool-Paris route. The route remained 
operational from Buckinghamshire southwards as part of the retained, but threatened, commuter route 
between Aylesbury and Marylebone.
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and Birmingham, and cities such as Nottingham, Bristol and Cardiff. The provision of 
these terminals was straightforward as there were plenty of surplus yards which 
could be utilised. Freightliner was having particular success with what, in the longer 
term, came to be its most successful market, the deep sea maritime traffic. Ports 
such as Southampton and Tilbury were served, along with the new port of 
Felixstowe which was growing rapidly as a result of containerisation and the shift 
towards Europe in the pattern of trade. In parallel with these developments was the 
closure and, in most cases, destruction of railway infrastructure built to serve the 
historic ports of London, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow and Cardiff. Despite its 
successes though, Freightliner lost business to road haulage and its problems 
undermined the finances of the National Freight Corporation: it was transferred back 
to BR in 1978.
There was investment in the network for freight: in 1970 access to Felixstowe 
Docks was improved and a new rail link was built into Foster Yeoman’s Merehead 
quarry in Somerset. In 1970 the BRB bemoaned the lack of progress in securing 
planning permissions for terminals for aggregates and similar traffic (BRB, 1970, 9), 
but concern over the environmental impact of the large volumes of lorry traffic which 
would be necessary to move bulk materials led to planning authorities including 
policies to encourage rail haulage in statutory plans as, for example, in the open cast 
coal extraction industry in Northumberland or deep coal mining in North Yorkshire. 
Where an operator, typically at this time the National Coal Board, did not want to 
apply for a rail freight grant, then planning authorities used planning conditions 
specifying the movement of material by rail, and even used planning agreements 
under section 52 of the 1971 Town and Country Planning Act which constrained lorry 
movements associated with the developments. The most significant example where 
the NCB, BR, the Departments of Energy and Environment, and local planning 
authorities worked together was the opening up of the Selby Coalfield. After a public 
inquiry this received Ministerial approval in 1975, followed by an Act of Parliament in 
1978 for a new 913-mile stretch of 125 mph main line to divert the ECML away from 
its historic alignment which would be affected by subsidence. This project was 
complete by 1983 and included a major rail served coal concentration facility at 
Gascoigne Wood, with most of the coal destined for the merry-go-round traffic to 
power stations.
Rail based domestic waste disposal systems involved the development by 
local authorities, as planning and waste authorities, of rail served waste
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concentration plants and remote landfill sites. The first waste trains ran in the late 
1970s from Brent in North London to the London Brick Company claypits at 
Stewartby. By the early 1980s another service was running from Hillingdon to 
Calvert10 and, by 1984, Avon County Council was using Calvert too. In 1984/85 
Greater Manchester Council began running waste trains from three concentration 
depots in Manchester and Salford to a Wimpey owned disposal site at Appley Bridge 
near Wigan.
Despite these positive relationships between planning policy and rail freight, 
the general relationship was poor. It was typified by zoning land in development 
plans for new industrial and distribution facilities which were located around the 
motorway network with no rail connection and no potential for one. Ironically, two of 
the most striking examples were at the new towns of Milton Keynes and 
Warrington, where the excellent strategic location on the WCML was not utilised to 
fix the location of extensive warehousing and distribution facilities. Although some 
statutory development plans, such as South Yorkshire’s structure plan (South 
Yorkshire County Council, 1978), contained policies supportive of rail freight, in 
practice most of these were ineffectual, given the steady decline of heavy industry 
and the fact that Government was content to let road haulage dominate the rest of 
the freight market.
Major developments, new towns and the railway network.
Across the network improvement of rail services was patchy and was most 
strongly associated with Intercity and commuter services in the major conurbations. 
It was in the major cities that there was the maximum potential for integrated land 
use-transportation planning. In strategic terms the continuing focus on urban 
containment, after the mid-1970s in association with inner city regeneration, was in 
the broadest sense supportive of rail. This was because of the continuing restriction 
of the location of retailing and commercial services to town and city centres, rather 
than allowing more decentralised, road oriented patterns of development. As 
evidenced by experience in Birmingham, there was also an awareness that road 
building was not going to solve local transport problems and that it was important to 
plan for public transport too. However, as concluded in the previous chapter, there 
was little evidence in contemporary structure plans that this was leading to
9 This was the first stretch of main line built since opening of the Great Western-Great Central joint 
route through High Wycombe in 1906.
10 Calvert lies to the north of Aylesbury and is a retained freight only stub of the former Great Central 
main line.
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prescriptive, rail-oriented planning strategies and the number of major developments 
which were steered to rail accessible locations was limited.
Although there was no further designation of new towns in the 1970s, there 
was evidence of their continuing association with the rail network: stations opened at 
Redditch in 1972, Stevenage in 197311, Basildon in 1974 and Newton Aycliffe in 
1978 (appendix ten). The Stevenage and Basildon examples showed that, even in 
the South East, it could take twenty-five years to deliver a station at designated new 
towns. By way of contrast, expanded towns such as Basingstoke already had a town 
centre station at designation and, in its case, a planned new retail development was 
complete by 1969 and there was over 1.75m square feet of offices by 1977, all 
reasonably accessible from the station:
The railway station is well sited to serve the town centre and the business area, and rail 
passengers arriving during the morning peak-hour produce a steady stream of pedestrians 
into these areas (Butler, 1980, 72).
There was evidence of awareness that the rail network needed to access
new activity nodes, and that the location of major set-piece developments was 
influenced by considerations of rail access. For example, Birmingham International 
station was opened in 1976 to serve both the National Exhibition Centre and the 
adjacent airport. A large amount of car parking was provided as the peripheral 
location was favourable for a railhead. However, despite new stations, the overall 
number on the network fell from 2,750 in 1967 to 2,358 in 1977 and the station 
planning process continued to be poorly developed:
The location of railway passenger stations has received little attention, theoretical or 
practical.....Planners have sometimes shown little appreciation of station location....
In the past at least, British Rail has also been reluctant to provide new stations to 
accommodate new traffic resulting from land-use change (White and Senior, 1983, 113- 
114).
Most of the larger new towns designated in the 1960s were expansions of 
existing towns, like Peterborough and Northampton, and growth led to expansion of 
existing town centres. Completion in 1982 of the Queensgate Centre at 
Peterborough (Bendixson, 1988) sensitively inserted a large shopping mall into a 
previously historic, but uninspiring, town centre. Although this was separated from 
the railway station by the new inner ring road, the characteristic outcome, this was 
bridged in a fairly satisfactory manner and the proximity made the walk a realistic 
proposition for rail users. Despite this reinforcing of the role of the main station, the 
expansion of Peterborough did not produce the focusing of districts around new 
railway stations, or the re-opening of any of the area’s closed lines.
11 The new station adjoined the new town centre and was accompanied by closure of the historic station.
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New railway infrastructure was built at Milton Keynes as its development 
involved the creation of a city centre on a green field site for a target population of 
over 200,000: development on this scale was unprecedented. The fact that the 
master plan was car oriented has already been noted but, despite this, it opted for a 
fairly conventional city centre with a mix of medium density office developments, a 
major shopping mall, community services and peripheral residential development. 
The focal point was the mall which was the largest of its kind to be developed 
outside an existing city centre at the time: as a symbol of the New Right’s populism, 
it was opened by Margaret Thatcher in 1979.
In order to take advantage of the location on the WCML a new station was 
planned, in association with office development, and this opened in 198212: getting 
BR to commit itself had been a difficult task owing to its financial difficulties and the 
£3m cost (Bendixson and Platt, 1992). The gap between railway and town planning 
was reflected in the fact that BR’s original view had been that Milton Keynes would 
be served by the existing stations at Wolverton and Bletchley. It was significant too 
that the shopping mall was remote from the station site, being on the opposite side 
of the city centre, this choice was driven by aesthetic considerations13. This failure to 
plan around access to the station occurred despite the development corporation 
priding itself on being a guardian of good design (Milton Keynes Development 
Corporation, 1992). Just to underline the weakness, the shopping mall was a huge 
success: it was a precursor of what was to come in the 1980s and attracted 
shoppers from an extremely wide catchment area. The prior closure of rail links to 
the east and west of Milton Keynes has already been noted: the Bedford-Bletchley 
service survived but was not extended to Milton Keynes, which serves to illustrate 
weaknesses in integrating retained rail services with planning outcomes.
Although modest in scale, the most significant (and unique) pro-rail new town 
development occurred at Warrington. A modest mall was built in the new suburb of 
Birchwood (Warrington New Town Development Corporation, 1973, 27-3014) 
alongside the Manchester-Liverpool railway. A new station to serve the centre and 
the growing eastern townships opened there in 1980 and was jointly funded by BR
12 Birmingham International and Milton Keynes were the first major new stations on the W CML since 
the turn of the century
13 The site was the highest point of the city centre and, thereby, best able to take advantage of its 
location along an axis oriented on the rising and setting of the sun at the midsummer solstice
14 This document noted that BR had stated that it would be able to provide a station at this location and 
that talks were ongoing between BR and Merseyside and SELNEC PTEs about electrification of the 
Liverpool-Warrington-Manchester line although, subsequently, this did not come to pass.
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(50 per cent), and the development corporation and Cheshire County Council (50 per 
cent).
Table 15: Shopping malls over 500,000 sq ft built post-1969 and their relationship to 
the railway network.
Location Centre Year
Opened
Size (000 
sq ft)
Rail Access Situation
In-Town
Poole Arndale 1969 631 5 minute walk from station
Luton Arndale 1972 700 5 minute walk from station
Nottingham Victoria Centre 1972 622 built on closed station/trackbed: 
remote from retained Midland 
station
Maidstone Stoneborough 1976 542 5 minute walk from station
Manchester Arndale 1976 1,189 10/15 minutes walk from 
Victoria/Piccadilly: direct from 
Metrolink post 1992
Newcastle Eldon Square 1976 830 10 minutes walk from Central: 
direct from Metro post 1984
Cardiff St. Davids 1981 581 10 minutes walk from Queen 
Street and Central
New Towns
Runcorn Shopping City 1971 600 remote from station
Telford Shopping City 1973 650 10 minute walk from Telford 
Central opened 1986
Redditch Kingfisher 1973 676 5 minutes walk from station 
which was rebuilt 1972
Washington The Galleries 1977 543 no station
Milton Keynes Central MK 1979 1,065 15 minutes uphill walk after MK 
Central opened in 1982
Basildon Eastgate 1980 517 10 minutes walk from station 
opened in 1974
Peterborough Queensgate 1982 650 10 minutes walk - bridges over 
ring road
Out-ofTown
Hendon Brent Cross 1976 760 15 minute walk from 
Underground stations - hostile 
route under elevated North 
Circular road
Gateshead Metro Centre 1986 1,630 5 minutes from new station 
opened under Speller 
amendment in 1987; not on 
Metro
Dudley Merryhill 1989 1,410 not rail connected , but owners 
are proposing a link to the 
Midland Metro line as part of an 
expansion project
Thurrock Lakeside 1990 1,150 not rail connected*
Sheffield Meadowhall 1990 1,100 new station opened 1990: 
accessible by Supertram post- 
1994
Total built 15,846
Source: Hillier Parker: British Shopping Centre Developments, various years.
Note: for centres developed in several phases, ‘Size’ includes all phases of development. ‘Year’ is that 
of the opening of the largest phase.
• Chafford Hundred station was opened in 1995 on the Upminster-Grays line to serve the new 
housing scheme and a shuttle bus operates between there and Lakeside, with a connecting 
footbridge opening in 2000
The BR Property Board and surplus railway land in the 1970s.
Closures led to large areas of land becoming vacant and between 1968-1973 
between 6,100 and 7,000 acres were disposed of annually. By 1979 the cumulative
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acreage of land disposed of since 1964 was 79,000 acres15. The Property Board’s 
priorities meant that income generation not rail traffic generation was the prime 
objective. However the two did sometimes overlap, especially where property was 
disposed of close to an operational station. Southport was one example where, in 
1973, a new shopping centre was promoted as an integral part of the station: in 
keeping with contemporary practice it also included 400 parking spaces. A new bus- 
rail interchange was opened at Bradford in 1973, but this involved closing the original 
Exchange station and moving to a new location, 200 metres further out of the city 
centre so that the site could be redeveloped for the city’s Crown Courts. A similar 
development took place at Fort William where the old station site was required for a 
ring road and was closed in 1975, on the opening of a new station several hundred 
metres back up the line and outside the town centre ring road. Lines at Looe and St 
Ives were similarly cut back, with construction of new but more peripheral stations 
with minimal facilities. This marginalisation of stations continued the trend which had 
commenced in the 1960s and, although it produced revenue, it was clearly contrary 
to the railway’s long term interests where convenient access to town centres would 
become of increasing importance as car ownership increased.
The continuing frictions between the Property Board and. local planning 
authorities with regard to station redevelopment projects was illustrated at Cardiff 
Queen Street. Adjacent parts of the city centre had become attractive to the office 
market but a scheme to rebuild the station as part of a commercial development 
went to appeal, with a favourable result for BR in 1970. This friction caused by 
planning delays was mentioned in the BRB annual reports from time to time16. 
Although hardly objective, it is suggestive of a lack of urgency by planning authorities 
in facilitating schemes which had obvious merits beyond income generation for the 
BRB.
London and the provincial conurbations.
There were many improvements to local services in London and the major 
conurbations and these also reinforced the role of CBDs. In London the 1970 
investment in the Southern Region was mostly for modernising signalling where the
15 The 1979 annual report (BRB, 1979, 33) estimated the total railway estate at 200,000 acres, with 
170,000 acres being operational land, with much of the remainder yielding income. There remained 
some 1500 miles of closed branch lines awaiting disposal. Disposals since 1964 had yielded a 
cumulative total of £226m
16 For example, despite construction of Liverpool’s Link and Loop scheme the 1979 annual report cited 
delays in securing planning permission for the commercial redevelopment of Central station, which was 
very desirable for promoting rail access as it was to be built above a new underground station. The 
same report mentions continuing planning delays for a hypermarket and freight terminal at Neasden, 
more than five years after the project was conceived.
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intention was to operate the whole network from fourteen powerboxes: this brought 
cost savings as well as increasing capacity. Electrification of the surburban lines to 
Royston was completed in 1978, finally realising Howard’s vision of a garden cities 
connected to their parent by an electric railway. Services between St Pancras and 
Bedford were electrified in 1982.
On the London Underground the final section of the Victoria Line opened in 
1971 meaning that working class Brixton and Walthamstow had direct links to central 
London, as well as King’s Cross/St Pancras and Euston being linked with Victoria. 
The Piccadilly Line extension to Heathrow was opened in 1977, just over 30 years 
after a rail link was first proposed by Abercrombie. In 1979 the Jubilee Line, the 
second of the new tube lines, was opened between Charing Cross and Baker Street, 
where it connected with the pre-existing Bakerloo line to Stanmore.
The Tyne and Wear Metro system was open by 1984 providing direct access 
to Newcastle’s Central Station, the city centre, and suburban town centres such as 
South Shields. The system had 43 stations including 17 new ones, one of which was 
the expanding suburban office node of Regent Centre, an unusual development in 
the provinces. A monitoring study (Transport and Road Research Laboratory et al, 
1986) reported that, although the Metro had had only a limited impact on 
development patterns, the stations were well located with regard to major areas of 
trip generation, and there had been a significant increase in public transport trips 
compared with decline elsewhere. Saturday was the peak day for Metro travel 
showing good integration with shopping and leisure trip destinations.
Main line railway access to Glasgow was improved by WCML electrification. 
By the mid-1970s the magnificence of Glasgow’s Victorian heritage, typified by 
Central Station, was increasingly recognised. Through the GEAR project came a 
greater awareness of the importance of the city centre and, in this respect, GEAR’S 
launch can be seen as the beginning of its renaissance. One of the PTE’s early 
achievements was the re-opening in 1979 of the Argyle Line, linking Rutherglen in 
the south to Partick in the north via Central Low Level. Eight stations were opened, 
including Argyle Street and Central Low Level in the city centre: that at Partick 
provided interchange with the Subway. Surprisingly, given the closure of so many 
urban railways, the Subway survived into the 1970s before reaching a crisis: closure 
or renewal. The economy of inner Glasgow was undergoing sufficient structural 
change to question its raison’d’etre but the PTE decided on renewal. The line closed 
in 1977 and re-opened in 1980: ridership in the first year of operation was, at 10
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million passengers, less than half that predicted17, and there was a significant cost 
overrun. Despite this, the PTE’s cost cutting strategy of the early 1980s was 
successful and the Paisley-Ayr line was energised in 1987, further strengthening 
the links between central Glasgow and towns up to 35 miles distant.
In Liverpool the Loop and Link were completed in 1978 with new stations at 
Moorfields, Central and Lime Street to complement the long established St James. 
This work facilitated closure of two surface termini at Exchange and Central. 
Central’s site was well located in the prime retail area and was redeveloped as a 
shopping centre above the new underground station, an example of integrated land- 
use/transportation development on a scale unusual in provincial cities.
As the public backlash against road building set in, Birmingham came to 
enjoy a certain notoriety for the unattractiveness of its CBD. The 1960s saw 
considerable office development in the peripheral Five Ways area, where the station 
had been closed in 1944, and the growth of car commuting to it was significant. The 
Inner Ring Road, with 52 pedestrian subways and the associated Bull Ring scheme, 
was opened in 1971. Following the concentration of local and Intercity services on 
New Street, Snow Hill station was closed in 1972 despite its proximity to the city 
centre office district, but the rail alignment through the site was protected by the City 
Council. It soon became apparent that road building had not solved Birmingham’s 
traffic congestion problems: on the other hand there had been growth in ridership on 
the local railway network, 72 per cent on the Lichfield-New Street line between 1966- 
70 for example. Debate about the potential to reinvigorate railway services on the 
Lichfield-New Street-Longbridge route led to significant investment by the PTE in 
1978. This produced new stations, including one at Five Ways, improved track 
layouts, a DMU service of 4 trains per hour and six in the peak, and integration with 
feeder bus services. Notably, this improvement did not include electrification showing 
the limited funds available18.
The railway renaissance in the 1980s.
Despite the hostile stance of the Conservatives towards public sector 
investment, the strength of BR’s business case for electrification was demonstrated 
by improvements to the main line network. Electrification was extended from 
Tonbridge to Hastings in 1986, to Norwich and Cambridge in 1987, to Weymouth in 
1988, and Kings Lynn in 1991. Electric services on the ECML from King’s Cross to
17 The highest level of ridership was 37.3 million passengers in 1949.
18 The cross-city line gained the dubious reputation of being the most intensively operated DMU service 
in Europe.
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Leeds, Newcastle and Edinburgh were operational by 1991. This became Britain’s 
premier route, as the thirty year old electrification of the WCML began to show its 
age and cancellation of the APT19 in 1983, owing to technical difficulties and rising 
costs, created an investment hiatus. Paddington and St Pancras remained as the 
only major London termini without electrified main line services.
The beneficial impacts of Sectorisation, and the continuing ability of rail to 
provide competitive access to activity nodes despite the Government’s policies, was 
demonstrated by NSE and Provincial. Between 1983 and 1989, PSO subsidy for 
NSE fell from £328m to £149m20. Although commuting into Central London grew with 
the economic upturn of the late 1980s, NSE was also mindful of other markets such 
as travel into centres like Reading, Croydon and Milton Keynes. These experienced 
significant growth in commercial floorspace and some21 of it was located in their 
centres and was accessible by rail. In 1992, 19,600 commuters left Milton Keynes 
each workday whereas 25,000 arrived (Bendixson and Platt, 1992, 269), an 
interesting outcome given the wartime debate over new towns and London’s railway 
network.
Despite the buoyancy of rail travel into London and the fact that plans had 
been laid decades previously to improve main line penetration, none had come to 
pass by the mid-1980s. But, as an example of what became a broader phenomenon, 
such a cross-London link was provided very cheaply by imaginative, low cost 
investment. This was the Thameslink scheme which was conceived in the 1960s 
(Calvert, 1965), but eventually came to fruition as a result of work by GLC planners, 
before the authority was disbanded in 1986. Opened in 1988, Thameslink utilised 
Snow Hill tunnel, the only cross-London tunnel built by the Victorians on the main 
line network, which linked Farringdon with Blackfriars22. Through passenger services 
had been withdrawn from this line during the First World War. Subsequently it had 
been used for inter-regional freight movements which declined to the point where the 
tunnel was closed in the 1970s.With services linking Bedford and Gatwick Airport 
and giving direct access to the City, Thameslink was an immediate success. BR took 
advantage of the property boom to remove the bridge at Ludgate Hill by burying the 
railway under a new office development financed by Rosehaugh Stanhope, who
19 The sinuous character of the WCML meant that it was particularly dependent on tilt to achieve higher 
average speeds.
20 The BRB annual reports for 1987/88 and 1988/89 record consecutive record breaking years for 
passenger ridership, with InterCity recording a £57m profit in 1988/89, its first year as a fully 
commercial business. Government support had been cut by 51 per cent between 1983 and 1988/89.
21 Most of it was road oriented B 1 office park development though.
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entered into a deal with the Property Board to fund a new station too, St Paul’s 
Thameslink (Cordner, 1990).
One of the most notable positive impacts of the creation of the NSE sector 
was Marylebone and the suburban lines out to the Chilterns. Previously threatened 
with closure, under Chris Green they received ‘total route modernisation’ with new 
signalling, new trains and station refurbishment in place by 1991, enabling the 
railway to serve the growing townships in the M40 corridor. Research by Headicar 
and Bixby (1992) showed how timely this was, and how the relaxed planning regime 
of the 1980s in association with road building, was leading to traffic congestion and 
other problems in the Chiltern corridor.
Despite investment in the network there was still plenty of evidence of the 
Government’s parsimony towards BR23: the most notable example was the Dornoch 
Bridge saga on the Scottish Far North Line24 from Inverness to Wick and Thurso. 
Despite much effort by BR when the road bridge over the Dornoch Firth was 
planned, the Government refused to sanction the additional expenditure to 
incorporate a single line railway in the structure, which opened in 1991. The result is 
that the railway continues to meander around the various inlets on the coast and is 
161 miles long, whereas the road mileage has been reduced to 100 miles25. 
Development outcomes in the 1980s.
The City of London Corporation responded to the threat posed by Canary 
Wharf by relaxing its strictly conservationist approach to development. Between 
1988-92 nearly 2 million square metres (21 million square feet) of office 
development was built in the City (Corporation of London, 1995) and this did produce 
schemes which were well integrated with the railway network. Another impact of the 
focus on Docklands was that it deflected attention away from more centrally located 
derelict areas where investment would have benefited central London’s transport 
network as well as the specific developments concerned. For example, the King’s 
Cross Railway Lands, which lay in an area designated in the GLDP as a ‘preferred
22 This route had used the bridge over Ludgate H ill which had probably attracted even more acrimony 
from the aesthetic establishment than Hungerford Bridge.
23 The 1988/89 annual report recorded a concentration of deaths from accidents in late 1988 early 1989: 
35 at Clapham, 5 at Purley, and 2 at Bellgrove. These created a sombre mood and there was 
widespread speculation as to whether the drive for economies, resulting in excessive overtime and the 
creation of rationalised junctions which produced conflicting train paths requiring more staff vigilance, 
could be contributory factors.
24 This had been proposed for closure by Beeching but was saved by a broad based ‘MacPuff 
campaign (Farr, 1999).
25 On the other hand the collapse of the railway bridge over the River Ness at Inverness in the winter of 
1989/90, did not lead to closure of the whole Far North route as it might have done: the bridge was 
rebuilt expeditiously
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location’ for offices, and was potentially one of the biggest schemes for the Property 
Board, was never brought to fruition. The appalling fire at King’s Cross underground 
station in 1987 which claimed 32 lives, served to underline the air of neglect which 
hung over much of the Underground. Furthermore, in the King’s Cross area there 
were, (and still are), extensive areas of non-operational railway land as well as a 
number of listed warehouses and other buildings: a proposal to redevelop the whole 
area for commercial development in association with construction of an 
underground Channel Tunnel rail terminal was the subject of a Parliamentary Bill 
promoted by BR in 1989. A scheme of this magnitude, so closely linked with rail 
access by Underground, suburban, Intercity and international high speed services, 
was a qualitative leap beyond even Broadgate (see below) and was on a par with 
that at Lille. But, with the focus on Docklands, the Government’s unwillingness to put 
public money into the Channel Tunnel high speed link, and then the collapse of the 
property market in 1990/91, the scheme failed to get off the ground.
Although the experience in Docklands was cited as evidence of the failure of 
the Government’s approach, at the end of the day because these developments took 
place in London where satisfactory access demanded rail infrastructure, they were 
eventually well served by rail. The quality of stations was generally excellent, both in 
terms of their visual appearance and the convenient access they provided to major 
developments. That at Canary Wharf was designed to a very high architectural 
specification, and provided easy access to the commercial developments it served 
as it was integrated into the building complex. This stood out as an example of what 
could have been achieved elsewhere, but the irony was that this resulted from 
private sector master planning in a situation where the statutory planning system was 
marginalised. The reason was that the market demanded rail access.
The DLR extension to Beckton, opened in 1994, running alongside the former 
Royal Docks. Although the collapse of the property market in 1989/90 severely 
delayed the redevelopment of the Royals, it is notable that this infrastructure was put 
in place well in advance of the market, the reverse of the Government’s approach in 
the 1980s, which was indicative of the change towards a more planning led 
approach.
Investment in rail to serve new development was not the general experience 
in the provinces where the overall extent of urbanisation and its associated levels of 
road traffic congestion were less constraining. The deregulation of planning 
encouraged developers to submit planning applications for major out-of-centre 
regional shopping centres (those in excess of 100,000 square metres (1m square
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feet)) with inadequate or no railway connections. Between 1982-91 there were 54 
such applications: before 1987 the only example built was Brent Cross, but between 
1987-92 60 per cent of retail development was out-of-centre, including several 
regional centres (DoE, 1994), as shown in table 15. Whereas the Tyne and Wear 
Metro system provided excellent access to Eldon Square, the Gateshead Metro 
Centre opened in 1987, was not on the Metro system although a new station was 
provided on the BR Newcastle-Carlisle route which adjoins the site, but this provided 
very inadequate access to the rest of the conurbation. In the West Midlands the 
Merryhill Centre at Dudley was built with no rail connections at all, as was the White 
Rose Centre in Leeds, Cribb’s Causeway in Bristol and the Trafford Centre, 
Manchester, although these latter developments were not completed until after 1994.
Developments of this scale outside city centres and with poor or none 
existent rail services, would have been unacceptable under the planning regime of 
the 1970s and were symptomatic of the impact of Thatcherism on the locational 
utility of the railway network. The development at Meadowhall was the major 
exception as it was quite fortuitously located next to a railway junction, and within the 
territory of the South Yorkshire PTE who were interested in promoting rail access: a 
£7.5 million bus-rail interchange was provided and, arguably, Meadowhall became 
more accessible by public transport than Sheffield city centre (Donnison, 1992).
The huge growth in suburban and peri-urban office development, typified by 
those in the M4 corridor - Stockley Park, developments in the Reading/Bracknell 
area, and Aztec West at Bristol, was strongly associated with the growth of car 
traffic and was inaccessible by rail. Hall (in Breheny et al, 1989) considered that, 
although decentralisation was initially highly correlated with commuting back to 
London, the growth of office employment in the reception areas led to many 
commuters finding work nearer home. Access to this was usually by car leading to 
the tangle of car based journeys-to-work so common in the American urban fringe 
leading to the condition of what Hall, following Cervero (1986), labelled ‘Suburban 
Gridlock’.
The accelerated rate of development experienced in Cambridge in the 1980s 
was a good example of a case wherein typical policies of the time collectively 
produced a very complex transport problem. Rationalisation of the local railway 
network post-Beeching had seen closure of several local branch lines, including that 
to the ‘expanded town’ of Haverhill, some 15 miles to the south east, and the route to 
St Ives and Huntingdon to the north west. As a historic city Cambridge was set within 
a green belt, but a large number of ‘B1 ’ developments were built within the city along
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with requisite car parking. The housing to accommodate the additional population 
attracted to the area tended to be provided in small towns and villages outside the 
green belt owing to lack of space within Cambridge itself: the result was large growth 
in car commuting across the green belt and growing traffic congestion within 
Cambridge. Although the 1989 version of the Cambridgeshire structure plan had a 
transport section which contained bus policies, there were no rail policies, despite a 
long standing campaign by the RDS to re-open services between Cambridge and St 
Ives (Cambridgeshire County Council, 1989). However the policy changes of the 
early 1990s were in evidence in Cambridge too, and the county council began to 
develop ideas about congestion charging (Tomkins, 1991) and using the income 
generated to fund public transport projects, including a light rail system which would 
utilise some disused trackbeds as well as other alignments (Cambridge Traffic 
Planning and Liaison Select Panel, 1990).
In 1983, encouraged by the pro-developer stance of the Conservatives, ten of 
the country’s biggest housebuilders had got together to form Consortium 
Developments with the aim of securing planning permission for private new 
settlements. These were characterised by the selection of sites not allocated for 
development in statutory plans26 and the aim was to secure approval on appeal. 
Following the backlash against the proposed relaxation of green belts, these projects 
caused major political problems for the Government. Although few were built, they 
were significant in transportation terms as their motorway oriented locations and low 
density designs epitomised the car-oriented nature of new housing development in 
this period, such as the expansion of Reading at Lower Earley. Even where a new 
station was opened in association with private sector township, as at Beckton on the 
DLR or Chaffon Hundred in Essex, the layout was not manipulated to secure the 
maxim number of residents within easy walking distance on the Runcorn model.
The BR Property Board and surplus railway land in the 1980s.
The dominant feature of the relationship between planning authorities and the 
Property Board was the reclamation, typically by means of the Derelict Land 
Programme, of derelict railway land: the amounts justifying reclamation were 
reported as 6,400 hectares in 1974, 6,000 hectares in 1982, and despite continuing 
reclamation works, still 5,000 hectares in 1988 (DoE, 1990b)27. Other planning
26 The first project, Tillingham Hall in Essex, was in fact in the green belt.
27 The 1982 BRB annual report noted that 86,000 acres of land had been disposed of since 1964, 
reducing the size of the railway estate by one third. Some 12,000 acres of railway land, 6 per cent of the 
estate in England and Wales, was listed on the Registers of Vacant Land. The 1985/86 annual report 
noted that the length of closed lines to be disposed of dropped to less than 1000 miles for the first time
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involvement was with facilitating development of this land. Research by Gore (1986, 
297-314) revealed that in 1985 BR had 8,119 hectares (20,050 acres) of non- 
operational land and that, of 8,400 miles of railway ‘line’ closed post-Beeching, 7385 
miles (88 per cent) had been sold. In addition 36,000 hectares (89,000 acres) of 
‘nodal’ land, ie. that formerly occupied by depots and sidings, had been disposed of. 
Gore looked at the types of development which had taken place on land disposed of 
in his South Wales case study, concluding that over a third of all sites had been used 
for housing, with a fifth being used for industry and warehousing, although many 
former ‘lines’ remained vacant. Unsurprisingly given the close, historic relationship 
between the railway network and patterns of urbanisation in South Wales, most of 
these redeveloped sites were within major centres of population. But significantly, 
like Paul’s findings in Liverpool (1980), Gore found that:
Perhaps the most significant finding is the extent to which railway use has been replaced by 
roads and related purposes. As well as car parks, the latter includes new vehicle distribution
centres...., car showrooms.... and bus garages in spite of the increased support given to
railway passenger services via the Valleys Rail Strategy....further land-use shifts from rail to 
road are likely in future (1986, 312).
Local planning authorities were often resistant to the proposed uses of this
land which included housing, industry, and especially retail development including 
supermarkets and D-l-Y stores28. Because of these difficulties, the Property Board 
became adept at arguing that certain uses, particularly ‘storage’, were a continuation 
of the former railway use and therefore did not require planning permission with the 
result that:
To the general public, one of the most noticeable signs of the railway’s favoured treatment is 
adverse; the number of former goods yards used for what at its kindest can only be called 
environmentally unfriendly purposes. At how many stations, still used or not, does one see in 
the adjoining yard an untidy scrap dealer, road haulier or builder’s merchant? (Biddle, 1990, 
246).
Such cases were a good illustration of how the Property Board’s commercial 
remit worked against the needs of the operational railway because of the poor image 
they lent to station environs. Additionally the BRB was under great pressure from 
Government in the early 1980s to secure income from land disposal: the 1981 
annual report stated that the emphasis on cash flow would lead to the loss of long 
term financial benefits: transport benefits were not even on the Government’s 
agenda.
On the other hand the boom gave the Property Board the opportunity to 
develop several major schemes of great commercial value which were also relevant
since 1964. The 1989/90 annual report noted that 12,130 acres of land had been removed from the 
statutory Land Registers since 1980.
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to rail ridership and well designed. The City Corporation was particularly willing to 
progress such schemes so as to reinforce the City’s role as the primary office 
market. Schemes which gave rail an almost captive market included developments 
at Fenchurch Street, where the 1856 facade was retained as the frontispiece to an 
airspace development and, especially, the 4.2 million square feet Broadgate Centre. 
The latter, also by Rosehaugh Stanhope (1991), involved closure and redevelopment 
of Broad Street Station as well as an airspace development over part of Liverpool 
Street, and provided funds for refurbishment of the remaining train shed and the 
station concourse, producing the best quality railway interchange in the UK. 
Elsewhere in central London the Property Board secured development of the Plaza 
office and retail development at Victoria, and a particularly striking scheme by Terry 
Farrell and Partners at Charing Cross which projected the walkway from Hungerford 
Bridge into the station concourse (Architects’ Journal, 1986; Haywood, 1997b). 
London Transport was able to work with London Boroughs in similar fashion and to 
secure developments over or adjacent to its stations which also provided money for 
station refurbishment: Gloucester Road, Kensington and the Broadway Centre at 
Hammersmith were notable examples.
Outside London the Property Board was involved in major station related 
commercial schemes at locations as widespread as Aberdeen (180,000 square feet), 
Welwyn (the Howard Centre - 200,000 square feet), and Reading (200,000 square 
feet). The financial returns were impressive, with the Property Board showing growth 
in income from £121 million in 1985/86 to £370 million in 1989/90, and the location of 
major commercial facilities at rail nodes was beneficial for ridership too.
The railway renaissance in the provincial conurbations.
Co-operation between the PTEs, Provincial, and local planning authorities 
produced a resurgence of integrated planning. It has been shown that, historically, 
the relationship between the growth of Birmingham and its railway network was 
weaker than in other conurbations. However, the redevelopment at New Street, the 
development of Birmingham International, followed by success with the Cross City 
line, had significantly strengthened this relationship. Subsequent events transformed 
the West Midlands from the third model category used in chapter seven to a 
combination of the first and second. The first major achievement was the re-opening 
of Snow Hill in 1987 as the terminus for local trains from the Leamington Spa and 
Stratford lines. The planning authorities had played a significant role in this as the
28 This was not usually because of a desire to retain it for transport use, let alone for railway restoration, 
but because of ‘normal’ planning problems such a inadequate road access or proximity to existing none 
compatible uses, such as housing.
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County and City Councils had protected the trackbed. The new station, although 
rather minimal architecturally, was developed as part of an office and car park 
development by the Property Board and served the growing number of office 
developments in the adjoining parts of the city centre. By 1989 the WMPTE had 
plans to extend the service westwards to Stourbridge which would provide further 
relief to New Street which was congested, and to open new stations, such as The 
Hawthorns to serve West Bromwich Albion football ground (Boynton, 1989). The 
congestion at New Street had been made worse by steady improvements in medium 
distance services between Birmingham and destinations such as Worcester, Cardiff, 
Nottingham and Cambridge associated with Sprinterisation.
Overall in the West Midlands there was a mood of optimism about the local 
railway network and, reflecting this, the PTE changed its name to ‘Centro’, and 
developed a new corporate logo and train livery scheme: as with BR, the 
Government’s emphasis on market forces and entrepreneurialism was having 
unexpected beneficial impacts on the activities of public bodies. The optimism went 
further: Centro proposed to develop a light rail route between Snow Hill and 
Wolverhampton on the trackbed of the former GWR main line which had also been 
protected by the planning authorities. The Cross-City line service was experiencing 
problems owing to worn out rolling stock and infrastructure and, in 1988, the PTE 
submitted an investment case to the DoT to upgrade it, including electrification. This 
met with the usual delays as the Department appraised the scheme and debated its 
rate of return, but the project was eventually approved by Cecil Parkinson in 1990 
and, by 1993, the whole route between Lichfield, New Street and Redditch was 
energised and operational.
During this period Birmingham City Council began to develop and implement 
an ambitious regeneration strategy for the city centre which involved 
pedestrianisation, reducing the barrier effects of the orbital ring road, and promoting 
property led regeneration of peripheral areas. Given what has been said in this 
thesis about the significance of CBD activity to demand for rail travel, this was an 
important change from the previous strategy which had primarily focused on older 
industrial areas, as well as the NEC and the urban periphery. By 1991 the 
International Convention Centre, the Symphony Hall and the Hyatt Hotel were 
complete and this was followed by production of the City Centre Strategy in 1992 
(Birmingham City Council, 1992) and the Planning and Urban Design Framework for 
the Convention Centre Quarter (Birmingham City Council, 1994). The latter 
facilitated the very successful Brindley Place development, and incorporated plans
208
for a new station adjacent to the new Indoor Arena to serve the whole of this new 
quarter. The combined outcome of rail improvements along with a much 
strengthened CBD was a very positive outcome in the face of what had been a very 
hostile context in the early 1980s, and demonstrated the underlying strengths of 
Birmingham’s railway inheritance.
This resurgence, reflecting the impact of the international New Urbanism 
movement, was mirrored by similar developments elsewhere: Glasgow was a 
significant example where there was a planning-led regeneration of the Merchant’s 
Quarter (City of Glasgow District Council Planning Department, 1992). Another 
favourable outcome for rail travel resulted from development of the site of the former 
St Enoch station, closed in 1966, which was subject to a major retail redevelopment 
opened in the late 1980s : its proximity to Argyle Street and Central Stations, and 
the Underground, facilitated rail access29.
Although these regenerative activities in central Birmingham and Glasgow 
were beneficial for rail ridership, this outcome was largely fortuitous as the primary 
goal was the strengthening of the local economy, not promoting rail ridership. The 
underlying weakness of the overall relationship between land-use planning and rail 
development was highlighted by the development of the South Yorkshire Supertram. 
The importance to this project of securing positive impacts on the local property 
market has already been noted, as has the weakness of the institutional and policy 
contexts to deliver it. Research between 1992-9630 utilising planning application as 
indicators of development activity around the light rail route, and which also looked at 
comparable data around contemporary new roads in corridors parallel to Supertram, 
concluded that:
....there was little evidence of South Yorkshire Supertram regenerative impacts but that
there was evidence of them clustering around the road corridor (Haywood, 1998, 38).
This research also utilised data on land-use change within an 800 metre wide 
corridor around the Supertram route and similarly concluded that:
There was little evidence of South Yorkshire Supertram having exerted a locational pull on the 
pattern of major developments in Sheffield, but there was evidence that the Lower Don Valley 
Link Road had exerted such a pull (Haywood, 1998, 38).
This research produced powerful evidence to show that, even where there was an 
explicit policy requirement to integrate land-use and rail development, the
29 The Buchanan Galleries retail centre was opened in 1999 on the site of the former Buchanan Street 
station, also closed in 1966, adjoining the extant Queen Street high and low level stations and the 
Subway.
30 This research went beyond the 1994 cut off date but, as Supertram was not part of the BR system, it 
is relevant to consider the results.
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institutional and policy contexts existing in Sheffield at the time, more or less 
guaranteed that this would not be the outcome. The combined effect of market 
forces and a laissez-faire planning regime meant that any new development was far 
more likely to be drawn towards the roads (Lawless, 1999)31.
Given that Newcastle and Liverpool had received significant investment in 
their local railway networks it was not to be expected that, in the political climate of 
the 1980s, there would be any major projects subsequently. However, Merseyside 
PTE opened some new stations, with that at suburban Halewood in 1988 being the 
most significant as it had a 10,000 catchment within a half-mile radius (RDS, 1992, 
12). Tyne and Wear PTE opened an extension of the existing Metro to Newcastle 
Airport in 1992. It is notable though that in both cities the designated UDAs were not 
readily accessible by rail, with that in Newcastle being particularly poor.
An analysis of travel-to-work trends using 1981-91 census data (Beatty and 
Haywood, (1997), showed that rail ridership showed only small increases, with some 
decreases, except in Tyne and Wear where the impact of the Metro was obvious. 
The 1981 figures for Merseyside show that the 1970s improvements had already had 
an impact.
Table 16: Percentage of resident working population using rail for travel-to-work 1981- 
SI in the PTE areas.
PTE 1981 1991
Greater Manchester 2.4 2.2
Merseyside* 5.1 5.2
South Yorkshire 0.5 0.8
Tyne and Wear* 1.9 6.4
West Midlands 2.1 1.9
West Yorkshire 1.0 1.5
Strathclyde
* includes ridership classed as ‘underground’ in census data ie. Liverpool Loop and Link and 
the Tyne and Wear Metro.
Although data compatibility problems precluded analysis of rail ridership 
trends for the workplace populations in the PTE areas, the percentages using rail 
were similar to those of the resident population in 1991, ranging from 0.8 per cent in 
South Yorkshire to 5.4 per cent and 5.9 per cent in Merseyside and Tyne and Wear 
respectively. It is notable from other data sources though that the improvement of 
services between provincial cities through Sectorisation and Sprinterisation, coupled 
to the renaissance of their CBDs, did lead to increased ridership on CBD to CBD
31 It is also important to note that BR used the building of Supertram as a reason to close stations at 
Attercliffe and Brightside in the Lower Don Valley: it is very questionable as to whether Supertram 
provided a satisfactory alternative and these closures looked more like a continuation of the historic 
trend of BR withdrawing from the local travel market in Sheffield’s inner area, as in many other 
provincial cities.
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services: for example that between Manchester and Leeds was reported as 
increasing by 55 per cent between 1986/87 and 1991/92 (Abbott, 1992)
Railway renaissance: the ‘shires’.
The strategy for the Valley Lines developed jointly by local managers in the 
Provincial sector and the county councils produced what has been claimed to be the 
best local rail service of its type in Europe: annual passenger journeys increased 
from 4.7 million in 1982 to reach a peak of 9.5 million in 1990/91 with 30,000 daily 
passengers. Historically the Valley Lines had served local towns, such as Pontypridd 
and Caerphilly, where stations were conveniently located for passengers travelling in 
from surrounding areas. However, the major asset of the network was Cardiff Queen 
Street station which had long provided a convenient access to the city centre and 
was the busiest station in Wales32. During the 1970s the Valley Lines benefited from 
a £0.75M improvement scheme which included works to most of the 46 stations on 
the network at that time: the redevelopment of Queen Street was completed in 
197533. In the 1980s, the planning process facilitated further office development 
around Queen Street and the central retail area saw major investment too, including 
a new mall and extensive pedestrianisation. The support from the county councils 
and the Welsh Development Agency for station building and line re-opening 
produced a remarkable improvement in rail accessibility with the first new station 
opening at Cathays in 1983, followed by a further 15 involving the re-opening of 
passenger services along the Cardiff ‘City’ line in 1985, to Aberdare in 1988, and to 
Maesteg in 1993 (Railway Development Society, 1992; Davies and Clark, 1996). A 
novel feature of the Valleys renaissance was the use of dedicated feeder bus 
services which appeared in the railway timetable and provided a rail link into the 
wider community.
The creation of the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC) in 1988 
presented a significant transport problem as they wanted to promote the former dock 
area, located to the south of the city centre, for developments which would have a 
significant impact on passenger trip generation. There was a rail link into the dock 
area, the Bute Town branch, but this ran on an embankment along an alignment 
where CBDC wished to build a road link to the city centre. CBDC floated plans to 
demolish this and replace it by street running light rail which would link into the
32 Cardiff Central, on the Great Western main line, is very accessible to the city centre too.
33 The largest of the associated office developments, Brunei House, became HQ for the Western 
Region. Similar offices for regional managements were opened in the 1960s and 1970s at Manchester 
Piccadilly, Sheffield Midland, Plymouth and East Croydon. Although convenient for railway staff, the 
fact that they all travelled free meant that commercially this was a questionable use of such valuable 
rail accessible developments.
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Valleys Network, which would be partially converted to light rail on the core routes. 
This ambitious plan did not come to fruition and there was no significant 
improvement in rail services into the UDA although there was major investment in 
new roads (Davies and Clark, 1996, 65). This outcome in Cardiff was further 
evidence of the failure of the UDA mechanism, outside London, to integrate land 
development with local railway networks34.
In Nottinghamshire the first phase of the Robin Hood project between 
Nottingham and Newstead opened in 1993 and the route through to Mansfield was 
open by early 1995; overall this involved the construction of seven new stations 
(Sully, 1995). Given organisational problems and rising costs associated with 
impending privatisation, this project stands as a remarkable monument to the 
strength of the relationship that was developed between Regional Railways and the 
local authorities, particularly the counties, and the town planning process was a 
significant element of this35 (Haywood, 1992).
Partnerships between the shires and various BR bodies were also formed to 
achieve more modest goals. For example, there was one established in 1983 
between Hampshire County Council, NSE, and BR’s Community Unit, which worked 
to improve existing stations and their settings, bridges, and the linesides (Hampshire 
County Council et al, 1993). The visual attractiveness of the station schemes gave 
the railway a positive and re-assuring image, a factor which was increasingly 
recognised as important in facilitating ridership as BR became more ‘customer 
aware’. Other partnerships, such as that in Devon and Cornwall, worked to promote 
ridership on rural lines. This was by: producing promotional material; encouraging 
tourist facilities to locate on or near stations; developing footpaths and cycle routes 
linked to stations; and including supportive policies in relevant statutory land-use 
plans (Regional Railways et al, 1993). This work went well beyond land-use planning 
and was indicative of just how sophisticated and supportive the relationship between 
BR and local authorities had become, based on an holistic view of what was in the 
the railway’s best interests.
Rail freight: mixed fortunes
For the reasons discussed previously, with the additional factor that most of 
the national motorway network was complete by the end of the 1970s, rail freight
34 Gore (1986, 323) showed that the projected investment in the Valleys Rail Strategy, £17M over five 
years, was very modest compared with investment in new roads in Mid and South Glamorgan in 1981- 
86 of £128.5 million, this being followed by construction of the Cardiff Peripheral Distributor Road at a 
projected cost of £165 million.
35 The line subsequently opened through to Worksop in 1997 with construction of a further four new 
stations.
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traffic continued to decline, leading to closures and disposal of land. For example, in 
Sheffield Tinsley Yard became redundant and the Freightliner terminal closed36. This 
was followed by closure of nine other Freightliner terminals in 1987, including those 
at Edinburgh, Newcastle and Nottingham which left them, along with most other 
medium sized cities, with no rail freight facility at all. The rundown of the mining 
industry which provoked the desperate miner’s strike of 1984-85, was a major threat 
to the coal traffic which, despite all the new business developed post-Beeching, 
continued to be the mainstay of the industry. Surprisingly, in the late 1980s rail 
haulage of coal increased as British Coal persuaded a number of major industrial 
concerns to switch their energy source from oil to coal and Trainload Coal was very 
focused in its pursuit of business. Lower cost opencast coal was increasingly 
attractive to British Coal and growth of this drew planning authorities into the 
industry: they usually demanded rail transport as a requirement of planning consent. 
Durham and Northumberland County Councils became particularly involved with the 
development of rail connected concentration and disposal points at Wardley and 
Haltwhistle respectively (Allen, 1990).
The 1980s property boom and, ironically, the Government’s road building 
programme, also stimulated the rail freight market because of the demand for 
aggregates and Trainload Construction was well placed to take advantage of this. 
With the boom focused in the South East and the primary aggregate sources being 
in other regions, typically the Mendips and Charnwood Forest, rail haulage made 
good economic sense. This was also desirable from the minerals planning 
authorities’ points of view too. This traffic was so significant as to provide sufficient 
incentive for one of the Mendips quarry operators, Foster Yeoman, to acquire a fleet 
of five locomotives to haul37 their own wagons which had previously been hauled by 
BR locomotives. Customers often had their own wagons but to acquire locomotives 
was unprecedented and was held up as evidence of BR’s commercialism and 
flexibility. ARC followed suit a few years later and Redlands also invested in a train of 
‘self-discharging’ wagons to give greater flexibility in delivery. These investments 
reflected the Government’s market-led minerals planning regime which recognised 
the need to import construction materials into the South East, and the suitability of 
rail for this work.
The buoyancy of traditional traffics whilst Freightliner was struggling 
underlined the dominance of road haulage. All modes freight tonne-kilometres 
increased by 27 per cent between 1980-89 but rail’s market share declined. From a
36 The only rail freight left in this archetypal railway age city, was a couple of spurs into steel works.
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land development perspective this marginalisation was illustrated by the fact that, 
even where major new manufacturing complexes were developed, such as by 
Nissan at Sunderland and Toyota near Derby, the plants were not rail connected. 
This was despite their proximity to railways and BR’s experience elsewhere with 
serving the automotive industry. The ideological context was not one where the local 
planning authorities felt that they should, or could, demand rail haulage to reduce the 
environmental impact of these developments.
The wagonload business suffered from the Sectorisation of the rail freight 
industry as the Sectors were reluctant to let another cost centre handle their traffic. 
Eventually this provoked a crisis for Speedlink and, after a review, BR abandoned 
the business in 1991 and more yards were declared surplus to requirements 
(Shannon and Rhodes, 1991). In the run up to privatisation BR was forced to 
rationalise its operations in order to maximise the profitability of its various 
businesses and this led to various ‘marginal’ flows being deliberately priced off the 
network and more customers38 closed their rail links. The closure of the Ravenscraig 
steel plant at Motherwell in 1992, was further evidence of the decline of the 
traditional market. By 1995 rail freight’s market share had declined to 6 per cent.
But construction of the Channel Tunnel provided an historic opportunity for 
rail to compete more effectively for international traffic where, theoretically at any 
rate, it should be able to offer faster delivery times than road at competitive rates. 
Prior to opening of the Tunnel, rail could only offer a limited international service 
using purpose-built ferries. To develop the Tunnel traffic a network of inter-modal 
terminals and freight villages was developed. Railfreight Distribution took the lead, 
but private developers and local authorities were involved too. Some of the schemes 
involved the intensification of the use of existing ‘stand-alone’ terminals such as 
Manchester’s Trafford Park, and these did not require planning consent. But the 
development of terminals and freight villages at Daventry, Hams Hall and Wakefield 
was historic in the sense that it involved the development of land not previously 
used for general rail freight. They also brought with them some significant planning 
policy issues as they showed that commercial developers had become aware of the 
potential to use rail access to major industrial and distribution developments as a 
counter to planning policy concerns about the appropriateness of such 
development.
37 These were operated by BR drivers.
38 A significant example was the Castle cement works near Clitheroe: the cement industry had been a 
major BR customer for years but the traffic fell away rapidly. Smaller ports such as Boston, Goole and 
Kings Lynn also closed their links.
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For example, Wakefield Europort was jointly promoted by Wakefield 
Metropolitan District Council, Railfreight Distribution, and a private company, AMEC 
Developments, on a site adjoining junction 31 of the M62 and an existing industrial 
estate. The rail terminal was only a small part of the overall 140 hectares (350 acres) 
of land to be developed, most of which was green belt. The project was contrary to 
planning policy and was evidence of a failure to incorporate these new demands 
within the planning process. The development was subject to a public inquiry and 
was only granted planning permission by the Secretary of State, John Gummer, 
because of the exceptional and strategic significance of the rail freight facility. The 
planning permission required the terminal to be built before any subsequent 
development of the site. A similar outcome occurred at Hams Hall, which was also a 
green belt site. In both cases the lasting impression was that they received planning 
permission despite the planning system, not as a product of it (Haywood, 1999). In 
fact a similar project at Toton Sidings was the subject of two planning applications 
which were withdrawn in 1990 and a third, submitted in 1994, was refused consent 
in 1995(Greensmith and Haywood, 1999): no appeal was lodged. A further negative 
outcome occurred at what was the largest distribution development of the early 
1990s, Magna Park off Junction 20 of the M1 near Lutterworth in Leicestershire. This 
was endorsed through the planning process, with no rail access, and sat 
uncomfortably with the county’s pro-rail strategies: ironically the disused alignment 
of the former Great Central runs close by.
The Daventry scheme was the exception as its origins can be traced back 
through the planning process. Although located on what was open countryside, this 
was not green belt, and the strategic significance of the location was identified in 
supportive regional planning guidance. Subsequently the statutory local plan for the 
area was amended to incorporate the terminal and freight village (Daventry District 
Council, 1993). This preparation meant that, when the planning application was 
submitted, it had a relatively smooth ride: local councillors were supportive of the 
economic benefits and approved the scheme, which was not ‘called in’.
The overall outcome of the Channel Tunnel initiative (tables 17 and 18) 
showed the difficulties in delivering a balanced strategy whilst depending upon the 
vagaries of the property market and the reactive development control process to 
deliver sites and funding. For example, terminals were developed very close to each 
other at Doncaster and Wakefield, and at Hams Hall and Daventry, whereas no new 
terminals and freight villages were delivered anywhere in the South East. Similarly, 
as shown in table 17, the exclusion of Freightliner from the process left this business
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on historic and somewhat constrained sites, with that at Coatbridge being the worst 
example.
Table 17: BR terminals developed for the Channel Tunnel and their relationship with 
the nearest Freightliner terminal.____________________________________________
Location Channel Tunnel traffic Freightliner
Birmingham Originally to be with Freightliner at Landor 
Street pending development of out-of- 
town site (this became Hams Hall - see 
table 8.4)
Landor Street - established city 
centre site.
Cardiff To share Pengam with Freightliner Pengam - established city centre 
site, now being replaced by new 
terminal at Wentloog.
Glasgow Development of Mossend Euroterminal on 
largely greenfield site in assocation with 
industrial/warehousing development by 
Lanarkshire Development Agency
Terminal on cramped, established 
site with poor access to the 
motorway network a few miles to 
the north at Coatbridge
Liverpool Development on existing rail site at within 
the port area at Seaforth - no freight 
village
Garston - established site
London Development of existing Freightliner 
facilities at Willesden and Stratford (latter 
not progressed)
Barking - established site.
Manchester New Euroterminal on BR land in Trafford 
Park - no freight village
Separate established site next to 
the Euroterminal
Wakefield Europort - new development on green belt 
in assocation with industrial/warehousing 
development
Leeds (Stourton) on established site
Middlesbrough To share Freightliner terminal - not 
developed as a Tunnel terminal
Freightliner continue to operate the 
established site
Table 18: Channel Tunnel terminals promoted by parties other than BR
Location Developer
Daventry Promoted by private sector on green field site in 
association with freight village
Doncaster Promoted by Doncaster MBC on industrial land 
adjacent to longstanding BR freight facilities - no 
freight village
Hams Hall Promoted by privatised electricity generator on former 
power station site in green belt in association with 
industrial/warehousing development
Toton Promoted by private landowner in association with RfD on green belt land adjoining long established sidings 
area: planning permission refused, no appeal.
Conclusions
For the railway sector this period was different to the previous one as the 
fundamental questioning and rationalisation was over, and the balance of power in 
the political debate over transport constrained the Treasury view. Nevertheless, the 
tensions between the commercial and social railways remained, with continuous 
pressure from all Governments to cut costs. The overriding outcome was that, 
despite all the positive outcomes reviewed above, rail ridership did not change
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significantly over the period, despite a large overall increase in society’s mobility: rail 
freight fared much worse and virtually collapsed.
Although the industry remained in public hands, management structures and 
ideologies changed dramatically but there was, throughout, more awareness of the 
need to work with other public planning agencies, particularly local authorities. 
Initially this was with the PTAs/PTEs and the metropolitan counties, but came to 
include shire and district councils and their planning departments, as well as the 
regional planning conferences. Equally there developed an increasingly 
sophisticated approach to marketing the railway’s services, although the impact of 
this became much greater after 1979. The potential benefits of this were limited as 
planning control over developing patterns of urban form was substantially relaxed 
after 1979, which placed potential customers in locations which were not easily 
accessible by rail. This situation was beginning to change by 1994.
The interplay between ideology, institutional structures, and policy was 
therefore very complex but at no time did they all fall into place in the railway sector’s 
favour. This chapter has shown that, from 1968 to the mid-1970s, there was 
significant investment in railway infrastructure in some of the major conurbations, 
and investment in the main line network. But rail oriented ideology was poorly 
developed in the land-use planning system and local government re-organisation 
delayed development of statutory structure plans and local plans. Nevertheless, the 
pro-public transport ideology which underpinned transport and land-use planning 
ensured that many major developments, particularly office and retail schemes, were 
located favourably with regard to the railway network, often in association with 
improvement of the latter. By the time the new local government system was 
beginning to bed down, new planning issues had arisen which tended to push 
transport considerations down the agenda. Investment in railway infrastructure and 
the property market were curtailed, in any case, by the recession. By the early 1980s 
when statutory land-use plans were adopted which sought to restrict major activity 
generators to rail accessible nodes, the Conservatives were in power and, once the 
property market recovered, they had no intention of constraining road oriented 
urban decentralisation: they saw virtue in encouraging it in fact.
The BRB reacted remarkably well to the generally hostile stance of the 
Conservatives towards the industry. They adopted the strategy of placing the 
commercial railway closer to its customers, whilst at the same time developing a 
united front with other public bodies to secure as much funding and general support 
as possible for the commercial and social railway. However, a thread running
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throughout the period was that the most rail focused planning activity was 
safeguarding disused trackbeds and developing re-opening strategies in 
partnership with BR (and the PTE where appropriate): in other words putting back 
what central Government had taken away. This tended to give a geographically 
constrained, project bias to implementation, rather than more widespread activity to 
maximise accessibility across an existing high quality network.
Once the Conservatives began to pull back from their extreme deregulatory 
stance towards land-use planning, and began to encourage rail ridership, there 
began what can only be called a renaissance in the rail mode and its relationships 
with land-use planning. This saw the policies cited above coming to fruition with re­
opening of stations and lines, and the completion of development schemes which 
were rail accessible, including high quality schemes around stations.
A summary of the thematic analysis is shown in figure 24 and with regard to 
the list of points developed at the end of chapter two, the following summarises the 
overall outcome for the period with regard to the rail network:
1. although much reduced, the process of rationalisation continued, but there was 
a counter thrust which saw re-opening of closed stations and lines in major 
conurbations and their hinterlands, demonstrating that the process of 
rationalisation had been taken too far;
2. significant improvements in the main line network were made to allow faster 
speeds, with completion of London-Scotland electrification on both main lines, 
electrification of local and semi-fast services on routes outside the South East 
was limited; at their best the quality of passenger services improved significantly 
with regard to speed, comfort and frequency for intercity, regional and local 
services, but quality was patchy and, at the margins, cramped, squalid and 
unreliable. Similarly with regard to freight, core services with regard to bulk 
traffics were reliable and competitive, but the railway just did not try to compete 
for most traffic, although the advent of the Channel Tunnel brought better 
prospects for international intermodal services;
3. there were significant strategic improvements to the network including cross- 
CBD tunnelling/tunnel re-opening, LRT street running, building of new 
railway/light railway routes into major developments/regeneration areas, 
construction of one new London tube route, and opening of the Channel Tunnel;
4. although some stations were closed, the balance was heavily in favour of station 
openings, and there were some notable examples of major mixed use 
redevelopment projects in major towns and cities around stations;
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The following summarises the outcome with regard to the operation of the planning
system:
5. planning practice in the 1970s steered major trip generating uses to CBDs and 
there were some supportive developments in the new towns too which produced 
positive outcomes for intercity and commuter services, but this was severely 
undermined in the 1980s apart from special cases strongly favoured by the 
property market;
6. planning practice in the 1970s steered development to locations in CBDs which 
were accessible to stations with generally a much weaker relationship in 
suburban developments, but even the CBD focus was undermined in the 1980s; 
during the 1970s the detail of this relationship was generally poorly handled, but 
this was exceptionally well handled in those cases in the 1980s where 
development at and/or around stations was favoured by the property market; the 
closure and disposal of freight facilities continued throughout the period, although 
developments in mineral extraction and waste disposal and construction of 
Channel Tunnel terminals brought some engagement with the planning process;
7. planning practice throughout the period with regard to greenfield areas 
continued to be to prevent their development as far as possible and, where 
development took place, the prime transport consideration was to provide access 
by road: the exceptions to this trend continued to be in the new towns although 
the pace of development in most of them slackened considerably in the 1980s 
and, even where development continued, its relationship to the railway network 
was weaker than previously.
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Figure 24: Summary of thematic analysis of outcomes: 1969-94.
Explanatory themes Railway sector Interrelationships 
between the two 
sectors
Planning sector
Politics and 
political ideology
Supportive context 
produced significant 
improvements to main 
line and local services 
to mid-1970s. 
Stagnation
subsequently followed 
by Government hostility 
made it difficult to 
invest. But combination 
of market orientation 
and partnerships 
produced limited but 
significant benefits 
despite this.
Positive outcomes in 
1970s in London, some 
new towns and 
PTA/PTE areas, 
followed by stagnation. 
Recovery in late 1980s 
associated with 
sectorisation and urban 
regeneration in same 
areas, plus some 
shires. Continuing 
emphasis in rural areas 
on holding on to existing 
services, with some 
supportive 
developments.
The supportive context 
delivered some relevant 
developments in new 
towns and some CBDs 
to mid-1970s.
Stagnation
subsequently, followed 
by flood of road 
oriented decentralisation 
in 1980s. Market 
oriented planning 
produced some relevant 
development, 
particularly in CBDs.
Professions and
professional
ideology
In the 1970s the 
continued dominance of 
the technical 
professions improved 
intercity and London 
commuter services: 
relationships with the 
PTEs influenced 
regional managers and 
delivered improved local 
services. Sectorisation 
reinforced the outward 
facing marketing role, 
which produced 
effective liaison with 
planning authorities.
A limited engagement in 
the 1970s which was of 
most significance in 
delivering macro co- 
locational outcomes in 
CBDs. Postive 
outcomes post-1979 
were initially limited to 
locations favoured by 
the market, but growing 
liaison between the 
sectors developed wider 
benefits throughout the 
range of local authority 
areas.
Structure planning had a 
limited effect in 
restricting trip 
generators to CBDs, but 
the detail of 
development produced 
poor integration with 
stations. The largest and 
best designed pro-rail 
developments of the 
1980s were largely 
market driven, although 
pro-rail planning 
ideology delivered 
significant re-openings 
and other benefits 
towards 1994.
Governance and 
management
The BR corporate 
period made liaison with 
planning authorities 
difficult, although the 
PTEs bridged the gap to 
a degree. Sectorisation 
revealed the benefits to 
be gained from working 
with the full range of 
planning bodies and 
delivered significant 
outcomes.
The creation of strategic 
local authority bodies in 
the 1970s helped 
relationships between 
the sectors, but by the 
time Sectorisation 
produced a more 
receptive BR, 
Government support for 
strategic planning had 
wained. The recovery 
towards the end of the 
period was delivering 
significant outcomes.
Many upper tier 
authorities pursued 
effective pro-rail 
strategies and the 
PTA/PTEs served as an 
effective bridge. Hostility 
to local government 
undermined planning’s 
role in the 1980s, but the 
return to a more 
supportive Government 
attitude produced a 
significant recovery with 
notable achievements 
by 1994.
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PART THREE
Conclusions
Chapter six showed that, although the railway and planning sectors remained 
in different parts of the State, several developments in institutional arrangements 
created the potential for more collaborative working. The most significant was the 
creation of the PTA/PTE structures which, despite profound changes in national 
politics and governance, remained extant throughout the period. The second was 
creation of the BR Property Board in the 1970s, and the third was creation of the 
Sectors in the 1980s as a reaction to the over-centralised corporatism of the 1970s. 
The fourth was the reinvigoration of regional planning bodies towards the end of the 
period. The hostility of the Thatcher Government to planning and local government 
had negative impacts on institutional arrangements by the creation of the UDCs and 
abolition of the GLC and the metropolitan counties. However, the overall situation at 
the moment before the onset of privatisation, was that the institutional arrangements 
and the organisational culture of those working within the structures, was the most 
supportive of collaboration between the sectors of the whole 1948-94 period.
Chapter seven showed that trends in policy towards the railways and town 
planning could be grouped into three broad time periods. That from 1968 to 1979 
was characterised by the BRB developing policies to secure improvements in the 
main line railway network, whilst the PTA/PTEs developed innovative policies for the 
conurbations. The stance towards the rest of the network was characterised by plans 
for further cost cutting or closure.
Despite the shift in political and professional ideology towards planning for 
public transport, it took many years for supportive policies to find their way into 
statutory development plans. This was caused partly by local government re­
organisation which was not complete until 1974, partly by the general sluggishness of 
the plan making process, and partly by changes in priorities arising from the onset of 
recession. When they finally crystallised, policies were only supportive of the railways 
in the most general sense in that they expressed resistance to decentralisation. The 
exception was where very specific policies were developed to protect disused 
trackbeds and station sites, typically but not exclusively, in areas where the 
presence of a PTE meant there was a reasonable likelihood of reinstatement.
The period from 1979 to the mid-1980s was characterised by ideological 
hostility towards BR and planning. Although subject to great pressure to cut costs, 
the BRB responded imaginatively through the development of the Sectors and a 
more detailed development and defence of the case for rail investment. As the
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economy recovered this led to unexpected buoyancy within the railway sector and 
the development of ambitious investment plans characterised by those for the ECML, 
Network South East and the Channel Tunnel. Even the Provincial sector got the 
Sprinterisation plan. Although the boom created situations where the property market 
found it advantageous to develop proposals for rail accessible sites, encouraged by 
the Property Board, the role of planning policy in facilitating this was limited.
However in the third period from the late 1980s to 1994, the planning system 
developed a more robust stance towards the railway network. This began with fairly 
widespread inclusion in plans of policies for development around stations, for railway 
re-opening schemes and, finally, more wholehearted ideological engagement with 
planning around railways by development of the sustainability concept and 
production of the updated version of PPG13. Despite this reinvigoration of planning 
for rail, policy making by the BRB was curtailed after 1992 because of the 
Government’s commitment to privatisation.
Chapter eight showed that railway outcomes in the 1968-79 period were 
markedly different to those in the 1948-68 period. The most notable difference was 
the improvement in local networks in the conurbations, particularly Newcastle, 
Liverpool and Glasgow. The second difference was the fall in the rate of closures and 
the turn towards re-openings, exemplified by Glasgow’s Argyle Line. Probably the 
most relevant achievement of the planning system was a negative one, the fact that 
market pressures for decentralisation of retailing and office development were 
resisted and such developments continued to be steered towards city and town 
centres which, broadly speaking, were accessible by rail. The commercial 
developments in the centres of new towns, as in Peterborough and Milton Keynes, 
reinforced this pattern, although the detail showed the limitations of planning 
ideology.
The period froml 979 to the late 1980s saw few positive outcomes for the 
railway network and the early 1980s in particular was a bleak period. Traffic fell 
because of the recession, the Woodhead route was closed, the Settle and Carlisle 
was threatened with closure, local services in many conurbations continued to be 
operated by ageing DEMUs. The most notable positive outcomes were off the BR 
network, the completion of the Tyne and Wear Metro and construction of the 
Docklands Light Railway. This period was the most negative for the planning 
outcomes too, characterised by the relaxed attitude to massive decentralisation of 
retail and commercial developments to locations not accessible by rail.
From the late 1980s to 1994 the rail outcomes were more positive as the 
industry reaped the rewards of Sectorisation, its more robust approach to case
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making, and the impacts of the growth in ridership during the boom. The most 
significant example of large scale development focused around new rail investment 
was on the Isle of Dogs around the DLR, but this was hardly ‘planned’ in the 
conventional sense, although the DLR itself was. However the market did favour 
commercial developments elsewhere around railway stations and local planning 
authorities were involved in these in the conventional way. The high quality of 
Broadgate, and other developments around stations in the provinces, from Aberdeen 
to Welwyn, were evidence of a robust community of interest between the BRB, 
developers and planning authorities. The effectiveness of the very specific role of 
planning in safeguarding disused alignments and promoting rail re-openings was 
exemplified by outcomes in the Valleys, Birmingham and Nottinghamshire.
Overall, part three has shown the continued and increased dominance of road 
transport and its associated patterns of urban form over the 1968-94 period.
However, part three has also shown that the concepts of the commercial railway and 
the social railway were robust and, before the onset of recession and privatisation, 
policy around them placed the railways in their most favourable ideological context 
of the whole 1948-94 period. This produced positive outcomes which embraced all 
aspects of the passenger railway, although rail freight was marginalised. Similarly the 
combination of planning support for market led commercial development at or near to 
stations, the use of planning powers to safeguard trackbeds, along with the deeper 
ramifications of the sustainable city concept, meant that planning was ideologically 
more supportive of rail than at any time since 1948.
The analysis in part three has further demonstrated the value of the spatially 
hierarchical perspectives developed in parts one and two, and these are developed 
further below.
Outcomes at the national level for the railway sector were characterised by 
creation of the Intercity business. It can be concluded from previous chapters that 
the main line network was the priority for investment, although even this was 
constrained by strict fiscal criteria. Main line railway considerations were never a 
priority for the national land-use planning policy agenda, nevertheless certain 
policies had particular relevance to it, such as the general approach to 
decentralisation, urban containment and, in particular, policies for CBDs.
At the intra-regional, or city region level, railways provided access between 
suburbs, satellites, rural hinterlands and regional cities. After being neglected for 
twenty years, such services outside London were given champions with the creation 
of the PTA/PTEs, and there was a wider resurgence after creation of the Provincial 
sector. Throughout the period land-use planning had an impact at this level through
223
the specific approach taken in each city region to the balance between centralisation 
and decentralisation, CBD development, and the degree of commitment to planning 
around and developing local railway networks.
At the local level the idiosyncrasies of railway network geography and 
management, their interrelationship with the unique urban geography of specific 
localities, and the impact of local land-use planning activity on this, together 
impacted on the accessibility and viability of local railway networks. The after-use of 
redundant railway land was a particularly significant aspect of policy and practice at 
this level. However the general weakness of planning ideology towards the railways 
meant that, for the most part, the detail of the local relationship between the two 
sectors was poor.
These perspectives were utilised to further develop the hypotheses for the 
Manchester case study set out in the conclusions to part two.
The first hypothesis for the case study area was that:
the emphasis on main line investment has led to: piecemeal improvement in railway 
services with priority for those on trunk routes to London; removal of some services 
on secondary and branch lines and stagnation of others. In the most general sense 
planning has been supportive of the network through containment and managed 
decentralisation, but has not been specifically rail oriented, and there was only a 
loose spatial fit between patterns of development and the broad geography of the 
network, with evidence of significant dislocation. The overall relationship can be 
characterised as inconsistent, both spatially and temporally.
The second hypothesis was that:
rail access to the regional CBD has been rationalised with priority for stations 
associated with the trunk route to London; there have been significant 
improvements for access by local services after 1968 by the PTE, although this has 
been subject to ‘queuing’ mechanisms, sporadic and under-conceptualised. 
Although land-use planning has been broadly supportive of these investments by 
steering major activity generators to the CBD, proximity to stations has not been a 
prime consideration and urban design initiatives have not focused on the public 
domain around and pedestrian access to stations.
The third hypothesis was that:
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at the local level there has been minimal association between the detail of suburban 
development and stations. There has been some provision of new stations and 
some examples of pro-rail trends in land-use planning, although these have been 
exceptional. Redundant railway land has been redeveloped predominantly for uses 
which do not directly stimulate demand for rail travel.
This completes part three of the thesis.
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PART FOUR
Introduction.
Part four comprises the Manchester city region case study: the reasons for 
the selection of Manchester are set out in chapter one. The aim of the case study is 
to ground the analysis in a single conurbation in order to give a coherent and 
comprehensive perspective on the forces at work and their outcomes.
The analysis utilised the three hypotheses derived from parts two and three of 
the thesis which were set out at the end of part three and these were tested by 
specific reference to:
a broad review of policy and outcomes with regard to the development of the area’s 
railway network and its relationship with broad patterns of urban development;
a review of rail penetration of Manchester’s CBD and the degree to which planning 
facilitated rail access to major developments;
a study of patterns of urban growth in south Manchester and their relationship to the 
railway network, along with analysis of the end use of redundant railway land in the 
City of Manchester.
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CHAPTER NINE
CASE STUDY: THE MANCHESTER CITY REGION
The chapter begins by briefly reviewing the history of the area’s railway 
network, its relationship with patterns of urban development and the stance of land- 
use planning towards this, in order to define a benchmark to serve as a point of 
departure for the post-1947 analysis.
Manchester 1947: the inherited relationship between the railway network, 
urban form and planning
Laissez-faire produced a network wherein east-west trans-Pennine routes 
criss-crossed north-south routes to London (Patmore, 1964). One of the major 
companies, the Lancashire and Yorkshire, only served provincial markets whereas 
the Midland and, particularly, the London and North Western, had trunk routes to 
London. The Manchester Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway started life as a trans- 
Pennine company but developed into the Great Central, with its main line to 
Marylebone. Manchester was provided with several major stations and goods 
facilities around the periphery of the CBD (figure 25), and there were many areas of 
Figure 25: Lines, stations and goods depots around central Manchester: 1914
Newton Heath
,00/»/?ot 
Central
Oxford Road
Goods Depots
1 Windsor Bridge
2 Liverpool Street
3 Liverpool Road
4 Deansgate
5 Central
6 Salford
7 London Road
8 Ducie Street
9 Oldham Road
10 An coats
11 Ardwick
12 Ashton Road
13 Beswick
14 Openshaw
Source: Hall, 1995.
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extensive sidings on the various approaches1. Although the network was complex, 
basically it comprised two separate sub-systems, one to the north of the city and the 
other to the south. London Road, Oxford Road, and Central stations became the 
focal points of the southern network, and Victoria, Exchange and Salford became 
their counterparts to the north.
From the 1860s Manchester developed middle class railway suburbs, largely 
outside the City’s administrative boundary; these included, Prestwich to the north, 
Heaton Moor, Wilmslow, and Alderley Edge to the south, and Urmston, Flixton, Sale 
and Altrincham2 to the west. In response to competition from street tramways the 
railway companies invested in services to the outer suburbs; in 1909 the London 
Road-Wilmslow via Styal (the Styal line) was opened3, and in 1916 the steeply 
graded Victoria-Bury line was electrified. Although these brought rail access to 
growing suburbs, most of Manchester’s inner suburbs, and certainly its most notable 
planned suburbs, Chorltonville and Burnage, were more readily accessible by tram 
(Sutcliffe, 1981).
The development of middle class suburbs was strongly related to the 
transformation of central Manchester from a residential and industrial area into a 
CBD with ample employment in various white collar jobs. The core of the CBD was 
most readily accessible from Exchange and Victoria stations. However the main 
area of grand warehouse development, which was Manchester’s most distinctive 
contribution to Victorian architecture, lay along the Portland Street axis and was 
much closer to London Road ‘which provided the impetus for such lavish buildings, 
for it was the line to Euston that brought important clients up from London..’ 
(Parkinson-Bailey, 2000, 73)4
Manchester’s network was largely owned by the LMS during the period of the 
‘Big Four’. Little rationalisation occurred and the only significant improvement was 
electrification of the Manchester-Altrincham line in 1931, which allowed the railway to 
play a continuing role in outer suburban growth along this axis. Two new stations 
were opened at Navigation Road and Dane Road (Knight, 1999), and on the
1 Many of these were associated with various industrial complexes such as breweries, collieries, gas 
plants, steel works and engineering works, but others were ‘exchange’ sidings necessitated by the 
interfaces between the various company networks.
2 Patmore (1964,167) commented that the Manchester South Junction and Atrincham Railway opened 
in 1849 was: ‘purely suburban in function but from its opening had an intensive passenger service and 
did much to develop the south-western outskirts of Manchester as a residential area’.
3 This include the opening of Mayfield as a major extension to London Road in the city centre.
4 In the following sections various major developments and their chronology are referred to, and unless 
otherwise stated, this publication is the source.
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Manchester-1 rlam-Liverpool line5 stations were also opened at Chassen Road near 
Flixton, and at Old Trafford (on the instigation of Manchester United). Despite 
recession in the cotton industry, there were further commercial developments in the 
core of the CBD which maintained demand for rail travel. These included major office 
developments along King Street such as Ship Canal House and the Midland Bank, 
Arkwright House in St Mary’s Parsonage, and the Rylands and Kendal Milne’s 
department stores.
Post-1919 Manchester City Council tackled its slum problem but shortage of 
land forced them to look outside the City boundary. They were successful in 1926 
in what was then north Cheshire where they decided to build a garden city, 
Wythenshawe, with an intended population of over 100,000 (HMSO, 1995). 
However, despite this size, the peripheral location and proximity to railway lines, 
this was not focused around a rapid rail link to the mother city: municipal bus 
services to the tram terminus in south Manchester were used instead, a rather 
tenuous link.
As in other cities a plan to guide reconstruction was produced during the 
Second World War, the Nicholas plan (Nicholas, 1945). This only related to the 
administrative area of the City of Manchester and so could not address the strategic 
development of the wider conurbation. It incorporated extensive proposals for orbital 
roads but had little to say about integration between the railway network and outer 
suburban growth. However, Roy Hughes of the LMS assisted with the plan and, as a 
result, it recognised the need for better rail access to Wythenshawe and links across 
the city centre. However it rejected the idea of a connecting tunnel as too costly and 
proposed an elevated loop line around the periphery of the CBD with rationalisation 
of the city centre stations.
The important points about Manchester’s railway network and its relationship 
with the area’s urban geography which would influence the post-1947 period were: 
there was duplication of lines, stations and goods facilities;
there was a tradition of rail served outer suburban growth, but this was overlooked in
the development of Wythenshawe;
the north and south networks were poorly linked;
penetration of Manchester’s CBD was poor;
electrification was limited to two suburban routes;
5 This line was operated by the Cheshire Lines Committee (CLC), created by the Manchester Sheffield 
and Lincolnshire Railway, the Great Northern and the Midland. The CLC was created to break into the 
territory of the London and North Western: like some other ‘joint lines’ it remained outside the 
Grouping but became part of BR’s London Midland Region on nationalisation (Dyckhoff, 1999).
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local authority transport and land-use planning for the wider area was dominated by 
municipal engineers and road building.
The chapter is now moving on to test each of the hypotheses.
First hypothesis.
The emphasis on main line investment has led to: piecemeal improvement in 
railway services with priority for those on trunk routes to London; removal of some 
services on secondary and branch lines and stagnation of others. In the most 
general sense planning has been supportive of the network through containment and 
managed decentralisation, but has not been specifically rail oriented, and there 
was only a loose spatial fit between patterns of development and the broad 
geography of the network, with evidence of significant dislocation. The overall 
relationship can be characterised as inconsistent, both spatially and temporally.
First hypothesis: the railway network post-1947.
For most of the period the BR regional structure placed Manchester in the 
London Midland Region: although there was a local management presence in 
Manchester this was largely concerned with operating matters and the big decisions 
were taken in London. One of the few early strategic investments was electrification 
of the Manchester (London Road)-Sheffield via Woodhead route, completed in 
1954. Although the rationale for this was interregional freight haulage, particularly 
coal, it facilitated electric haulage of express passenger services6, as well suburban 
services to Glossop and Hadfield7 . The Modernisation Plan led to electrification of 
the WCML to London including the spurs to Manchester via both Crewe/Wilmslow8 
and Stoke-on-Trent/Macclesfield with a significant reduction in journey times and 
growth of passenger traffic. London Road was modernised and renamed Manchester 
Piccadilly in 1960 and, by 1968, local electric trains worked out to Stoke and Crewe 
and station rebuilding took place at Cheadle Hulme, Handforth and Macclesfield. 
Because electrification was restricted to the London trunk routes, there were 
significant gaps with regard to strategic routes serving Manchester, particularly the 
two Manchester-Liverpool routes and Manchester-Bolton-Preston-Blackpool.
Despite the improvements to the London routes there was simultaneous 
rationalisation of other parts of the network. Central Station was closed, although the 
building was retained and subsequently listed, and the retained services diverted to
6 Services beyond Sheffield required a change of traction to steam haulage at Sheffield Victoria.
7 This was on the 1500volts DC model which was quickly rendered obsolete by the introduction of 25kv 
AC model for all subsequent electrification on British Railways.
8 The new premier electric service to London, the Manchester Pullman, stopped at Wilmslow as well as 
Stockport, and from this time Wilmslow can be regarded as a de facto parkway station for south 
Manchester/north Cheshire.
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Piccadilly and Oxford Road, the latter also being rebuilt9. Exchange was 
demolished, like Central the site became a car park, and services were diverted to 
Victoria. Generally the network to the north of the city centre began a long period of 
relative decline owing, to a significant degree, to the fact that it was not part of a 
trunk route to London10.
Trunk route rationalisation post-Beeching brought complete closure of the 
Chinley-Bakewell-Matlock section of the route from Central to London (St Pancras) 
via Derby, and ending of passenger services on the Woodhead line to Sheffield. 
These significantly reduced the potential for rail access into the Peak National Park 
and greatly reduced the convenience of rail for journeys between the North West 
and the East Midlands: services to South Yorkshire and the East Midlands were 
concentrated on the Hope Valley line which saw minimal investment, retaining its 
semaphore signalling system throughout the period.
Completion of WCML electrification was largely the end of the story as far as 
the positive impact of national railway network policy was concerned: the most 
significant factors subsequently were negative. Despite the Crewe-Piccadilly-Preston 
route being an important diversionary route for Anglo-Scottish services, the section 
between Manchester and Preston was not electrified. The Woodhead route was 
closed completely in 1981. The introduction of the APT, which had held so much 
promise for accelerated services between Manchester and London, was abandoned 
in 198611. Without it the best that could be achieved on the WCML was a 110mph 
line speed. In the early 1990s plans were developed for new trains and investment 
in the ageing infrastructure, but were abandoned as a result of the recession and 
the preparation for privatisation. In 1994 the journey time to London at 2 hours 35 
minutes, was slightly longer than the 2 hour 30 minutes in 1966 when electric 
services were first introduced.
With regard to local services, south Manchester experienced loss of railway 
passenger services in 1958 when those on the orbital route from Gorton/Fairfield on 
the Woodhead line to Manchester Central via Levenshulme and Fallowfield were 
withdrawn. Longsight station on the main line to London Road was closed at the 
same time. There were extensive proposals in the Reshaping Report for closures of
9 Followed in 1971 by conversion of the electric service to Altrincham to 25kv AC, the same as the 
WCML, which facilitated running through trains between Crewe, Piccadilly and Altrincham.
10 Although east-west rail routes were not modernised the M62 motorway made road travel quick and 
convenient across the Pennines to the north of Manchester.
11 The long development process for the APT, culminating in failure, was in stark contrast to the 
rapidity with which Boeing got the 737 into service for British Airways on competing shuttle services 
(Modem Railways, 1982, 99)
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local lines, including those out to Glossop12, Buxton and Bury, but there was 
widespread and successful opposition to these. The most significant losses in the 
conurbation core were associated with severing of the trunk route to St Pancras: the 
line from Cheadle to Central via Didsbury, Chorlton and Trafford Bar, reflecting BR’s 
withdrawal from the inner suburban market. Further out, the orbital Marple- 
Stockport-Altrincham-lrlam/Warrington axis and Rochdale-Bury-Bolton lines were 
closed too: these were parts of duplicate main lines between Manchester and 
Liverpool. The local railway network was paired back to its core of radial routes 
serving the bulk commuter flows on axes leading to central Manchester, with major 
investment only taking place on the back of WCML electrification. Analysis showed 
that 64 stations were closed in the area (table 19, figure 26), with 49 (77 per cent) as 
a product of complete line closures. The relative decline of the northern network was 
shown by the fact that it received 61 per cent (39) of the closures, and Oldham, Bury 
and Bolton lost much of their local networks. All the general merchandise facilities 
around Manchester city centre, as well as those in towns in the area, were closed, 
along with numerous areas of sidings. Freightliner terminals were opened on existing 
operational railway land at Longsight and Trafford Park13. By the mid-1970s 
Manchester Docks were running down and were eventually closed in 1985 and the 
internal railway network became redundant: although the Trafford Park estate
experienced large job losses, such as the 10,000 that went when AEI and English 
Electric merged to form GEC, its internal railway network survived although much 
reduced.
It is notable that station closures, other than those already in the pipeline, 
stopped as soon as the Greater Manchester PTE (GMPTE) was created. The extent 
of previous closures suggests that this was largely because all those that BR was 
pressing for had already been made. For the future the biggest strategic issue facing 
GMPTE was the separation of the northern and southern networks. The first 
solution14 proposed was a tunnel linking suburban services previously terminating 
at Piccadilly and Victoria, which would pass under the core of the CBD, a scheme 
known as Picc-Vic. This scheme was abandoned when public expenditure was 
capped in the mid-1970s and strategic policy for the local network was plunged
12 After closure of the Woodhead route local passenger services were retained to Glossop and Hadfield 
on the remaining stub.
13 Longsight was for London traffic and Trafford Park for Glasgow: owing to low traffic volumes, 
Longsight was closed and business was concentrated at Trafford Park.
14 The development of this proposal for the heavy rail network had been delayed until 1971 whilst a 
feasibility study was carried out in the late 1960s for a north-south rapid transit railway (White, 1980).
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Table 19: Stations closed in the Manchester area 1948-94.
No on fig. 26 Station Route Date of Closure* Barton Moss Mcr Victoria-Liverpool 1929* Molyneux Brow Bury-Clifton Jen 1931
* Weaste Mcr Victoria -Liverpool 1942
1 Darcy Lever Bolton-Bury-Rochdale 1951
2 Holcombe Brook Holcombe Brook-Bury 1952
3 Greenmount Holcombe Brook-Bury 1952
4 Tottington Holcombe Brook-Bury 1952
5 Woolfold Holcombe Brook-Bury 1952
6 Brandlesholme Road Holcombe Brook-Bury 1952
7 Bradley Fold Bradley Fold-Radcliffe ( spur off Bolton-Bury) 1953
8 Ringley Road Bury-Clifton Jen 1953
9 Bolton Great Moor Street Bolton-Worsley-Eccles 1954
10 Plodder Lane Bolton-Worsley-Eccles 1954
11 Little Hulton Bolton-Worsley-Eccles 1954
12 Walkden Low Level Bolton-Worsley-Eccles 1954
13 Worsley Bolton-Worsley-Eccles 1954
14 Monton Bolton-Worsley-Eccles 1954
15 Delph Moorgate-Delph 1955
16 Dobcross Moorgate-Delph 1955
17 Moorgate Moorgate-Delph 1955
18 Grasscroft Greenfield-Oldham(Clegg St.) 1955
19 Grotton Greenfield-Oldham(Clegg St.) 1955
20 Lees Greenfield-Oldham(Clegg St.) 1955
21 Glodwick Road Greenfield-Oldham(Clegg St.) 1955
22 Ashton-Under Lyne (Park Parade) Guide Bridge - OIdham(Clegg St.) 1956
23 Seedley Mcr Victoria-Liverpool 1956
24 Irlams-o’th’Heights Mcr Victoria-Wigan 1956
25 Radcliffe Bridge Bury-Clifton Jen 1958
26 Fallowfield Fairfield-Mcr Central 1958
27 Hyde Road Fairfield-Mcr Central 1958
28 Levenshulme Fairfield-Mcr Central 1958
29 Wilbraham Road Fairfield-Mcr Central 1958
30 Longsight Mcr London Road-Stockport 1958
31 Oldham (Clegg Street) Guide Bridge - Oldham(Clegg St.) 1959
32 Cross Lane Mcr Victoria-Liverpool 1959
33 Pendlebury Mcr Victoria-Wigan 1960
34 Heaton Mersey Mcr Central - Cheadle Heath 1961
35 Withington & West Didsbury Mcr Central - Cheadle Heath 1961
36 Dunham Massey Timperley-Warrington 1962
37 Broadheath Timperley-Warrington 1962
38 Stockport Tiviot Dale (TD) Stockport-Woodley 1962
39 Lowton St Marys Wigan-Glazebrook 1964
40 Tyldesley Wigan - Tyldesley 1964
41 Baguley Stockport TD -Glazebrook 1964
42 Cadishead Stockport TD -Glazebrook 1964
43 Cheadle CLC Stockport TD -Glazebrook 1964
44 Northenden Stockport TD -Glazebrook 1964
45 Partington Stockport TD -Glazebrook 1964
46 West Timperley Stockport TD -Glazebrook 1964
47 Middleton Middleton-Middleton Jen 1964
48 Middleton Jen Middleton Jen - Oldham Wemeth 1966
49 Ramsbottom Bury-Accrington 1966
50 Newton Heath Mcr Victoria-Rochdale 1966
51 Royton Royton Junction-Royton (Oldham) 1966
52 Oldham Central Mumps-Wemeth-Mcr Victoria 1966
53 Cheadle Heath Mcr Central - Cheadle Heath 1967
54 Chorlton-cum-Hardy Mcr Central - Cheadle Heath 1967
55 Didsbury Mcr Central - Cheadle Heath 1967
56 Clayton Bridge Mcr Victoria-Stalybridge 1968
57 Droylsden Mcr Victoria-Stalybridge 1968
58 Manchester Exchange Liverpool-Mcr-Halifax-Leeds 1969
59 Manchester Central Central -  Cheadle Heath 1969
60 Bury(Knowlsey Street) Bolton-Bury- Rochdale 1970
61 Bollington Marple Rose Hill-Macclesfield 1970
62 High Lane Marple Rose Hill-Macclesfield 1970
63 Higher Poynton Marple Rose Hill-Macclesfield 1970
64 Royton Junction Mcr Victoria-OIdham-Rochdale 1987* Miles Platting Mcr Victoria-Oldham/Rochdale/&Stalybridge 1995♦ Godley East Mcr Piccadilly-Glossop/Hadfield 1995* Park Mcr Victoria-Stalybridge 1995* Pendleton Mcr Victoria-Bolton 1999
* Closures which pre or post-date nationalisation Source: Daniels and Dench, 1980; Jowett, 2000; and OS maps.
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Figure 26: Manchester conurbation: station and line closures 1948-94.
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into crisis. As a result, the PTE’s achievements were modest: the most notable were 
bus-rail interchanges at Bury and Altrincham. The former included a short diversion 
of the railway away from Bolton Street station to a new location adjoining the retail 
core, whereas the latter involved bus facilities in the station forecourt: Altrincham 
station was already conveniently located for the town centre. These schemes were
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followed by the opening of 20 new stations on the existing network. These were 
intended to improve access to rail as they were adjacent to new housing areas, 
including overspill estates, as shown in table 20. Analysis shows that all the new 
stations, except for Manchester Airport, were for local as opposed to inter-regional or 
intercity services. Excluding those stations built in the city centre for Metrolink, 7 new 
stations were on the northern network and 8 on the southern (figure 27), showing 
again that the northern network was at a disadvantage, albeit slight.
Table 20: New stations in the Manchester area 1968-94.
No. on Location Route Date of Comment
fig. 27 opening
1 Brinnington Piccadilly - New Mills 1977 Serving council estate
2 Hattersley Piccadilly-Glossop 1978 Serving council estate
3 Humphrey Park Piccadilly-Warrington 1984 Outer Manchester suburb
4 Mills Hill Victoria-Rochdale 1985 To serve Middleton 
original station closed 
1964
5 Derker Victoria-Oldham-Rochdale 1985 To replace Royton 
Junction
6 Flowery Field Piccadilly-Glossop 1985 Hyde suburb
7 Ryder Brow Piccadilly-New Mills 1985 To serve south Gorton, 
mostly council housing
8 Smithy Bridge Victoria-Rochdale-Halifax 1985 Re-opening
9 Godley Piccadilly-Glossop 1986 To replace Godley East
10 Hall i’th Wood Victoria-Bolton-Blackburn 1986 Bolton suburb
11 Salford Crescent Piccadilly/Victoria-Bolton/Wigan 1987 In association with 
concentration of E-W 
services on Piccadilly
12 Hag Fold Victoria-Wigan 1987 To serve Atherton
13 Lostock Parkway PiccadillyA/ictoria-Preston 1988 To serve Bolton suburbs
14 Woodsmoor Piccadilly-Hazel Grove 1990 Stockport suburb
15 Market Street Bury-Manchester-Altrincham 1992 Metrolink-Manchester city 
centre
16 Piccadilly Gardens Bury-Manchester-Altrincham 1992 Metrolink-Manchester city 
centre
17 Mosley Street Bury-Manchester-Altrincham 1992 Metrolink-Manchester city 
centre
18 St Peter’s Square Bury-Manchester-Altrincham 1992 Metrolink-Manchester city 
centre
19 GMEX Bury-Manchester-Altrincham 1992 Metrolink-Manchester city 
centre
20 Manchester Airport Piccadilly-Airport 1993 In association with new 
line to serve airport
Source: (Hall, 1995; Railway Development Society, 1992,1994).
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Figure 27: Manchester conurbation: new stations and lines 1968-94.
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Despite the hostility of Thatcherism there were some significant, though 
modest, improvements to the local network as a result of promotion by the PTE. In 
1986 the Hazel Grove Chord was opened to the south of Stockport allowing 
Sheffield-Manchester-Liverpool trains to run via Stockport, which was important to 
the latter’s development as a rail hub. In 1988 the Windsor Link was opened 
connecting the north and south networks and facilitating concentration of trans-
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Pennine and local services on Piccadilly: Salford Crescent station was opened to 
facilitate interchange, but although this was well located for Salford University it did 
not improve access to Salford Precinct15 as this was remote from the network. 
Concentration of services on Piccadilly reinforced its role as Manchester’s principal 
station, but also facilitated downsizing at Victoria which could release land for 
development.
A significant example of commitment to the network was the opening, in 
1993, of a spur to Manchester International Airport (MIA), which was thereby 
accessible from Liverpool, Preston, Blackpool, and Huddersfield, Leeds, York and 
Sheffield. This was not accessible to trains from the Crewe direction, but a chord 
opened in late 199516 facilitated this. Although more concerned with medium and 
long-distance than local traffic, the airport link was successful but has already 
experienced capacity problems, as well as being criticised for poor links with the 
areas to the west in Cheshire and North Wales, demonstrating the inability of the 
agencies involved to plan sufficiently expansively because of the difficulties involved 
in securing funding.
The impact of Sectorisation was positive with regard to interregional 
services: its focus on CBD-to-CBD routes, especially Liverpool-Manchester-Leeds- 
Newcastle, was very beneficial with increases in service frequency as a result of 
Sprinterisation which produced increases in ridership (Modern Railways, 1993): it is 
notable though that this very important route17 was not electrified although, like 
Manchester-Preston-Blackpool, this was mooted on many occasions but always 
turned down owing to the Treasury inspired investment criteria.
The impact of Sectorisation on local services was muted; for example, routes 
serving Victoria, typified by the Manchester-Oldham-Rochdale service, became very 
basic railways using rail buses and unstaffed stations. The area did not experience 
the reopening of closed routes.
The abandonment of Picc-Vic had left two significant problems with regard to 
the local network: poor penetration of the regional CBD and the need to modernise 
the area’s most significant commuter routes - those to Altrincham and Bury. These
15 This was a Salford City Council promoted development at the heart of a large housing CD A.
16 As an illustration of the difficulties in securing funding for rail projects, BR was a sponsor of the first 
link but not the second, whereas Manchester Airport funded the second but not the first: only GMPTE 
was involved in both showing the significance of the PTE role.
17 Known as ‘North Trans-Pennine’ it is the most important trans-Pennine route -  with the benefit of 
hindsight it can be seen that the BTC electrified the wrong route in the early 1950s.
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were converted into Metrolink18, light rail lines connected by a short street running 
section across the city centre providing an imaginative, though partial, solution to 
the penetration problem and the separation of the north and south networks. It is 
notable that this came 20 years after the PTE was created, with Metrolink becoming 
operational in 1992. Outside the city centre the tram stops were former railway 
stations and were generally well located with regard to journey patterns because of 
the historic role of the commuter lines. However, no funds were available for station 
rebuilding, only for the installation of lifts to provide easier access for disabled 
people, and this forced the system to utilise high-floor trams which necessitated 
construction of intrusive platforms in the city centre. At the time of its inception the 
line was seen as part of a wider network which would involve further conversions of 
parts of the heavy rail network, as well as new alignments, but none were committed 
before 199419.
First hypothesis: town planning policy post-1947.
Housing renewal and associated land supply issues were the most 
significant strategic planning problems in the early post-war period. Initially, 
Manchester’s favoured policy was dispersal to new towns in north Cheshire and 
south east Lancashire: Mobberley, Lymm, Risley, Westhoughton and Winsford were 
considered but rejected, largely as a result of resistance by the county councils (Hall 
et al, 1973a, Robson, 1980). The institutional arrangements for planning, whereby 
the areas administered by Cheshire and Lancashire County Councils extended deep 
into the conurbation, mitigated against a strategic approach and central Government 
did not intervene: the national priorities were London, Glasgow and the Durham 
coalfield. In the 1950s and early 1960s the exporting local authorities, mainly 
Manchester and Salford, therefore had to utilise overspill estates on whatever sites 
they could persuade their neighbouring authorities to accept, which undermined 
consideration of transport links. The resistance by the county councils was 
reinforced by their development of draft green belts, the effectiveness of which was 
not undermined by the fact that it took many years for them to become formally 
adopted, 1984 in the case of Greater Manchester (GMC, 1984).
18 GMPTE worked Metrolink into a firm proposal in 1983 and won funding in 1989: the delay was 
caused by the DoT considering Metrolink’s impact on bus deregulation and by introduction of new 
assumptions to underpin the section 56 funding mechanism as described previously.
19 The first extension, to Eccles via Salford Quays, did not open until 1999 and was funded largely 
from the £77 million premium obtained from refranchising Phase 1 with the Phase 2 (Eccles extension) 
contract. About £25 million of the £42 million receipt from privatising Greater Manchester Buses was 
also invested in phase 2.
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As a result, dispersal was largely to overspill estates where between 1955 
and 1973 the biggest exporter, Manchester, built approximately 22,000 council 
houses (Manchester City Planning Department, 1981). Most of these were in 
locations with poor access to the rail network or, even where they were in a 
settlement that nominally enjoyed a railway service, such as Wilmslow or Knutsford, 
they were located on the periphery well away from the nearest station. At this time 
even where estates were alongside the railway, no thought was given to opening a 
new one. Many sites within the city were redeveloped, but rail access was not a 
consideration for these either. A prime example was the redevelopment of huge sites 
previously occupied by the BR owned Gorton Works and Beyer Peacocks: although 
within walking distance of Gorton station these were developed by the City Council 
for non-housing purposes.
With the growth of the private housing market, suburbs developed outside the 
draft green belts, primarily in the south east in areas like Macclesfield, Wilmslow, 
and Knutsford, but also in the northern outskirts of Bolton and Bury (Robson, 1980). 
They were associated with car commuting and the development of the regional 
trunk road network. As part of the latter the City of Manchester Development Plan20 
contained extensive proposals for road building within the city derived from the 
Nicholas Plan, exemplified by completion in 1966 of the Mancunian Way which was 
intended to become the inner of three rings. Although these plans were scaled back, 
the outer orbital M62 and M63, and the radial M56 were open by the early 1970s. 
The general lack of policy towards the railway network was illustrated by the fact that 
Manchester’s Development Plan contained only one reference to it;
Railways.
No proposals are envisaged by the British Railways involving changes in land use and the 
Development Plan is based on the retention of railway facilities in their present form (City of 
Manchester, 1961,14).
The difficulties in securing a new town to take decentralisation from 
Manchester were eventually overcome when Warrington was designated in 1968: 
this had existing stations on the Manchester-Liverpool railway and the WCML, and 
an additional station was opened at Birchwood as outlined in chapter 8.
As well as closure of BR’s general merchandise facilities, the national decline 
in rail freight was exemplified by East Manchester, an archetypal nineteenth century 
rail served industrial area. The 1960s saw the end of locomotive building with closure 
of Gorton Works and Beyer-Peacock’s, along with closure of Bradford Colliery.
20 This was belatedly approved by the Minister o f Housing and Local Government in 1961 
after submission in 1951.
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These were followed in the early 1970s by closure of the rail served English Steel 
works21, Bradford Gas Works and Stuart Street Power station. Regeneration of the 
area came to be seen as dependent on significant improvements to the strategic 
road network, improvements to which had been already made as outlined above 
(Manchester City Planning Department, 1983). The planning system allocated sites 
for industry in East Manchester, but rail access was not sought by developers or BR, 
and was not incorporated into the redevelopment process.
But there were more favourable outcomes for freight elsewhere. These 
included development of waste compaction and rail loading facilities at Northenden, 
Brindle Heath and Dean Lane, the retention of several stone terminals, the 
rehabilitation of the lines into Trafford Park by Trafford Park Development 
Corporation (TPDC) which included an important link to the Cerestar plant and, in the 
1990s, development of the Euroterminal. The latter was permitted development22 
and, generally, the role of the planning system in the provision of these freight 
facilities was reactive.
By the mid-1960s more new jobs were being created in the service sector in 
association with commercial redevelopment schemes, than in industry. The outcome 
in Manchester was that the city centre and certain suburban centres, came to be 
seen by the market as attractive locations for office development and this was 
encouraged by local planning policy. Outside central Manchester demand for office 
space was strongest to the south and south west of the city and planning policy 
steered development to locations such as Trafford Bar, the biggest concentration, 
situated alongside the Manchester-Altrincham railway. Other concentrations were in 
or near suburban town centres: these included Sale and Atrincham with 88,255 
square metres (950,000 square feet) and Stockport, where more than 74,000 
square metres (800,000 square feet) was built between 1965-76, including a minor 
node adjacent to Cheadle Hulme station, a long standing source of commuter traffic. 
Further out Wilmslow developed into a successful office location where rents rivalled 
those in central Manchester and all the developments were in the town centre and
21 Following abandonment of high rise and overspill, Manchester City Council launched a search for 
1000 housing sites within the city in the early 1970s which led to some controversial developments. 
Openshaw Village on the site of the former English Steel works was one such site: it was isolated, 
inaccessible by public transport, and adjacent to noxious industrial premises. This development 
reinforced the missed opportunities to provide housing on more accessible sites such as those in Gorton 
mentioned previously.
22 To underline subsequent controversy around the extent of permitted development rights enjoyed by 
the railway industry (Greensmith and Haywood, 1999), the operation of this terminal, which included 
night time working, triggered complaints from local residents and Trafford MBC environmental 
services department demanded the installation of noise attenuation measures.
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accessible by rail. Several suburban town centres also saw significant 
redevelopment of their retail areas: Stockport, Sale, Bolton and Altrincham were the 
most notable: disposals by BR in the 1960s produced small retail developments 
close to stations at Urmston and Alderley Edge. Undoubtedly office decentralisation 
and town centre redevelopment was strongly associated with use of the car, 
nevertheless the suburban centres were generally well located with regard to access 
by rail and this facilitated utilisation of local services in particular.
By the late 1970s the Greater Manchester Council (GMC) had produced their 
Structure Plan which had four major themes; ‘urban concentration, redirection to the 
inner core, maintenance of the regional centre, resource and amenity conservation’ 
(GMC, 1982, 1). The stance towards commercial development was typified by office 
policy: ‘Office developments will normally be expected to locate in or adjacent to 
town centres or in Trafford Bar office centre’ (GMC, 1986, 423). The resistance to the 
decentralisation of such trip generating uses was, in the broadest sense, supportive 
of the railway network.
The Manchester-Salford Inner City Partnership was created in 1978 and the 
initial strategies were focused on housing schemes, community projects, industrial 
developments and the environment, particularly the reclamation of derelict land. 
Whereas there was an awareness that the regional centre was of crucial importance 
to the well-being of inner city residents (Manchester City Council, et al 1983), it took 
a while for this to crystallise into a city centre strategy as such. When this occurred a 
significant feature which was seen as essential to competition with suburban town 
centres, but which was inimical to the utilisation of the railway network, was the 
promotion of short stay car parking. An 8 per cent increase was reported in 1985 
(Manchester City Council, 1986, as cited in Healey et al, 1988). It was recognised 
that there was a need to improve the railway network’s penetration of the city centre, 
but;
The fact that the railway network converges on termini on opposite sides of the City Centre 
coupled with the relative scarcity of stations in the Inner Area means that the railway is little 
used by Inner Area residents. However the County Council are considering proposals for 
linking together the two networks and converting some existing railway lines to a light rapid 
transit system. This will increase frequencies and may involve a greater number of Inner Area 
stations. All these factors should increase the attractiveness of the network to inner area 
residents (Manchester City Council et al, 1983, 49)
Manchester City Council was hostile to the Thatcher Government but Salford 
was more pragmatic and lobbied for EZ status for 370 acres of the derelict docks 
area, which was granted in 1981: the Council took the lead in developing a market
23 This was the final version of the structure plan produced just before abolition of the GMC.
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oriented planning and regeneration strategy for the area, branded as Salford Quays. 
The Conservative controlled Trafford Council similarly lobbied for EZ status for the 
declining Trafford Park industrial estate which was also granted in 1981: in 1987 
regeneration of the area was handed over to theTPDC.
Despite the various initiatives, employment in inner Manchester declined by 6 
per cent between 1984-91 (DoE, 1996, 44) whereas there was a 41 per cent 
increase in outer Manchester, and between 1981-96 there was a 62 per cent 
decrease in manufacturing jobs in the city, a 7 per cent decrease in public services 
and a 2 per cent decline in private services (Power and Mumford, 1999). These 
trends were suggestive of a continuing weakening of demand for traditional radial rail 
commuter services. The impact of Thatcherism was significant with abandonment of 
the restraint on office decentralisation being a prime example24. Research published 
during the PhD process (Haywood, 1996) showed that deregulation of planning 
control influenced the location of office developments and that the total floorspace 
built outside the city centre during the 1989-1991 boom, was considerably greater 
than that within it. The locations outside the city centre were suburban, free standing 
and poorly located for rail access (fig. 28). Even where they were reasonably close, 
such as around the Airport rail link, the details discouraged rail access: although an 
excellent station was built to serve the airport there was no Docklands style vision of 
a high density, rail served development node.
Even at Salford Quays, where there was no prior passenger rail access, none was 
built despite the area being developed as a major office node containing over 
185,000 square metres of floorspace (Law and Dundon-Smith, 1994), in association 
with housing and leisure uses. This failure to integrate the development 
of such a major growth pole with the local rail network was typical of the 1980s 
approach outside London as, in the absence of a transit oriented planning vision, 
the property market was car oriented: multi-storey car parks were built to serve the 
development.
In the wider conurbation, despite the shifts in national planning policy in the 
1990s, the long lead time of major developments meant that several schemes 
which contravened the new policies were completed after the changes, or were still 
in the pipeline in 1994. The major out-of-centre shopping schemes alongside the 
A34 by-pass were notable examples: although relatively close to Handforth station
24 An early indicator of the new policy context for office development was the movement in 1985 of the 
Refuge Assurance company from their Edwardian purpose built premises adjacent to Oxford Road 
station to new purpose built premises in the green belt to the south of Wilmslow on a site not within 
walking distance of Wilmslow station.
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Figure 28: Manchester Conurbation: the location of major developments with regard to 
strategic transport routes 1988-94
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on the Manchester-Crewe line they were not readily accessible from it and were 
wholly focused on the new road which they partially funded through planning gain 
(Haywood, 1997). To the west of Manchester, the new regional shopping centre at 
Dumplington25, comprising approximately 93,500 square metres with 10,000 parking 
spaces, was supported by central Government in a complex legal battle26 going to 
the House of Lords in 1995 (EGi Legal, 1995), despite it contravening the new 
policies and being fiercely resisted by local planning authorities in Greater 
Manchester: it is not accessible to the rail network. The retail and leisure 
developments on the former railway land adjoining Stockport station were one of the 
few examples of rail accessible major developments built in the conurbation in the 
1980s, although even the detail of this detracted from the accessibility of the station 
and the station itself received no investment 
Hypothesis one: conclusions.
The evidence shows the hypothesis to be proven. There was a significant 
difference of experience between the northern and southern networks and it was the 
latter, focused Piccadilly and the WCML, which received most investment. In 
particular there was only one closure on the retained radial routes to Oxford 
Road/Piccadilly (Longsight) and that predated electrification. By managing 
decentralisation, planning policy was broadly supportive of passenger rail use, 
particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, but not specifically rail oriented. There was 
evidence of significant dislocation in the early years with regard to the location of 
overspill, and especially in the later period as a result of Thatcherite laissez-faire.
The overall relationship between land-use planning and Manchester’s network can 
be characterised as partial and inconsistent.
Second hypothesis.
Rail access to the regional CBD has been rationalised with priority for 
stations associated with the trunk route to London; there have been significant 
improvements for access by local services after 1968 by the PTE, although this has 
been subject to ‘queuing’ mechanisms, sporadic and under-conceptualised. 
Although land-use planning has been broadly supportive of these investments by 
steering major activity generators to the CBD, proximity to stations has not been a
25 Renamed the Trafford Centre, this scheme opened in late 1998.
26 The original outline planning permission was granted by the Secretary of State in 1986 but this was 
followed by two public inquiries, the second one focused on concerns over traffic congestion on the 
adjacent M63 motorway. The basis of the submission to the House of Lords by the opposing local 
authorities was that the Secretary of State had ignored changes in retail policy and was perverse: the 
Secretary of State’s decision was upheld and full planning permission granted.
prime consideration and urban design initiatives have not focused on the public 
domain around, and pedestrian access to, stations.
Second hypothesis: rail access and access to rail in central Manchester
It has been shown that Manchester inherited a major problem with regard to 
rail access to the CBD. Despite the Nicholas plan there was no improvement before 
1968, although main line and local services into Piccadilly were significantly 
improved. Closure of Central removed what was arguably the best placed station for 
city centre access, although retention of Piccadilly, Oxford Road, Deansgate, Victoria 
and Salford left stations at significant, if peripheral, locations.
The general vitality of Manchester’s CBD and the encouragement of 
commercial redevelopment by the City Council through the use of the CDA 
mechanism, was exemplified by completion of the CIS building in Miller Street in 
1962, which was very accessible to Victoria. The even bigger Piccadilly Plaza 
scheme, completed in 1965, was on a war damaged site and was also the subject of 
a CDA plan, along with other office development sites on nearby Portland Street. 
London Road station was within 400 metres of Piccadilly and it is instructive that BR 
chose that name to rebrand the station in the modernisation process. In 1961 the 
BTC completed the development of Rail House, a ten-storey office building adjoining 
Piccadilly. Other large office developments were completed in the vicinity of the 
station suggesting that modernisation and initiatives by BR had served to boost the 
market in this part of the CBD and the planning process had facilitated this: the 
seven-storey Gateway House on the site of the former LNWR goods depot on the 
station approach was the most notable scheme, completed in 1969.
Following publication of the Buchanan Report the encouragement of large, 
multi-storey, mixed-use redevelopment schemes impacted in Manchester with the 
working up of the Arndale redevelopment through a CDA based partnership 
between the City Council and Town and City Properties. Although not completed until 
the mid-1970s this 100,000 square metres (1.2million square feet) development, and 
the adjoining Market Place scheme, served to reinforce the attractiveness of the city 
centre in the face of intense competition from suburban centres. The late 1970s also 
saw pedestrianisation of Market Street and St Anne’s Square which linked with these 
precinct developments. Other significant office developments were completed in the 
early 1970s, mainly in the financial core around King Street, an area known as the 
‘square half mile’ . To the extent that employees and customers used rail for access 
to the city centre, these schemes were beneficial to the rail network, despite the
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peripheral location of stations: the PTE’s station minibus service introduced in the 
early 1970s provided some sort of link.
Taken together, these developments in the 1960s and early 1970s showed 
how, in the most general sense, planning reinforced the importance of Manchester’s 
CBD which was crucial to ridership on the local rail network. However, despite 
modernisation of Piccadilly and Oxford Road stations, no steps were taken to 
facilitate pedestrian access to them from the core of the CBD: this was not perceived 
as a planning issue.
During the second half of the 1970s Manchester’s CBD entered a period of 
relative decline. This was partly a result of a contraction of the commercial core 
which was strongly associated with closure of railway freight facilities27, but it also 
arose from competition from suburban town centres and the economic recession. In 
response, Manchester City Council (MCC) produced the City Centre Local Plan 
which was a new kind of statutory plan which a conscious promotional role. For 
example, it recognised the importance of office development to the centre and 
argued that:
Office activity is a major and vital part of the Regional Centre, providing substantial, wide- 
ranging employment opportunities and helping to sustain, both directly and indirectly, a wide 
variety of other uses and activities (MCC, 1984, 43).
The importance of transportation was recognised, particularly public transport, as 
central to the goal of attracting more activity to the city centre.
The abandonment of Picc-Vic was a serious blow for city centre access and 
for several years the best the PTE could do was the mini-bus shuttle service 
between Piccadilly and Victoria via the CBD. The concentration of trans-Pennine 
and local services on Piccadilly in 1988 further reinforced its primacy as the city’s 
main station, but facilitated further running down of Victoria. The opening of 
Metrolink in 1992, with its street running penetration of the city centre, provided an 
imaginative and cost-effective solution in a very hostile political context. The city 
centre section runs through both Victoria and Piccadilly and passes close to the 
main retail, office and leisure areas.
Despite the surge in out-of-centre office development in the late 1980s, the 
CBD remained an attractive location (figure 29). However, the accessibility of office 
developments to the rail network was variable. For example, the square half mile 
continued to be a favoured location and, whereas it was reasonably accessible by
27 Warehousing activities became road served and moved out to locations on the motorway network, 
typified by Warrington new town at the intersection of the M6 and M62
246
Metrolink, it was not close to the heavy rail stations. The pattern of office 
developments outside the square half mile, particularly those in the Oxford 
Road/Mosley Street area, was more favourable with regard to heavy rail access. 
What is clear however, is that unlike the 1960s, the areas around Victoria and 
Piccadilly were not attractive to significant office development during the 1980s 
boom.
The popular backlash against the large scale urban redevelopment of the 
1960s and 1970s came to have positive impacts on planning policy for central 
Manchester, which in turn had positive implications for development and, thereby, 
demand for rail travel. Despite the blitz and redevelopment, many buildings from the 
Victorian and Edwardian periods remained in the early 1970s and, progressively, 
these were listed and incorporated into conservation areas (MCC, 1984, 30). Lower 
King Street had a significant concentration and, owing to its proximity to the prime 
retail area, it was pedestrianised. However, the conservation areas also included the 
peripheral Castlefield and Whitworth Street areas, and such notable buildings as 
Liverpool Road station and goods buildings, Central Station and the Great Northern 
goods building. Although the City Council had sought to promote the regeneration of 
these large areas of historic buildings, progress had been modest: significant 
successes included conversion of Central Station into the GMEX centre and creation 
of the Museum of Science and Industry in the former railway buildings on Liverpool 
Road. In order to further stimulate the market, in 1988 the Government handed 
regeneration of the area stretching along the Rochdale Canal from Castlefield to 
Piccadilly Station to the Central Manchester Development Corporation (CMDC). 
Intervention by CMDC (CMDC, 1990), and the increasing attractiveness of 
Manchester to developers in light of the favourable image projected through the 
Olympic bidding process (Kitchen, 1993), boosted market interest. The result was 
significant investment in the CMDC area in historic buildings and proposed new 
build, including the Bridgewater Hall and the Great Bridgewater office development 
(20,460 sq. m. )28. All of this was accessible to Piccadilly and, especially, Oxford 
Road and Deansgate stations, as well as Metrolink stops at GMEX and St Peter’s 
Square. On the other side of the CBD there was development of the Arena which 
incorporated the rationalisation of tracks through Victoria Station and construction of 
a new station under the Arena: this was a very significant development as it was the
28 Although not completed until 1995-96 these developments were underway by April 1994, the thesis 
end date.
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Figure 29: Major office completions in Manchester city centre 1985-95.
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first attempt in Manchester to produce a high density airspace development29. But 
despite this, the Arena also contained 1000 new parking spaces. More generally, the 
presence of around 20,000 long stay parking spaces in the city centre (Kitchen,
1995), particularly the large number of private and contract spaces, undermined 
utilisation of rail for CBD access.
Census data shows that between 1981-91 the proportion of journeys to work 
by rail fell from 2.4 per cent to 2.2 per cent in Greater Manchester (Beatty and 
Haywood, 1997) and, although this does not tell the full story with regard to rail 
utilisation for access to the CBD, it is indicative of the overall situation. Although it is 
necessary to go beyond the 1994 cut-off to develop an understanding of the impact 
of Metrolink, by 1996 this was carrying more passengers than the local heavy rail 
network, showing the positive effects of frequent, high quality services and improved 
CBD penetration (GMPTE, 1996). These attributes were, of course, missing from all 
of the heavy rail network.
Hypothesis two: conclusions.
The evidence shows the hypothesis to be proven. Manchester lost two of its 
four main city centre stations and investment at Piccadilly far outweighed that at 
Victoria which, despite partial rebuilding at the end of the period, enjoyed a 
worsening rail service with no electrification. Manchester experienced massive delay 
in securing improved rail penetration of the CBD and, when delivered, this only 
benefited local services on the Bury-Altrincham axis. There was no benefit for heavy 
rail users without changing onto Metrolink30. By steering development to the CBD, 
planning policy was generally supportive in the 1960s and 1970s, although the 
experience of the 1960s in securing major trip generators near to Victoria and 
Piccadilly was not repeated in the 1970s. Subsequently circumstances forced a 
concentration of planning activity on the core of the CBD and it was not until the late 
1980s/early 1990s that significant development activity was taking place in the 
peripheral areas nearer to/at the main stations. There was not sufficient momentum 
before 1994 for this to produce significant detail urban design improvements in main 
station access and environs.
Third hypothesis.
At the local level there has been limited association between the detail of 
suburban development and stations. There has been some provision of new stations 
and some examples of pro-rail trends in land-use planning, although these have
29 It was also notable that, apart from Metrolink, local services using the new station were all operated 
by low quality rail buses produced in the 1980s.
30 The city centre minibus continued post-Metrolink from Piccadilly.
249
been exceptional. Redundant railway land has been redeveloped predominantly for 
uses which do not directly stimulate demand for rail travel.
Third hypothesis: suburban corridors and redundant railway land.
The research focused on the south eastern part of the conurbation where the 
southern parts of Manchester and Stockport merge with north Cheshire. This area 
was chosen as it had experienced significant suburban growth and retained five 
radial rail corridors. One radial line was closed, the Marple-Bollington-Macclesfield 
route, although the northern stub of this between Marple and Rose Hiil remained 
open. Other orbital routes and routes linking south Manchester with Central Station 
were closed as reviewed above. As a result of the WCML electrification three of the 
routes were electrified: the Styal line, Stockport-Cheadle Hulme-Alderley Edge and 
Stockport-Cheadle Hulme-Bramhall-Poynton-Macclesfield. The original Metrolink 
project envisaged conversion to light rail of the Manchester-Marple/Rose Hill route, 
but this did not take place.
The research method entailed tracking the chronological and geographical 
pattern of suburban growth by superimposing tracings from sequential Ordnance 
Survey maps of the area, as reproduced in figure 30. This shows development 
before 1939, development between 1945-68, and development between 1969 and 
1997: the latter post-dates the end point of the research but was the only map 
version available.
Inspection of the map shows that development fell broadly into two 
geographical categories: the mass of the continuous built-up area in the north, and 
the discrete settlements to the south which, broadly, sit astride the rail corridors as 
‘beads on a string’. It is the latter which the research was particularly concerned 
with, especially in the electrified rail corridors. As outlined earlier, the core of these 
developed as rail commuter settlements before 1914, but there has been significant 
expansion subsequently as shown. In the most general sense, because of the broad 
association with the rail corridors, the map provides evidence that the planning 
system managed decentralisation in ways which were favourable to the utility of the 
railway network. The main tools used to achieve this were the power to prevent 
development in certain areas, typically through use of green belts, and to release 
other specific areas of land for development.
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Figure 30: the railway network and suburban growth in South Manchester 1930-97.
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However, on closer examination, the outcome can be seen to be not as 
favourable for rail as it might have been. It has been shown in this research that 
there is a limit to how far people are prepared to walk to a public transport stop: 
typically around 400 metres. What is clear from the map is that, generally, 
expansion of the settlements had been permitted to take place on their outer 
peripheries, at increasing distances from their centres: the westward expansion of 
Wilmslow was a good example. This, progressively, reduced the likelihood of 
residents walking to the station. Alternative means of transport to link housing areas 
with the station could have been provided, either bus services, cycle facilities or car 
parks. There is evidence of the latter at Wilmslow31, but the typical outcome is that 
commuters have opted to use their cars for the whole of their journey.
Two main factors have encouraged this. One was the development of the 
trunk road network : the radial M56 (and its extension into Manchester via the 
improved Princess Parkway) and the orbital M62/6332 (now the M60) were open by 
the mid-1970s. Construction of the A34 by-pass had commenced before 1994 and 
would reinforce the role of the A34/Kingsway axis as a commuter route into 
Manchester (this project was completed in 1995). The second factor was the 
decentralisation of employment and other trip generators to suburban locations, not 
readily accessible by rail. It will be recalled that by 1975 Cheadle Hulme had 
emerged as a rail accessible suburban employment node: it is notable that office and 
retail development in these corridors in the late 1980s was road oriented. Taken 
together, the difficulties at both ends of the journey made rail very unattractive to 
those who had access to a car.
The impact of green belt policy can also be seen to have had negative 
impacts in that there are long lengths of expensively maintained railway which pass 
through open countryside with no stations. In other cases there are extant stations 
but little development has been permitted around them: Styal and Adlington are key 
examples. Traffic at Styal became so limited that, whereas until the mid-1980s it had 
a half hourly service to Manchester, the service had become so sparse by 1994 as to 
be virtually unusable.
31 Wilmslow is an Intercity station and most car park users are likely to be travelling to London. This 
contrasts with the situation at Hazel Grove where there is a large car park and only a local train service 
to Stockport and Manchester. Hazel Grove was promoted for park-and-ride by GMPTE whereas 
Wilmslow is outside the PTE area.
32 The final north eastern quadrant of this orbital motorway between Denton and Heaton Park did not 
open until 2000.
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This mapping exercise revealed the sorts of outcomes from the planning 
process recorded by Hall in the 1960s, with the additional impacts of the accelerated 
road-oriented decentralisation of the 1980s. The map clearly shows the power of the 
planning system to manage the land development process, but it also shows that this 
has not been used in ways to maximise utilisation of rail services.
The second element of the hypothesis three research comprised analysis of 
the re-use of redundant railway land. This related to land in the City of Manchester 
and utilised records of all disused land held by the planning department from the 
mid-1970s, to inform the inter-departmental Sites Appraisal Group (SAG). The initial 
trigger for this had been the need for sites for council housing, once both high rise 
and overspill development were abandoned, but the mechanism became used as 
part of the general regeneration process. As the Property Board made sites available 
for development they were entered into the SAG system. The vast majority of the 
sites were areas of sidings, or small goods yards, which became redundant as a 
result of the collapse of the wagonload business and the closure of rail served 
industries. Although it has not been possible to quantify the proportion of all 
redundant railway land in the conurbation which entered the SAG system, it is fair to 
say that because the City of Manchester lies at the heart of the area’s railway 
network, the sites studied were very representative.
The research identified 50 sites with a total area of approximately 400 acres 
(162 hectares). Tracking the subsequent use of the sites through field work has 
shown that the largest category of after use was industrial, with 29 per cent of the 
total. Typically this comprised small units and none of it was rail connected, although 
there was a theoretical potential for use of Freightliner. One large site was used for 
the new road-only served Royal Mail33 facility on Rochdale Road. Vacant land was 
the second largest category at 92.5 hectares, or 23 per cent of the total: this 
reflected the problematical nature of much disused railway land which was, typically, 
elongated and inaccessible. Nearly all of it was in East Manchester too where the 
property market was extremely weak. Together, vacant and landscaped land 
comprised almost 113 hectares, almost as large as the industrial category: 
landscaped land such as the Irk Valley is very little used, acting as an informal 
greenspace. Approximately 11.5 per cent of the land was used for transport 
purposes, with one site partially in use as a rail-served stone terminal and another
33 As part of a major restructuring of Royal M ail’s use of the railway network in the mid-1990s, all rail 
usage in the Liverpool-Manchester belt was concentrated at Warrington which is accessed by road. 
Previously the disused Mayfield Station and an adjacent large building erected in the 1960s had been 
used by Royal Mail for the rail parts of their Manchester business
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site being used for the Metrolink depot: the largest site was the former main line to 
Manchester Central between Didsbury and Chorlton which is a linear walkway, 
although it is safeguarded for use as an extension to the Metrolink system. Where 
sites were redeveloped for retail or residential use their potential impact on rail 
ridership would have depended upon their proximity to a station and, in the case of 
retail, on the propensity of customers to use rail to access the particular kind of 
outlets concerned. The two largest residential sites were close to Dean Lane and 
Moston stations respectively, but the retail uses were supermarkets or D-l-Y stores 
and were not likely to generate rail traffic, although the latter adjoined Mauldeth 
Road station.
It was in the city centre that redevelopment had the largest potential for 
promoting rail ridership, albeit indirectly. The use of the former Liverpool Road 
station and goods buildings for the Museum of Science and Industry created a rail 
accessible tourist facility, and the Nynex project was an airspace development over 
Victoria station. Central Station did not become a SAG site but its use as the GMEX 
exhibition centre had positive implications too. However, both the Arena and GMEX 
also comprised large numbers of car parking spaces; 1656 between them. Three 
other redundant railway sites which did not enter the SAG system were the sites of 
the former Exchange Station, the Great Northern34 goods building adjoining Central, 
and most of the former goods yard35 adjoining Piccadilly Station. These had been in 
long term use as car parks with 1440 spaces between them. Additional parking 
space adjoining Piccadilly was retained by BR for Intercity users.
Third hypothesis: conclusions.
The evidence shows the hypothesis to be substantially proven. Land-use 
planning was pro-rail in the corridors studied only in the most macro-geographical 
sense. Even before the onset of Thatcherite laissez-faire, new development was 
poorly located for rail access, and during the 1980s the rail corridors and their 
stations were largely ignored as locational factors. Although some new stations were 
built in the area studied, it is significant that none were built on the main electrified 
corridors. Generally stations were not utilised as the focal points for new suburban 
nodes, despite some fairly large developments in the corridor. Rather than being
34 This was a ‘state of the art’ integrated goods building when erected in the late nineteenth century: it is 
now listed and is currently undergoing conversion to a retail and leisure centre. Controversially, the 
structures which carried the approach lines have been demolished. The viaducts over the Castlefield 
basin which gave access to this building were listed but unused for many years until re-utilised for 
Metrolink.
35 The former Great Central goods building was listed and remained vacant until late 1999: it is 
currently being converted for residential use.
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higher density and designed around pedestrian access from stations, the norm for 
commercial development was low density schemes along roads. The new Airport rail 
link was the exception, but even this failed to provide access to the many office 
developments built in the locality.
Outside central Manchester redundant railway land has not been redeveloped 
in ways likely to promote rail utilisation, except in a minority of cases with the two 
housing sites (SAG 337 and 339) being the most notable. The major qualification to 
the finding in favour of the hypothesis was the fact that there were several key 
sites/railway structures in the city centre where significant re-use or redevelopment 
was likely to have promoted rail owing to the nature of the end use and proximity to 
stations. However even these developments comprised generous car parking 
facilities and the overall effect is likely to have been to stimulate access by car. 
Overall conclusions from the case study.
The case study has demonstrated the richness of experience in Manchester 
and the value of grounding the study in a single conurbation. The application of the 
hierarchical approach has proved to be an effective tool in understanding the 
outcomes, and the hypotheses have been proven. The most notable conclusions are 
to draw attention to: the importance of the creation of the PTA/PTE structure to 
champion the local rail network; the continuing importance of Manchester’s CBD to 
the passenger rail system; and the inordinate length of length of time it took to 
deliver even a partial solution to the problem of poor rail penetration of the CBD. The 
planning system was broadly supportive of promoting rail access to the CBD 
throughout much of the period, although it was never single-mindedly focused on 
delivering high density development around stations, except at the Arena at the end 
of the period. Generally, suburban planning delivered little for the rail system outside 
of restraining the excesses of housing decentralisation and limiting commercial 
developments to town centres or other rail accessible locations, although even the 
latter was abandoned in the 1980s. Outside the city centre the redevelopment of 
redundant railway land had minimal impacts on demand for rail services.
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PART FOUR
Conclusions.
The case study has demonstrated the robustness of the analysis developed in parts 
two and three and the value of the spatially hierarchical approach. The research 
showed two very important, but different, aspects to the relationship between 
railways and planning in the Manchester conurbation, one with regard to suburban 
growth and the other with regard to Manchester’s city centre.
The extent of line and station closures in the Manchester suburbs was large, despite 
the survival of several routes scheduled for closure by Beeching. Although the PTE 
opened new stations, these were only a third of the number closed. On the other 
hand, the area experienced extensive suburban growth which was clearly influenced 
by planning policy but, on the whole, this was poorly located with regard to the 
surviving railway network. On the other hand, despite the ebb and flow of policy and 
the property market, planning delivered significant trip generating uses into 
Manchester city centre, which continued to be the hub of the railway network.
It was with regard to management of the pattern of suburbanisation therefore that 
planning policy and practice was weakest in terms of its impact on the utility of the 
railway network. The fact that it was strongest with regard to central Manchester 
reflects an important element of the rationale for the planning system - intervention in 
the market to limit the impacts of urban decentralisation. However its effectiveness in 
this regard was hampered by the lack of a rail oriented ideological thread and the 
practical difficulties presented by the inherited locations of the major city centre 
stations. The latter point, and the general significance of the CBD outcomes shows, 
the enduring impacts of the geography of the Victorian railway system.
A final point can be made about the place of GMPTE with regard to the PTE typology 
developed in chapter seven. GMPTE began by aspiring to have a role which would 
place it in the same category as Strathclyde and Merseyside, but abandonment of 
Picc-Vicc placed it the same category as the West Midlands with a minimal stance 
towards the rail network. However with the development of Metrolink, GMPTE ended 
up in the first category along with Tyne and Wear and South Yorkshire as owner of 
its own light rail system utilising former BR lines, as well as being BR’s client for the 
heavy local rail services.
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PART FIVE
Introduction.
Part five comprises chapter ten, the final conclusions to the thesis. This 
begins by drawing together the conclusions from parts one, two, three and four. It 
then considers the scope for further research which could reinforce the analysis in 
parts two and three, and provide alternative means of testing the hypotheses used in 
part four. The chapter concludes by demonstrating the relevance of the methodology 
and findings to contemporary research into the relationship between land-use 
planning and the railway network.
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSIONS
Part one.
Part one developed the overall methodology and structure to the research in 
chapter one, and chapter two looked at the formative period between 1830-1947, 
wherein the railways moved from dominance to a position where they were 
successfully challenged by road modes. In the early years, despite laissez-faire, 
Gladstone and others tried to develop the case for the State to have a greater role in 
railway network development, but the ‘Railway Interest’ successfully opposed this. 
Interestingly though, this met its match in the ‘Landed Interest’ and that clash seems 
to have characterised the fault line between the railway industry and land 
development which was to continue subsequently, despite deep institutional changes 
on both sides and overall changes in society, politics and the economy.
Chapter two showed that the exclusion of railway companies from land 
development did not preclude railways from becoming deeply embedded in patterns 
of urban form: their primacy in the transport market ensured that they would. But the 
lack of planning meant that the network came to exhibit certain shortcomings in its 
geography and its relationships with urban form which would, eventually, undermine 
its role:
• duplication of routes at local and strategic levels;
• duplication of facilities, particularly stations and goods depots;
• poor location Of stations with regard to town and city centres;
• failure to maximise network benefits, such as leaving strategic gaps and the poor 
development of cross-country routes;
• restricted vertical loading gauge.
The work of the Royal Commission on London Traffic, and that by planners 
such as Unwin and Howard, showed that these shortcomings were recognised at the 
time. There was the beginning of a political and professional ideological 
convergence around cheap trains, suburban social housing, stations and urban 
design, railway companies and the development of surplus lands, and the creation of 
public bodies to intervene in metropolitan railway development.
But this was short lived. By the inter-war period town planning had developed 
a locus around decentralisation and self-containment. The impacts of competition 
and the process of amalgamation triggered by the 1921 Railways Act forced the 
railway companies to reinforce their traditional focus on internal matters. Their
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outward gaze was limited, typically, to involvement with other transport modes such 
as feeder lorry services or financial interests in bus companies. The experiences of 
Metroland and the Southern Electric, the ideas of railway industry figures such as 
Selbie, Pick and Walker although significant, were notable because they were 
exceptional. They were not reciprocated by the ideas of architects, planners and 
municipal engineers amongst whom there were very few who displayed aspirations 
and/or played roles like those of Barman. The work of Unwin had offered the most 
potential but, at the end of the day, his priority was the design of medium to low 
density, small settlements. Abercrombie displayed some understanding of railway 
matters, but integration of land-use with the network was not his priority and 
contemporary planning’s overall ideological stance towards railways in London was 
dominated by aesthetic concerns.
Part one concluded with the development of the agenda which formed an 
analytical template for the core of the thesis. A pre-condition was the creation of 
institutional arrangements to facilitate collaborative working between the land-use 
planning and railway sectors at national, regional and local levels: the creation of the 
LPTB and its work alongside the LCC had been the most notable achievement pre- 
1947.
With regard to the railway network, the policy agenda included the following:
1. rationalisation of the network in order to remove duplicate routes and facilities, but 
with an eye on both contemporary diseconomies and the potential for future utility;
2. development of railway services to ensure that their pattern and quality would be 
competitive with that offered by road networks and road vehicles;
3. closing strategic gaps in the network, particularly with regard to CBD 
penetration and access across cities;
4. development of a programme of station enhancement to maximise their 
convenience and attractiveness to travellers, and station building so as to ensure 
that new urban areas would be located close to points of access to the network; 
The town planning policy agenda included:
5. the general articulation of expectations about changing patterns of urban form in 
ways which would identify the implications for the potential utility of existing main 
line, suburban, cross country and rural railway routes, and the utility of new routes;
6. management of the redevelopment process in existing urban areas to maximise 
access to railway stations and rail freight facilities, with appropriate guidance for 
the location, layout, and density of development;
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7. management of the location and character of greenfield site development so as 
to ensure accessibility to the railway network, with appropriate guidance for the 
location, layout, and density of development.
Part two.
Part two was concerned with the 1948-68 period. The analysis showed that, 
at the outset, the political centre of gravity had moved towards interventionism in 
transport and land development. This was characterised by ideology around 
integrating transport modes, but was poorly developed with regard to the 
relationship between land use and the railway network. The initial priority for the 
railways was modernisation and, the fact that General Sir Brian Robertson headed 
the BTC through the 1950s, speaks volumes about what sort of organisation the BTC 
was perceived to be by the Government. The timing of the post-war recovery meant 
that, ironically, it was the Conservatives who gave the BTC the opportunity to invest. 
But the lack of commercial vision and rigour in the Modernisation Plan, coupled with 
the political implications of rising car ownership, produced a paradigm shift in the 
stance of subsequent Governments of all parties towards transport planning and 
railways: this was the dominance of what came to be called ‘predict and provide’ and 
road building, and ‘the Treasury view’ with regard to the railways. The latter was 
characterised by deep seated suspicion of the competency of BR which led to a 
very tight rein on investment: it was very difficult for BR to develop an image which 
was different to the perception of it as some sort of ‘lame duck’ , dependent on public 
‘subsidy’, a pejorative term when compared with use of the word ‘investment’ which 
was associated with road building.
As a nationalised industry, BR managers were excluded from the political 
process and, during this period, the ‘railway lobby’ effectively comprised those 
affected by closures and those concerned about the impact of closures on the less 
mobile members of society. If a railway manager raised his head above the parapet 
and ‘went public’ with views which were contrary to official policy, he (the research 
did not identify any women who were senior managers) risked dismissal, as in fact 
happened in the case of Gerald Fiennes (Fiennes, 1967). What became clear 
however, was that by 1968 there were two railways: the commercial one and the 
social one. Recognition of that dichotomy was a step forward.
Planning ideology and practice changed dramatically over the period. Initially 
planning's role was supporting public sector led reconstruction, urban renewal and 
development of the welfare state, along with protection of agricultural land. By the 
end of the period, even under a Labour Government, these activities were 
counterbalanced by a deep involvement in managing private sector property
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development. The common thread between the two was an overriding acceptance of 
the primacy of planning around roads and a remarkable and massively influential 
political and professional convergence around the ideology of ‘predict and provide’. 
The nationalised railway industry did not produce the likes of Selbie or Pick, and after 
the ‘greyness’ of Robertson there came the notoriety of Beeching who epitomised the 
hawkish, Treasury view. Road building, on the other hand, produced Marples, 
Buchanan, Manzoni, and T. Dan Smith, as the public sector side of an alliance which 
also included major private companies, to create a transport culture which claimed 
the allegiance of a large slice of the population. Those situations where there were 
pro-rail planning policy outcomes, such as new town location or airspace 
development at stations, were notable because they were exceptions.
The conclusions of part two with regard to outcomes on the list of points 
developed in part one were:
1. rationalisation went well beyond removing duplicated routes with the goal of 
cutting back to a commercially viable core network, rather than with an eye to 
maximising the network’s future scope and utility;
2. services and fixed infrastructure on the main line network radiating from London 
were modernised, although only one trunk route was electrified; outside greater 
London those commuter and rural services which were not withdrawn were 
modernised by the introduction of some EMUs but mainly DMUs although, where 
travellers had a choice, the quality was unlikely to persuade then to prioritise the 
train over the car; those rail freight services which were retained, were 
significantly improved but the marshalling yard programme was not a success;
3. no significant sections of new railway were built and in fact some cross CBD 
tunnels or well located stations were closed, and only one new Underground 
railway line was built in London;
4. many stations were rebuilt, occasionally as part of a larger commercial 
developments, but hundreds were closed and there were very few new stations;
With regard to the town planning agenda:
5. planning policy produced patterns of development which were generally poorly 
related to the railway network, with the exception of some strategic 
developments such as the new towns and some major industrial complexes, the 
most significant of which were the power stations which were permitted 
development;
6. the redevelopment process in existing urban areas generally served to 
undermine access to railway stations, and the location, layout and density of 
development generally took little note of station location;
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7. with the exception of most of the new towns, the development of greenfield areas 
generally produced settlements which were not focused around rail corridors, 
and the location, layout and density of development generally took little note of 
station location, even in the new towns.
Despite this negative outcome, part two ended on an optimistic note because 
of the obvious strengths of the commercial railway and the policies for the social 
railway set out by Barbara Castle. Behind the 1968 Transport Act was a recognition 
that there were limits to the ability of cities to absorb rising road traffic, that not 
everyone had access to a car, and that rail transport had a role to play in tackling 
both of these problems. These two facets of the case for rail reflected wider 
ideological developments around the emergence of ‘the environment’ as a political 
issue and the ‘rediscovery’ of poverty as the post-war boom faltered. Together with 
the optimism around the commercial railway, and the renewed emphasis on strategic 
planning, these converging ideological trends had very positive implications for the 
future development of the relationship between railways and planning.
Part three.
Part three was concerned with the 1968-94 period. The analysis showed that, 
at the outset, there were similarities with the late 1940s, but some significant 
differences too. As part of a second ideological swing towards integrated public 
transport, there was support for greater intervention in the railway industry to limit the 
impact of the commercialism of the 1960s. However, the severe economic crisis of 
the 1970s meant that, whatever its successes, the BRB’s costs escalated, and 
Government intervention limited their ability to raise prices accordingly. The solution 
of 1968 provided only a temporary respite. The economic downturn post-1976 further 
compounded the problems and, by the late 1970s, the railway network was 
characterised by under-investment and what Peter Parker called ‘the crumbling edge 
of quality’. On the other hand the achievements of the PTEs were a notable success 
with significant improvements in railway planning and investment, until the downturn 
post-1976. The presence of the PTEs, the GLC and the metropolitan counties, and 
the creation of the BR Property Board, put in place institutional arrangements which 
could deliver pro-rail outputs, if the economic context was favourable and policy 
makers sought to use the structures favourably.
The major shifts in planning ideology in the late 1960s impacted at the local 
and strategic levels. At the local level came the pressures to democratise the 
planning process associated, particularly, with the change in housing policy from 
clearance to rehabilitation. At the strategic level came structure planning where there 
was a link with the emergence of the pro-rail stance in urban transport planning.
262
Public involvement with planning spread to resistance to urban road building. This 
mix of institutional and ideological change was very favourable for the relationship 
between planning and the railways as compared with the situation post-1948, and 
there were some notably successful outcomes in the 1970s.
The economic downturn of the late 1970s, followed by Thatcherism, initially 
produced a very hostile policy context for the planning-railway interface. The BRB 
responded positively and the new emphasis' on customers and markets under Robert 
Reid produced a break up of the monolithic ‘corporate railway’ and creation of the 
sectors. This led to a re-conceptualisation of the relationship with national and local 
government and to them being perceived as ‘customers’. The BRB encouraged 
managers to pursue partnerships with local government, which extended to liaison 
over strategic and, to a lesser extent local, land-use planning policy development. 
The creation of Vacant Land Registers and pressure from central Government to 
reduce dependency on the public purse, also forced the Property Board to become 
more aggressive in its land development activities. Although, on the one hand this led 
to short termism, on the other it produced high density, commercial developments 
around many major stations and countered the general market trend of car-oriented 
decentralisation, the archetypal development form of the 1980s.
Town planning had much more difficulty in finding a response to Thatcherism. 
With so much emphasis on the primacy of market forces and the active 
encouragement of developments which ran counter to existing strategic policies, the 
very existence of planning was called into question, not least by planners themselves 
(Reade, 1987). This hostility was characterised by the creation of the UDCs and 
abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties. Initially, it was only through the work 
of the Property Board, and in situations such as Docklands or the development of the 
Channel Tunnel terminals where the market happened to favour rail, that 
developments of any significance around rail nodes were achieved. But the 
successes were notable and, to varying degrees, did arise from positive engagement 
between the planning and railway sectors. In fact, the positive products of the market 
led trends produced a further shift in ideology back towards pro-actively co-ordinating 
the sectors. These trends produced an unexpected ideological convergence around 
rail in the late 1980s which was widely perceived as a ‘railway renaissance’. This 
produced politically astute BR managers, typified by Chris Green, who were well 
aware of the importance of liaison with land-use planning authorities.
Despite the downturn in the economy in 1989-90, railway-oriented transport 
and land-use planning ideology continued to strengthen. Several factors combined 
to produce this trend: these included the reaction against the development pressures
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of the previous few years; the perceived regenerative potential of rail schemes; and 
the general rise of environmental consciousness which focused increasingly on the 
negative aspects of road traffic growth.
Changes in planning ideology produced the amended PPG 13. This, for the 
first time since 1947, was an official planning policy document which set out how 
land-use policy should be utilised to produce patterns of urban form which would 
facilitate utilisation of the railway network for passenger and freight purposes. It had 
taken nearly 50 years to arrive at that point. It seemed remarkable that this 
innovation should have been produced by a government which took its ideological 
inspiration from Thatcherism. There has been much debate as to why the 
Conservatives used planning to lead their policy thrust towards environmentalism, 
and critics saw the reasons as being that it would have least impact on constraining 
business, whilst having a high public profile. Nevertheless, the experiences of the 
1980s showed that there was real potential to skew land development patterns 
towards rail and that, in congested urban areas at least, there was an identifiable 
market trend towards that and planning could be used to encourage it.
The conclusions of part three with regard to outcomes on the points 
developed in part one were:
1. although much reduced, the process of rationalisation continued, but there was a 
counter thrust which saw re-opening of closed stations and lines in major 
conurbations and their hinterlands, demonstrating that the process of 
rationalisation had been taken too far;
2. significant improvements in the main line network were made to allow faster 
speeds, with completion of London-Scotland electrification on both main lines, 
electrification of local and semi-fast services on routes outside the South East 
was limited; at their best the quality of passenger services improved significantly 
with regard to speed, comfort and frequency for intercity, regional and local 
services, but quality was patchy and, at the margins, cramped, squalid and 
unreliable. Similarly with regard to freight, core services with regard to bulk 
traffics were reliable and competitive, but the railway just did not try to compete 
for most traffic, although the advent of the Channel Tunnel brought better 
prospects for international intermodal services;
3. there were significant strategic improvements to the network including cross- 
CBD tunnelling/tunnel re-opening, LRT street running, building of new 
railway/light railway routes into major developments/regeneration areas, 
construction of one new London tube route, and opening of the Channel Tunnel;
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4. although some stations were closed, the balance was heavily in favour of station 
openings, and there were some notable examples of major mixed use 
redevelopment projects in major towns and cities around stations;
The following summarises the outcome with regard to the operation of the 
planning system:
5. planning practice in the 1970s steered major trip generating uses to CBDs and 
there were some supportive developments in the new towns too which produced 
positive outcomes for intercity and commuter services, but this was severely 
undermined in the 1980s apart from special cases strongly favoured by the 
property market;
6. planning practice in the 1970s steered development to locations in CBDs which 
were accessible to stations with generally a much weaker relationship in 
suburban developments, but even the CBD focus was undermined in the 1980s; 
during the 1970s the detail of this relationship was generally poorly handled, but 
this was exceptionally well handled in those cases in the 1980s where 
development at and/or around stations was favoured by the property market; the 
closure and disposal of freight facilities continued throughout the period, although 
construction of Channel Tunnel terminals brought some engagement with the 
planning process;
7. planning practice throughout the period with regard to greenfield areas continued 
to be to prevent their development as far as possible and, where development 
took place, the prime transport consideration was to provide access by road: the 
exceptions to this trend continued to be in the new towns although the pace of 
development in most of them slackened considerably in the 1980s and, even 
where development continued, its relationship to the railway network was weaker 
than previously.
This completed part three of the thesis but the product of parts one, two and three 
were used to draw together the three hypotheses which formed the basis of part four, 
the Manchester case study.
Part four.
The first hypothesis tested was that:
the emphasis on main line investment has led to: piecemeal improvement in railway 
services with priority for those on trunk routes to London; removal of some services 
on secondary and branch lines and stagnation of others. In the most general sense 
planning has been supportive of the network through containment and managed 
decentralisation, but has not been specifically rail oriented, and there was only a 
loose spatial fit between patterns of development and the broad geography of the
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network, with evidence of significant dislocation. The overall relationship can be 
characterised as inconsistent, both spatially and temporally.
Findings.
The hypothesis was proven.
The second hypothesis was that:
rail access to the regional CBD has been rationalised with priority for stations 
associated with the trunk route to London; there have been significant 
improvements for access by local services after 1968 by the PTE, although this has 
been subject to ‘queuing’ mechanisms, sporadic and under-conceptualised. 
Although land-use planning has been broadly supportive of these investments by 
steering major activity generators to the CBD, proximity to stations has not been a 
prime consideration and urban design initiatives have not focused on the public 
domain around and pedestrian access to stations.
Findings.
The hypothesis was proven, with the exception of the airspace development at 
Manchester Victoria.
The third hypothesis was that:
at the local level there has been minimal association between the detail of suburban 
development and stations. There has been some provision of new stations and 
some examples of pro-rail trends in land-use planning, although these have been 
exceptional. Redundant railway land has been redeveloped predominantly for uses 
which do not directly stimulate demand for rail travel.
Findings.
The hypothesis was proven, with the qualification that the second largest category of 
re-use of redundant railway land was a combination of ‘vacant’ and ‘landscaped’, and 
that the re-use of land/buildings in Manchester city centre had largely indirect, but 
beneficial, impacts for rail.
The underlying aims of the thesis.
The main methodological tool used in the thesis has been the concept of the 
‘interface’ between the town planning and railway sectors. In chapter one this was 
developed into three research questions which have laid at the heart of the analysis. 
It remains to return to these to distil out the essence of the findings.
Question 1. What were the institutional structures for railway management and 
iand-use planning and to what extent did these facilitate the development of 
positive relationships between the two sectors?
Findings.
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British Railways and land-use planning were both State activities but were in 
quite separate realms. The railways were centrally managed as a production 
oriented industry, whereas planning was a service, mainly of the Local State. 
Although, from the outset, BR’s structure had a strong regional dimension, this was 
largely limited to operational matters, not external liaison. In any case there was 
never a statutory layer of land-use planning at this level, although there was an 
interface between the railway regions and informal structures for planning in the 
1960s and post-1986. The latter involved the railway sectors rather than the regions.
Creation of the PTA/PTEs put in place institutions which lay at the interface 
between the metropolitan counties, once they were created, and BR, although their 
remit only concerned local services. Given that the LPTB was created in 1933, and 
that there was widespread recognition of its achievements, it is surprising that it took 
another 35 years before similar organisations were created in the provincial 
conurbations.
The BR Property Board had a very specific role with regard to the interface 
between the planning and railway sectors. In the right circumstances, this could be 
very positive in delivering railway oriented development projects, although the 
Property Board cannot be perceived as having continued the traditions of Metroland, 
or even of the relationship between the Southern Electric initiative and suburban 
developers. Its role was much more narrowly focused on short term cash flow.
It is notable that the PTA/PTE arrangements did not apply to London.
Although the GLC took over London Underground, the operation of main line rail 
services remained in the hands of the BR regions and development of commuter 
services as well as inter-city ones was handled directly by the DoT. Notwithstanding 
the shortcomings of these arrangements for London, overall the institutional 
arrangements in the 1970s were much more favourable to facilitating liaison between 
the planning and railway sectors than in the previous period. It is also important to 
recall that the creation of the DoE in 1970 placed planning in a locus which implied a 
reinforced role for planning. The amalgamation of the DoT and DoE reflected the 
commitment to integration between planning and public transport and it is notable 
that several major local railway projects were conceived and delivered during this 
period.
Thatcherism vastly reduced the propensity to use the institutional structures 
for the purposes for which they had been created. This was followed by abolition of 
the GLC and the metropolitan counties, and the return of London Transport to direct 
ministerial influence. However these negative trends were counterbalanced by 
creation of the BR sectors and market ideology led to local government as a whole,
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not just the PTEs, becoming seen as valued customers, so there was a drive to 
develop links across a broad front, including the shire counties. Once the resurgence 
of regionalism began in the late 1980s, the relationship between the railways and 
planning authorities was reinvigorated. It was particularly strong in the South East 
where liaison was facilitated by the presence of Network South East, Serplan, LPAC 
and London Regional Transport, this being reinforced at the local level by the work 
of the Property Board and the property arm of LRT. This amalgam of residual bodies 
from the 1960s with those produced in the 1980s, created a very positive institutional 
structure, unexpectedly so given the ideological context of the period. Their strength 
was at the regional and sub-regional levels, and was reflected in joint work on such 
matters as the London Rail Study and railway re-opening schemes such as the Robin 
Hood Line. The absence of effective strategic land-use planning bodies in the former 
metropolitan counties was a serious weakness though, which the presence of various 
informal groupings of district authorities, and the continued presence of the 
PTA/PTEs, could not make up for.
2. What were the main features of policy for the two sectors and to what extent 
was policy in each concerned with the relationship between them, as opposed 
to other matters, and was this concern likely to be positive or negative in its 
impacts on utilisation of the railway network?
Findings.
Policy in both sectors was firmly focused on matters internal to each and at 
no time did policy with regard to the relationship between them achieve a priority as 
high as the internal priorities. In the early BTC period, against a background of ‘public 
service’, the priority for the railways moved from ‘make-do-and-mend’ to 
modernisation. The failure of the latter led, in the 1960s, to an emphasis on cost 
efficiency and rationalisation against a new ideological background of private sector 
inspired commercialisation. The initial priority for the planning sector was housing 
renewal and planned decentralisation set against an ideological background 
dominated by the welfare state. By the 1960s the early priorities remained, but 
management of private sector renewal and decentralisation had been added along 
with a new ideological orientation around the private property market.
There were three significant relationships between the sectors during this 
period. The first was very ‘macro’ and indirect: the exercise of containment policies 
which sought to limit decentralisation and thereby retain more of the inherited pattern 
of urban form, and its relationship with the railway network, than would otherwise 
have been the case. The second was more positive: the location of new and 
expanded towns on rail routes. The third was local and focused around station
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development. But this was poorly developed as illustrated by the shortcomings of the 
planned relationships between stations and town centres in the new towns and the 
limited number of major development schemes at city centre stations.
After 1968 there were more positive policy developments derived from 
development of the social and environmental cases for rail transport. One set arose 
from creation of the PTA/PTEs who had a duty to develop local railway networks and 
facilitate access to them. It was only in the work of the PTEs that emphasis on policy 
around the relationship between land-use and the railways approached the emphasis 
given to that on public transport itself.
Outside the conurbations the priorities for the BRB in the 1970s were to 
secure funding for modernisation of the commercial services whilst continuing to cut 
costs and maintain the level of service of the social railway. Away from the main 
lines there was a continued drift towards closure and, overall, an underlying sense 
that the network was locked into long term decline. The success of the HSTs 
produced a welcome lift which reinforced the significance of city centre stations. After 
several difficult years in the early 1980s the creation of the sectors, and the economic 
boom, produced a remarkable change in fortunes which led to ambitious investment 
plans being made.
The priorities for land-use planning in the early 1970s remained unchanged, 
although there was encouragement for development of strategic policies to facilitate 
access to public transport. However it took a decade for these to become embedded 
in adopted structure plans and, by that time, they had slipped down the list of 
priorities because of the emergence of the inner city problem. Nevertheless, the 
broad containment policies of the previous period had been refined into policies 
which, specifically, sought to concentrate major trip generators in CBDs and to resist 
their location on out-of-centre sites, which was supportive of rail utilisation. In some 
notable cases this was reinforced by more site specific policies to safeguard closed 
trackbeds and station sites. The existence of these policy bundles in Greater London 
and the conurbations, along with the rail policies of London Transport (the GLC) and 
the PTA/PTEs, was the most robust policy framework created for the relationship 
between land use and the railways since 1948.
However this only fully emerged by the late 1970s/early 1980s by which time 
Mrs Thatcher was in power and her Government ignored it. The depression around 
railway policy in the early 1980s was paralleled by that around land-use planning. 
Planning was perceived as having a very limited role, as a means of facilitating 
property development and as a regulatory tool to limit the excesses of the market in 
politically sensitive areas (for the Tories) such as green belts, national parks and
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conservation areas. It took a decade for the role of planning as a whole to be 
reinvigorated and gain a new sense of direction and value. When that came in the 
early 1990s, it was informed by the market led, railway oriented policy developments 
of the 1980s and was reinforced by the responsiveness of the sectorised railway. The 
combined result was that by 1994, notwithstanding the effects of the recession, policy 
with regard to the relationship between the two sectors reached its highest degree of 
sophistication in the whole of the post-war era. However, just as the gaze of the 
sectors towards each other strengthened, the mutual confidence and understanding 
was thrown into turmoil by the commitment to privatisation. Railway policy making 
more or less collapsed as managers focused on forming private businesses.
3. What was the outcome of the interrelationships between institutional 
structures and policy for the two sectors as measured by: the geographical 
characteristics of the railway network and the intensity of the service on it; 
patterns of land use; and the degree of spatial association between patterns of 
land-use and the railway network?
Findings.
The overriding outcome with regard to the BR network was that 
geographically, it was ‘undeveloped’. Total length of route declined from 31,593 
kilometres in 1948 to 16,528 kilometres in 1992/93, a reduction of 48 per cent: the 
peak for closures was between 1960-74. Closures were most strongly felt in rural 
areas although, as shown by the Manchester case study, many lines not on trunk 
routes to London were closed in urban areas too.
Closure is not the whole story though: the length of passenger route open fell 
from 23,820 kilometres in 19551 to between 14,300-400 in the late 1970s, a decline 
of approximately 40 per cent, a lesser decline than for the network as a whole. Then, 
as a result of re-openings, closures and transfers of routes to non-BR operations, 
passenger route length moved up and down within this band for the rest of the 
period, apart from 1991/92 when it dipped below 14,300 kilometres. When the 
various light rail systems which utilised former BR routes are added in, the result is a 
gross increase in the length of route of the passenger network from the late 1980s. In 
addition station closures were balanced by openings from 1976 and the number on 
the BR network began to increase, with those on light rail systems pushing the total 
up further.
In addition, although the railway network was severely cutback, the retained 
network was used much more intensively for passenger traffic. The relative success
1 Data on passenger length of route is only available from 1955 in official statistics.
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of rail as a public transport mode was reflected in the fact that, broadly speaking, in 
1994 passenger kilometres were the same as they were in 1948, having been 
somewhat higher during the late 1980s boom. This was not the case for freight traffic 
though, which declined from 37 to 13 billion tonne kilometres, a decline of 65 per 
cent. The separation of freight generating activities from the railway network was the 
most negative aspect of the relationship between the planning and railway sectors.
Until the 1970s there were relatively few examples of specifically rail oriented 
land-use planning outcomes. The list included: the location of the new towns and 
construction of a few new stations at them; airspace developments at a couple of 
London termini; the redevelopment of Birmingham New Street; and office 
developments at or near to other major provincial stations such as Manchester 
Piccadilly. In resisting more dispersed car oriented suburbanisation on the North 
American model, the general thrust of containment policies put some sort of base 
under the relationship, but the overriding feeling in looking back is one of missed 
opportunities. Before the Beeching Plan there had been capital for railway investment 
and a public sector driven decentralisation process: there was great potential for 
integrated planning but, what was lacking, was a railway-oriented vision of the sort 
which underpinned the post-war development of Stockholm, Copenhagen or Paris 
(see later).
The vision which inspired the planning of British cities was road oriented and 
crystallised as the Buchanan plan. Although Buchanan was aware of the need for 
efficient public transport his report had no effect on the Beeching rationalisation. But 
when the reaction against urban road building set in a decade later, improving local 
railways as an alternative was an obvious choice and the PTA/PTEs achieved a 
great deal before the onset of recession halted further investment. Construction of 
the Newcastle Metro along with redevelopment at Eldon Square served to 
emphasise the inadequacy of the achievements of the 1948-68 period.
A significant feature of the post-1968 period was the re-opening of closed 
railways and stations and PTA/PTEs and ‘shire’ counties expended considerable 
energy and capital in achieving them. Re-openings were evidence of over­
rationalisation, a failure of planning in the broadest sense. The case for re-openings 
stemmed from the growing need for increased labour mobility as a result of 
continuing structural economic change, and as part of road congestion reduction 
strategies. The fact that so many re-openings were achieved, usually with the active 
involvement of the land-use planning process, was evidence of successful interaction 
between the sectors. But as this amounted to replacing that which had been taken
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way just a few years previously, it emphasised the inconsistency and inadequacy of 
the British approach.
The 1980s was a crucial decade for the relationship between planning and 
the railways. By that time there had been plenty of experience in delivering 
substantial improvements to intercity and local railway networks and land-use 
planning policy was much more pro-rail than at any time previously. The mid-1980s 
boom produced a flood of property development and Treasury income was boosted 
by North Sea oil revenue: there was scope to pick up the thread of rail investment 
which had been severed by the mid-1970s recession and to utilise the planning 
system to manage the redevelopment of city centres as well as creating new rail 
accessible suburban nodes. Instead, the Thatcher Government chose to relax 
planning control and the typical commercial developments of the period were not 
accessible by rail. The Manchester case study served to show how, even where 
there was rail investment such as the Airport link, this was under-conceptualised and 
there was no vision of creating a rail served office employment node around it. On 
the other hand, at Salford Quays where a relatively high density out-of-centre 
employment node was created, there was no contemporary commitment to 
developing it around new railway infrastructure2. The exceptions to these outcomes, 
where the market favoured rail, were strikingly better than anything achieved 
previously with regard to facilitating rail access, and architectural quality: compare 
Croydon with Canary Wharf, Birmingham New Street with the Broadgate Centre. The 
conclusion is that, in just the same way that two decades of potential integration 
between planning and the railways were lost between 1948-68, another decade was 
lost in the 1980s, despite over a decade of comparatively good practice in between.
A one sentence conclusion to the thesis is this: there were eight years 
from 1968-76 when the necessary preconditions for a positive relationship between 
the planning and railway sectors existed, with another period of four years from 1988- 
92, but the overall relationship between the sectors can be characterised as one of 
missed opportunities.
Further research.
The thesis has raised several matters which lead to considerations about 
further research to reinforce the thesis. Firstly, the review of institutional structures, 
policy and outcomes in chapters three to eight was pitched at a national level, 
although the examples of positive outcomes were limited. The most notable were
2 Metrolink has been extended subsequently by GMPTE with the route through Salford Quays to 
Eccles being fully open in 2000. However as this is ‘retro-fitted’ it is a convoluted and slow running 
line.
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new town and new town station location, developments around major stations, and 
developments in PTE areas. Further research could take a small sample of these 
and to ’drill down’ for more detailed, case study analysis. This would begin by 
describing the development process for each subject, and then identifying 
chronologies, key actors, key documents and local policy constraints for the planning 
and railway sectors. Archival research would seek to go beyond official reports and 
the like, in order to get inside the process of policy and project development. This 
would necessitate access to letters, memoranda, and notes of meetings. For BR 
these may well exist within the Public Record Office, but access to such documents 
for local authorities may be more problematical: for subjects within the past twenty 
years it could be possible to supplement such documentary research by qualitative 
interview work with key actors. Detail analysis would seek to determine the extent to 
which the desire to maximise access to railway services informed the process, as 
opposed to other factors such as maximisation of revenue, opportunism, or general 
renewal policies. The selection of the case studies would be informed by, the need to 
review a selection of the situations where outcomes were positive, and the availability 
of the necessary archival material.
A second opportunity for further research is with regard to further testing of 
the hypotheses. The Manchester conurbation was selected as it represented the 
‘critical case’, it was normative rather than being atypical. An alternative approach 
would be to select several atypical areas for case study and testing of the 
hypotheses. For example, three cases could be Glasgow, Sheffield, and a non-PTE 
area. Glasgow and Sheffield are both PTE areas and the research has shown that 
positive outcomes were more likely to occur in such areas. But Glasgow is atypical 
because its inherited railway network was more extensive than other conurbations, it 
received more investment over a longer period, and its historic population densities 
were relatively high. The potential for positive outcomes of the relationship between 
the planning and railway sectors would seem to be relatively high therefore. 
Sheffield, on the other hand, was a conurbation where, historically, the passenger 
railway played a relatively minor role in the development of this industrial city and, 
post 1974, it was several years before the PTE began supporting local railway 
services. Sheffield would therefore seem to be a conurbation where the likelihood of 
positive outcomes was rather less than in other conurbations with a PTE. A third area 
could be an emergent conurbation, probably in the South East, where there has been 
no PTE, but the rate of economic growth and its associated levels of road traffic 
congestion and property development, nevertheless, potentially created opportunities 
for a positive relationship between the planning and railway sectors. Conurbations
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which offer potential are Portsmouth-Southampton and Ipswich-Colchester, both of 
which appeared in the Strategic Plan for the South East and experienced significant 
improvements in their railway services.
A third opportunity for further research would be to compare and contrast 
British experience with that in other European countries. The case of Stockholm, as a 
medium sized city, is an interesting one for this thesis (Hall,1988, 308-312) (Cervero, 
1995): the General Plan of 1945-52 produced by Sven Markelius was a grand one, a 
sort of combination of the Abercrombie and Inglis plans for the Clyde Valley. It 
involved the development of four satellite towns where there would be local 
employment and commuting into central Stockholm. The satellites were to be linked 
to the centre by a new underground railway, and high rise housing developments 
were placed at the metro stations to ensure that the maximum number of people 
lived close to them. The satellite towns have not been without their problems of the 
type all too familiar in Britain, nevertheless:
 his grand design has stood the test of time: despite the critics, Stockholm works better,
and has more effectively reconciled the conflict between car and urban environment for a 
longer period, than most other cities (Hall, 1988, 312).
In terms of overall population and geographical extent, Stockholm is comparable to 
British provincial conurbations, so research to compare specific outcomes in 
Stockholm with similar situations in Britain, and exploration of the reasons behind the 
identified differences, would deepen understanding of the British experience.
Paris, which is at the heart of an urban area comparable with that of London, 
was experiencing similar pressures with regard to the need for urban renewal in the 
early 1960s. In 1961 President de Gaulle initiated production of a strategic plan for 
the whole lie de France region. Planners calculated that even if growth targets in 
provincial cities were achieved, the Paris region would grow from 9 to between 14 
and 16 million by the end of the century. Various strategies were considered, 
including self-contained new towns, but were all rejected. Instead, a plan like 
Markelius’ for Stockholm was adopted, but on a huge scale. Paris would have eight 
new towns of between 300,000 and 1,000,000 population each. They were to be 
linked with the centre and with each other not only by orbital highways but by a new 
express, standard gauge transit system, the Reseau Express Regional (RER): a 
network of 160-miles was planned. Not only would it service the new towns but also 
new, inner-urban centres which would act as catalysts for urban renewal in the run 
down, middle ring of the Paris region: development of the largest centre, La 
Defense, had already started when the plan was being prepared and was integrated 
into the strategy (Hall, 1988, 312-315). There is an interesting and relevant
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resonance here with experience in London: the location of new towns on radial 
railways, the opening of Thameslink, the Docklands experience. Selective and 
carefully designed comparative research between London and Paris would also 
deepen understanding of British experience3.
A fourth opportunity for further research is with regard to experience with the 
relationship between heavy rail, the old street tram systems, modern light rail 
systems, and the overall relationship between them and land-use planning. Insights 
into the sorts of things which a multi-modal Buchanan report could have produced 
can be gleaned from a consideration of German and Swiss practice. Leibbrand 
(1970, first published 1964) is a useful point of departure as he articulated principles 
and practice which were contemporary with Buchanan. He too emphasised the 
importance of city centres:
The city core is and remains the centre of gravity which determines the life of a city and the 
traffic pattern within it. It is the magnet which exerts an economic and political pull throughout 
an even larger region. It is an intellectual and commercial meeting point. This heart of the 
city must be kept healthy (1970, 85).
Leibbrand noted the historical character of city centres and the implications 
for them of over-reliance on the car and road building. But he also noted the dangers 
of too negative a stance towards road traffic which could undermine economic well­
being by causing the flight of business to more accessible suburbs. The answer was 
to plan the urban street network and the public transport network in a unified 
manner: in Germany the latter included trams, buses and railways. Leibbrand was 
aware of the potential of railways and of their problems which needed to be 
overcome:
The future of the railways does not lie only in long-distance expresses but also in mass 
transport over short distances. Plans for bringing suburban rail services further into the cities, 
such as have been evolved for Zurich, Munich, Stuttgart and Frankfurt, are basically right.
 With increasing congestion on the roads the advantage of a segregated track, making it
possible to maintain a high average speed, is more and more evident. But in many places 
interchange with road transport, bus and car, remains a problem. Uncomfortable mixed-mode 
travel, with long waiting times and tiresome methods of payment, frightens away some 
travellers (1970, 201).
In what, to British eyes, is a fascinating glimpse of what might have been, Leibbrand 
also had a section dealing with the need to create reserved lanes for buses and 
trams. Where these crossed busy intersections it would be necessary to put them 
underground which, with regard to tramways, meant that:
3 More far reaching international comparative study could review experience in countries such as Japan 
where, owing to different institutional, ideological and political contexts and greater population 
density, centralised planning and management of the railway network has, nevertheless, been
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...there is no very sharp distinction to be drawn between the underground tramway and the 
underground railway... (1970, 207).
This concern for the historic quality of city centres coupled with recognition, as a 
basic principle, that provision for both the car and public transport should be 
considered together, was the conceptual basis for the systems of U-bahns, S-bahns 
and surface running light rail systems that were subsequently developed in German 
and Swiss cities. Further analysis would provide a valuable template against which 
to measure British experience.
The research results and the contemporary British situation.
It is generally accepted that the motivations behind the privatisation of BR 
were the desire of the Major Government to be perceived as continuing the 
Thatcherite agenda of rolling back the state, and the medium term goal of reducing 
the burden on the Treasury. The expectation was that use of the network would 
continue at more or less the same level as at privatisation which, because of the 
continuing increase in road traffic, implied further relative decline. The form that 
privatisation took, with separation of ownership of the fixed infrastructure from 
ownership of trains, went against historical precedent as railway companies had 
previously been vertically integrated organisations, whether in private or public 
ownership. This is not the place to explore the complexity of, or arguments around, 
these institutional structures for the railways (Harris and Godward, 1997), but a 
significant outcome is that the relationship between the railway and planning sectors 
has become very complex, owing to changes in both sectors. The product of this 
research has relevance to the analysis of this relationship and for informing the 
design of new research to develop better understanding of it: two examples will 
demonstrate this.
The first is with regard to institutional arrangements. The separation of 
infrastructure from train operation has created a problem over where the locus of 
interest lies with regard to land development and its impacts on railway utilisation. Is 
this a matter for Railtrack as monopoly owner of the fixed infrastructure, or for the 
train operating companies who actually manage most of the stations on Railtrack’s 
behalf and have the prime interest in promoting passenger growth? The post­
privatisation period has had strong similarities with the post-grouping and post­
nationalisation periods in that the gaze of the industry was forced inwards as the 
impact of deep organisational change was digested: as Fiennes noted, ‘when you re­
associated with significant volumes of high density development at rail nodes (Hoyle and Knowles, 
1998, chapter 4)
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organise you bleed’ (1967, 113)4. This has meant that it has taken several years for 
the industry to begin to consider its external relationships
With regard to land-use planning, the post-1994 period has seen a good deal 
of change too: the most significant for the relationship with the railway network has 
been Welsh and Scottish devolution and the reinforcing of the regional tier in 
England. The latter has included an upgraded role for Regional Planning Guidance 
and the creation of regional assemblies and statutory Regional Development 
Agencies. The thesis has shown the significance of this regional dimension to the 
relationship between the planning and railway sectors so its reinforcement is, 
potentially, a good thing for railway oriented planning. However, the difficulties within 
the railway sector mean that the two sectors have not been engaging as well as they 
might. The insights gained into these matters during the thesis have facilitated their 
consideration with regard to the Manchester conurbation and the product of this has 
been published (Haywood, 1999). The Labour Government elected in 1997 
considered that Railtrack was not acting strategically in the public interest and has 
created the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) to exercise this role.
These institutional problems would matter less if the decline of the railway 
network had continued as expected. But, on the contrary, there has been a surge in 
rail traffic: passenger kilometres increased from 30.0 billion in 1995/96 to 38.5 billion 
in 1999/00 and rail freight increased from 15.1 billion tonne kilometres in 1996/97 to 
18.4 in 1999/00 (DETR, 2000). This growth seems to be a product of a buoyant 
economy, and in that sense is a re-run of the late 1980s railway renaissance, but 
also there is a suggestion that road traffic congestion is actually forcing some car 
drivers and freight customers to use rail. In addition the Government has developed a 
bundle of transport policies, since publication of their transport White Paper (DETR, 
1998)5, which seeks to reduce society’s dependence on the car and lorry and to 
transfer traffic to rail. The recently published Ten Year Plan (DETR, 2000) envisages 
50 per cent growth in rail passenger traffic and 80 per cent growth in freight.
The research has shown that there has been a longstanding separation 
between railway management and the land development process, as exemplified by 
the general case that railway companies have not engaged in extensive land 
development activities. It is hardly surprising therefore that the complex structure of
4 The Southall and Ladbrook Grove accidents have been cited by critics as evidence that the 
complexity of the privatised industry has led to erosion of the safety culture which is such an 
important internal priority for the industry, suggesting that the efficacy of external relationships is 
likely to have been very poor.
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the privatised industry has made this aspect of the external relationships of railway 
companies more difficult. However, the SRA can be perceived as a sort of ‘super 
PTE’ charged with a duty, amongst many others, to work at the interface between 
the railway and planning sectors. Its creation should therefore be welcomed. It is re­
assuring, too, that its organisational structure is being expanded to include a 
planning function, and a special body has already been created to secure the 
safeguarding of remaining disused railway land which, in the new context of growth, 
may well be returned to rail use. It will be crucial to ensure that the SRA receives all 
party political support and is not abolished if a Conservative government is elected at 
some future date. It will be particularly important for the SRA and Railtrack to work 
together to develop a national and regional perspective on the management and 
development of the railway network, in order to provide a consistent and coherent 
view that planning policy documents can incorporate and relate to.
It is notable too that despite abolition of the metropolitan counties, bus 
deregulation, and bus and rail privatisation, the PTA/PTE structure remains intact. 
The research identified the significance of their role at the interface between the 
planning and railway sectors and this is being enhanced as a result of the new policy 
agenda and the creation of statutory Local Transport Plans. PTA/PTEs are centrally 
involved in railway passenger franchising, in investing in local networks, in 
developing light rail systems, and in liasing with local land-use planning authorities. 
However, there is clearly a case for considering whether or not the PTA/PTE model 
should be extended to other conurbations, given the changes in Britain’s urban 
structures over the past thirty years. The research has shown that the ‘shire’ counties 
achieved a great deal in terms of promoting rail, but extension of the PTA/PTE model 
could yield more. Conurbations which, potentially, should benefit from this would be 
Cardiff and the Valleys, Bristol-Bath, Portsmouth-Southampton, Nottingham- 
Leicester-Derby.
But the product of the research suggests that it may be necessary to think 
more expansively as the regional tier of planning produced significant results 
throughout the period, even though it was non-statutory. The research cited above on 
Manchester, identified the significance of this and noted Continental practice where 
regional governments are increasingly involved in developing their railway systems. 
This suggests that if this becomes a statutory tier in England, then the PTA/PTE role 
could gravitate to that level. Research which evaluated railway-oriented planning
5 This is the first transport White Paper since 1977 and contains some interesting parallels with the 
content of that document which also expressed concern over continuing increases in road traffic and the 
impact of land use change in stimulating demand for transport.
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policy in draft updates to RPG would show what is being achieved at present and 
inform the debate about further institutional change at this level.
Secondly, the research has highlighted the importance of CBDs and their 
major stations to the utility of the rail network. The CBD renaissance of the 1990s is, 
therefore, to be welcomed, as is the continuing development of urban design 
ideology around pedestrian access to stations, and developing stations and their 
environs. However the research leads to the view that there is need for a more 
sophisticated development of planning policy around stations than is included in the 
draft update to PPG 13 which is very generalised and talks about ‘transport 
interchanges’ rather than the specific attributes and land-use policy implications of 
different kinds of interchange. For example: stations can be characterised as ‘origins’ 
or ‘destinations’ and station development might include enhancing the role of 
existing stations, or building completely new stations. The latter might be parkways, 
or might be associated with new developments of one kind and another. 
Interchanges might be in city centres, or suburbs, or might be associated with 
airports or other development scenarios. These matters raise all sorts of transport 
and land-use planning issues, which may involve substantial policy conflicts. In a 
recent discussion document on green belt policy, the RTPI has already identified the 
fact that utilising rail corridors to create rail accessible developments leads to 
questioning of the resistance to development in green belts (RTPI, 2000). The 
research would certainly lead to support for that point of view.
Final conclusion.
Without labouring the point too far, this review of the current situation 
demonstrates that the product of the thesis has a currency which is of continuing 
value post-1994. This has already informed the design of successful research into 
the planning-railway interface (Greensmith and Haywood, 1999) and can continue 
to do so for the foreseeable future. Although the research itself has been immensely 
satisfying, it is comforting to know that it will have a continuing relevance.
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PART FIVE
Postscript.
The 1948-94 period experienced immense change. British population 
increased from 49 millions to 56.75 millions. The economy was restructured with the 
decline of heavy engineering and manufacturing and the rise to dominance of 
producer services. The quality of people’s lives was transformed from the greyness 
of austerity to a consumer society, characterised by mass home and car ownership.
The numbers of cars on the roads increased from 2 million to 21 million and 
personal mobility increased dramatically with fundamental changes in urban social 
geography, broadly described as ‘counter-urbanisation’.
In an era characterised by such far reaching change the continuing 
relevance of passenger railways was, at first glance, remarkable. But railways were 
able to utilise new technologies whilst continuing to enjoy the competitive advantage 
derived from their ability to carry dense flows, swiftly, in narrow corridors, with a 
lesser land take and fewer negative impacts on adjacent areas than road based 
modes. This longevity leads to an important general conclusion with regard to the 
thesis subject matter: the opportunities to concentrate land development in railway 
corridors continued to occur many decades after the railways were built. This is 
because railways are high cost, fixed infrastructure and, once built, cannot be re­
routed easily. The rider is that, once removed, they cannot be put back easily either. 
Similarly, although lumpy, high density developments may be built fairly quickly in the 
modern era, generally the pace at which city regions change, and grow, has been 
relatively slow. Many features which were important to rail utilisation a 100 years ago, 
such as the location of CBDs and stations within them, continue to be important to 
the present. The fact that modern industry and distribution facilities have been 
permitted to develop in locations remote from railways demonstrates the opposite 
effect, with the concomitant demise of rail freight.
The relationship between railways and urban form is therefore, 
essentially, a long term one and this makes the role of ‘planning’, in the broadest 
sense, and continuity and consistency in planning, all the more important. The 
overriding conclusion from the thesis is that continuity and consistency has not 
characterised the approach to the relationship between the planning and railway 
sectors in the 1948-94 period. There was an ebb and flow to the strength of the 
relationship between the sectors, with few periods when institutional arrangements, 
ideology, policy and the availability of capital for railway and property investment 
were all favourable, at the same time. The contemporary situation shows the
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continuing difficulties: land-use and transport planning ideology is firmly pro-rail but, 
outside the South East, property markets continue to be road oriented, whilst the 
management function within the railway sector is balkanised and pre-occupied with 
fundamental internal problems associated with delivering a safe and efficient 
railway. This thesis demonstrates the historic significance of the opportunity which 
currently exists to achieve closer and longer lasting relationships between the sectors 
than those resulting from the previous high water marks of 1948,1968 and 1988. 
However, there is much to do if the opportunity is to be seized.
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Appendix One
Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Railways, 24 May, 1844.
This report contains statements which set out the basis of the case for greater State 
involvement in the development of railway schemes in order to protect the public 
interest. These demonstrate the concerns of Gladstone and others over the 
unbridled operation of laissez-faire principles giving rise to circumstances where 
railways were being proposed to take business away from an existing company or to 
block a legitimate extension scheme. The Report sets out the circumstances under 
which a railway project would merit special consideration and goes on to set out the 
main matters to which the Board of Trade should have regard when considering 
railway schemes submitted to it in advance of their consideration by Parliament.
The Committee will now endeavour to sum up the results at which, from the 
examination of this part of the subject referred to them, they have arrived.
1. In cases where it is proposed to push new Lines of Railway into districts not at 
present within the circle of Railway Communications, the main questions for 
consideration will ordinarily be simple, and require no detailed notice from the 
Committee.
2. In cases where Branch lines are proposed with a view to the more convenient 
connexion of a particular town and district with the subsisting railway, and not with a 
view to the formation of any new line of ulterior communication, the same 
observations will apply.
3. In cases where it is intended to form, either at once or piecemeal, new Lines of 
Communication, which are to compete with subsisting Lines, there should be an 
examination of each scheme with respect to the amount of increased facilities which 
it is intrinsically calculated to give to traffic, either terminal or intermediate.
If they be considerable, they tend to show both that the railway will be made and 
worked, and likewise that when made and worked, it will be beneficial.
If, on the other hand, they be insignificant, it should be considered whether the 
projected railway is one which, if it is to remunerate the projectors at all, can only
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remunerate them by means of the abstraction of traffic which is already, for all 
substantial purposes, equally well accommodated by some existing railway; and if 
so, it ought to be further considered whether, upon the whole, it is for the Public 
interest that the new Scheme should be discouraged, provided such existing 
Company be willing to tender to the Public favourable engagements, whether by way 
of increase of accommodation, of reduced charge, of accession to the conditions 
under which it has been proposed by the Third Report of this Committee to place all 
new Railways, or otherwise, together with adequate guarantees for the fulfilment of 
such engagements. And, on the other hand, if no such engagements be tendered by 
the existing Company, with whose traffic the projected railway might be likely to 
interfere, then, what particular conditions should be imposed upon the new 
Company, and what guarantees could be taken for the execution of its works, in the 
first instance, and subsequently, for its continuing to work the line, in conformity with 
the terms to which it has acceded.
All these matters would form part of the Report of the Public Department.
................In recommending, therefore, that Railway Bills be submitted to the Board
of Trade previously to their coming under the notice of Parliament, the Committee 
conceives that that Board (or such other public department as may be entrusted with 
the care of railway matters) might advantageously examine these Bills, with regard to 
the following subjects:
1. All questions of public safety.
2. All departures from the ordinary usage of railway legislation, on points where such 
usage has been sufficiently established.
3. All provisions of magnitude which may be novel in their principle, or may involve 
extended considerations of public policy. For example, amalgamations and 
agreements between separate companies; extensions of capital; powers enabling 
the railway Companies to pursue purposes different in kind from those for which they 
were incorporated; modifications of the general law.
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4. Branch and Extension Lines, in cases where upon the first aspect of the plan, a 
presumption is raised that the object of the scheme is to throw difficulties in the way 
of new, and probably legitimate enterprises.
5. New schemes where the Line taken presents a strong appearance of being such 
as to raise the presumption that it does not afford the best mode of communication 
between the termini, and of accommodating the local traffic.
6. Cases where a Bill of inferior merits may be brought before Parliament, and where 
a preferable scheme is in bona fide contemplation, although not sufficiently forward 
to come simultaneously under the judgement of Parliament according to its Standing 
Orders.
7. Any proposed arrangements with subsisting Companies which may appear as 
objectors to new Lines’ (SC, 1844).
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Appendix Two
1845 : Report of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade on the Kentish 
and South Eastern Railway Schemes.
In this report Dalhousie’s board set out the principles by which it was to be guided in 
its consideration of the many railway schemes placed before it;
‘The list of schemes in this district shows that on the one hand a very extensive and 
comprehensive system for the accommodation of the whole Kentish and South 
Eastern district, is proposed by the South Eastern Company, in connexion with their 
existing lines; while, on the other hand, the same or nearly the same objects are 
proposed to be attained by a number of new and independent schemes.
‘This renders it necessary that we should begin by an explicit statement of the 
principles which have guided us, in this and similar cases, in forming an opinion 
whether a preference ought or ought not to be given, and if given, under what 
conditions and to what extent, to lines for completing the accommodation of 
particular districts, which lines are in connexion with existing Railways in those 
districts.
“In this, as in every other case, we have endeavoured to keep steadily in view the 
attainment of the greatest amount of public advantage. We have not recognised the 
existence of anything like a vested right in existing Companies to be protected from 
the same description of competition which they have themselves inflicted on canals 
and other existing modes of communication. Beyond, perhaps, a bare preference, in 
cases of absolute equality, due to the interests of shareholders, who themselves 
constitute a portion of the Public, we have not considered that an existing Railway 
Company could claim any preference over other parties proposing to effect the same 
objects, beyond that which might result from an identification of interest with the 
Public.
“Considering the subject in this point of view, it appears to us that, as a general rule, 
the most important point for the interests of the Public, is to secure the best 
permanent lines of Railway communication for the country at large and for the wants 
of the district. To sanction an inferior or unnecessarily circuitous line proposed by an 
existing Company, or to reject one of decided public and local advantage, proposed
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by a new Company, for the sake of any terms that could be offered by an existing 
Company, would, in our opinion, be, except under peculiar circumstances, unfair 
towards the local interests thus sacrificed, and unwise as regards the general and 
permanent interests of the Public.
“We have, therefore, as a general rule, considered it as an essential preliminary 
requisite, before entering upon the question of giving protection to existing 
Companies by allowing them to complete the Railway communications of particular 
districts, that the lines proposed by them shall be, in all substantial respects, sound 
in themselves, and not inferior to those proposed by other parties.
“Assuming this to be the case, the question is at once raised whether the public are 
likely to derive most benefits from competition, or from arrangements with the 
existing Company.
‘With regard to the general principles which regulate competition in the case of 
Railways, we have little to add to the Reports of the Select Committee on Railways 
of last Session, by whom the subject was fully investigated. The Committee state, in 
their Fifth Report:-
“ With regard to the check of competition by Railways among themselves, the 
Committee cannot in all cases repose implicit faith in it’.
“ When the lines are very short, the probability is that unless charges be moderate, 
road traffic will revive, and in such cases the Public have a great degree of security. 
Again, as respects the carriage of goods, it is found in practice that by other 
channels of conveyance, such as canals, an effective control may, under certain 
circumstances, be placed upon Railway charges. But in considering the case of 
passenger charges, and in all classes of lines, except those which are so short as to 
be effectually checked by the ordinary road, the Committee think that little can be 
permanently expected from the mere multiplication of Railways, in the way of 
security for moderation of charge. There may be, indeed, indirect and accidental 
competition between Railways, which may cause cheapness, and there may even be 
direct and brisk competition, with great reductions of fare, for short periods. But in 
such cases of competition, somewhat modified, as have hitherto occurred, the result 
has generally been increase of charge by mutual arrangement or positive
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amalgamation of the competing Companies. The experience of the past is, however, 
limited, and might not, if taken alone, warrant any conclusive opinion; but in looking 
to the nature of the question itself, the Committee feel this difficulty, that they cannot, 
in case of Railways, anticipate any such facilities in the introduction of new 
competitors as to check the proceedings of the Companies actually in possession of 
the traffic; that in fact there is no district in which the traffic will support any 
considerable number of Railways; that there is no case in which they can imagine a 
likelihood of more than two, or at the very utmost, three lines of Railway 
communication, which could be so situated as to compete with one another, and they 
cannot conceive that two bodies, or even three, acting by compact executive Boards, 
and secure against the entrance of any other party into the field, will fail to combine 
together. It is, therefore, their apprehension, that in such cases, either the different 
Railways will continued to be worked, and then that extreme measures will be taken 
in concert for the purpose of paying very moderate dividends, and it may be found 
that several capitals have been expended for performing the business which could 
have been equally well, or perhaps even better performed by one; or a closer 
combination will take place among the Companies: they will choose the line upon 
which they can most profitably carry the traffic, and will leave the rival line or lines 
unoccupied’.
‘The principle here stated, that competition loses more or less of its value as a 
security for the Public, when from the nature of the case it is limited to two or three 
parties, who are constantly urged by mutual interest to combine, has received 
abundant corroboration from the experience, of what has already taken place in the 
history of Railways.
‘The following instances may be mentioned where Railway Companies, in a 
situation to compete, have, after a short time, either amalgamated or combined 
together, so as to put an end to competition:
‘The Leeds and Selby with the York and North Midland; in this case the 
former line being virtually for several years shut up.
‘The Birmingham and Derby with the Midland Counties.
‘The Chester and Crewe with the Grand Junction.
‘The Manchester and Birmingham with the Grand Junction.
‘The Bolton and Preston with the North Union.
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‘The Northern and Eastern with the Eastern Counties.
“On the other hand, we are not aware of a slight instance which can be pointed out, 
in which the Public are now deriving any benefit from direct competition between two 
railways.
“In addition to the instances of combination between directly competing Companies, 
recent experience has furnished numerous instances of the tendency of smaller 
lines, originally sanctioned as independent undertakings, to resign their 
independence into the hands of powerful neighbours. We may mention, among other 
instances of this tendency, the amalgamation or lease of the Sheffield and 
Manchester to the Midland and Manchester and Birmingham.
“Of the Bristol and Exeter, and Cheltenham and Great Western, with the
Great Western.
“Of the Hull and Selby, and Manchester and Bolton, with the Manchester and
Leeds.
“Of the North Union with the Liverpool and Manchester and Grand Junction.
“Of the Greenwich with the South Eastern.
“Of the Sheffield and Rotherham with the Midland.
“Of the Chester and Birkenhead with the Chester and Holyhead.
“Of the Bristol and Gloucester with the Birmingham and Gloucester.
“Beside others that might be quoted.
‘The same principle has received further elucidation from the inquires of 
Parliamentary Committees on former occasions as well as from the great body of 
evidence collected by the Commissioners of Inquiry into the Sanitary Condition of 
Large Towns, in regard to the operation of the principle of competition as compared 
to that of well-regulated monopoly in the analogous cases of Water and Gas 
Companies. Indeed it is too evident, as a general proposition, to be disputed; 
although great caution may be required in its application and in discriminating those 
cases where the competition is of a pure and simple nature, such as must eventually 
lead to a compromise, from those where a certain degree of indirect and incidental 
competition may exist, from which the Public may expect to derive lasting benefit, 
either in the shape of reduction of charge or of extension of accommodation.
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“When an existing Railway Company proposes schemes which, although only 
partially sufficient for the full accommodation of the district, may yet be sufficient to 
prevent other parties from entering the field with further or improved projects in that 
district, the arguments against the creation of a monopoly acquire additional 
strength. The simpler case is, when, as in the present instance, the existing 
Company comes forward with a complete and comprehensive scheme, and the 
question is reduced to this: whether the existing Company is able and willing to offer 
guarantees for the public advantage superior to any that can be afforded by a new 
Company.
“Of the ability of the old Company to offer such guarantees there can, generally 
speaking, be little doubt.
“Istly. An established Company, which has a valuable property and large available 
income independent of the new scheme can, of course, offer a guarantee for the 
fulfilment of all that it undertakes to accomplish greatly superior to that of any new 
Company, however respectable.
‘This consideration derives great weight from the experience which has been already 
afforded of the failure of many new Companies to accomplish the objects for which 
they were incorporated. We need only refer to the instances of the Eastern Counties 
Company, which was incorporated as a line from London to Norwich, and has never 
yet been carried beyond Colchester; of the Northern and Eastern, which for many 
years stopped short of Cambridge; and of the Great North of England, which 
abandoned the portion of its line between Darlington and Newcastle.
“2dly. The traffic of a system of lines connected with one another, can always be 
worked more economically and conveniently under one uniform-management than 
by independent Companies. The Company which works the main trunk line, and 
possesses the principal terminal stations, can run more frequent trains, and make 
better arrangements for forwarding traffic of the cross lines, than it could afford to do 
if two or three separate establishments had to be maintained, and the harmony of 
arrangements depended on two or three independent authorities. Under such 
circumstances a conflict of feeling and interest has almost inevitably grown up, from 
which the Public has suffered the most serious inconvenience. When the traffic is 
large, this conflict has frequently led not only to increased inconvenience, but to
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increased danger: and where the terminus or a portion of the rails of one Company 
have been common to the other, these results have been greatly aggravated.
“3dly. An established Company can always, if so disposed, offer guarantees and 
advantages for a greater extent of Railway than the new Company, viz., for the 
existing as well as the projected lines. When the existing Company is already in 
possession of the principal trunk of the district, the advantage of securing such 
guarantees for the whole system, rather than for only a small portion of it, is 
rendered more apparent.
‘The Select Committee of last Session, for reasons which are fully stated in their 
report, attach great importance to the obtaining of guarantees from existing 
Companies, by voluntary arrangements similar to those which they recommended, 
and which Parliament subsequently adopted in the case of new Railways, and 
expresses a strong hope, ‘that among the existing Companies there may be those 
which will be disposed to accede to arrangements, resembling, in their general 
principle and effect, those which are now proposed for new Railways’.
“4thly. Whatever guarantees may be thus offered by existing Companies, possess 
the double advantage, as compared with similar offers from new Companies, of 
coming into immediate operation, and of being more certainly rendered effectual. An 
offer from a new Company to bind itself to charge fares considerably lower than 
those usual upon other lines, might readily be made, in the hope of thereby securing 
their Bill; but the fulfilment of it would depend almost entirely upon the eventual 
success of the line, and its ability to perform its engagements. No Act of Parliament 
could compel an insolvent concern to carry at as low rates and afford as ample 
accommodation as a prosperous undertaking might be able to do. A moderate offer 
from an established Company, who can be relied on to fulfil their engagements, is 
therefore preferable to one apparently more advantageous from a new Company.
“For these, among other reasons, we conclude that the policy indicated by the 
Committee of last Session, of giving preference to the schemes of existing railway 
companies for supplying their own districts, when such schemes are as good or 
better than those of any other parties, where no special reasons exist which should 
induce us to look for advantage from competition, and where the old Company 
voluntarily offers such guarantees as may reasonably be required to protect the
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Public against the possible abuses of monopoly, or such conditions as at once place 
the Public in a better position than they could hope to obtain from competition, is that 
from which the greatest amount of permanent public advantage is likely to be 
derived.
“We by no means intend these principles to be considered as rules of universal 
application, being satisfied that no abstract or invariable rule can be safely laid down 
by which to decide cases of such complexity; and varying so greatly in detail; but we 
have thought it desirable to state thus generally the views which have guided us in 
cases like this of the South Eastern district, and upon which the soundness of the 
conclusions at which we have arrived must mainly depend.
HC, 1845, Vol. XXXIX.203, pp1-4.
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Appendix Three
Development of the London Underground network 1863 -1994
Railway company/Route Year
opened
Railway company/Route Yearopened
Metropolitan * Metropolitan District *
Farringdon to Paddington 1863 Kensington High Street to Westminster ‘1868
Paddington to Hammersmith 1864 Gloucester Road to West Brompton 1869
Farringdon to Moorgate 1865 Westminster to Blackfriars 1870
Baker Street to Swiss Cottage 1868 Earls Court to Hammersmith 1874
Paddington to Kensington 1868 Hammersmith to Richmond 1877
Swiss Cottage to Harrow-on-the -Hill 1880 Turnham Green to Ealing Broadway 1879
Harrow-on-the-Hill to Rickmansworth 1887 Acton Town to Hounslow West 1884
Rickmansworth to Verney Junction 1894 Inner Circle Completed 1884
Farringdon/Baker Street to Uxbridge 1905 Putney Bridge to Wimbledon 1889
electrification
Baker Street to Hammersmith 1906 Whitechapel to Upminster 1902
electrification
Rickmansworth to Watford 1925 Ealing Common to South Harrow 1903
Wembley Park to Stanmore 1932 Electrification to Hounslow, Ealing, 
Wimbledon, Richmond and East Ham
1905
Rickmansworth to Amersham/Chesham 1960 Electrification to Barking 1908
electrification
South Harrow to Uxbridge 1910
Waterloo and City Barking to Upminster 1932
Waterloo to Bank 1898
East London Railway * Great Northern and City Railway
Whitechapel to New Cross 1884 Finsbury Park to Moorgate ‘1904 ....
Shoreditch to New Cross electrification 1913
Northern Line Northern Line
(City and South London Railway) (Hampstead Line)
Stockwell to King William Sireet 1890 Charing Cross to Golders Green with 
branch fron Camden Town to Archway 1907
Moorgate to Clapham Common 1900 Charing Cross to Embankment 1914
Moorgate to Angel 1901 Golders Green to Hendon 1923
Angel to Euston 1907 Hendon to Edgware 1924
Euston to Camden Town 1924 Embankment to Kennington 1926
Clapham Common to Morden 1926 Archway to High Barnet 1940
Finchley Central to Mill Hill East 1941Bakerloo Line Central Line
Baker Street to Elelphant and Castle 1906 Shepherd’s Bush to Bank 1900
Baker Street to Marylebone and Edgware 1907 Shepherd’s Bush to Wood Lane 1908
Road
Edgware Road to Paddington 1913 Bank to Liverpool Street 1912
Paddington to Willesden Junction 1915 Wood Lane to Ealing Broadway 1920
Willesden Junction to Watford Junction 1917 Liverpool Street to Stratford 1946
Baker Street to Stanmore 1939 Stratford to Leytonstone 1947
Piccadilly Line North Acton to West Ruislip 1947
Hammersmith to Finsbury Park '1906 Leytonstone to Woodford (direct) 1947Holbom to Aldwych 1907 Leytonstone to Newbury park 1947
Hammersmith to South Harrow 1932 Victoria Line
Finsbury Park to Arnos Grove 1932 Walthamstow to Victoria 1968
Acton Town to Hounslow West 1933 Victoria to Brixton 1971
Arnos Grove to Cockfosters 1933 Jubilee Line
South Harrow to Uxbridge 1933 Baker Street to Charing Cross 1979
Hounslow West to Heathrow 1977 Green Park to Stratford 1999 |
* originally built as steam operated railways
SOURCES: D.F. Croome , A. Jackson, Rails Through the Clay: A History of London’s Tube Railways, Harrow 
Weald, Capital Transport, 1993. J. Glover,, London’s Underground, London, Ian Allan, 1991. A. Jackson, Semi- 
Detached London, Didcot, Wild Swan, 1991.
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Appendix Four
Southern Railway CompanyVBR Southern Region electrification : 1900-1994
Route Year opened 
for electric 
services
London Bridge - Victoria ** 1909
Victoria - Crystal Palace ** 1911
Waterloo - Wimbledon 1915
Waterloo - Kingston - Waterloo Loop 1916
Waterloo - Shepperton 1916
Waterloo - Hounslow Loop 1916
Waterloo - Hampton Court 1916
Victoria/Holborn Viaduct-Orpington via Herne Hill/Shortlands 1925
Victoria/Holborn Viaduct-Catford Loop/Crystal Palace 1925
Waterloo-Guildford/Dorking South 1925
London Bridge/Victoria-Extensions to Coulsdon North/Sutton via 
Selhurst
1925
Charing Cross layout major works 1925
Cannon Street major works (temp, closure) 1926
All AC converted to DC 1929
Hounslow/Feltham-Windsor 1930
Wimbledon-West Croydon 1930
Dartford-Gravesend Central 1930
London-Brighton/Worthing 1933
London-Eastbourne/Hastings via Lewes 1935
Bickley/Orpington-Sevenoaks 1935
Waterloo-Portsmouth via Guildford 1937
Woking-Alton 1937
Staines-Weybridge 1937
London Bridge/Victoria-Portsmouth via Horsham 1937
Three Bridges-Horsham 1938
West Worthing-Ford (Sussex) 1938
Littlehampton-Bognor Regis Branches 1938
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Route Year 
opened for 
electric 
services
Motspur Park-Leatherhead via Chessington 1938
Sevenoaks-Hastings/Bexhill 1939
Strood-Maidstone 1939
Gravesend/Swanley-Gillingham 1939
Aldershot-Guildford 1939
Ascot-Aldershot 1939
Staines-Reading 1939
Gillingham-Ramsgate/Dover (Kent Coast electrification) 1959
Maidstone-Ashford (Kent Coast electrification) 1961
Sevenoaks-Ashford-Folkestone-Dover-Deal-Ramsgate (Kent 
Coast electrification)
1962
Woking-Bournemouth 1967
Ryde-Shanklin 1967
Tonbridge-Hastings 1986
Sanderstead-East Grinstead 1987
Branksome-Weymouth 1988
Portsmouth-Southampton-Eastleigh 1990
* and corporate predecessors** Originally electrified with the AC overhead catenary system, later converted to the Southern Railway third rail system.
Sources:
G.T. Moody, Southern Electric, 1909 -1979, London, Ian Allan, 1979.
Thrower T., 1998, Electrification: dead in its tracks?, Rail, 334, pp 22-27.
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Appendix Five
British railways electrification
Appendix Five A : surburban electrification outside the Southern Railway/BR 
Southern Region: 1900-1994
Route* Date of opening of electric 
services
Seaforth-Dingle (Liverpool Overhead Railway) 1893
Liverpool-Birkenhead (Mersey Railway) 1903
Liverpool-Southport 1904
Newcastle-T ynemouth 1904
Manchester-Bury 1916
Richmond-Broad Street (North London Railway) 1916
Bury - Holcombe Brook (closed 1951) 1918
Euston/Broad Street-Watford 1922
Lancaster-Morecambe/Heysham (experimental system)
Manchester-Altrincham 1931
Birkenhead-West Kirby/New Brighton 1938
Liverpool Street-Shenfield 1949
Manchester London Rd - Glossop/Hadfield 1954
Shenfield-Southend 1956
Liverpool Street -Hertford East/Chingford/Enfield 1960
Town/Cheshunt
Glasgow Queen Street- Helensburgh/Balloch/Milngavie 1960
Glasgow Queen Street- Bridgeton/Airdrie 1960
Fenchurch Street-Southend 1961
Glasgow Central-Cathcart/Paisley 1962
South Tyneside de-electrifed 1963
Paisley-Gourock/Wemyss Bay 1967
North Tyneside de-electrified 1967
Lea Valley-Cheshunt 1969
Kings Cross/Moorgate-Welwyn/Hertford North 1976
Hertford/Welwyn-Hitchin/Royston 1977
Liverpool-Kirkby 1977
Liverpool-Garston 1977
Rutherglen-Central-Partick (Glasgow Argyle Line) 1979
Liverpool Street -Gidea Park 1980
Stockport - Hazel Grove 1981
St Pancras-Bedford 1982
Garston-Hunts Cross (Liverpool) 1983
Wickford-Southminster 1986
Ayrshire to Ardrossan/Largs 1987
Thameslink 1990
Hooton-Chester/Ellesmere Port 1993
Leeds-Bradford/Skipton/llkley 1995
Paddington-Heathrow 1998
* all routes electrified before 1950, except the Lancaster-Morecambe/Heysham scheme used
DC current: most were subsequently converted to AC
Sources: Creer, 1986, Glover, 1985,1987; Heaps, 1988; Thrower 1998.
295
Appendix Five B : main line electrification outside the Southern Railway/BR Southern 
Region: 1900-1994
Route* Date of opening of electric 
services
Wath/Sheffield-Manchester (DC system) 1952
Shenfield- Colchester- Clacton/Walton 1959
Crewe-Manchester (WCML) 1960Crewe-Liverpool (WCML) 1962
Euston-Crewe WCML -Trent Valley) 1966Rugby-Birmingham (WCML) 1967
Crewe - Glasgow (WCML) 1973Wath/Sheffield-Manchester - closed 1981Great Eastern to Cambridge 1987Ipswich-Norwich 1987
King’s Cross-Leeds (ECML) 1988King’s Cross-York-Newcastle-Edinburgh/Glasgow *(ECML) 1991Cambridge-Kings Lynn 1991
* via Carstairs to Glasgow Central
Source: Sources: Creer, 1986, Glover, 1985,1987; Heaps, 1988; Thrower 1998.
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Appendix Six
The Control of Land Use: Cmd. 6537, Presented to Parliament by the Minister 
of Town and Country Planning and the Secretary of State for Scotland, 1944
Introduction.
1. Provision for the right use of land, in accordance with a considered policy, is an 
essential requirement of the Government’s programme of post-war reconstruction. 
New houses, whether of permanent or emergency construction; the new lay-out of 
areas devastated by enemy action or blighted by reason of age or bad living 
conditions; the new schools which will be required under the Education Bill now 
before Parliament and under the Scottish Education Bill which it is hoped to 
introduce later this Session; the balanced distribution of industry which the 
Government’s recently published proposals for maintaining active employment 
envisage; the requirements of sound nutrition and of a healthy and well-balanced 
agriculture; the preservation of land for national parks and forests, and the 
assurance to people of enjoyment of the sea and countryside in times of leisure; a 
new and safer highway system better adapted to modern industrial and other needs; 
the proper provision of air-fields -  all these related parts of a single reconstruction 
programme involve the use of land, and it is essential that their various claims on 
land should be so harmonised as to ensure for the people of this country the 
greatest possible measure of individual well-being and national prosperity.
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Appendix Seven
Barman: New standards for station design 1947
a. Free and comfortable circulation planned as a result of scientific study of 
passenger movement; circulation unencumbered by luggage trolleys for which 
separate means of access will be planned.
b. The various station and platform buildings grouped into compact and continuous 
blocks.
c. Clearly distinguishable signs, illuminated where necessary, to guide and inform 
passengers at all points between their entering and leaving.
d. Escalators to and from different levels, wherever the traffic is sufficient to justify 
their operation.
e. Island platforms to allow direct interchange from one train to another, without 
climbing stairs.
f. Full-length platforms to avoid double stopping, protected from the weather for most 
of their length, and fitted with windscreens to protect passengers from cold winds 
and draughts.
g. Plentiful lighting in hours of darkness in all parts where passengers may tread.
h. At very large stations, interesting and well-stocked shops in which last-minute 
shopping will become a pleasant experience.
I. Shops, kiosks, automatic machines and advertisements arranged in compliance 
with a general station design and rigorously controlled so that order and dignity may 
never be lacking.
j. Light, airy waiting rooms, well heated, well ventilated, welcoming in appearance, 
decorated in light, cheerful colours.
k. Tea and coffee served in the waiting room, or in refreshment rooms next door.
I. Bright, welcoming refreshment rooms and restaurants, with soft, intimate lighting, 
scrupulously clean underfoot, without advertisements, lined where necessary with 
absorbent materials that will reduce noise and clatter.
m. The windows of waiting rooms, refreshment rooms, buffets and restaurants 
arranged so as to give a full view of platforms and trains.
n. Lavatories lined with delicately coloured tiles and kept spotlessly clean at all hours 
of the day and night.
Source: Barman, 1947, 64.
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Appendix Eight
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, Report on British Railways, 1960, 
p xciii)
‘What size and shape should British Railways be? The first consideration must be 
financial; the size and shape must be such as can enable the Commission to carry 
out their statutory task of balancing their accounts, taking one year with another. But 
if the Commission are to know which of their services are justifiable on grounds of 
direct financial return, they must first have some form of accounts by which the 
profitability of Regions and services can be judged.
However, the consideration of direct profitability is not the only one which applies in 
this case. Because of the cost of the roads, and of the congestion on them, the 
national interest may require railway services which do not in fact directly pay for 
themselves, but which may cost the nation less than the alternatives.
In some cases, there may be a third and different consideration - one of social need. 
A service may be justified on other than economic grounds, because for example the 
less populous parts of Britain might otherwise be left without a railway service. 
Account may, in other words, need to be taken of social considerations.
The consideration of profitability, mentioned above, should be left to the 
Commission. But if decisions are to be taken on grounds of the national economy or 
of social needs, then they must be taken by the Minister, and submitted by him for 
the approval of Parliament.
Furthermore, if Parliament is to specify that certain services should be undertaken, 
despite the fact that the Commission cannot profitably undertake them, then the 
additional cost of them should be provided, in advance, out of public funds.
If subsidies of this kind are to be paid to the Commission, then they should be paid 
for specific purposes, and they should be paid openly. They should not be disguised 
as, for instance, a payment of the track costs (which are an integral part of railway 
operations), nor as the writing-off of the burden of interest; and they should not be 
hidden away in the Commission’s accounts.
299
The need for clarity in the accounts is important. Your Committee have suggested, 
at various points in this Report, that payments should be made to the Commission of 
appropriate sums from public funds. Provided that these payments relate to specific 
services dictated by the Minister, or are compensation for specific losses incurred by 
his actions, the Commission would be able to publish accounts for British Railways 
which would reflect only the matters within their control.
If this were done, there would be one important consequential advantage that both 
the Commission and the Minister would become much more clearly accountable to 
Parliament for their separate railway responsibilities.’
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Appendix Nine
The Railway Network: 1838 -1994
Length of British Rail Route British Railways British Railways London
length of route 
(kilometres)
open to 
passenger 
traffic 
(kilometres)
passenger
journeys
(million)
passenger
kilometres
(billion)
goods lifted 
(million 
tonnes)
goods
moved
(billion
tonne
kilometres)
no. of 
stations
passenge
journeys
(million)
1838
1848 3582
1858
1868 13,565 322 169
1878 15,563 596 236
1888 17,281 796 304
1898 29,783 1114 427
1908 30,000 1265 522
1918 32,420 2,064
1928 32,565 1,250
1938 32,081 1,237 30.6 270 16 49
1948 31,593 1,024 37.0 277 \ 72
1958 30,333 23,621 1,090 35.6 247 30 ; 4300* 69
1968 20,080 15,242 831 28.7 211 23 65
1978 17,901 14,396 724 30.0 171 20 2356 56
1988 16,599 14,309 764 34.3 150 18 2418 81
1994 16,528 14,317 745 31.7 122 15 2493 72
Sources: DoT, Transport Statistics 1993/94 * as quoted in Beeching 1963
Data for 1838-1898 rounded from various secondary sources based on Railway Returns
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Appendix Ten
New towns and the railway network: 1945-94
Conurbation/new towns date of target revised target distance from
designation population population conurbation centre
1000s 1000s miles
Greater London
—
Stevenage 1946 60 80 30
Crawley 1947 50 85 30
Hemel Hempstead 1947 80 85 25
Harlow 1947 60 80 25
Hatfield 1948 29 29 20
Welwyn Garden City 1948 36 50 22
Basildon 1949 50 130 25
Bracknell 1949 25 60 28
Milton Keynes 1967 250 200 45 y
Peterborough 1967 190 150 72
Northampton 1968 300 180 66
Birmingham —Telford 1963 90 150 30
Redditch 1964 90 84 14
Merseyside
Skelmersdale 1961 80 61 13
Runcorn 1964 100 95 14
Greater Manchester
Warrington 1968 200 170 18 ,
Central Lancashire 1970 430 285 30
Tyneside
Washington 1964 80 80 6
Glasgow
East Kilbride 1947 100 90 9
Cumbernauld 1955 50 70 15
Livingston 1962 100 90 29
Development Areas
Newton Aycliffe 1947 10 45 n/a y
Peterlee 1948 30 30 n/a
Glenrothes 1948 95 70
Cwmbran 1949 55 55 n/a
Irvine 1966 90 85 25
Newtown 1967 11 13 n/a
Other
Corby 1950 40 70 80
Sources: Schaffer (1970), Dupree (1987), Hurst (1992), British Transport Commission (1956b), RDS (1998).
—
Page 302
Appendix Eleven
Town expansion and the railway network: 1951-94
Greater London Population1961
Distance from conurbation centre
Station at designation Station in 1994
miles (date of closure/opening)
Andover B 16,985 66 yes yes
Ashford UD 27,996 54 yes yes
Aylesbury B 27,923 40 yes yes
Banbury B 21,004 72 yes - two yes - one
Basingstoke B 25,980 47 yes yes
Bletchley UD 17,095 47 yes yes
Bodmin B 6,214 234
yes, General, North & 
Bodmin Road yes, one Bodmin Road( Parkway)(196'i
Braintree and Booking UD 20,600 43 yes no
Burnley CB 80,559 205 yes - three yes, two - Manchester Road reopened 
1986
Bury St Edmunds B 21,179 75 yes yes
Canvey Island UD 15,605 38 yes (Benfleet) yes
Frimley and Camberley UD 28,552 30 yes yes
Gainsborough UD 17,278 148 yes yes
Grantham B 25,048 110 yes yes
Haverhill UD 5,445 56 yes no (1962)
Huntingdon and Godmanchester B 8,821 62 yes, one at each yes (not Godmanchester)
Kings Lynn B 27,536 98 yes yes
Letch worth UD 25,511 37 yes yes
Luton CB 131,583 32 yes yes
Luton RD 36,462 32
Melford RD 13,317 60
Mildenhall RD 20,458 71 yes no (1962)
Peterborough B 62,340 81 yes yes
Plymouth CB 204,409 211 yes yes
St Neots UD 5,554 57 yes yes
Sandy UD 3,963 49 yes yes
Sudbury B 6,642 58 yes yes
Swindon B 91,739 79 yes yes
Thetford B 35,399 82 yes yes
Wellingborough UD 30,583 68 yes yes
Witham UD 9,459 40 yes yes
Sources: BTC, 1956; Hall, 1973; Daniels & Dench, 1980; Hurst, 1992; British Rail National Timetable 1994; Jowett, 2000.
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English provincial cities
Population
1961 Distance from 
conurbation 
centre
Station at 
designation
Station in 1994
miles (date of closure/opening)
Birmingham
Aldridge-Brownhills 77,440 13 Yes - two No (1962)
Banbury B 21,004 41
Yes one (one 
closure 1951) Yes
Cannock UD 42,191 17 Yes Yes - re-opened 1989
Daventry B 5,860 37 Yes No (1958)
Droitwich B 7,976 20 Yes Yes
Leek UD 19,182 50 Yes No (1956)
Lichfield B 14,087 16 Yes - two Yes - two
Lichfield RD 39,935 16
Rugeley UD 13,017 25 Yes - two Yes - two
Stafford B 47,806 27 Yes Yes
Stafford RD 17,930 27
Tamworth B 13,646 15 Yes - two Yes - two
Tutbury RD 17,597 33 Yes Yes
Uttoxeter UD 8,185 34 Yes Yes
Weston-super-Mare B 43,938 108 Yes Yes
Walsall
Aldridge UD ) 77,440 4 Yes No (1962)
Brownhills UD) 6 Yes No (1962)
Wolverhampton
Cannock RD 42,191 8 Yes(1965) Re-opened 1989
Selsdon RD 36,981 5 ? 9
Tettenhall UD 14,867 3 No No
Wednesfield UD 33,048 3 No No
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English provincial cities (cont)
Population
1961
Distance
from
conurbation
centre
Station at 
designation
Station in 1994
miles (date of closure/opening)
Liverpool
Burnley CB 80,559 51 Yes - three Yes - see below
Ellesmere Port B 44,681 10 Yes Yes
Widnes B 52,186 13 Yes Yes
Winsford UD 12,760 33 Yes Yes
Manchester
Burnley CB 80,559 24 Yes - three Yes - two - 
Manchester Road 
re-opened 1986
Crewe B 53,195 34 Yes Yes
Macclesfield B 37,644 18 Yes Yes
Winsford UD 12,760 28 Yes Yes
Salford
rorsley UD 40,393 Yes No
Bristol
eynsham 15,152 Yes Yes
odbury RD 44,884 12 Yes No
lornbury RD 30,679 13 Yes No
'armley RD 19,406 Yes No
ewcastle
eaton Valley UD | 26,095
Cramlington) Yes Yes
ongbenton UD 
Killingworth)
46,530 Yes (1978) 
Yes (1958)
Metro (1980) 
No
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Scotland
Date of 
agreement
Station at 
designation
Station in
1994
(date of closure/opening)
Glasgow
Alloa 1959 Yes No (1968)
Alva 1963 No (1954) No
Arbroath 1959 Yes Yes
Barrhead 1963 Yes Yes
Bathgate 1963 No (1956) Yes (1986)
Bonnyrigg & 
Lasswade 1961 Yes No (1962)
Denny & Dunipace 1960 No No
Dumbarton 1963 Yes (two) Yes(two)
Dumfries 1962 Yes Yes
Dunbar 1961 Yes Yes
Dumbarton County 1964
Forfar 1959 Yes No (1967)
Fort William 1962 Yes Yes
Galashiels 1960 Yes No (1969-bus)
Galston 1961 Yes No (1964)
Girvan 1959 Yes Yes
Grangemouth 1958 Yes No (1968)
Haddington 1958 No (1949) No
Hamilton 1958 Yes(three) Yes(three)
Hawick 1963 Yes No(1969-bus)
Invergordon 1961 Yes Yes
Inverkeithling 1962 Yes Yes
Inverness County 1963 Yes Yes
Irvine 1959 Yes Yes
Jedburgh 1962 No (1948) No
Johnstone 1965 Yes Yes
Kelso 1963 Yes No (1964)
Kilsyth 1967 No (1951) No
Kirkintilloch 1961 Yes No
Maybole 1967 Yes Yes
Midlothian 1961
Newmilns & 
reenholm 1963 Yes No (1964)
eebles 1961 No (1950) No(bus)
eebles County 1965
enfrew County 1967
el kirk 1962 No (1951) No(bus)
tevenston 1961 Yes Yes
tewarton 1960 Yes Yes
utherland County 1960
est Lothian 1960
hitburn (Durham) 
ick
1960
1961
No (1953) 
Yes
No
Yes
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Appendix Twelve
The role of rail in a national project: the third London airport.
Rail planning played an important role in the debate around the choice of a site for 
London’s third airport: this had begun almost as soon as the decision had been 
made in 1954 to locate the second airport at Gatwick, and eventually a Royal 
Commission was appointed in 1968 to explore four options and recommend a 
preferred site. It was taken for granted that rail access would be provided to the 
airport and table 21 shows that, although the distance from London of the options 
ranged from 35 to 58 miles, the difference in travelling time between the longest and 
shortest journeys was only 14 minutes: King’s Cross was to be the London terminal 
in all cases. The Roskill Commission came down in favour of Cublington but 
Buchanan, in his Note of Dissent, favoured Foulness. This was because he could not 
countenance intrusive airport development in what he called, using Abercrombie’s 
term, ‘London’s open background’ (Roskill, 1971, 150). Although Foulness was 8 
miles further away from London than Cublington, the estimated travelling time was 
only 5 minutes longer because it was expected that a new railway would be built to it 
(Roskill, 1971, fig. 10.9): this was the most expansive rail project to be countenanced 
since the war and was indicative of the new mood.
Table 21: Rail access to the Third London Airport
Cublington Foulness Nuthampstead Thurleigh
High*
time
value
Low
time
value
High
time
value
Low
time
value
High
time
value
Low
time
value
High
time
value
Low
time
value
Distance
from
London
(miles)
48 56 35 58
Travel 
time form 
London 
(mins)
39 44 32 46
% surface 
access by 
rail
53 51 55 50 56 54 58 56
* Different assumptions were made as to the value of the time spent travelling by various
groups of passengers
Source: Roskill, 1971, appendix 19.
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SAG No. Date Reg Location site area (a) site area (ha) current use(a)
transport retail reside
46 1974 Liverpool Road Goods Station 10.4 4.2
48 1979 Crumpsall Sidings 5.5 2.2
49 1978 Levenshulme South Goods depot 2.96 1.2
164 1977 Glencastle Rd, Gorton South 2.9 1.2
168 1977 rear 41 Grange Ave, Levenshulme 1.65 0.75
200 1977 Tank Yard Sidings, Collyhurst 7.49 3.03
202 1978 Fallowfield Goods Dep, Withington 4.5 1.82
203 1978 Ceylon St, Newton Heath 3.6 1.45
207 1977 Ancoats Goods Station 10.89 4.38
209 1977 Chapeltown St, C Centre 1.34 0.54
210 1978 Mauldeth Rd Sidings, Bumage 4.44 1.80 4.44
211 1977 Ardwick Goods Depot, Ashton O Rd -12.16 -4.92
212 Cornwall St, Gorton 1.72 0.7
213 Gorton Lane/Preston St 12.0 4.8
215 1977 Choriton Goods yard 4.15 1.68 1.6
217 1980 Oldham Rd Goods Depot, Roch Rd/Old Rd. 21.72 8.78
221 1977 Ducie St/Jutland Street, C Centre 7.10 2.87
229 1975 Oldham Rd (Pitt Street), 4.5 1.8
267 1976 Grimshaw Lane, Newton Heath 5.34 2.16
314 1979 Northenden Station 1.95 0.78
328 Slade Lane Triangle 1.7 0.6
329 Slade Hall, Levenshulme 0.08 0.02 0.08
330 1978 Adj. Belle Vue Station 8.0 3.22
331 Land off Alex. Rd South, Fallowfield 4.01 1.62
332 Cornwall St/Ogden Lane, Bradford 1.8 0.73
333 1977 Ancoats Branch Line, off Ashton O Rd . 3.2 1.3
334 East Didsbury Goods depot 6.0 2.45
335 off Pottery Lane,Ashton ORd, N of Ashb St 1.07 0.2
336 Ashbury’s Sidings, Bradford 17.5 7.2 8
337 1977 Moston Exchange Sidings, off Fairway 18.0 7.3
339 1978 Lightbowne Sidings 10.8 4.34
340 1978 Choriton to Didsbury Rlwy Line 22.5 9.10 22.5
341 Queens Road Sidings 11.12 4.52 11.0
342 1977 Longsight Coal and Mineral Yard 14.8 6.0
343 Ardwick West Goods Depot 42 17
.344 1980 Brewery Sidings, Harpurhey 12.0 4.85
345 1980 Phillips Park Sidings, Newton Heath 10.4 4.04
347 1980 Collyhurst Station, Miles Platting 14.0 5.65
352 1978 Dalton Street Sidings, Coll. Church 2.0 0.81
354 1977 Red Bank Sidings, Coll Church 17.2 7.0
355 1980 Victoria Station 18.31 7.41
359 Shady lane, Baguley 0.75 0.35
457 1977 West Didsbury Station 1.42 0.57 1.42
507 1978 Levenshulme North Goods Yard 2.55 1.03 2.55
508 1976 Broom Avenue, Levenshulme 6.9 2.8
741 1977 Ardwick East Goods depot, Ashton Old Rd 18.5 7.48
911 1975 Adj Gorton Station, Brightman St, Gorton 1.50 0.61
933 1977 Tan Yard Brow, Gorton 2.33 0.94
934 1977 Hyde Rd Goods Yard, Gorton 10.00 4.04
992 Cheetham Hill carriage sidings 4.28 1.73 4.28
Total 398.87 161.5 45.78 10.09
100% 11.50% 2.50% 1
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